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The United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961 is presumed to be a 
testament to the progressive teleology of post-war liberal international law. In 
establishing the prohibition of the illegitimate trade of drugs as a global norm, this 
treaty serves as the legal grounding for what is popularly referred to as the War on 
Drugs. International drug prohibition offers a potent exemple of the humanitarian 
discourse taken to anchor the international legal order in the second half of the 
twentieth century. In practice, the failure of realising ‘A Drug Free World’ has been 
outright; international law’s declaration of a War on Drugs has produced little more 
than the same mass of casualties that all wars tend to produce. In an attempt to 
enforce the unenforceable, the drug war has visited social death (through mass 
imprisonment) and material death (through violent state enforcement) onto untold 
millions. Moreover, empirical studies reveal a sharp racial and geographical 
asymmetry in the violence that emerged through drug prohibition 
In this thesis, I will theoretically unpack the apparent contradiction between 
the humanitarian rhetoric of the international laws governing drug prohibition and the 
racialised violence of the War on Drugs in practice. Rejecting the orthodoxies that 
seek to decouple the violence of the war from the law itself, I read the drug war as a 
telling instantiation of a violence that is not only consistent with but also productive 
of the liberal international legal order. Through unpacking the discursive association 
that has been produced between drugs and racial others posited as the negation of 
idealised ‘human’ underlying liberal international law’s humanitarianism, this thesis 
will employ a critical study of the War on Drugs in order demonstrate how the 
operative coherence of twentieth-century liberal international law remained indebted 
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The Sacrificial International: 




Let us begin with the catastrophe.1  
The international legal project of drug prohibition offers a significant 
theoretical challenge to legal scholars. How can the violence produced through the 
law by the War on Drugs be reconciled with international law’s stated commitment to 
end the ‘scourge of war’?2 Before engaging with the theories of violence, empire, 
sacrifice and communality that will animate my response to this problematic, I must 
first mine through the piling of wreckage upon wreckage that initially provoked my 
interest in the workings of drug prohibition in international law. As the preamble from 
the United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, makes clear, the 
prohibition of trading narcotic drugs aims to ‘prevent […] social and economic 
danger for mankind.’3 However, even a brief review of the empirical data collected by 
the institutions that monitor the drug war presents a problem that exceeds social 
scientific measurement and demands some form of theoretical explanation. Despite 
international law aligning the project of drug prohibition and its protection of 
mankind alongside a wider post-war commitment to humanitarianism and facilitating 
a universal peace, the War on Drugs has produced little more than the same mass of 
casualties that all wars tend to produce.4 The drug war has visited catastrophe upon 
untold millions; it has been the cause of social death (through mass imprisonment) 
and material death (through violent state enforcement) throughout the globe. For 
instance, the United States of America has been shown to domestically imprison more 
                                                
1 This metaphor is taken from Walter Benjamin, ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History’, in 
Illuminations, trans. by Harry Zohn, ed. by Hannah Arendt (London: Penguin, 1969), pp.253-265. 
2 The Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations states its aim as ‘to save succeeding generations 
from the scourge of war’. The Charter of the United Nations (San Francisco: 1945) 
<http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/preamble/index.html> [accessed 3 August 2017]. 
3 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNDOC), preamble to the United Nations Single 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs 1961 (United Nations, 1961), 
<https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/single-convention.html> [accessed 2 October 2015]. 
4 The ‘War on Drugs’ will be capitalised throughout this thesis as this grammatical decisions aligns 
with the wider aim of the thesis to emphasise the violence produced through drug prohibition as being 
on par with traditional military conflict. 
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than half of all federal prisoners because of drug offences.5 Internationally, the U.S.A 
has driven the construction of a global security apparatus through being the de facto 
enforcer of drug laws; a role that escalated to the point of openly engaging in targeted 
assassinations of suspected drug-traffickers.6 While much of the focus of this thesis 
will be on the U.S.A and its operation of drug prohibition both domestically and 
internationally, the failings of the drug war are apparent when examining a plethora of 
localities. In Rio de Janeiro, where the whole objective of law enforcement has been 
‘a war against gangs and drug traffickers,’ on-duty police officers are estimated to kill 
at a rate of three people every day.7 Shifting to Colombia, we can see how in the War 
on Drugs, violence is not only confined to law enforcement but quickly escapes from 
the boundaries of the law and threatens to engulf society at large. At the height of the 
Colombian drug wars, the annual murder rate was one per 1000 of the population.8 
On top of the deaths, there were also 300,000 Colombians driven from their homes.9 
This story of death and displacement is repeated across the Americas, where peoples, 
particularly indigenous communities, routinely lose their livelihood through the crop 
eradication and land seizure programmes invoked to enforce the drug laws.10 In 
Mexico, murders between 2006 and 2012 totalled 60,000, a number widely accredited 
to an escalation of the drug war.11 The scale of the violence is better appreciated when 
compared with the 14,728 civilian deaths in Afghanistan over the same period, a 
                                                
5 Heather C. West and William J. Sabol, Prisoners in 2007, NCJ 224280. Bureau of Justice Statistics 
Bulletin (2008). See appendix, table 12: ‘Number of sentenced prisoners in federal prison by most 
serious offense’, 2000, 2006, and 2007.	  
6 See Patrick Gallahue, ‘Targeted Killing of Drug Lords: Traffickers as Members of Armed Opposition 
Groups and/or Direct Participants in Hostilities’, International Journal on Human Rights and Drug 
Policy, 1 (2010), 15-33. 
7 Philip Alston, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions – 
Mission to Brazil’, Human Rights Council, Eleventh Session, A/HRC/11/2 (2008), p.13. 
8 Steven Levitt and Mauricio Rubio, ‘Understanding crime in Colombia and what can be done about it’, 
Institutional Reforms: The Case of Colombia (Boston: MIT Press, 2005), p.132. 
9 Noam Chomsky, Rogue States: The Rule of Force in World Events (London: Pluto Press, 2000) p.64. 
10 Damon Barrett, Reflections on Human Rights and International Drug Control, (London: LSE 
IDEAS, 2013). <http://www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/pdf/SR014/Barrett_Damon.pdf> 
[accessed 3 August 2017]. 
11 See Human Rights Watch Report: ‘Mexico’s Disappeared: The Enduring Cost of a Crisis Ignored’, 
Human Rights Watch (February 20, 2013), <https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/02/20/mexicos-
disappeared/enduring-cost-crisis-ignored> [accessed 7 September 2015]; or Nick Miroff and William 
Booth, ‘Mexico’s Drug War at a Stalemate as Calderon’s Presidency Ends’, Washington Post 
(November 27 2012) <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/calderon-finishes-his-six-
year-drug-war-at-stalemate/2012/11/26/82c90a94-31eb-11e2-92f0-496af208bf23_story.html> 
[accessed 5 October 2015]. 
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nation officially at war.12 To continue to tally the drug war’s piling of wreckage upon 
wreckage could exhaust the word count of this thesis, but it aids my argument to 
detail at the outset what has been the ultimate result that the prohibition of drugs has 
had upon the real bodies of peoples. 
Such a catastrophe should at least offer some qualification by pointing to the 
achievement of a stated purpose, yet this claim also remains beyond the drug war. 
Through a universal prohibition of the drugs trade, international law explicitly stated 
that it aimed to bring about ‘A Drug-Free World.’13 This ambition emphasises the 
belief in the omnipotence of the law. International drug prohibition held that it was 
within the power of the law to make the natural world conform to its word. The 
underlying belief of prohibition is that it is possible for the law to universally reduce 
and finally abolish the illegitimate production and use of substances drawn from 
naturally occurring plants such as cocaine, opium and cannabis.14 Furthermore, the 
prohibition of drugs was posited as a humanitarian endeavour through the claim that 
the reduction of the use of these plants would ‘ensure the health and welfare of 
humankind.’15 The idea was that the law would, through its force, suffocate the 
supply of drugs, while, concurrently, the authority of the law would inspire a 
reduction in the demand, by deeming these substances to be transgressive and against 
the accepted norms of society. In practice, the defeat of this plan has been outright. 
Even the institutions of international law invested in proclaiming prohibition to have 
been a success, such as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 
have recognised the durability of the drugs, estimating that between 162 million and 
                                                
12 Statistics from ‘The United Nations Mission in Afghanistan Review, 2012’, Guardian, April 2013. 
<http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2010/aug/10/afghanistan-civilian-casualties-statistics> 
[accessed 6 October 2015].  
13 This is made explicit upon a review of the history of the United Nations engagement with the 
prohibition of drugs. The most prominent example is offered by the 1998 United Nations General 
Assembly Special Session on Drugs, which was held under the slogan: “A Drug Free World – We Can 
Do It”. 
14 This overarching ambition of the international drug control system is clearly stated in the 
Transitional Reservations of Article 49 in The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961. See Article 
49, 2 (g): ‘The production and manufacture of and trade in the drugs referred to in paragraph 1 for any 
of the uses mentioned therein must be reduced and finally abolished simultaneously with the reduction 
and abolition of such uses’. This ambition was further reaffirmed in the ‘UNODC Political Declaration 
and Plan of Action on International Cooperation towards an Integrated and Balanced Strategy to 
Counter the World Drug Problem 2009’. See paragraph 2: ‘[We] Reaffirm also that the ultimate goal of 
both demand and supply reduction strategies and sustainable development strategies is to minimize and 
eventually eliminate the availability and use of illicit drugs and psychotropic substances in order to 
ensure the health and welfare of humankind.’ 
15 Ibid., 
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324 million people used illicit drugs recreationally in 2012.16 Following prohibition, 
the continuing prevalence of drug use has led to the trade in illegal drugs emerging as 
amongst the most lucrative of all global criminal industries, accounting for one fifth 
of global criminal proceeds by the UN’s own admission (rising to half if tax evasion 
is discounted).17 This is all despite over $100 billion per annum being spent globally 
on enforcing the War on Drugs.18 All of the successful drug seizures or arrests of 
traffickers have, in practice, been of only a trivial significance, yet they are presented 
by officers of the law, policemen, presidents and UN officials, as markers of victory 
in the never-ending war that the international community is engaged in.19 It is a war 
with no point of conclusion, with the enacting of the war being the result in itself. The 
ostensible futility of these laws, combined with the empirical devastation of life that 
has resulted in their wake, demands further theoretical investigation. This theoretical 
investigation is the task that I am undertaking with this thesis. I argue that the urgency 
of such an investigation is revealed by the absence, by both practioners and 
academics, of viewing stated empirical failings of the drug war as revealing any wider 
problem of law. 
Firstly, there are those who, despite the figures offered above, do not 
recognise the War on Drugs as a catastrophe. They look upon the history of drug 
prohibition and the people who have suffered it as, at best, unfortunate victims in the 
necessary march of progress. For the generals of this drug war, who continue to 
‘dream of a world free of drugs’, despite the aforementioned failure of international 
drug laws to reduce recreational use of prohibited substances, they still claim that ‘the 
conventions’ success […] is undeniable.’ 20  Any negative consequences of the 
attempts to enforce prohibition are seen to reinforce the dangers of the drugs and 
therefore the need for prohibition, rather than as evidence of any failure of law. Their 
                                                
16 ‘World Drug Report 2014’, UNODC (New York: United Nations, 2014), p.1. 
<https://www.unodc.org/documents/wdr2014/World_Drug_Report_2014_web.pdf> [accessed 3 
August 2017]. 
17 ‘Estimating Illicit Financial Flows Resulting from Drug Trafficking and Other Transnational 
Organized Crimes: Research Report’, UNODC (October, 2011), p.20 
<https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/Illicit_financial_flows_2011_web.pdf>  
[accessed 3 August 2017]. 
18 Steve Rolles, George Murkin, Martin Powell, Danny Kushlick, Jane Slater, The Alternative World 
Drug Report, Counting The Costs Of The War on Drugs: Executive Summary (Count the Costs, 2012) 
19 Desmond Manderson, ‘Possessed: Drug Policy, Witchcraft and Belief’, Cultural Studies 19 (2005) 
36-63, p.51. 
20 Antonio Marie Costa (Head of the UNDOC), ‘Legalise Drugs and a Worldwide Epidemic of 
Addiction Will Follow’, Guardian, 5 September 2010 
<http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/sep/05/legalisation-drugs-antonio-maria-costa> 
[accessed on 9 August 2015]. 
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response to the evident failures of the drug war has been to call for more law: more 
enforcement programmes, more institutions, greater surveillance powers, stronger 
punishments for those who defy the law.21 Outside of their consideration is potential 
of the law actually being implicated in ills of the drug war. However, not only do 
prohibitionists remain invested in the infallibility of law, the dissociation of the 
catastrophe from the actual law itself is also echoed by some critics of universal 
prohibition, who read the drug war as an ‘approach [that] might be tempting in theory 
but in practice is murderous and self-defeating.’ 22  This understanding portrays 
prohibition as a benevolent project, albeit one that, due to unforeseen complications, 
has created worse harms than those it initially aimed to address. Theoretically, while 
it recognises a problem, it reinforces the idea that problem is not one of law- the 
failure is with the external reality of politics and economics that make the noble 
intentions of the law impossible.  
My thesis rejects both perspectives on the War on Drugs; I read international 
drug prohibition over the twentieth century as neither an essential humanitarian 
endeavour, requiring only further commitment to the determinations of the law in 
order to succeed, nor a misguided application of a benevolent legal project. I will 
instead focus on the ways in which the violence detailed above is actually inscribed 
into and produced through the law. Furthermore, I seek to illuminate the function that 
such violence serves in constituting and sustaining the international legal order. The 
drug war must be reinterpreted: no longer held as a necessary undertaking or as an 
unfortunate misstep in international law’s teleological march to universal peace but 
instead read as an instantiation of a recurrent struggle that gives the modern 
international legal order its very form. In short, my thesis will argue that the apparent 
contradiction between the violence of the War on Drugs and the humanitarian rhetoric 
through which the law speaks prohibition into being, reflective of a wider 
humanitarianism of post-colonial liberal international law, no longer appears 
contradictory upon reading the violence as operating as ‘sacrificial.’ Through the 
concept of a ‘sacrificial’ international law, I propose a reading of legal violence that 
stresses a function as law-making/law-preserving, which in the international arena 
                                                
21 See Robert M. Kimmitt, ‘International Law in the War on Narcotics’ published in Proceedings of the 
Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law (ASIL), 84 (1990), pp. 302-307. Kimmitt 
calls for greater international cooperation and greater legal force in pursuit of realising the goal of 
universal prohibition.  
22 Philip Alston, Report of the Special Rapporteur, p.13. 
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aims at the taming of global rivalry through the facilitation of global community. As 
the community in this instance acclaims universality, the ‘sacrificial’ violence can 
only be served against an internalised negation of the communal order and I argue 
that for the humanitarianism of international law this translates into the 
representations of ‘failed’ humanity, which in the discourse of law is imposed upon 
racial subaltern subjects. This thesis will aid understanding of its central topic by 
offering an original theoretical lens through which to understand both the persisting 
violence of the drug war and asymmetry in it impact upon different the peoples of the 
world.	  The traditionally legalistic demands of my thesis will meet by the detail I will 
supply regarding the emergence, production and application of international law 
against drugs. However, the theoretical thrust of my research is to expose and displace 
the malignity of what is being recorded in the legal instruments that establish drug 
prohibition. This argument proceeds from a presumption that in order to fully 
understand the international law against drugs, you must with a concern for those 
reduced to rubble by the history of prohibition, those at the receiving end of the 
violence produced through this war. Such a theoretical perspective seeks to make an 
explicit claim about the persisting imperial violence of international law through the 
focal instantiation of drug prohibition. This is to act as a corrective against much of 
the literature of War on Drugs that have sought to examine the war as though it was 
independent of the legal institutions that produced and sustained it.  
 
The Origin and Innovative Contribution of Thesis 
 
It is my assertion that surveying the wreckage of the drug war invites a set of 
questions that scholars of international law must address: How was it possible for this 
scale of violence to have been performed through the workings of international law 
without disturbing its claim to effecting a universal peace? How does the law sustain 
a claim to rationality and objectivity in the face of continuing with such a destructive 
but ultimately futile legal project? How did the limited idea of prohibition of 
particular drugs by the law, originating from the U.S.A at the turn of the twentieth 
century, become universally applicable by that century’s end? If drugs are a threat to 
‘all mankind’ and the force of international law is required to be deployed against it, 
what is the ‘kind of man’ that is acclaimed; what is the conception of the human that 
international law is seeking to protect? How does the drug war work? As much as it is 
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a war, i.e. a violent, destructive undertaking, could it also be understood as a 
productive process, productive of a shared system of norms and a general 
communality in international law? If so, what are these norms? And finally, if 
international law, particularly post-1945, sought to enshrine the essential equality of 
all nations and peoples through an arrogated universal humanitarianism, why has the 
violence of universal drug prohibition been implemented with such geographical and 
racial asymmetry? What does the political and racial identity of those who have been 
the predominant victims of the drug war tell us about the enemy of this war? These 
are the questions I will develop an answer to over the course of my thesis. These 
questions emerge from previous some of the previous practical legal work I have 
undertaken that gave me first hand experience of the consequences of the drug war. 
Prior to my PhD, I worked with the Capital Post-Conviction Centre of Louisiana, a 
law firm committed to challenging mass incarceration in the U.S.A., amongst other 
aims. Furthermore, for the first two years of my doctoral studies, I also worked with 
Release, the national centre of expertise on drugs and drugs law in the U.K., as a legal 
advisor committed to the reform of drug prohibition. Both of these roles aided me in 
developing the questions that underpin this thesis and I bring the empirical experience 
gained in the jobs to the following study.  
Having taken account of the questions I seek to answer, I move on to 
reviewing a set of distinct theoretical approaches that can offer some guidance in 
responding to the problem at hand. The concrete questions stated above make clear 
the requirement to think theoretically: for instance, how do we conceptualise the War 
on Drugs if by ‘war’ we don’t mean the traditional concept of war and if by ‘drugs’ 
we don’t mean to describe all psychoactive substances? In seeking to address these 
issues and others, this thesis makes an intervention in the current body of critical 
scholarship on international law to enrich understandings of the relations between 
legal violence, the order of the international community and a persisting imperial 
legacy within the contemporary world. My original contribution will be illustrate the 
contradiction between the violence of the War on Drugs and the humanitarian rhetoric 
of drug prohibition and liberal international law more widely, can be better 
understood as an instantiation of the sacrificial structure that international law appeals 
to in order to allow the system to produce itself. This illustration of how legislation 
presumed to be peripheral in terms of international law actually provides a telling 
instantiation for how violence operates with the liberal humanitarianism of post-
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colonial international law serves to advance my primary field of study - critical 
international law – as well as the many sub-fields that are connected to this field by 
my project, such as drug policy studies, post/decolonial studies, political philosophy 
and political theology.  
In order to make a distinct contribution to these disciplines, as well as display 
an immersion in the scholarship already produced, my thesis will embark upon 
several theoretical innovations, built upon primary and secondary bodies of 
knowledge. Firstly, I will read together the empirical research detailing the failures of 
drug prohibition alongside traditions of critical legal scholarship, especially those that 
draw on the post/decolonial and political-theological readings of legal violence. The 
connections between these fields of study have yet to be drawn out in the literature. A 
further contribution will be my extension of post/decolonial critical readings of 
international law into an understanding of the theological underpinnings of persisting 
imperial relations. This contribution will be offered through my development of the 
concept of a ‘sacrificial’ international law that will be laid out in full in Chapter Two, 
before being employed as a lens through which to understand the history of drug 
prohibition across the following chapters.  
Original historical work will also be employed in order to anchor my 
theoretical argument, particularly the unpacking of the professional and philosophical 
connections that existed between the moral reformers and Christian missionaries who 
drove drug prohibition, figures like Bishop Charles Henry Brent, Wilbur Crafts and 
Hamilton Wright, and the jurists who developed an American tradition of liberal, 
humanitarian international law such as Elihu Root and James Brown Scott. The 
argument offered in Chapter Five emphasises not only the lines of communication 
and professional alliances that developed between the prohibitionists and the jurists in 
the early twentieth century but also the way that a shared theoretical vision of 
constructing a ‘single standard of morality’ across the globe facilitated these alliances. 
This unpacking of the political and philosophical connections between the moral 
reformers and international lawyers allows an under-researched element of the 
narrative of early American international law to be recovered, helping to explain why 
drug prohibition, far from being a peripheral concern, was one of the main vehicles 
through which the U.S.A. entered the international legislative arena and therefore has 
much to tell us about the direction that American internationalism (and international 
law more widely) would take over the course of the century.  
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Foundational Data: The Racial Asymmetry of Drug Prohibition 
 
Returning to the empirical for the moment, only the most myopic of observers 
could ignore the asymmetry in the way the violence of the War on Drugs has been 
apportioned amongst the peoples of the world. Despite adopting a liberal posture, 
couched in terms of the impartiality and universality claimed of law, the international 
laws on drugs have disproportionately impacted specific categories and territories of 
peoples. This contradiction is now well established in drug policy studies. The impact 
of prohibition of certain drugs has fallen heaviest on the peoples of Latin America, the 
Caribbean and the racially subaltern populations of Europe and the United States of 
America. The scale of the catastrophe in Latin America is only hinted at by the 
statistics presented above regarding the death toll and rate of displacement in 
Colombia, Mexico and Brazil. However, it is also important to note how, within 
Western nations in general and the U.S.A. in particular, drug prohibition is 
inextricable from the perpetuation of a racially discriminatory legal system. As 
Michelle Alexander points out in her essential book, The New Jim Crow, ‘Black men 
have been admitted to prison on drugs charges at rates of 20 to 50 times that of White 
men’ in the U.S.A., despite the fact that there is no discernible discrepancy regarding 
the use, supply or production of prohibited substances amongst different racialised 
groups.23 It is difficult to contest the claim of Craig Reinarman and Harry G. Levine 
that the ultimate consequence of the drug war has been not the reduction in drug use 
or the elimination of the drug supply but the production of a ‘bulging prison 
population […] disproportionately comprised of poor people of colo[u]r, most of 
whom had not committed violent crimes.’24 Therefore, a body of scholarship has now 
established the drug laws in America as interwoven with that country’s particular 
history of legalised, racialised violence. Before Michelle Alexander, Ira Glasser also 
named America’s drug laws as that nation’s ‘New Jim Crow.’25 Doris Marie Provine 
offers an extensive review of the history of race as it has functioned within anti-drug 
campaigns, from the moralist temperance movements of the early twentieth century to 
                                                
23 Michelle Alexander; The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness, Reprint 
Edition (The New Press, 2012), p.7. 
24 Craig Reinarman and Harry G. Levine; ‘Crack in the Rearview Mirror: Deconstructing Drug War 
Mythology’, Social Justice 31, 1-2 (2004) 182-199. 
25 Ira Glasser, ‘America's Drug Laws: The New Jim Crow’, Albany Law Review 703 (2000), p.63.	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the panic of the crack epidemic in the 1980’s.26 Provine draws a direct line of 
continuum between these distant moments to illustrate the debt that drug prohibition 
in America owes to racial fears and paranoia.27 Legal professor David A. Sklansky 
has further argued that the mandatory federal sentences for trafficking in crack 
cocaine contravene the assumption of equal protection for all races under the law.28 
Sklansky highlights how crack cocaine, as a substance that is, in its form, not 
significantly dissimilar from its derivative of powder cocaine, receives far harsher 
penalties as a result of those penalties being imposed almost exclusively on the Black 
population of America. For Sklansky, ‘it is hard to find contemporary laws that fail 
this prophylactic requirement [for equality before the law] more blatantly than the 
federal crack penalties.’29  
However, whilst scholarly attention has been largely directed at the racial 
discrepancies in drug law enforcement in the U.S.A., this phenomenon is not isolated 
to that country. While Alexander is particularly elegant in her tracing of the 
continuum between America’s drug-war fuelled model of mass incarceration, and 
plantation slavery, it is important to remember when discussing race, drugs and 
transatlantic slavery, that Alexander is addressing topics that cannot be analysed in 
full from within the confines of any one nation-state. Therefore, in this thesis I will try 
to expand the frame in which the ‘New Jim Crow’ is set in order to include the 
parallel manifestations of the same racialised dynamics it identifies occurring in other 
nation states. For instance, empirical research in the United Kingdom shows how race 
is also a key determinant in that jurisdiction when it comes to punishments for 
contravening the drug laws. In the U.K. people racialised as Black are 
disproportionately imprisoned when they are convicted as guilty of drug offences, 
whereas white counterparts are far more likely to receive a simple informal caution 
for the same drug offence.30 The discrepancy in the application of drug laws has 
                                                
26 Dorine Marie Provine; Unequal Under Law: Race and Law in the War on Drugs (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2007). 
27 Ibid. 
28 David A. Sklansky, ‘Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection’, Stanford Law Review 47, 6 (1995), 1284-
1355. 
29 Ibid, p., 1301. 
30 Niamh Eastwood, Michael Shiner, and Daniel Bear, ‘The Numbers in Black and White: Ethnic	  Disparities	  in the Policing and Prosecution of Drug Offences in England and Wales’. Release, 2013. 
This report showed that Black people in the U.K. are far more likely to be charged and sentenced for 
the same drug offence, with 56% of White people caught in possession of cocaine receiving cautions, 
while the remaining 44% were charged. In contrast, when Black people were caught in possession of 
cocaine, 22% received cautions, while 78 % were charged for the offence. This disparity continues 
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helped create a situation in which the proportion of black people imprisoned, in 
relation to their proportion of total population, is in fact larger in the U.K. than in the 
U.S.A. 31  This trend in terms of clear evidence of racial discrimination in the 
application of drug laws continues in Brazil, where drug prohibition has similarly 
propelled a similar disproportionality in the impact it has had upon Afro-Brazilian and 
indigenous communities.32 Enforcing drug prohibition in Brazil has facilitated an 
imagining of the space of the favela and the primarily racially subaltern inhabitants of 
this space as legitimate victims whose suffering at the hands of draconian methods of 
law enforcement maybe necessary in the quest for order. Those from the favela are 
therefore naked to the violence of the law – ‘whether or not they are involved in drug 
trafficking’, their deaths are jus necessitates for legal ordering.33 Further examples of 
this trend in prohibition can be seen in Colombia where Michael Taussig connects the 
violence of the contemporary cocaine trade to the racialised history of slavery and 
gold production in Colombia.34 Again, in Colombia, the forced crop eradication and 
aerial fumigation has particularly affected Afro-Colombian and indigenous 
communities, reinforcing the ‘historic marginalisation’ of these communities.35 It is 
because of the consistent racial asymmetry in the application of drug laws detailed 
above that the theoretical traditions that have extensively considered the problem of 
race in the modern world, postcolonial/decolonial studies and critical race theory will 
be resources that I will mine over the coming chapters. My theoretical choices emerge 
from the problems in the world. The racial and geographical discrepancies that have 
been produced in the application of the international laws on drugs across a variety of 
jurisdictions, to my account, offer a key insight for addressing the question of how the 
                                                                                                                                      
with regard to sentencing, with Black people being imprisoned for drug offences at almost 6 times the 
rate of White people. 
31 Randeep Ramesh, ‘More Black People Jailed in England and Wales Proportionally than in US’, 
Guardian, 11 October 2010: “the proportion of black people in jail in the UK was almost seven times 
their share of the population, whereas in the US the proportion of black prisoners is four times greater 
than their population share”. <http://www.theguardian.com/society/2010/oct/11/black-prison-
population-increase-england> [accessed 21 October 2015]; Equality and Human Rights Commission, 
How Fair is Britain: Equality, Human Rights, and Good Relations in 2010 (EHRC, 2010), p.172. 
“There is now greater disproportionality in the number of Black people in prisons in the UK than in the 
United States”. <https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/how_fair_is_britain_-
_complete_report.pdf>	  [accessed 3 August 2017]. 
32 Jamie Amparo Alvez and Dina Alvez, ‘Drugs and Drug Control in Brazil’. Pan-African Issues in 
Drugs and Drug Control: An International Perspective, ed. by Professor Anita Kalunta-Crumpton, 
(Ashgate: 2015), pp.248-292. 
33 Denise Ferreira da Silva, “Law, Race and Violence,” Griffith Law Review 18 2 (2009), p.232. 
34 Michael Taussig, My Cocaine Museum (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004). 
35 See ‘Peace, Drug Policy, and an Inclusive Society: Eleven Ways Colombian and FARC Negotiators 
can Reform Drug Policy and Build a Lasting Peace’, Washington Office on Latin America (2013), p.4. 
	   12	  
violence of the drug war can be reconciled with international law’s acclaimed 
commitment to universal peace. 
 
Outline of Chapters  
 
The following sections of this thesis will be arranged in three parts. Firstly, 
Part A will explain the theoretical and historical understanding of international law 
that I am applying in this study of the international laws on drugs. Chapter One will 
commence with an engagement with the critical scholarship produced on the concept 
of ‘drugs’, drawing on the work of drug policy experts as well as canonical 
philosophers who have touched on their topic in order to unpack the discursive 
ground that informs normative understandings of what differentiates a ‘drug’ from 
other plant-life/psychoactive substances. Over the course of this chapter, I will 
illustrate how the concept of ‘drugs’ cannot be divorced from the legal act of 
prohibition, for it is in the determination of law that the discursive ground for drugs is 
fixed; rather than being objects in the world over which law is legislating, the law 
speaks the idea of drugs into being as it prohibits it. Only their legal status is able to 
collate the diverse set of plant-life/psychoactive substances that are now known as 
drugs into collective. Furthermore, in unpacking ‘drugs’ I will show how indebted the 
fear of their ‘transgressive’ nature is to racialised conceptions of ‘non-humanity’ with 
drugs feared as being the conduit between ideal and denigrated states of humanity. 
The understanding of discursive grounding for drugs developed over this chapter will 
provide theoretical underpinnings behind the reasons why the history of drug 
prohibition was intertwined with explicit racist sentiments, even by early lawmakers, 
as will be detailed over the later chapters.  Chapter Two will focus on critical readings 
of international law, drawing particularly from traditions of scholarship that are 
concerned with the impact that the colonial encounter between the European and non-
European worlds had upon the emergence and orientation of international law.36 A 
distinct subgenre of critical international legal scholarship taking seriously such 
questions has emerged under the nomenclature of Third World Approaches to 
                                                
36 See Peter Fitzpatrick, Modernism and The Grounds of Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001); Sundhya Pahuja, Decolonising International Law: Development, Economic Growth and 
the Politics of Universality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Martti Koskenniemi, 
From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2011); Jennifer Beard, The Political Economy of Desire: International Law, Development and 
the Nation State (Routledge-Cavandish, 2006). 
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International Law (TWAIL). TWAIL provides a useful framework for engaging with 
international law in a manner that seeks an explanation for the condition of ‘the 
suffering humanity.’ 37  TWAIL has been described as seeking to ‘understand, 
deconstruct and unpack the uses of international law as a medium for the creation and 
perpetuation of a racialised hierarchy of international norms and institutions that 
subordinate non-Europeans to Europeans.’38 By making explicit a desire to address 
‘the material and ethical concerns of third world peoples,’ TWAIL illustrates how 
European colonialism shaped the very character of international law and its 
institutions.39 However, my distinct contribution to critical readings of international 
law will be to read the racial and geographic exclusions detailed in TWAIL 
scholarship, particularly the work of Anthony Anghie, alongside appreciations of the 
theological undercurrents that persist within the ostensibly secularised international 
law. This will require developing an understanding of ‘third world peoples’ that 
functions not merely as a descriptor of populations from a fixed geographical 
location, but also a descriptor that captures how particular peoples are produced by 
the discourse of Euro-modernity as the erased underpinnings of the mutual 
recognition of dialectics. To be ‘third world’ is to be the excluded third term upon 
which the relationality of modern subjectivity is sustained; it is to be the unseen third 
part on which the rivalry of ‘realised subjects’ is built, whilst remaining devoid of the 
reciprocity upon which the dialectic of the modern is founded.40 In short, to be ‘third 
world’ is to be ‘damned’ within an ostensibly secular world of Euro-modernity 
modern secular, as captured in the title of Frantz Fanon’s magnum opus Les Damnés 
de la Terre.41 It is this element of the racial/colonial subaltern subject as ‘damned’, 
shamefully erased in the English translation as ‘The Wretched of the Earth,’ to which 
I will turn throughout this thesis and which will be read alongside the concept of 
‘sacrifice’ as a lens through which to explain understand the political-theological 
underpinnings of the colonial relations that TWAIL scholars see as persisting within 
                                                
37 Upendra Baxi, ‘New Approaches to the History of International Law’, Leiden Journal of 
International Law 19 (2005), p.560. 
38 Makua Matua, ‘What is TWAIL?’, American Society of International Law Proceedings (2000), p.31. 
39 B.S. Chimni, ‘Third World Approaches to International Law: A Manifesto’, International 
Community Law Review 8 (2006), p.3-5; Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of 
International Law, (Cambridge: Cambridge United Press, 2005), p.311. 
40 For a full discussion on the misrecognition of the colonised subject as the excluded third-term on 
which he modern dialectic is built, see Frantz Fanon, Black Skins, White Masks, (Pluto Press, 2008), 
particularly ‘The Negro and Hegel’, pp.168-173. 
41 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (London: Penguin, 2001). 
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the discipline of international law. In Chapter Two, I will draw on the work of French 
philosophical anthropologist René Girard, amongst others, in order to illustrate the 
potency of the concept of ‘sacrifice’ for understanding how violence, such as that 
produced by the drug war, can be theoretically reconciled with the acclaimed 
humanitarianism of a communal international legal order and its task of externalising 
violence from within its midst. Chapter Three will take up the task of historically 
rooting the notion of a ‘sacrificial international’ at the birth of European imperialism, 
showing how international law emerged through the colonial endeavour. Francisco De 
Vitoria will serve as the primary point of reference at this juncture, and I will draw on 
critical scholarship that has argued for a ‘dynamic of difference’- a structural 
inequality between those he deems civilised and those deemed uncivilised- persisting 
within the Salamancan theologian’s bold claim to a universal humanity. As Anthony 
Anghie details Vitoria’s ‘dynamic of difference’, allows for law to cleave ‘a gap 
between two cultures, demarcating one as ‘universal’ and civilized and the other as 
‘particular’ and uncivilized’ and continues to animate many of contemporary 
international law’s central doctrines and institutions.42 Looking at this sixteenth-
century jurisprudence as an ‘origin’ for the liberal international law of the twentieth 
century, I will study how the interior/exterior positionality that Girard mandates as 
necessary for the scapegoat to exorcise the intra-communal violence will be shown to 
marry with Vitoria’s inclusion of the colonial subject within a humanitarian 
framework for the law of nations but in a condition of primary exclusion which 
ultimately licences violence upon the colonised.  
Part B will focus on the emergence of international drug prohibition at the 
turn of the twentieth century, illustrating how this particular project functioned as a 
vehicle through which the U.S.A emerged as a major actor in international law and 
this section of the thesis will also explore the correlative (re)turn towards a ‘sacrificial 
internationalism’ that came along with emergence of American liberal 
internationalism. Chapter Four will detail the American recovery of Vitoria, who had 
fallen behind jurists such as Grotius or Vattel in the consideration of the ‘origin’ of 
international law by the end of the nineteenth century. However, I will review how, 
propelled by the endeavours of the ‘father of American international law’ James 
Brown Scott and a generation of forthright American internationalists, Vitoria was 
                                                
42 Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty, p.4 
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recovered and his jurisprudence began to influence the orientation that international 
law would take over the coming century. Through a review of the early history of 
American international law in this chapter, I will establish the importance of the 
recovery of the Vitorian legacy upon American internationalism and its correlative 
legal projects. Chapter Five will study the concurrent births of American international 
law and international drug prohibition, showing drugs not to be peripheral but actually 
central to the story of America’s turn to internationalism. I will focus on the juridical 
crisis provoked by the U.S.A’s acquisition of the Philippines in the Treaty of Paris 
1898- and therefore, inheriting, in the eyes of prohibitionists, an international opium 
problem. I will subsequently explore the theoretical parallels between the ‘sacrificial 
internationalism’ and the prohibition of drugs to suggest an understanding for why 
under Scott’s tenure at the US State Department, religious missionaries such as 
Bishop Brent gained significant mileage in their campaign to establish drug 
prohibition as international law. This chapter will also examine how the explicit 
racism of domestic drug prohibition in the U.S.A would come to inform the structure 
and form of the drug prohibition it would argue for internationally. Chapter Six will 
argue for a critical reading of the development of drug prohibition over the interwar 
period. I will unpack why the institutionalisation of international law provided such 
fertile ground for prohibitionists as well as illustrate the connection between the 
desire for communality that emerged in jurisprudential takes on international law 
following the crisis of the Great War and the holistic conceptualisation of the globe as 
one required for drug prohibition to realise itself. I will also examine what were the 
limitations of international drug prohibition in this inter-war era that resulted in its 
failure to concretely establish itself.  
Part C will focus on the manifestation of what we now call the War on Drugs 
that emerged following the crisis of the Second World War, as drug prohibition 
became a key element in the contemporary international legal order. Chapter Seven 
will take up a review of the context that produced the key touchstone for 
contemporary drug prohibition, the United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic 
Drugs, 1961. I will undertake a close reading of this treaty in search for evidence of 
the West-Non West dichotomy that TWAIL scholars read into international law’s 
promise to protect a ‘universal mankind.’ Furthermore, in contrast to the prevailing 
trend in drug policy studies to emphasise the discontinuities between drug prohibition 
and the humanism of post-war international law, I will read drug prohibition 
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alongside other major treaties of that epoch such as the U.N Charter and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights to search for any shared theoretical assumptions about 
the order of international law that may allow these historically co-current legal 
instruments to compliment each other. Drug prohibition is under-researched as a 
project of the post–Second World War international law. By reading the UN drug 
laws alongside the contemporaneous emergence of international criminal law and 
international human rights law, I will explore how drug prohibition provides insights 
to some of the wider dynamics of post-war international law. Chapter Eight will focus 
on the declaration and escalation of the War on Drugs in the final decades of the 
twentieth century once the international legislative framework for drug prohibition 
was firmly in place. This chapter will seek to draw together the insights collected 
from the previous chapters and their review of the chronology of drug prohibition in 
international law to try to answer the question of what kind of war was the War on 
Drugs? Returning to the material violence, the statistics of death, detention and 
displacement detailed at the start of this introduction, I will enquire as to whether the 
War on Drugs can offer any insight into the changing nature of conflict following 




My task over the course of this thesis will be to establish the theoretical value 
of reading the War on Drugs as an instantiation of a sacrificial internationalism: a 
reading of the violence that has been produced through this specific legal project as 
being interwoven with the humanitarian, universal peace acclaimed by liberal 
international law. The concept of sacrifice, which will be illustrated by my 
post/decolonial and political-theological reading of the drug war, captures the way in 
which international law’s management of violence functions through the legitimising 
of violence onto a signifier taken as the negation of the community. Recognising the 
sacrificial victim as both included within and utterly excluded from the community, I 
will posit that those who have been the ultimate victims of the drug war, the racially 
and geographically subaltern populations taken as the embodiment of non-humanity 
in association with the transgressive plant-life collectively termed as ‘drugs’, can be 
read as functioning as sacrificial victims within the operation of twentieth century 
international law.
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PART A 
 
Chapter 1  
 
Speaking Drugs into Being: ‘Drugs’ as a legal construction 
 
1.1 Introduction  
 
There has been range of approaches taken by scholars in order to produce 
greater understanding of the War on Drugs. For instance, David Bewley-Taylor’s 
historical studies have done much to illustrate the central role that the U.S.A has 
played in driving international drug prohibition.1 Alternatively, Ross Coomber and 
Nigel South’s collection of essays unpack how the socio-cultural context influences 
perceptions of drug use and the relative beneficial or harmful impact of drugs.2 
Taking in cultural practices as diverse as ritual use of Ayahuasca in Brazil to the use 
of Khat in Yemini culture, Coomber and South’s work argues that although drug 
prohibition has expanded to the scale of becoming a truly global project, it is a 
distinctly 'Western, ethnocentric view of progression and humanist thinking that led 
(without irony) to the declaration of a 'War on Drugs.’3 However, few scholars have 
taken up the War on Drugs as a theoretical question of law, or of international law 
specifically. The underdevelopment of this literature is curious because, as Neil 
Boister tells us, ‘the international drug control system is a creature of international 
treaty law.’ 4 The drug war should be read as a child of international law. International 
law requires nation states to implement drug prohibition, as well as limits the 
parameters that any calls reform of drug laws can achieve.  
Yet despite the War on Drugs being sourced and justified in specifically 
international legal terms, there has been a relative absence of engagement with this 
area of law by critical legal scholarship. A review of the literature reveals that much 
                                                
1 David R. Bewley-Taylor, The United States and International Drug Control, 1909-1997 (New York: 
Continuum, 2001), p.43. 
2 Ross Coomber and Nigel South (eds.), Drug Use and Cultural Contexts 'Beyond the West': Tradition, 
Change and Post-Colonialism (London: Free Association Books, 2005). 
3 Ibid., p.14. 
4 Neil Boister, The Suppression of Illicit Drugs Through International Law (doctoral thesis, University 
of Nottingham, 1998), p.27. 
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of the legal academy has remained silent of the significance of the drug laws. In this 
chapter, I will address this omission by unpacking the way ‘drugs’ are discursively 
produced by the law. This chapter will analyse how the law speaks the very concept 
of ‘drugs’ into being, for rather than being independent objects that are then legislated 
over, drugs are discursively produced by the act of prohibition and therefore cannot 
be decouple from it. Furthermore, the debt that the process of discursively producing 
drugs owes to the legitimisation of violence against the ‘nonhuman’, associated by 
Euro-modernity with both ‘transgressive’ plant-life and racially subaltern peoples, 
will be unpacked, providing some initial theoretical insight into the relationship 
between violence and ‘humanitarianism’ in the War on Drugs.  
 
1.2 Critical Scholarship on Drugs 
 
From a critical standpoint, Seddon’s contributions to advancing a genealogical 
reading of drug prohibition in the U.K. and the U.S.A is particularly useful in 
illustrating how the concept of drugs is itself a legal construction.5 Seddon pursues the 
genealogy of the concept of the drug, arguing that rather than being an inanimate 
object over which the juridical can legislate, drugs as we currently understand them, 
are in fact produced through the law; we should understand that juris-diction speaks 
the idea of drugs into being, for ‘the modern drug concept is, in a fundamental sense, 
a legal one.’6 The law produces the very idea of drugs themselves. Drugs offer an 
example of a quintessential legal fiction; by that I mean it is the law that first creates 
and then legislates what we commonly categorise as drugs. The only solid criterion 
through which to differentiate what is commonly referred to as ‘drugs’ from other 
psychoactive substances is the determination of the law. The law is what ties together 
as one group cannabis, cocaine and opium and then places that group in 
contradistinction to alcohol or caffeine. It is law that ultimately separates the medical 
from the recreational, from the prohibited psychoactive substances and a recognition 
of this point encourages further work in thinking about the drug war as a problem of a 
juridical nature. Furthermore, Seddon reads two elements as being present within the 
law’s transformation of certain psychoactive substances into drugs ‘the association of 
                                                
5 Toby Seddon, ‘Inventing Drugs: A Genealogy of a Regulatory Concept’, Journal of Law and Society, 
43, 3 (September 2016), pp. 393-415. 
6 Ibid., p.414.  
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a substance with `deviant' or disliked groups, and perceptions that use of a particular 
substance may threaten the future of the collective.’7 The understanding of drugs 
being discursively interwoven with groups of people held to be inherently deviant has 
been further developed through scholarship on how the drugs laws have generated 
and amplified racial discrimination within the law. Keeping her attention confined to 
the domestic context of the U.S.A, Michelle Alexander’s study on mass incarceration 
famously described the drug laws in America as bringing about a New Jim Crow, a 
reinstitution of racial division and legalised violence on Black peoples within the 
formal equality of the American body politic in the post-civil rights era.8 This reading 
of how drug laws produce racial oppression in the U.S.A has also been taken up by 
Angela Davis and Ruth Wilson Gilmore, who have also touched upon the racial 
consequences of the War on Drugs within America in their work on America’s prison 
industrial complex.9 Desmond Manderson, following in the wake of canonical critical 
theorists such as Jacques Derrida and Michael Taussig, has interrogated the symbolic 
value of drugs, reading the ‘undoubted racism’ of the drug laws as being underwritten 
by a fear of an uncivilised state of humanity that drugs use came to symbolise.10 
However, still largely unexamined are questions around the context of international 
law that produced drug prohibition? In a world in which global consensus often 
appears impossible, drug prohibition initially suggests an example of a functioning 
universal legal project. Despite the plethora of different traditional and ritualistic uses 
of narcotics that have long existed across the world, The Single Convention remains a 
particularly powerful exemplar of modern international law’s arrogation of the 
universal, commanding an unusually high level of compliance: 184 of the 193 
members of the United Nations became signatories, while the few non-signatories 
largely followed the demands of the convention.11 Drug prohibition has largely 
overridden the protections offered to of cultural or customary practices offered by 
international human rights law in the context of the coca-leaf chewing in the 
                                                
7 Ibid., p.409. 
8 Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness (London: 
The New Press, 2012). 
9 See Angela Y. Davis, ‘Race and Criminalization: Black Americans and the Punishment Industry’. 
Wahneema Lubiano (ed.), The House That Race Built, (New York:  Random House, 1999), pp.265-
279; and Ruth Wilson Gilmore, Golden Gulag: Prisons, Surplus, Crisis, and Opposition in Globalizing 
California (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007). 
10 Desmond Manderson, ‘Possessed: Drug Policy, Witchcraft and Belief’, Cultural Studies, 19, pp.36-
63. 
11 Christopher Hobson, ‘Challenging “evil”: Continuity and change in the drug prohibition regime’, 
International Politics, 51, 4 (2014); pp.525-542, p.526. 
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indigenous communities of the Andes or the traditional consumption of Khat by 
Arabian and North African.12 We must therefore ask what is the “international” of the 
international War on Drugs? Has there been spontaneous universal agreement about 
the existential danger of particular psychoactive substances and the need to deploy the 
force of law against them? Or can drug prohibition illuminate more critical 
understandings of international law and its claim to universality? Drawing from the 
insights of the works cited above, but expanding then into the register of the 
international, this Chapter will explore what drug prohibition can illuminate about the 
wider theoretical underpinnings of international law.  
Drug prohibition encompasses many of the key antagonisms of international 
legal theory: the debate between a natural law anchoring a universal humanity against 
positivist law enshrining the rights of each sovereign state; between international law 
facilitating colonialism as a legal project and law as the vehicle through which formal 
decolonisation would be realised; between international law as the limitation of 
violence throughout the globe and international law’s power to legitimise violence in 
the name of a universal humanity. Therefore, turning to the international legal realm 
that is the primary concern of this thesis, a gap in the literature is created on account 
of the work on the international drug laws having been more conventional in its 
methodological approach, with these larger theoretical questions that drug prohibition 
could provide an entry point into being generally overlooked. S.K. Chatterjee and 
Neil Boister have each produced a comprehensive review of how the international 
laws on drug function, Boister also producing further work that focused upon the 
penal aspects of the UN drug conventions.13 Kettil Bruun, Lynn Par and Ingemar 
Rexed produced perhaps the most comprehensive historical review of the emergence 
of international drug prohibition in the twentieth century, stressing the full 
transformative significance of this project when they argue that ‘few movements 
wielded as great an influence or had quite as many repercussions as the anti-opium 
                                                
12 For further on the tension between international drug prohibition and international rights to 
traditional culture see Sven Pfeiffer, ‘Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the International Drug Control 
Regime: The Case of Traditional Coca Leaf Chewing’, Goettingen Journal of International Law, 5, 1 
(2013), pp.287-324. 
13 See S. K. Chatterjee, Legal Aspects of International Drug Control (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1981); Neil Boister, The Suppression of Illicit Drugs through International Law (PhD thesis, 
University of Nottingham, 1998); Neil Boister, Penal Aspects of the UN Drug Conventions (Kluwer 
Law International, 2001).  
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protest at the turn of the century.’ 14  Rick Lines has furthered the critique by 
illuminating the contradictions between the laws prohibiting drugs established by the 
United Nations and the concurrent human rights framework erected by post-war 
international law.15 Also, in a brief but exciting engagement with the topic, Alvaro 
Santos explored a critical examination of the role international law plays in actually 
producing the ideological anchoring of this failing, indefinite war.16 However, the 
aforementioned contributions notwithstanding, the War on Drugs, remains under-
theorised as a problem of law, particularly when considering the implications that 
drug laws may have for conceptual understandings of international law in general or 
for understandings of how international law developed over the course of recent 
history. At stake in the question of the War on Drugs is an understanding of amongst 
the most ambitious, universalizing and, by its own metrics, unsuccessful legal projects 
of the twentieth century. The inconsistency between the consequences of drug 
prohibition and the contemporaneous institutionalization of international law and its 
turn to humanitarianism invites further theoretical exploration. This chapter will 
provide a fresh theoretical lens through which to view the War on Drugs. I will draw 
on traditions of critical international legal scholarship, including TWAIL scholars 
who emphasize the indebtedness of international law to European imperialism and 
scholars of political-theology who read international law as functioning as a deific 
surrogate. Interrogating how the law aims to expand so as to sustain an operative 
communality across a disparate globe, my argument is a reading of the violence of the 
drug war as not contradictory to the acclaimed peace of post-war, liberal international 
law, but rather as co-constitutive of that order. This argument will require introducing 
the concept of a ‘sacrificial international’, drawing together the theological and 
post/decolonial strands of critical international legal scholarship to present the drug 
war as an instantiation of a wider relationship between law and violence, particularly 
following international law’s turn to a post-colonial, universal humanism post-Second 
World War. As Oscar Guardiola-Rivera argued in a challenge to critical legal 
scholarship ‘any general theory of law and society that wishes to be relevant at the 
time of globalisation must make the intra- and trans-national experience of 
                                                
14 Kettil Bruun, Lynn Parr and Ingemar Rexed, The Gentlemen's Club: International Control of Drugs 
and Alcohol (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), p.13 
15 See Richard Lines, Drug Control and Human Rights in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2017). 
16 Alvaro Santos, ‘International Law and Its Discontents: Critical Reflections on the War on Drugs or 
the Role of Law in Creating Complexity’, ASIL Proceedings (2012), pp.172-176. 
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antagonism and violence, motivated by imitation and envy, and its containment, its 
object of study.’17 The concept of a ‘sacrificial’ international law seeks to respond to 
Guardiola-Rivera’s challenge and provides an insightful lens through which to review 
the history of international drug prohibition over the twentieth century.  
 
1.3 The Inter of International Drug Prohibition 
 
The end of the Second World War provoked a reconstitution of international 
legal order. As law had failed twice that century to act as a restraint upon the outbreak 
of contagious violence within the international community, post war international law 
was imbued with a greater commitment to humanism and universality through the 
embrace of human rights, the dissolution of the formal colonial division of the world 
and the recognition of the Nuremberg principles for governing warfare. Over the later 
half of the twentieth century, particular in the wake of the neoliberal turn, an 
expanded conception of the international community began to cohere itself, with 
scholar Denise Ferreira de Silva identifying three interwoven elements of a ‘global 
contract’ as tying this community together. 
 
First, this global contract would facilitate expansion and consolidation 
of global market capitalism (free trade), restrict labor laws, and cut 
social rights—all of which negatively affect economically 
dispossessed populations. Second, it would institute a pluralist 
(inclusive) democracy, based on multiculturalism and diversity, which 
demands institutional inclusion of groups that have been legally 
discriminated against for their gender/sexual, racial, and/or ethnic 
difference, and demands the protection of human rights that were 
recognized in the neoliberal agenda, including cultural and political 
rights. Finally, it would promote deployment of the police and the 
military to curb non-state armed group activities involved in drug 
trafficking in the urban and rural spaces where the economically 
dispossessed populations live and die (internal security).18 
 
While the substantive theoretical engagements with neoliberal globalization and 
human rights have been produced in critical legal scholarship there has been a relative 
absence of such attention upon the third strand of contemporary universalism that 
                                                
17 Oscar Guardiola-Rivera, ‘Law in Other Contexts: Stand Bravely Brothers! A Report from the Law 
Wars’, International Journal of Law in Context, 4, 2 (2008), pp. 111–134, p.114. 
18 Denise Ferreira de Silva, ‘An Outline of a Global Political Subject: Reading Evo Morales's Election 
as a (Post-)Colonial Event’, Seattle Journal For Social Justice, 8, 1 (2009), pp.25-49, p.35. 
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Silva highlights, the global security and militarised policing network involved in drug 
prohibition. Despite the huge profits that were being generated in the major European 
empires that enjoyed colonial monopolies over coca, opium and others at the start of 
the twentieth century, by the new millennium, the international community, including 
those former European empires, were wholly invested in a War on Drugs that sought 
to erase the non-medical use of these substances from the face of the earth. How did 
such a dramatic and widespread shift occur across a disparate global order in less than 
a century? How was such consensus by international law achieved in a twentieth 
century that was heavily marked by global war and division? 
As aforementioned, I will engage with the problem of drug prohibition at the 
level of the international, in contrast to domestic focus offered by scholars such as 
Michelle Alexander. As was recognised by the American lawyers who first advocated 
drug prohibition at the start of the twentieth century, since the traffic of drugs is an 
inherently globalised industry, any attempt to combat this traffic must itself function 
at the level of the global.19 The ‘necessity for international cooperation’ allowed the 
prohibition of drugs to be conceptualized as an issue for the international 
community.20 It was this need for ‘international cooperation’ that Richard Nixon 
would emphasise when he announced the ‘War on Drugs’ in a 1971 speech. 21 
However, it should be recognised that Nixon’s speech did not create the ‘War on 
Drugs’, a project that has several contested birthdays, as the subsequent chapters will 
illustrate. The evolution of the prohibition of drugs lies at several key junctures in the 
history of international law over the twentieth century, as the idea transitioned from 
being a marginal concern of missionaries and temperance groups to becoming a 
governing norm adhered to by the international community at large. The 
establishment of the United Nations following the Second World War provided 
prohibitionists with the ideal forum in which far-reaching legislation on drugs could 
be produced. The result was the three United Nations treaties that, at present, define 
the illegality of drugs in international law: The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 
1961; The Convention on Psychotropic Substances, 1971; and The Convention 
                                                
19 Editorial Comment, The American Journal of International Law, 19, 2 (1925) pp. 327-361, p.354. 
20 Ibid.  
21 Richard Nixon, ‘Special Message to the Congress on Drug Abuse Prevention and Control’, 1971: 
‘To wage an effective war against heroin addiction, we must have international cooperation. In order to 
secure such cooperation, I am initiating a worldwide escalation in our existing programs for the control 
of narcotics traffic’. The American Presidency Project, ed. by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley 
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Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988. The 
spine of this thesis will be the critical examination these treaties, as well as a review 
of the earlier drugs conventions that entered into force in the interwar period, before 
being subsumed by the bedrock of the current system, The Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs, 1961 (hereafter referred to as the Single Convention). The Single 
Convention required signatories to make illegal the ‘cultivation, production, 
manufacture, extraction, preparation, possession, offering, offering for sale, 
distribution, purchase, sale, delivery on any terms whatsoever, brokerage, dispatch, 
dispatch in transit, transport, importation and exportation of drugs contrary to the 
provisions of this Convention’ the apotheosis of a trajectory of increasing prohibition 
of drugs in international law since the 1909 Conference of Shanghai Opium 
Commission.22 The question that presents itself is why after centuries of drug use and 
trade being not only tolerated but commercially exploited by Western powers, and 
before that being enjoyed in cultures across the globe, does the project of universal 
drug prohibition emerge at this point in history?  
 
1.3.1 De-positioning the concept of ‘Drugs’ 
 
The laws on drugs provide a particularly telling example of the challenge to 
positivist readings of law as fully comprehensible through the formalities of its 
provisions. I draw on historical, political and philosophical insights in my study of 
drug laws as substantive understanding of the system of norms in which these laws 
are placed requires reading the treaties outside of their four corners. For instance, the 
very title of the bedrock of drug prohibition, The Single Convention on Narcotic 
Drugs, 1961, betrays in its reference to ‘narcotics’ the distinction between the 
scientific understanding of narcotics as a sleep-inducing substance and the juridical 
definition of narcotics which, since it is based not on a drugs effect but on a drug’s 
illegality, allows the descriptor of ‘narcotics’ to be extended to drugs that are 
scientifically stimulants (Cocaine) or hallucinogens (Cannabis). Without an 
appreciation of the discursive field in which drug treaties are situated, the 
contradictions contained such as those above are irresolvable. In their understandings 
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of the object of their prohibition, drug laws draw upon political, historical and 
theoretical constructions of ‘narcotics/drugs’ as inherently dangerous substances.  
Jacques Derrida provides one resource for illuminating the discursive field in 
which drug prohibition is situated, understanding the social and historical 
contingencies that are required to constitute the very concept of ‘drugs’ that the law 
acclaims legislation over. Derrida states:  
 
There are no drugs “in nature.” There may be natural poisons and 
indeed naturally lethal poisons, but they are not as such ‘drugs.’ As 
with addiction, the concept of drugs supposes an instituted and 
institutional definition: a history is required and a culture, 
conventions, evaluations, norms, an entire network of intertwined 
discourses.23  
 
Derrida’s reading of prohibition commences from an understanding that ‘the concept 
of drugs is not a scientific concept, but is rather instituted on the basis of moral or 
political evaluation.’24 Within the drug laws, we find a prime example of the law 
discursively creating a distinction that does not objectively exist. Derrida recognises 
the extent to which drugs are not something external to law to which the law is 
applied, but rather our very conceptualisation of drugs is rooted in the law itself, that 
the idea of drugs ‘carries in itself both norm and prohibition, allowing no possibility 
of description or certification -- it is a decree.’25 Derrida’s reading of the discursive 
construction of drugs begins to point us towards the imperial structure of world order. 
Following the Adorno and Horkheimer, Derrida reminds us that ‘drug culture has 
always been associated with the other of the Occident’ and therefore the threat that 
drugs pose to social order becomes synthesised with the corporeal threat of the 
colonial other. 26  Sociologist and cultural theorist Jean Baudrillard echoes this 
argument with his own reading highlighting how indebted the presumed scientific and 
objective condemnation of the psychoactive substances collectively grouped together 
as ‘drugs’ is to a Weberian conception of the economic and social good in western 
society.27 For Baudrillard, the West arrogates onto itself a specific capacity for 
delayed gratification, which is then taken to underlie presumptions of civilisation. The 
                                                
23 Jacques Derrida, ‘The Rhetoric of Drugs: An Interview, 5 Differences: A Journal of Feminist 
Cultural Studies, 5, 1 (1993), pp.1-25.  
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid,  
27 Jean Baudrillard, ‘A perverse logic’, UNESCO Courier, July (1987), pp.7-9. 
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condemnation of drugs functions as a stand-in for a wider fear of the potential loss of 
that capacity for delayed gratification, the defeat of reason and the will at the hand of 
the appetite. Baudrillard argues that ‘[t]races of this long-standing condemnation 
linger on in our own vision of modern drugs and of the occult power they derive from 
their ancient symbolic virtues.’28 As opposed to the ‘evil’ of drug addiction residing 
in the drug itself and infecting Euro-modernity from the outside, Baudrillard shows us 
how the ‘evil’ is instead ‘a consequence of the very logic of the system, of the 
excessive logic and rationality of a system-- in this case society in the industrialized 
countries--which, having reached a certain level of saturation, secretes antibodies 
which express its internal diseases, its strange malfunctions, its unforeseeable and 
incurable breakdowns.’29 Within the discourse of Euro-modernity, where the social 
relations between subjects are taken to be fully secularised and consequently mediated 
through the mutual recognition by each subject of their counterpart’s capacity for 
reason and a predisposition to delay the appetite, the fear has been that ‘drug use 
threatens the social bond’ and summons up the spectre of the sub or non-human that 
persists within. 30  This discursive association between drugs as the symbolic 
opposition to Euro-modernity and racially subaltern subject as the embodied figure 
serving a similar role provides a starting point from which to begin exploring how the 
violence of the War on Drugs is co-constituted with the humanitarianism of 
international law. Violence enacted on what remains essentially plant-life is given a 
moral imperative through the imbuing of the drug with the power to serve as an 
existential threat to an idealised (European) social order, facilitating an easy 
association with those peoples taken as Europe’s constitutive outside. The drug war 
provides us with an instantiation of the relationship between colonial and 
environmental violence that Shela Sheik illuminates, showing how a shared discursive 
terrain connects the contemporary wars against plant-life with the wars against the 
bodies of racially subaltern subjects.31 Furthermore, to commence from a perspective 
of recognising the relationship between environmental and racialised violence helps 
to contextualise the contemporary attitude to drugs, which, once produced by law, is 
retrospectively projected backwards so that today’s current fear of drugs is read as 
objective and natural. If there are no drugs in nature then there is no natural history of 
                                                
28 Ibid., p.7 
29 Ibid., p.9. 
30 Derrida, ‘The rhetoric of drugs’. 
31 See Shela Sheikh, “Translating Geontologies” 21 The Avery Review (2017) 
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drugs: the history of drugs can only be human. Within the given histories of 
supposedly biological facts that are presumed as natural persist social presuppositions 
and in the case of drugs, these presuppositions are heavily indebted to imperial 
context that first brought drugs onto the world market. 
Like the discipline of international law itself, drug prohibition cannot be 
uncoupled from the imperial context through which it emerged. As will be discussed 
in greater length in later chapters, drug prohibition emerged onto the international 
stage through the U.S.A’s imperial endeavours in the Philippines. However, it is 
important to recognise how this imperial origins of drug prohibition also help us 
historicise a legal determination that is now presented as self-evident. The inherent 
biological and social danger presented by prohibited drugs is taken as objective and 
indisputable within the law. However, the very idea of ‘drugs’ is only a recent 
construction, as the historian Roy Porter reminds us:  
 
If you'd talked about the `drugs problem' two hundred years ago, 
no one would have known what you meant. There was no notion 
then of `drugs', in the sense of a small group of substances 
scientifically believed to be harmful because addictive or 
personality destroying, the availability of which is restricted by 
law. The term `drugs' as a shorthand for a bunch of assorted 
narcotics is in fact a twentieth-century coinage.32 
 
Historical study therefore betrays drugs as inseparable from drug prohibition; rather 
than the law in this instance legislating over an object that is external to itself, drugs 
and drug laws are co-constituted in the moment of prohibition. Prior to prohibition the 
substances now referred to by common parlance as ‘drugs’ were not immediately 
differentiated from other goods and resources that were being commercially exploited 
in the world market produced by European imperialism. As the historian David 
Couthwright identifies ‘European expansion in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and 
eighteenth centuries turned psychoactive drugs, including spirituous alcohol and 
tobacco, into global products.’33 Substances such as opium and cocaine were sources 
of great wealth for the British, Dutch and French empires amongst others. 
Furthermore, intoxication was glamourised within certain European artistic and 
literary circles, as seen in the works of Samuel Coleridge, Thomas De Quincey and 
                                                
32 Roy Porter, ‘The history of the “drugs problem”’, Criminal Justice Matters, 24, 3 (1996), p.3. 
33 David T. Courtwright, ‘A Short History of Drug Policy or Why We Make War on Some Drugs but 
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Charles Baudelaire.34 However, with American missionaries and moral reformers 
leading the way, the end of the nineteenth century saw a wave of international anti-
vice activism emerge, of which the birth of global drug prohibition remains perhaps 
the most dramatic legislative change achieved. 35  Thereafter, the course of the 
twentieth century would see drugs and drug use overtake other popularly held 
signifiers for ‘denigrated’ humanity such as homosexuality or vagrancy to serve as 
arguably the prevailing example of depravity and moral failing in societies across the 
world.36 
 
1.3.2 Drugs as ‘Transgressive Substances’ 
 
This thesis takes up the task of tracing how this transition occurred. 37 A key 
resource for my understanding how these ostensibly inanimate objects, naturally 
occurring plants and chemicals, became discursively infused with such demonic 
social power is the work of anthropologist Michael Taussig. Through his scholarship, 
Taussig has stressed how the social histories of commodities are interwoven within 
the symbolic potency that they wield once crystallised in material form. As opposed 
to the orthodox understanding of ‘man’ creating commodities through extractive 
labour and capital, before economically exploiting them for commercial gain, Taussig 
emphasises how in practice this relationship is not as unilateral as often envisioned, 
for once created it can be that, in fact, ‘commodities rule their creators.’38 Writing 
with a fidelity to the full significance of idea of fetishisation, Taussig recognises the 
                                                
34 For artistic engagements with opium use see Thomas De Quincey, Confessions of an English Opium-
Eater (London: Penguin Classics, 2003), Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ‘Kubla Khan; or, A Vision in a 
Dream: A Fragment’, The Complete Poems of Samuel Taylor Coleridge (London: Penguin Classics, 
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36 See Erich Goode and Nachman Ben-Yehuda, Moral Panics: The Social Construction of Deviance 
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something quite apart from these other moments of prohibition. For other, more localized histories of 
prohibition see Benjamin T. Smith, ‘Drug Policies in Mexico, 1900-1980’, Beatriz C.Labate, Clancy 
Cavnar, & Thiago Rodrigues (eds.), Drug Policies and the Politics of Drugs in Latin America. (Cham: 
Switzerland, Springer International Publishing, 2016), pp. 33-53; or Lee V. Cassanelli, ‘Qat a 
quasilegal commodity’, Arjun Appadurai (ed.), The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural 
Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp.236-261. 
38 Micheal Taussig, The Devil and Commodity Fetishism in South America (Chapel Hill: The 
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power for humans to transform objects into totems, and for those totems to then 
consequently transform the human upon connection. The theological undercurrent to 
the material relations of a modern capitalist society is unmasked by Taussig’s work, 
which argues for an appreciation for the particularly Christianised fetishisation of 
being, in which rituals and sacred objects stand in for the antagonisms between 
God/the Devil and good/evil, as well as anchoring the capitalist fetish in which 
‘commodities are held to be their own source of value.’39 This theoretical perspective, 
combined with his geographical focus on Latin America, has aided Taussig in 
developing an innovative understanding of the social life of ‘drugs.’ Speaking to the 
discursive production of cocaine as a ‘drug’, Taussig provides us with the insightful 
concept of drugs as ‘transgressive substances.’40 Through the term ‘transgressive 
substances’, Taussig illustrates how drugs are fetishized to become totems for the 
disruption of the order of the given world, drugs such as coca ‘make a mockery of the 
notions of ‘laws’ of supply and demand. They decidedly sabotage the notion of 
“demand” riddling it with phantasmic properties unknown to conventional 
economics.’41 Within the conceptualisation of prohibitionist law, drugs are not taken 
as the standard commodity but instead are recognised as commodities that have the 
power to rule their creators. Drugs are imbued with the phantasmal powers to able to 
use and consume the human subject as opposed to allowing humanity to use and 
consume it.  
To appreciate the social function of the concept of drugs, a concept only 
created in the twentieth century, helps us to understand the moral panic that they 
engender. Drugs are not seen as mere plant life in the manner that they appear in 
nature, nor are they seen as commodities, natural resources to be exploited for 
capitalist gain. Drugs are instead discursively produced as ‘transgressive substances’, 
elements of the natural world that are turned into a universal enemy of ‘humanity’. As 
Desmond Manderson argues, the fear of drugs is not merely the fear of the substances 
themselves, rather ‘what lies beneath is undoubtedly a fear of contamination’, a fear 
of the failed state of humanity they are commonly read as bringing about.42 Drugs are 
taken to facilitate movement between different states of being, transferring its 
consumers from the realm of the human to the non-human. The contemporary 
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conceptualisation of drugs takes much from the classical notion of pharmakon, which 
Derrida recovers to describe the discursive process for how difference is produced. 
The pharmakon – which can be taken to be both remedy and poison- captures how an 
ambivalence through dichotomies can constructed but it also facilitates ‘the 
movement and the play that links them […] (soul/ body, good/evil, inside/ outside, 
memory/ forgetfulness, speech/ writing, etc.)’ threating an notion of ‘internal purity 
and security.’43 René Girard picks up Derrida’s interpretation of pharmakon and links 
its use to how sacrifice is used to produce and sustain a community, he reads 
pharmakon within the enacting of a ‘maleficent violence on a double, who is 
arbitrarily expelled from the philosophic community.’44 Further engagement with the 
significance of Girard’s understanding of the violent process of community formation 
will be unpacked in the following chapter, however, it is important to acknowledge 
when exploring the discursive field unpinning ‘drugs’ the way in which classical 
philosophical concepts continue to inform modern juridical concepts such as ‘drugs’, 
only within the objective discourse of the law, this debt is both mystified and denied.  
The same mystification of drugs also contributes towards the relative absence 
of scholarly attention that the topic has received in comparison to the global 
commodities whose histories can also provide a glimpse into the shaping of the 
modern world.45 As aforementioned, it is the law itself that separates drugs from other 
psychoactive substances. The ‘economy of illegalities’ was produced through, and 
functions so as to anchor, the legitimate capitalist global marketplace.46 Drugs contain 
within themselves the same world-making histories that can be read in ‘legitimate’ 
psychoactive substances such as coffee or sugar.47 Yet while scholarship has traced 
how the role that international law played in turning the sugar cane plant into a global 
commodity that reveals an entire network of imperial and societal relations and 
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Black, Crude Reality: Petroleum in World History (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012); or 
Anthony Wild, Black Gold: The Dark History of Coffee (London: Harper Collins, 2010). 
46 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Vintage, 1995), p.87. 
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exclusions, drugs have not been afforded equivalent attention.48 This thesis aims to 
demystify drugs as a potential source of study, in addition to providing an account of 
the War on Drugs that unpacks its violence. 
A key element to grasp in order to appreciate the fear that underwrites 
prohibition is to understand that prohibition sees a mimetic or contagious power 
within drugs. The collective fear that drugs might consume the subject that 
themselves sought to consume the drug is not only a fear of the damage drugs might 
cause to a specific consumer or even to those susceptible members of the community, 
the drug addict, the narco-trafficker etc. Rather the fear of these drugs is that they 
threaten the stability of the social order as a whole, functioning as what Stanley 
Cohen termed as the societal folk-devil, through their suspected ability to spread their 
affliction amongst the whole community.49 David Couthwright states that ‘absent the 
idea of addiction, the whole system of controlling drug supply that has developed 
over the last two centuries would make little moral or practical sense.’50 I would add 
to this that an understanding of the fear drug addiction causing, and importantly 
spreading, the denigration of an idealised figure of the human being is necessary for a 
theoretical appreciation of how the system of laws persisted despite the devastation in 
brought upon particular peoples. This fear underwrites the law’s turn towards 
prohibiting vegetation/plant-life through the drug war. Drugs become imbued with a 
sovereign power over human life, which Taussig captures with a description of how 
“death stalks these substances in equal measure to the way they enliven life, enchant 
and compel.”51 Prohibition draws on the fear that drugs are able to drive human 
passions beyond the containment required for the fixing of a legal order. The 
correlative response to this fear is the aim of expelling this toxic substances from the 
collective social order, along with those who might be addicted or particular 
susceptible to addiction to this substances. This metaphysical quality read into drugs 
emphasises what is taken as being at stake in the project of drug prohibition, the very 
communality of the universal legal order as imagined.   
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1.4 The Problem of ‘Drugs’ and the Ground of Law  
 
The theoretical and conceptual questions at play in the construction of drugs 
and drug prohibition only reinforce the importance of correcting the gap in legal 
scholarship on this topic. The international laws on drugs remain under-theorised. The 
drug war has largely escaped the attention of historical or theoretically inclined legal 
scholars. To engage with the relation between the drug war and international law’s 
acclaimed containment of the ‘scourge of war’ demands an engagement with the 
intellectual tradition for accounting for how law can be productive of violence. To 
clarify, with regard to the instantiation of the drug war, I am not making the claim that 
all of the violence from the drug war, detailed in the introduction, is the result of state 
and international enforcement of prohibition, that is patently untrue with drug 
traffickers and drug users clearly contributing to the carnage in places such as 
Baltimore and Bogota in their own ways. Instead, what is being argued for is an 
understanding of law being productive of the conditions for both law enforcement to 
violently police drug prohibition and for the traffickers to violently attempt to 
circumvent drug prohibition. It is important to recall that drugs have not always been 
interwoven with violence, the cultivation and usage of these substances were 
practiced for centuries in various cultural traditions without being a generator of any 
violence comparable to that which has been realised through the War on Drugs.52 The 
violence, emerging both from and against drug enforcement can be better understood 
as actually rooted in the law, rather than in the drug, itself. Alvaro Santos clarifies this 
point in the passage below:  
 
The dominant paradigm for thinking about drug trafficking is to 
consider it a problem, external to law, that can be solved by a "law 
and order" strategy. Under this paradigm, drug traffickers are bad 
people who need to be prosecuted and jailed. The point that the illegal 
drug market is a result of the law, in the form of a legal prohibition, 
and that drug cartels-and their morally abhorrent acts-are a direct 
consequence of this legal regime is known but often remains 
invisible.53 
 
                                                
52 For further reading on the long history of different cultural traditions of drug use, see Ross Coomber 
and Nigel South (eds.), Drug Use and Cultural Context ‘Beyond the West’ (London: Free Association 
Books, 2004); or Jordan Goodman, Andrew Sherratt, Paul E. Lovejoy (eds.), Consuming Habits: 
Drugs in History and Anthropology (London: Routledge, 1995). 
53 Santos, ‘International Law and Its Discontents,’ p.174. 
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In short, the international laws on drugs releases ‘legitimised’ violence in an attempt 
to enforce its determination of prohibition and when, the law is unable to control the 
powers it has called up, it associates the excess of violence produced with the object 
of prohibition, drugs, rather than the law of prohibition itself.  
 
1.4.1 The War on Drugs and the Violence of Law 
 
My thesis offers a reading of the War on Drugs that disturbs any such 
protection offered to law. To associate the violence of the War on Drugs intimately 
with the workings of the international law is to call into question an orthodox 
understanding of the law: that law acts as an external limit on violence. Law derives 
much of its authority from the presupposition of its ability to restrict the human 
inclination to violence, thereby laying the basis on which society can founded. With 
regard to law’s operation in the international, this belief in the law’s ability to restrain 
violence is extended so as to traverse the globe, the expansion of international law 
presumed to aid the realisation of a peaceful global order. An illimitable international 
community is therefore read as produced through international law’s promise of 
universal peace.54 The centrality of this presumed pacifying capacity of law to 
international ordering becomes apparent when examining the historical moments in 
which international law has been most stringently (re)invoked. Whether at the Peace 
of Westphalia to conclude The Thirty Years War, the establishment of the League of 
Nations at the end of the First World War or the founding of the United Nations 
following the conclusion of the Second World War, potential ‘origins’ for 
international law tend to take the form of an attempt to reign in a transnational 
outbreak of contagious violence. When war appears to have become universally 
contagious, a turn to the law is offered as the solution to re-establish order; 
international law is presented as a solution to the crisis, a pacifying force to be 
acclaimed and celebrated as the diametric opposition of the violent crisis.  
             However, legal scholarship has complicated understandings of the relationship 
                                                
54 The Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations states its aim as to ‘save succeeding generations 
from the scourge of war’, ‘to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security’, and ‘to 
develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.’ The 
Charter of the United Nations (San Francisco: 1945) <http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-
charter/preamble/index.html> [accessed 3 August 2017]. 
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between law and violence. 55 Scholars have shown that the relationship between law 
and violence escapes such an easy binary opposition, as multiple forms of violence are 
performed everyday through the law and its institutions. The focal instantiation of this 
thesis, the War on Drugs, is one example that illustrates how violence can be produced 
not through an absence or lack of law but can emerge from law. Robert Cover 
provides a canonical contribution to work on the violence of the law by arguing that 
‘legal interpretation takes places in a field of pain and death.’56 Cover shows that it is 
this ability to inflict ‘pain and death’ which gives law its authority. Law must be 
violent in order to take effect; without the ability to wield violence, the law is not the 
law. And yet violence cannot be the totality of what the law is, for if law were only 
violence, it would not invoke the reverence that the law requires.57 This paradox is 
also unpacked by Walter Benjamin’s Critique of Violence, which canonised the 
concept that legal violence possesses a distinguishing ‘mythical’ quality. By mythical, 
Benjamin is referring to the function of legal violence, which he sees as law-making or 
law-preserving.58  Furthermore, rather than merely concern itself with legal violence as 
only the inflicting of physical force through the word of the law, recent scholarship 
has further illustrated the multiplicity of law’s violence. Violence informs law’s 
discourse as well as its actions, the way law uses languages and representational 
practices to silence perspectives, the way law denies alternatives of experience and the 
way law delimits legitimacy through its objectifying epistemology.59 The violence of 
the drug war draws on these refined, discursive understandings of violence in addition 
to the singular impacting of force. While the violence of the drug war does often 
manifest as the material inflicting of force, the theoretical enquiries of this thesis will 
examine this material violence as merely the superlative form of a preceding 
discursive violence. I do not wish to separate these two dimensions of legal violence: 
the material is, in itself, always already discursive. Discourse functions to reduce 
                                                
55 For scholarship on the relationship between law and violence, see Walter Benjamin, ‘Critique of 
Violence’, Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms: Autobiographical Writings, ed. P. Demetz (New York: 
1978), p. 287; Robert M. Cover, ‘Violence and the Word’, Yale Law Journal, 95 (1986), p. 1609; Gary 
Boire, ‘Legalizing Violence: Fanon, Romance, Colonial Law’, M. Freeman and A.Lewis (eds.), Law 
and Literature, Current Legal Issues, 2 (1999), pp. 581–601; Austin Sarat (ed.), Law, Violence, and the 
Possibility of Justice (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).  
56 Cover, ‘Violence and the Word’, p.1609. 
57 Austin Sarat, ‘Situating Law Between The Realities Of Violence And The Claims Of Justice: An 
Introduction’, Law, Violence, and the Possibility of Justice (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2001), p.1. 
58 Benjamin, ‘Critique of Violence’, pp.278-300. 
59 Sarat, ‘Situating Law’, p.4. 
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things beyond what they possibly could be, before it enacts force upon them. The 
material and discursive are part of the same process of violence and it will be this 
process, over and above the inflicting of force to which I refer throughout this work. 
The distinctive element of legal violence is that its functions to create the systems of 
norms, rendering it unintelligible as violence within the context of that system.  
The War on Drugs therefore offers a paradox: this violence cannot be the 
opposite of law – after all, it is a violence spoken into existence by the law; yet 
neither can this violence be simply all that the law is, since this would destabilise an 
international law understood to self-authorised the peaceful order of an international 
community. Therefore, the evidential problem of the violence of the War on Drugs 
requires a far more challenging analysis of tension between order and violence within 
the law. To seek to explain how the violence of the drug war does not disturb the 
coherence of a liberal international law, self-acclaimed as founded on sovereign 
equality and universal humanitarianism, requires a setting of the drug war within a 
critical picture of international law more generally. A different framework from 
conventional theories of international legal order is called for to reconcile the 
apparent contradictions we see when we look at the War on Drugs. Firstly, this 
requires integrating the violence of the War on Drugs into a longer genealogy of 
violence produced through, rather than read in opposition to, international law. 
Furthermore, when analysing the potential source and/or operative function of the 
violence of law, international law offers further theoretical challenges. In contrast to 
the force of law within the jurisdiction of a state, violence in the international arena 
does not derive from an exceptional, sovereign centre holding a monopoly on 
violence; instead the force of international law, tasked with sustaining as cohesive a 
diffuse international, must respond to a potential for disorder ever present within 
relations between autonomous, sovereign nations. There is a normative pull 
underneath the order of international law governing the distribution of violence 
throughout the globe.60 Moreover, the challenge for international law to contain 
violence across the globe intensified over the course of the twentieth century. It must 
be emphasised that the first half of the century was marked by the escape of violence 
from its confines in two world wars. The response of international law was to restate a 
commitment to the rule of law as the opposite of war and violence and the only force 
                                                
60 For more, see Anne-Charlotte Martineau, ‘Concerning Violence: A Post-Colonial Reading of the 
Debate on the Use of Force’ Leiden Journal of International Law, 29, 2 (2016), pp.95-112. 
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able to contain a destructive crisis of international order.  
Critical legal scholars have sought to challenge this narrative of twentieth 
century international law being the opposite of violence by exploring how 
contemporary global reveal international law as a discipline and practice that 
functions as a mode of violence itself.61 Jenifer Beard brings the Benjaminian critique 
of legal violence to bear upon international law, reading international law’s claim to 
producing a peaceful order of reciprocal sovereign states in the Treaty of Westphalia 
1648 against the law-making violence of the colonisation of the new world that was 
masked by the Westphalian myth. For Beard the violence of colonisation persist 
within the contemporary claims to universal peace, meaning that rather than expelling 
violence from the world ‘international laws operate as a form of sanctioned violence 
to maintain the Westphalian system of sovereign states.’ 62  By disturbing the 
foundations of international acclaimed peace, Beard reminds us that if international 
law is produced through the colonial encounter, then that violence is still operative 




 This chapter has focused on how the juris-diction of the law speaks the very 
concept of drugs into being, while legislating over it. The distinctions applied by 
society to different plant-life is a product of the legal determination, it is the law that 
cleaves the difference between, for example, the sugar cane plant that is cultivated 
and commoditised and the coca-leaf plant that is prohibited and subject to eradication 
through aerial fumigation. The works of Derrida, Baudrillard and Taussig have been 
used to illustrate how ‘drugs’ do not exist in nature but they are instead a concept 
discursively produced through human (mis)relation with particular psychoactive 
substances. Furthermore, prohibition not only produces these drugs as an existential 
threat to humanity, it then retrospectively projects this threat backwards to de-
historicize our contemporary relationship to these drugs. An understanding of the 
different socio-cultural perceptions of drug use that have existed historically and 
                                                
61 For critical legal scholarship on the violence of international law see Jennifer Beard, ‘The 
International Law in Force: Anachronistic Ethics and Divine Violence’, Fluer Johns, Richard Joyce 
and Sundhya Pahuja (eds.), Events: The Force of International Law (London: Routledge, 2011); or 
Vanja Hamzić, ‘International Law as Violence: Competing Absences of the Other,’ Dianne Otto (ed.), 
Queering International Law: Possibilities, Alliances, Complicities, Risks (London: Routledge, 2017).  
62 Beard, ‘The International Law in Force: Anachronistic Ethics and Divine Violence’, p.27. 
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globally helps to contextualize the current existential fear of drugs and provokes 
questioning about what underlies this fear. This chapter has analysed the debt the 
concept of ‘drugs’ owes to the Euro-modern association of these drugs with the 
spectre of the ‘non-human’- taken as embodied by racially subaltern peoples and 
transgressive plant-life. Finally, I concluded by unpacking how the production of 
drugs as what Taussig describes as ‘transgressive substances’ leads to further 
understanding of the imperative behind the War on Drugs. The paradox of the War on 
Drugs, the question of how can the violence detailed in the introduction be 
theoretically reconcilable with humanitarian claims of the law itself, begins to offer a 
telling insight into how law, particularly international law in its post-colonial, 
universalist instantiation, seeks to cohere itself.  
The War on Drugs serves an instantiation for what I am terming a ‘sacrificial’ 
international law, in which the humanitarianism and universal peace acclaimed by 
international law in constituted negatively through the legitimisation of violence 
against an enemy simultaneously included and excluded from the global order. The 
following chapter will unpack the concept of a ‘sacrificial’ international law, showing 
its relationship to both post/decolonial and political-theological readings of 
international law, before illustrating in subsequent chapters how it can be seen as 
operative within the War on Drugs.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Theorising A ‘Sacrificial’ International: The Persisting 




 The first chapter of this thesis engages with the literature produced on the 
focal instantiation of this thesis, the War on Drugs and drew on the more critical 
works in order to unpack how the very concept of ‘drugs’ is not an objective scientific 
category but one that is discursively produced by the law. The chapter analysed the 
relationship between the conceptualisation of particular plant-life as transgressive and 
the transgressive subjectivity imposed by Euro-modernity onto racially subaltern 
peoples, before concluding with an examination of how the violence of the War on 
Drugs troubles the orthodoxies that posit law as both the alternative and antidote to 
violence. However, such a reading raises the question of how this element of law can 
be reconciled with a claim to coherence. Particularly with regard to international law, 
which claims to constitute a communal order devoid of a sovereign authority that 
could monopolise violence, the questions of how violence is legitimised within this 
order invites significant theoretical engagement.  
 This chapter advances a notion of international law functioning as ‘sacrificial’ 
in order to both address the apparent paradox between the ‘humanitarianism’ of post-
war international law and the violence of the drug war. Drawing on a wealth of 
scholarship that highlights both the theological and colonial undercurrents that 
persists within the humanitarianism of international law, the idea of a sacrificial 
international law will be shown to be indebted to the inclusive/exclusion of the 
racially subaltern subject within the universal humanity of post-colonial, liberal 
international law. Furthermore, I will explore how this inclusive/exclusive 
positionality serves to legitimise violence upon this figure that is discursively 
produced so as to traverse the boundaries of humanity.  
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2.2 The Sacrificial Mechanism of International Law 
 
 As aforementioned, a central claim of this thesis will be to respond to the 
question of how international law can be reconciled with the violence of the drug war, 
through a notion of ‘sacrifice’. By sacrifice, I refer to the idea that a particular 
legitimised violence actually constitutes, rather than destabilises, international law. 
The potency of sacrifice, specifically as a (re)generative mode of violence, is most 
clearly illuminated in the work of French philosophical anthropologist René Girard. 
Girard offers through his literary scholarship and his philosophical anthropology an 
expansive understanding about the origins of violence and the mechanisms for its 
containment as employed for communal ordering. 1  Girard ties together our 
conceptions of violence with our notions of the sacred recognising theology as being 
rooted in the social need to contain and regulate violence. Through his reading of 
archaic ritual, Girard’s understanding of religion reminds us that religion functions 
not solely to facilitate the worship of the deific but, moreover, to allow the tying 
together of the social order as a constitutive whole. It is worth recalling that religion 
as a word is etymologically rooted in the Latin word religare – meaning to bind.2 
Girard begins his study through examining archaic societies ‘where institutions such 
as political or penal systems have not yet come into focus.’3 In these societies, an 
immediate problem becomes one of community formation, how does the group 
externalise violence from within its midst, Girard offers an instructive guide through 
which to understand operative function of the religious. Girard’s theory can be 
describe in two movements: firstly the mimetic nature of violence leading to 
escalation that engulfs social order and secondly, the reliance on the scapegoat 
mechanism to contain this violence and therefore allow a social order to be founded 
despite of this mimetic competition.4 Girard traces the ritual of sacrifice through the 
mythology and religions of human culture, reading its recurrence as betraying a 
subterranean mechanism for neutering the reciprocal violence that results from rivalry 
within any community. He begins with an understanding of violence as functioning 
                                                
1 See René Girard, Violence and the Sacred (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1977); René Girard, The Scapegoat,	  Yvonne Freccero (trans.) (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1986); René Girard, Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World (New York: 
Continuum, 2003). 
2 Sarah F. Hoyt, ‘The Etymology of Religion’, Journal of the American Oriental Society, 32, 2 (1912), 
pp.126-129, p.126.   
3 Michael Kirwan, Discovering Girard (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 2004), p.41. 
4 See Girard, Violence and the Sacred, Chapter 2 ‘The Sacrificial Crisis’, pp.39-68. 
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mimetically; it is prone to escalate unless contained by some sort of limiting system. 
In short, for Girard, the sacrificial ritual facilitates this catharsis by transferring that 
violence onto a legitimate victim, a victim that the community somehow justifies as 
deserving of violence. Girard’s schema suggests an alternative understanding of 
international law’s arrogation of a universal peace in the making of a community of 
nations. Through Girard, we can revisit the relationship between the production and 
renewal of the international legal order and an outbreak of violence – such as the War 
on Drugs – considering how certain modes of violence may actually facilitate, rather 
than destabilise, the peace of the international community.  
For international scholarship, Girard’s model can be particular useful as we can 
see conflict as the default condition for an international community of sovereign 
states in the absence of an over-arching authority. This presents a challenge 
particularly for thinkers of international law that subscribe to a wider tradition of 
liberalism, which can be defined as ‘the tradition of thought whose central concern is 
the liberty of the individual.’ 5  Liberalism as theorised by canonical European 
philosophers including, John Locke, Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill celebrates 
property rights, free trade and the rule of law as the pillars of social order. However, 
as Domenico Losurdo details, the liberal order, while projecting its tenets as universal 
and inalienable, has contained a tradition of ‘exclusion clauses’ categories of peoples 
that were disqualified from the sphere of liberal recognition and exchange.6 When 
translating liberalism into the international realm and examining its ability to organise 
relations not only between peoples but also between states, I ask if we see the 
persistence of these exclusion clauses and if so, what is their theoretical function? 
Liberalism as it emerged in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries presumed that the 
inherent liberating force of open trade between autonomous capitalist states could 
realise an enlightened, peaceful world order.7 International law in this era functioned 
to try to reconcile the tension between the economic prosperity produced through 
open capitalist rivalry and the tendency for such rivalry to fuel inter-state conflict and 
war. International law presumed to externalise violence from the ‘civilised’ world by 
demarcating an order of law- the order of mutual sovereign recognition described by 
                                                
5 Domenico Losurdo, Liberalism: A Counter-History, Gregory Elliott (trans.) (London: Verso, 2011), 
p.1. 
6 Ibid., p.173. 
7 For a full reading of liberal international law, see Tarik Kochi, ‘Dreams and Nightmares of Liberal 
International Law: Capitalist Accumulation, Natural Rights and State Hegemony’, Law and Critique, 
28 (2017), pp.23–41. 
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Carl Schmitt as ‘Jus Publicum Europaeum’- from the colonial world that was ‘beyond 
the line’ were violence was released in full.8 However, the challenge that faced 
liberalism in the international arena over the twentieth century was to respond to the 
explicit failure of that ideal as shown by the World Wars. After the Second World 
War, formal sovereign equality across all nations was established as the basis for 
international law, elevating the defining contribution of a liberal international 
jurisprudence.9 With the institution of a new economic framework through the end of 
formal colonial relations and invitation of new states into the capitalist marketplace 
through the rubric of development, the struggle to synthesise global capitalist 
accumulation with global pacification would befall international law. William Rasch 
details how this reading of international law seeks to depoliticise such structural 
antagonisms.10 He reads within the liberal legal order of the twentieth century the 
reduction of questions of ‘the political’ to becoming merely an issue of ‘policing’, 
with the combination of doctrines of universalism, development and human rights 
taking law from the sphere of politics into questions of morality.  Therefore, liberal 
international law operates by reducing politics to the legal (and military) 
implementation of morality.11  
However, this raises the question of what is the cohering force of an all-inclusive 
liberal international legal order? The cohering force that constitutes the international, 
famously described as the ‘anarchical society’ by Hedley Bull, has been a topic of 
interest for a ‘realist’ tradition of analysing the international which this tradition of 
scholarship understands as being predisposed to conflict.12 Girard aids the attempt to 
respond to Rasch’s challenge through a reading of conflict as resulting from what he 
terms as the mimetic quality of desire. Girard suggests instead that human desires are 
determined, not by one’s own mind, but in reflection of the desires of those others to 
whom we award the recognition of being. Upon perceiving that another might desire 
an object, humans comes to share the desire for that same object, thereby turning the 
                                                
8 Carl Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum (New 
York: Telos Press, 2006). 
9 Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia the Structure of the International Legal Argument 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p.93. 
10 William Rasch, Sovereignty and its Discontents: On the Primacy of Conflict and the Structure of the 
Political (London: Birkbeck Law Press, 2004). 
11 Rasch, Sovereignty and its Discontents, p.59. 
12 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (London: Macmillan, 
1977). 
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other human into the figure of ‘the rival.’13 A structure is therefore set in place for 
perpetual, intensifying violence between all those who claim complete subjectivity in 
themselves. Rivalry, following desire, functions mimetically, and, as a result, a state 
of crisis emerges which threatens to engulf all participants. A contagious cycle of 
violence materialises, multiplying as more and more subjects reflect each other by 
directing their desire towards the objects of contestation. Therefore, the basic 
requirement for a community to be established becomes the need for this intensifying 
violence to be quarantined. For Girard, this abiding peace is not achieved through a 
spontaneous truce or through the relevant parties engaging a capacity for reason, as a 
narrative of international law that placed the Peace of Westphalia as the origin of 
order might presume. Rather, unanimity is only brought about by displacing the 
violence felt by rival for rival, onto a surrogate victim, a figure Girard names as The 
Scapegoat. The scapegoat becomes a ‘sacrificial substitute’, tasked with absorbing the 
violence that has plagued the rival subjects and expunging this violence through its 
own sacrifice, allowing a community to emerge. Sacrificial violence cordons off the 
eruption of the maleficent violence that promised only perpetual disorder. Girard 
illuminates the workings of this mechanism in clear detail when he says: 
 
The violence directed against the surrogate victim might well be 
radically generative in that, by putting an end to the vicious and 
destructive cycle of violence, it simultaneously initiates another and 
constructive cycle, that of the sacrificial rite—which protects the 
community from that same violence and allows culture to flourish.14 
 
For Girard, this act of legitimate violence has served as the prerequisite for social 
orders to emerge, however its very operationality depends upon its invisibility. The 
sacrificial mechanism must remain concealed in order to achieve this catharsis: if the 
act of violence is not read as justified then it will merely add to the crescendo of 
violence emerging from the mimetic rivalry. Only when read by the social order as 
legitimate does the sacrifice of the scapegoat facilitate ‘the very real metamorphosis of 
reciprocal violence into restraining violence,’ bringing about a societal mode of 
relations. 15 Therefore, following Girard, the externalisation of violence onto the 
scapegoat creates as it destroys. The bounding of violence becomes also an enabling of 
                                                
13 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, p.147. 
14 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, p.93. 
15 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, p.96. 
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violence, since a particular category of violence-sacrifice- becomes that which is 
(re)generative of the social order as a whole.16 Girard’s model for the emergence of a 
peaceful social order is an inviting lens through which to analyse international law’s 
relationship to an enacting of violence, such as that offered by the War on Drugs. As 
Roy Rappaport details in his comprehensive anthropological study on the operative 
function of the sacred, prohibitions have long been used as the default mechanism by 
human societies in order to keep at bay feared monsters and spectres of disorder.17 
What a serious engagement with notions of sacred prohibitions or sacrifices reveals is 
that these rituals are not enacted in service of transcendent gods but in fact is an 
offering onto the social order itself. Particularly within the modern world, self-
constituted as being devoid of an external reference point, devoid of a transcendent 
unifying deity, legitimate violence ‘becomes an “introverted” sacrifice, a sacrifice to 
the perfected immanence of a now disenchanted world.’18 Through the process of 
ritual, social orders can achieve normative categories that could not otherwise be 
imposed upon an ambiguous and raw nature, allowing unity to be constituted, however 
temporally.19 I argue that an understanding of the (re)generative capacity of sacrifice 
enriches the current scholarly appreciation for how violence is not only inscribed into 
the law, but is operates as law-making and law-preserving. As the law posits itself as 
ontological complete in itself, is masks a crucial element of law for ‘what the 
sustaining of modern law requires […] is sacrifice.’20 Girard provokes the question of 
whether, for the international legal order to constitute itself, particularly the expansive, 
universal liberal international law of the late twentieth century, there has been referral 
to a sacrificial form of violence that services the cohesion and preservation of the legal 
order.21 A particular mode of violence therefore becomes not only tolerated within this 
order, rather it becomes sacred to this order; it is not read as violence but the legitimate 
process of making the order a constitutive whole. Rappaport recognises that within 
human communities the ‘sacred forms an unchanging ground upon which all else in 
                                                
16 Greg Noll, ‘René Girard and the Use of Force in International Law’, Leiden Journal of International 
Law, 21 (2008), p.568. 
17 Roy Rappaport, Ritual and Religion in the Making of Humanity (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999). 
18 Peter Fitzpatrick, ‘The Triumph of a Departed World: Law, Modernity and the Sacred’, Martha 
Umphrey, Austin Sarat and Lawrence Douglas (eds.), Law and the Sacred (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2007), pp.155-183, p.160. 
19 Rappaport, Ritual and Religion, p.87. 
20 Ibid., p.160. 
21 Noll, ‘René Girard and the Use of Force In International Law’, p.565.  
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adaptive social structures can change continuously without loss of orderliness.’22 In 
this thesis I will explore if we can understand the contemporary international legal 
order as anchored on a sacrificial violence that allows the fluidity of the liberal 
doctrines and provisions to operate. 
 
2.2.1 On Law and Sacrifice 
 
 Filtering a critical approach to international law through the ‘sacrificial’ 
model provides a new perspective on the peace that is acclaimed by the international 
community, especially in its post-war, post-colonial liberal instantiation. The concept 
of sacrifice and the sacrificial mechanism as a structure provides an insightful lens 
through which to engage with the question of what is international law; the sacrificial 
mechanism commences from the same place as orthodox international legal theory in 
presupposing a state of rivalry between subjects as the default (rather than 
interrupted) state of relations. Canonical political philosopher Thomas Hobbes shared 
this perspective of international order, which he offered as the exemplar par 
excellence of the rivalry that he felt to be the natural condition of human beings sans 
government. For Hobbes, international relations between sovereign states served as an 
archetype for the ‘war of all against all’ (bellum omnium contra omnes) that anchored 
his theory of the state of nature:  
 
Though there had never been any time wherein particular men were in 
a condition of war one against another, Kings, and Persons of 
Soveraigne authority, because of their Independency, are in continuall 
jealousies, and in the state and posture of Gladiators; having their 
weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their 
Forts, Garrisons, and Guns upon the Frontiers of their Kingdomes; 




Hobbes conceptualised the ‘war of all against all’ as the condition of being that 
prefigured the emergence of any social order. Subsequently, the Hobbesian 
understanding of a social that is devoid of the overarching sovereign being the sphere 
of unending violence became a predominant influence on classical theories of 
                                                
22 Rappaport, Ritual and Religion, p.427. 
23 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Richard Tuck (ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 
p.90. 
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international law, particularly what would emerge as the realist tradition of 
internationalism.24 Hobbes’ treatise was concurrent with the Peace of Westphalia, the 
event credited by orthodox historiography as founding event of modern international 
legal order.  Reading together Hobbes’ insights and the Westphalian moment, which 
brought a formal end to the thirty years war, we can see how even the mainstream 
account of international law admits the containment of ‘continuall jealousies’ between 
sovereign powers essential for the imagining of any form of coherent order. The 
subsequent celebration of Westphalia as a triumph of reason functions to try and 
satisfy the task that befalls the discipline of international law: to account for the 
transfer from ‘continuall jealousies’ to a peaceful order without recourse to the 
Hobbesian narrative for domestic social orders, in which submission to an 
overarching sovereign authority resolves perpetual conflict. For Hobbes, it is the 
institution of government that abates contagious warring and it is in recognition of 
this fact that humans are willing to give up their independence for the security of 
being ruled.25 This solution is not available to theorists of international law, which has 
sought to bring about a peace absent the institution of world government. As a result 
there arose a strain of positivist thinking, particularly in the nineteenth century, which 
dismissed international law being no true law; John Austin, for example, summarised 
that due to the lack of sovereign command, international law was not law as it 
depended upon the good will of the legal subjects to follow its determinations.26 The 
Girardian structure offers another answer to the question of how does the international 
community cohere itself absent the referral to an overarching sovereign. Girard points 
us towards a mechanism of constituting community through negation, rather than the 
submission to the sovereign of Hobbes’ Leviathan, the creation a ‘scapegoat’ as a 
figure that can bring the order into being through opposition to it. Sacrifice becomes 
an unrecognised element in producing the communality in the contemporary moment, 
becomes accredited to the rational power of law. 
                                                
24 For further reading on Hobbes’ influence on international legal thought, see Charles Covell, Hobbes, 
Realism and the Tradition of International Law (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). Covell details 
the place that Hobbes occupies amongst the primary international legal theorists Grotius, Pufendorf and 
Vattel, as well as the realist tradition of international politics.  
25 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan  Richard Tuck (ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
26 John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1954).  
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Critical legal scholarship has begun to pay attention to the extent to which the 
transcendent power of the law is grounded in sacrifice.27 For instance, Johan Van Der 
Walt’s exploration of a Post-Apartheid theory of law argued for a recognition of the 
sacrifice that is contained in every law or every legal decision.28 Van der Walt 
employs a Derridian notion of the ‘cut’ contained in every decision to illuminate how 
the law in producing ‘the social benefits pursued by deciding a case in favour of one 
party’ simultaneously produces a series of ‘harms resulting from deciding the case 
against the other party.’29 For Derrida, any positing of determinacy comes at the cost 
of sacrifice, what ‘is’ only can be on account of the violence of what is done to 
whatever else could be.30 The law, as an order, is dependent on the positing of 
determinacy. In its bid to present itself as a cohesive whole, with every decision, 
declaration or determination, the law sacrifices the plethora of possibilities contained 
in the alternative paths it could have taken. For Van der Walt the legal decision 
functions so as to puncture multiplicity in terms of modes of humanity, the law 
retreats from such plurality in order to produce a oneness in the social order.31 Placing 
a specific focus on the laws of apartheid South Africa, Van Der Walt shows how the 
racial violence can be performed through the law as a result of the disregard of the 
sacrifices contained in each determination of law.32 The relation between racial 
violence and sacrifice through the law will be a theme I take up again later. Anne 
Orford also follows Derrida in reading the inner workings of international trade deals 
through the lens of ‘sacrifice’, with law acting as a ‘transcendent god’ governing a 
globalised marketplace.33 
In the realm of critical theory and political philosophy, a particularly 
influential contribution to scholarship on the link between juridical order and sacred 
violence has been the work of Giorgio Agamben.34 Agamben reads the construction 
                                                
27 See Peter Goodrich, Languages of Law: From Logics of Memory to Nomadic Masks (London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1990); or Thanos Zartaloudis, Giorgio Agamben: Power, Law and the Uses 
of Criticism (New York: Routledge, 2010). 
28 Johan Van Der Walt, Law and Sacrifice: Towards a Post-Apartheid Theory of Law (London: 
Birkbeck Law Press, 2006). 
29 Ibid., p.187. 
30 Jacques Derrida, The Gift of Death, David Wills (trans.) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1996). 
31 Ibid., pp.11-12. 
32 Ibid., pp.11-14. 
33 Anne Orford, ‘Beyond Harmonization: Trade, Human Rights and the Economy of Sacrifice’, Leiden 
Journal of International Law 18, 02, (2005) pp.179-213. 
34 See Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press 1998) 
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of political community is fundamentally based on the ritualistic stripping of the homo 
sacer, a sacred figure of Roman legal ordering, of the protections of citizenship. 
Sovereignty is then constituted by this distinction between the bare life of the homo 
sacer and the qualified life of the recognised citizens. The homo sacer is thereby 
excluded from a legal order that its own exclusion is productive off. Agamben’s work 
on the homo sacer has made him amongst the most influential theorist in 
contemporary juridical thought.35 Girard shares Agamben’s reading of community as 
fundamentally indebted to the process of scapegoating. However, whilst Agamben 
has attracted the attention of international legal theorists, Girard remains 
underexplored as a resource.36 This oversight persists despite Girard’s model of 
community- formed through the scapegoat being collectively turned into the 
embodiment of the contagious violence which must be expelled to produce peace- 
drawing more immediate parallels for international law than Agamben’s model which 
remains fundamentally based on the power of the sovereign to declare an exception 
and cast out the homo sacer. Agamben’s theory, following Carl Schmitt, leads him to 
envision the totalitarianism of a continued state of exception as the apotheosis of 
sacrificial juridical ordering, however, as illustrated through his citing of Nazi 
Germany as his telling example, Agamben’s theory is indebted to the presumed power 
of the state. 
 
2.2.2 Sacrificial Mechanism Against The Myth of Westphalia 
 
Girard’s schema of community (re)generation though legitimate violence, I 
argue, provides a richer theoretical grounding for the international legal order as it 
recognises the paucity, not the strength of the law as underwriting this referral to 
sacrifice. Orthodox international legal theory relies on a teleological understanding of 
the international community and, through reference to Westphalia, attempts to 
construct a geographically and historically specific moment of origin for international 
                                                
35 For legal scholarship engaging with Agamben’s work, see Thanos Zartaloudis, Giorgio Agamben: 
Power, Law and the Uses of Criticism (London: Routledge, 2011); Stephen Humphreys, ‘Legalizing 
Lawlessness: On Giorgio Agamben’s State of Exception’, The European Journal of International Law, 
17, 3 (2007), pp. 677–687; or Thanos Zartaloudis (ed.), Agamben and Law: Edited Collection in Series 
Philosophers and Law (London: Routledge, 2015). 
36 For international legal engagements with Agamben, see Humphreys, ‘Legalizing Lawlessness’; or 
Dianne Otto, ‘Remapping Crisis through a Feminist Lens’, Sari Kouvo, Zoe Pearson (eds.), Feminist 
Perspectives on Contemporary International Law: Between Resistance and Compliance? (Oxford: Hart 
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law. Westphalia is posited as marking the transfer from the religious to the secular, 
from the medieval to the modern, from a violently contested Christendom to a 
community, or moreover, a society of sovereign states guaranteed by international 
law. 37  This sharp periodization between a pre-modern international community 
plagued by a ‘war of all against all,’ and the modern construction of order attributes 
international law with simultaneously facilitating and then exemplifying the 
relegation of the irrational, the superstitious, and the ritualistic onto the category of 
the pre-modern. 38  This familiar narrative underpins accepted truisms about 
international law: that international law is founded upon an objective scientific 
rationality; that international law operates as teleological, ever-progressing towards a 
greater peace; that international law- unlike the mysticism of the pre-modern- is a 
system of rules that can be objectively known and applied; that international law has 
no structural constraints that may contaminate its pursuit of universal justice.39 This 
orthodox understanding of international law invites us to accept that peace exists as 
immanent within the very establishment of the international legal order. Bringing an 
end to the era of cyclical religious violence that preceded it, the Westphalian Peace of 
1648 is offered as the event that brought the universal jurisdiction of the divine into 
the law itself. However, understandings of international law as a self-animating 
mechanism for peace, such as those contained in the popular memory of the 
Westphalian moment, betray themselves by the sharpness of the temporal break to be 
retrospectively constructed to provide the illusion of a fixed theoretical ground: the 
movement of history does not demark epoch from epoch in such determinate terms. 
Upon closer inspection, the Westphalian treaties show, as is often the case with 
artefacts of modernity, the shadowing of the modern by the pre-modern.40 To seek to 
effect a clean separation between the modern age and its precursor on account of the 
Westphalian moment would require a disregard for the exclusive control enjoyed by 
                                                
37 Peter Fitzpatrick, ‘Westphalia and The Poetics of Law’, London Review of International Law, 2, 1 
(2014), p.156. 
38 Kathleen Davis, ‘Timelines: Feudalism, Secularity and Early Modernity’, South Asia: Journal of 
South Asian Studies, 38, 1 (2015), pp.69-83, p.72 
39 This list is a development of B.S. Chimni’s list offered in ‘An outline of a Marxist course on public 
international law’, Susan Marks, International Law on the Left: Re-examining Marxist Legacies 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p.54. 
40 For further discussions on the inability of The Peace of Westphalia to fully determine the modern see 
Stephen Krasner, ‘Westphalia and all that,’ J. Goldstein and R.O. Keohane (eds.), Ideas and Foreign 
Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp.235–64; 
Stephane Beaulac, ‘The Westphalian model in defining international law: challenging the myth’, 
Australian Journal of Legal History, 8 (2004), p.181. 
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political entities over defined territories prior to the Peace, in a manner that would too 
easily substitute for orthodox definitions of sovereignty. It also would require a 
disregard for how political authorities that would be retrospectively defined as 
‘medieval’– the Holy Roman Empire, the Papacy – persisted as hegemonic well after 
the Peace.41 An examination of the treaties by Richard Joyce confirms that: 
 
The provisions in the Westphalian treaties […] did not reveal the 
unequivocal emergence of a widespread notion of modern sovereignty or 
the establishment of a coherent system at the heart of which lay the 
sovereign state. Instead, they revealed the continued influence of 
medieval ideas and institutional forms.42  
 
The notion of a ‘sacrificial’ international rejects such orthodoxies regarding 
international law as a self-animating discipline. The use of the myth of Westphalia to 
allow international law to account for itself in positive terms collapses too easily into 
tautology. For instance, an immediate challenge is presented in recognising that 
international law is not simply applied to or founded upon the sovereign nation state, 
but is actively involved in its production. 43  The Westphalian myth reads ‘the 
anarchical society’ as emerging through the authority of equal yet independent 
sovereign states, who, in their autonomy, undertake a condition of communality. Yet 
to be in accordance with this model, international law would be tasked with 
recognising and authorising the sovereignty of the nation state, whilst also receiving 
its force as an order through the authority of its component nation states. Westphalia  
is therefore tasked by its conventional to simultaneously birth both the principle of 
states constituting their own authority in and of themselves and a new international 
order based on the authority of these new nation states.44 This gives us a paradox of 
international law being founded by categories it is itself charged with bringing into 
existence. This circular logic is indicative of a critical indeterminacy at the heart of 
standard conceptions of international law. It is the same indeterminacy that presents 
itself when considering how independent, singular sovereign subjects manage to 
remain in common with each other, while retaining their independence and 
                                                
41 Richard Joyce, ‘Westphalia: Event, Memory, Myth,’ Fluer Johns, Richard Joyce and Sundhya Pahuja 
(eds.), Events: The Force of International Law (London: Routledge, 2011), p.59. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Sundhya Pahuja, Decolonising International Law: Development, Economic Growth and the Politics 
of Universality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p.28. 
44 Peter Fitzpatrick, ‘Westphalia and the Poetics of Law’, London Review of International Law, 2, 1 
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singularity. As Peter Fitzpatrick tells us, for the sovereign states to remain held in 
common with each other, their commonality has to be assuredly determinate but not 
ultimately determinate; in addition, the commonality must be illimitably responsive 
but not ultimately responsive.45 Such indeterminacy becomes a persistent feature in 
the workings of international law. Martti Koskenniemi, explains how it reoccurs when 
considering the structure of juridical argument, which, through a critical openness, 
often results in contradictory positions both claiming justification from the authority 
of international law. The classic instantiation of this is the irresolution that emerges in 
the face of a conflict between international law and the law of a nation state – the 
sovereign authority from which the international claims legitimacy. To avoid 
‘utopianism,’ international law must correspond with the state’s sovereign will, but to 
avoid ‘apologism,’ said law must be binding upon states, regardless of singular will.46 
This same indeterminacy reoccurs when the attempt to ground international law in the 
authority of the sovereign nation state confronts the irresolution underpinning the 
nation state’s claim to permanence and determination. The impossibility of a static 
definition of a nation state – language, territory or history all unsatisfactory– troubles 
the claim of international law to be based, as an order, upon the sovereignty of 
nations. To take as a given the model of the fixed, singular nation state ignores both 
the question of what constitutes a nation, as boundaries and histories remain 
perpetually in flux.47 This indeterminacy betrays a gap at the heart of the law, 
between law as it exists and law as is promised through the claim to universality.48  
Orthodox narratives of international law require a leap of faith, they take the law as 
promised by modernity to be already realised. To think critically about international 
law is to realise that there is ‘a void at the very heart of international society which is 
marked by the myth of international legal order.’49 When this void is acknowledged, 
the secular rationality that modern law self-ascribes lies embarrassed. As Oscar 
Guardiola-Rivera makes clear, ‘for all its ‘realism’, ‘pragmatism’ and ‘post-
metaphysics’, even the most refined or expert orientations of IL/IR [international 
                                                
45 Peter Fitzpatrick, ‘Latin Roots: The Force of International Law as Event’, Events: The Force of 
International Law, p.46. 
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law/international relations] turn out to be metaphysical. Its post-metaphysical self-
perception is therefore a myth.’50  From this perspective, Westphalia retains an 
importance but more as a recognition of the persistence of mythological within the 
modern than as a historical record.51 It necessarily conceals the workings of ‘sacrifice’ 
underpinning international law as ‘law can operate only through its mythical 
supplement, but the myth that sustains the law has to be excluded from the public 
eye.’52 
The notion of a ‘sacrificial international’ does not ignore the indeterminacy at 
the heart of the structure of international law, but rather attempts to account for the 
very necessity of this indeterminacy and of the mythological masking of its presence. 
From this perspective, the inability to offer a total account of the grounding of a legal 
order is the very element that allows for the institution of that legal order through 
bounding violence. Drawing a continuum from ‘rudimentary sacrificial rights’ he first 
read in archaic societies to ‘advanced judicial forms’ of the contemporary, Girard 
sketches not a sharp break between the pre-modern and modern forms of cohering 
communality but the persistence of a religious (in its broadest sense) orientation in 
our secularised moment, which allows the workings of sacrificial mechanism to 
function.53 Noll states this idea most clearly by suggesting that:  
 
If we follow Girard and read international law as religion, its 
incompleteness, its obscurity might be absolutely necessary for the law’s 
‘transcendental effectiveness’ in containing violence.54 
 
The bind that ties members of the international community becomes one that must 
remain hidden. The circularity of its presumed grounding betrays an unprocessed 
element of the constitution of the international legal order – that the unity that appears 
miraculous amongst the ‘anarchical society’ draws on a subterranean, sacrificial 
violence. Recalling the insights of Benjamin and other scholars of the nexus of law 
and violence, Girard illuminates how a particular form of violence can actually be 
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51 Richard Joyce, ‘Westphalia’,, p.57 
52 Oscar Guardiola-Rivera, ‘Paradise Lost...: The Meaning of Modernity and the Antinomy of the 
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productive, rather than destructive of a legal order. Christopher Menke also adds to 
this reading of legal violence as interrupting the mimetic structure of rivalry stating 
‘Law breaks with the violence of revenge by interrupting this merciless logic of the 
same, and thus an endless repetition.’ 55  Menke shows how the law therefore 
differentiates itself from the violence of rivalry, by positing itself as justified violence- 
a violence that could be termed as law making or law-preserving -as it creates or 
renews the social norms that rivalry threatens to upend. Girard offers clarity regarding 
the relationship between law and archaic sacrifice, stating that the work of the 
sacrificial mechanism persists in ‘one of our social institutions above all: our judicial 
system.’56 Following modernity, the law functions so as to secularise the sacrificial 
ritual employed to expel contagious violence from the society. The law also inherits 
the obscurity of its workings required for the sacrificial mechanism to be effective, as 
Girard highlights when arguing: 
 
It is that enigmatic quality that pervades the judicial system when that 
system replaces sacrifice. This obscurity coincides with the 
transcendental effectiveness of a violence that is holy, legal, and 
legitimate successfully opposed to a violence that is unjust, illegal, and 
illegitimate.57  
 
This is an immediate challenge to the ideas of secularity, modernity and universality 
on which orthodox understandings of international law are taken to rest. The claim to 
universality, particularly becomes central to international law over the course of the 
twentieth century, the period over which this thesis will trace the emergence of drug 
prohibition. As Anthony Anghie states, ‘the association between international law and 
universality is so ingrained that pointing to this connection appears tautologous.’58 
Encapsulating the totality of the globe, international law functions as a genuine world 
religion, in a manner that exceeded even the great Abrahamic faiths. To view the 
international legal order through Girard’s understanding of community formation 
illuminates the extent to which law remains hostage to the metaphysical grammar of 
the religious in order to constitute an ostensibly secular, liberal universality. As 
opposed to merely being a set of practices and provisions that are universally 
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subscribed to, the law produces universality through the development of an idealised 
standard, which can then be imposed upon the world. The sacrifice of that which is 
deemed other to the universal allows the law to contain – in both senses of the word, 
both keeping it at bay and keeping it within – the escalating violence of ‘continuall 
jealousies’ without sovereign power. Oscar Guardiola-Rivera recognises how this 
‘foundational sacrifice’ provides international law its ‘prescriptive force’ stating: 
 
Group survival is seen in the context of the predominant doxa as 
necessarily desirable and violence appears paradoxical: violent conflict, 
often seen as a foreign element threatening group survival, is necessarily 
undesirable and must be contained by means of…violence.59 
 
Understanding international law’s indeterminacy as necessarily obscuring the 
continued reference to sacrifice aids my attempt to reconcile the violence declared by 
the law- exemplified by the War on Drugs, with the maintenance of order amongst the 
‘anarchical society.’ However, where does the international legal order’s inability to 
justify ontological completeness leave its claim to function as an ‘all’? Is it possible to 
be foreign to an order of universal jurisdiction? Put simply, the corollary to follow a 
sacrificial reading of international law must be the question of: who could serve as a 
scapegoat for the modern international community and what moment could serve as 
the ‘foundational sacrifice’? 
 
2.3 The Racial Subaltern as Sacrificial Victim 
 
With the notion of a ‘sacrificial international’ at hand, the immediate problem 
presented by a review of the drug war- why does legal violence upon certain bodies 
seem not disturb the grounding of humanitarian, international law- can be unpacked. 
For the sacrificial mechanism to function, the scapegoat must be constructed as a 
figure on who violence can be licensed in order to produce a commonality amongst 
rivals. The construction of the scapegoat must be such that it reads as familiar enough 
to expunge violence from the community, yet foreign enough for its sacrifice to 
appear justified.60 Girard details the position that the sacrifice must occupy as: 
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Neither outside nor inside the community, but marginal to it […] situated 
[…] between the inside and the outside, they can perhaps be said to 
belong to both the interior and the exterior of the community.61 
 
Following Girard, we should appreciate the victim of legitimate violence as 
necessarily taking on the condition of being inside and outside the boundaries of the 
social order. It is inside so as absorb the spiralling violence that threatens to destroy 
the entire community, and yet outside, so that there remains a perceived discontinuity 
between the victim and the community, allowing the sacrifice to expunge, rather than 
perpetuate, the mimetic violence from the community.62  
In terms of international law, where the community being ordered is 
acclaimed as universal humanity, the scapegoat would have to correlate to a figure 
read as traversing the boundary of humanity. This leads us onto engaging the 
European colonialism, where many critical scholars locate the birth of international 
law, and its intertwinement with the discourse of racism. Racism is, at its core, the 
(impossible) attempt to push certain humans outside of the boundaries of humanity. In 
declaring certain peoples as not human, racism hopes to justify violence upon them 
but the violence that is then done in racism’s name actually serves to expose the lie of 
this declaration. To vehemently insist on the inhumanity of your victims through your 
brutalisation of them is, conversely, to betray that without that brutalisation, the 
claims of their inhumanity would dissolve. The international community as a whole 
self-identifies with ‘the civilised world.’ In doing so, it depends upon a boundary that 
differentiates outsiders from insiders as members of the community, while continuing 
to arrogate juristic claims of universality.63 Those who form the other must remain 
outside of the universal, so as to offer, as Sundhya Pahuja puts it, ‘a screen onto 
which the negative definition of universality itself may be projected.’ Yet in the post-
colonial era in which international law is now taken to extend to all peoples equally, 
those who form the other must also ‘answer a demand for inclusion within the 
universal without disrupting the assertion of those values as universal.’64 It is this 
interior/exterior ambiguity, paralleling the positionality essential to the cathartic 
function of the sacrifice, which encourages a reading together of the conditions of 
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Girard’s scapegoat and the history of the racial subaltern subject.  
The racial subaltern subject is a conceptual model for collectively describing 
the populations that the discourse of racism seeks to relegate from the category of the 
fully human. The post-colonial concept of subalternity was initially developed in the 
work of Gayatri Spivak, before being applied to the categories of race by scholars 
such as Denise Ferreira da Silva.65 Especially within the liberal discourse of the 
internationalism that arose over the twentieth century, the racial subaltern subject is 
conscripted into the modern universal order (so that the universal may act as it is 
named). However, with the persistence of racial and colonial relations of power 
within the promised equality of contemporary liberalism, the racial subaltern 
continues to stand as the embodiment of the barbarism against which the modern 
universal is formed: the constitutive outside that the universal can hold in 
contradistinction to itself. Returning to Girard, his model of sacrifice sees the 
community as positing its own self-ascribed antithesis as an embodied scapegoat. 
Within the international community we can see the same mechanism at work, 
although its workings are amplified as a consequence of the universal claim to 
illimitability: if international law is universal then that which is exterior is utterly 
excluded from law. But it must also be simultaneously be entirely included within the 
law, otherwise the claim to universality is punctured.66 This is the paradox, I argue, 
that befalls the racial subaltern subject, it is ensnared within the universal order whilst 
being excluded from it. Oscar Guardiola-Rivera details the functioning of this process 
stating:  
 
According to this logic, that which is excluded is not, for this reason, 
simply without relation to the rule since the rule maintains itself in 
relation to the exception in the form of suspension. Put another way, the 
rule maintains itself (and reintroduces order in the social) by subtracting 
the exceptional element from the society and focusing on it the violence 
of the whole of society…. In order to do so it introduces in society forms 
of internal differentiation or mediation, more often than not in the form 
of distinctions between what is normal or standard (and is thus on the 
side of society) and what is pathological (and becomes the outside of 
society).67 
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Moreover, Peter Fitzpatrick recognises how the orientation of the international legal 
order recalls the structure of modern racism, stating that ‘Universal ius could match 
the idea of the unity of the species in racist discourse.’68 Fitzpatrick is highlighting the 
way in which the racial subaltern subject cannot be removed from the universal 
humanity invoked by international law, while being fixed in an opposition to that 
universal humanity through an inscribed difference. The aim of racist discourse is to 
cleave a division within a biological continuum, to hold the racial subaltern apart 
from a universal humanity that it is always unable to escape from.69  
 
2.3.1 The Sacrificial Victim and The Damned of The Earth 
 
Frantz Fanon captures the paradoxical position imposed upon the racial 
subaltern subject with his description that this figure as ‘rooted at the core of a 
universe from which he must be extricated.’70 It is this positionality that ontologically 
structures the racial subaltern subject as naked to violence. Colonialism is understood 
as ‘violence in its natural state’.71 Fanon’s work remains an essential resource for 
scholars who try to think through race or coloniality as primary organizing principles 
of the global political order, including scholars engaging in questions of law.72 For 
Fanon, colonialism is driven by ‘the necessity to establish law and order among the 
barbarians’73 As aforementioned, recent international legal scholarship has turned 
towards viewing the colonial encounter as originating the Euro-modern world order.74 
An engagement with Fanon only enriches these readings of imperial roots of modern 
world order. The reading on colonialism and the post-colonial inheritance of colonial 
relations as systems of violence brings the recent critiques of international law 
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together with the aforementioned tradition of legal scholarship concerned with the 
intimate relationship between law and violence.75 Echoing Benjamin’s conception of 
the law-making potential of legal violence, Fanon’s reading of colonial law 
illuminates ‘how and why this violence operates as a constitutive-yet paradoxical- 
legal force: how and why this violence both creates and tries to preserve an 
interpellative legal system of civil society.’76 Fanon’s understanding of violence is 
again not merely a singular impacting of force but as the full tapestry of the discursive 
and material techniques used to disqualify a subject against a given system of norms. 
Fanon’s reads together the violence of the coloniser and the law imposed by colonial 
legal order as one and the same and crucially, this legal system does not merely 
separate the colonised from means of subsistence outside of capital relations but is 
further constitutive of colonial legal personality as what Fanon describes as 
‘damnation.’77 Far from being simply a codified set of rules, ‘colonial law is, for 
Fanon, a multivalent phenomenon: a material force, a form of representation, a 
multidimensional constitutive discourse, a system that forms colonial subjects and 
subjectivities.’78  
Fanon recognises that race is not a natural state of being. He understand that 
the subalternity of the ‘negro’ or the ‘amerindian’ or the ‘oriental’ is the result of 
discursive production that creates this social (non)relation. Discourse disqualifies the 
racial subaltern from the category of full humanity and the law is implicated in this 
discursive field. By identifying the pre-social misrecognition that underwrites the 
social order of the modern international community, Fanon illuminates how a single 
standard of humanity, elevated to circumnavigate the globe, was constituted 
negatively through the attempt to exclude whole categories of people from the register 
of humanity, by deeming them as racially subaltern. Fanon’s can also be read 
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alongside the insights of critical race theory, a rich tradition of scholarship that has 
focuses on a critical analysis of racism.79 Ruth Wilson Gilmore’s now canonical 
definition of racism defined it as ‘the state-sanctioned or extralegal production and 
exploitation of group-differentiated vulnerability to premature death.80 This definition 
can be extended to go beyond the mechanisms of the state violence in order to 
understand race as a global discourse, as legal violence does not derive solely from 
the state. Denise Ferreira da Silva takes up this task in her exploration of the global 
idea of race. Silva reads the material and psycho-social subaltern position that Black 
people occupy across the globe, placing a particular focus on Brazil and the U.S.A., as 
not merely a contradiction within but fully constitutive of a juridical universality.81 
Connecting the very production of a conception of a universal human subject, which 
she entitles ‘homo modernus’, to the ‘logics of exclusion/obliteration’ that she reads 
as underwriting racial difference, Silva offers a pertinent challenge to legal scholars 
who may wish to appeal to the law to allay racial violence by outlining the ways in 
which the modern conception of the law and of its idealised human subject is indebted 
to production of the figure of the racial subaltern as the geo-historically confined 
negation of the universal.82 For Silva ‘the racial delimits the reach of the law and 
humanity.’83 This returns us to the question of if race can be read alongside the 
scapegoat as a model for the communality for international law. 
A position of interior/exteriority to humanity would be essential for any 
scapegoat of international law, as would any signs of scapegoat as the cause of 
violence by corporeal markers of their irregular humanity. Girard explains that 
scapegoats are often chosen ‘because they bear the signs of victims’: they are already 
marked in their physicality as somehow abnormal. 84  The legitimacy of their 
victimhood is constructed as rooted in their physical being; they are damned through 
their corporeality, which marks them as a person or group of people who are 
                                                
79 See Gilmore, Golden Gulag; Fred Moten, ‘Blackness and Nothingness (Mysticism in the Flesh)’, 
The South Atlantic Quarterly, 112, 4 (Fall 2013); or Frank B. Wilderson, Red, White & Black: Cinema 
and the Structure of U.S. Antagonism (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010). 
80 Gilmore Golden Gulag, p.28. 
81 Denise Ferreira da Silva, Toward a Global Idea of Race (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2007).  
82 Ibid., part III. 
83 Ibid., p.11. 
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susceptible to selection for the sacrificial role.85 As aforementioned, the sacrifice 
serves as the superlative manifestation of the discursive violence already performed 
on the victim. Fitzpatrick notes how ‘the enclosing of […] identity, is always a denial 
of what could otherwise be or have been, and when explicit that denial is a 
sacrifice.’86 When this difference from the norm is embodied it can gives rise to 
political culture where, as Shela Sheikh argues, ‘certain bodies are culturally and 
politically constructed as “disposable” or “sacrificeable.”’87 With the discursive and 
material violence of European colonialism working in tandem with each other, 
Racism can be understood as a process that produces the colonised as disastrous 
subjects of people, peoples physically marked through their deviation from a 
predetermined standard and therefore read as a sign of ill fate and ruin. As the 
standard is geo-temporally located within Euro-modernity, the cleaving of difference 
necessarily demarcates a European exceptionalism that is also expressed through the 
language of body, and the political project of colonialism bleeds into the corporeal 
project of racialization. Fanon illuminates how the mythopoetics behind the language 
of racism centre on the construction of particular bodies as ‘damned.’88 Racism 
employs corporeal markers (skin colour, hair type, facial features, etc.) to impose a 
discursive language of branding upon human bodies.89 Those branded as racially 
subaltern are understood to be anatomically marked through their bodies as a 
deviation from the model of the ideal subject of modernity, that is, the European man. 
The language of race translates the demarcating physical features into the signs of 
damnation for the victims of the social order. The social order is then able to amplify 
those features, so as to reinforce the polarisation between itself and the victim. Girard 
himself recognises how the sacrificial process ‘is clearly observable in racist 
cartoons.’90 Such racist caricatures show how racially subaltern features are not only 
emphasised as physically repugnant, they are further imbued with a moral failing. The 
body is made into an indicator of its owner’s nature and fate ‘physical and moral 
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monstrosity go together.’91 Race thereby functions as the pathogen, an infection that 
disturbs, and if left unchecked could consume, the social order.  
The grammar of racism outlined above maps onto the production of the 
sacrificial scapegoat. Hidden within the workings of the sacrificial mechanism is the 
way in which selection for the sacrifice is not completely arbitrary.92 Though the 
scapegoat is innocent, in that they are not the actual cause of the conflict that their 
sacrifice is to abate, their guilt, in the eyes of the community, is written upon their 
body. The scapegoat’s responsibility for the crisis is a question not of facts but of 
mien: physical appearance is taken to betray guilt.93 As the process of victimisation 
remains at all times concealed to those who perpetrate it, a physical deformity of the 
victim – as in their deviation from the model, from the ideal – allows the community 
to rationalise its licensing of violence. The community understands itself to be simply 
reading the signs of doom written on the scapegoat’s body and, in a bid to restrain the 
spiralling mimetic violence upon the horizon, it looks to those in their midst who are 
somehow already marked as the embodiment of crisis, to those who can serve as 
scapegoat or as Girard alternatively calls the figure, ‘a sacred monster’.94 In referring 
to the scapegoat as a ‘sacred monster,’ Girard emphasises that the interior/exterior 
positionality of monsters disturbs us because they appear as human and not human at 
the same time.95 Furthermore, the etymology of the word ‘monster’ demonstrates how 
monstrous appearance is deemed to prophesise an emerging threat. Derived from the 
Latin ‘monstrum,’ from the verb ‘monere,’ meaning ‘to warn or admonish’, the word 
illuminates how, in the midst of a crisis, the monster is read as both the representation 
of the outbreak of violence and a warning of greater violence to come.96 The monster 
holds within its body the disharmony that has come to plague the community. 
Consequently, violence against the monster becomes a form of sacrifice, a bounding 
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violence which re-establishes order rather than contravening it.97 Their lives become, 
what Judith Butler terms as ‘ungreviable’ in that their deaths are not mourned, their 
suffering of violence does not disturb the prevailing order of the law.98 
 
2.4 The Sacrificial Orientation of Universalism 
 
 
  The concept of a ‘sacrificial’ international law problematizes international 
law’s universality. A notion of sacrifice offers insight into the role that legal violence 
plays into what Sundhya Pahuja calls ‘the operationalisation of universality’, by 
which she refers to ‘how a meaning for the universal is produced through and within 
international law, both institutionally and conceptually, and how this meaning is held, 
or stabilised, in that ‘universal’ position.’99  This differs from simply an argument that 
dismisses the universality of international law as just another particularism. It is a 
recognition that international law is, in a certain way, universal. The drug laws, with 
their near total compliance amongst all governments provide an example of this form 
of universalism. Post-colonial theory has done the necessary work of arguing that the 
universalism of the West as just another particularism. However, what the theoretical 
focus of this thesis seeks to address is what sustains this operative universality if it is 
not an authentic product of a universal, humanitarian consensus as the mainstream 
liberal history of the twentieth century would suggest. With the emergence of 
universalism becoming particularly insistent following the post-war dissolution of the 
colonial division in world ordering, I ask what is the universal figure on which 
international law, such as the project of drug prohibition, is grounded? This question, 
particularly when examining the provisions of the drug prohibition treaties, points us 
towards an idealised human subject that international law invokes as a conceptual 
grounding. In the legal order of the late twentieth century, an ideal image of humanity 
informs notions of international human rights law, international humanitarian law and 
international crimes against humanity. This image of humanity was, in terms of its 
historical production and defining cultural characteristics, distinctly western, an image 
of humanity that Frantz Fanon’s describes as ‘homo occidentalis’100 However, it 
continued to operate as universal in spite of this. Scholars have critiqued the 
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presumption that the claims to universality invoked by international law do in fact 
capture of something truly universal amongst all humans, cultures and societies; 
instead they argue that international law is prone to take a specific form of humanity 
and arrogate it into a condition of universality.101 However, I argue that still under-
theorised within this critique is the role the legal violence plays in producing that 
universality. The concept of sacrifice as I offer it describes the process of legal 
violence being licensed upon a particular subjectivity-that of the negation of 
humanity, of the non-human- in order to cohere a universal. As Judith Butler has 
stated, ‘the problem is not with universality as such but with an operation of 
universality.’102 The subsequent chapters of this thesis read the history of international 
drug prohibition as a particular ideal of social relations and social practices developed 
in the West, specifically by the moral crusaders of the U.S.A, arrogated by 
international law into the position as universal, all the while taking seriously the 
question of how prohibition attained operation as a universal truth discourse. The drug 
war provides a telling narrative setting and a historical backdrop against which to 
explore these wider fundamental questions about how international law coheres itself.  
Returning to the specific example of international legal violence that functions 
as my primary focus, the War on Drugs, I argue, provides a telling instantiation of the 
relationship between sacrificial violence and international law. A review of the 
populations who stand as primary victims of the drug war immediately betrays a 
connection with the former colonial populations and racially subaltern subjects who 
served as the underside to European modernity. The damage that the drug war has 
caused to Amerindian, African-American and ‘oriental’ populations encourages a 
tying-together of Fanon’s account of international order emerging through violence 
against the colonised, with Girard’s schematic of a sacrificial mechanism hidden 
underneath communal social order. Girard tells us how ‘the prohibitions that appear 
arbitrary stem neither from some sort of "neurosis" nor from the resentment of 
grumpy men eager to prevent young people from having a good time’ but are rather 
the attempt to ritualise a norm that can be the basis of social order.103 Through this 
theoretical lens we can understand prohibitions that may immediately appear 
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arbitrary, such as the prohibition of specific psychoactive substances, masked 
attempts to keep the crescendo of mimetic violence at bay. As aforementioned in the 
introduction, only the most myopic of observers could ignore the asymmetry of the 
apportioning of the violence of the War on Drugs amongst the peoples of the world. 
Despite adopting a liberal posture, couched in terms of the impartiality and 
universality claimed of law, the international laws on drugs have disproportionately 
impacted specific categories and territories of peoples, and the makeup of its victims 
recalls the Fanonian category of ‘the damned.’  
The international laws on drugs provide an archetypal, yet under-researched 
instantiation of the West-Non West dichotomy that TWAIL scholars have identified 
within the universal promise of international law. The impetus behind international 
law’s prohibition of drugs came from the desire of Western nations to control the fear 
of a growing demand for psychoactive substances amongst their population, with the 
treaties drafted so as to discriminate against the interests of producers and 
suppliers.104 Manderson illuminates the on-going tension between liberalism and 
drugs, stressing an anxiety inherent in law’s presumptions of “liberal individualism as 
a baseline of social policy, coupled with an identification of drugs […] as the 
corporeal manifestation of the virus that threatens it.’105 There are unarticulated 
binaries operating within the ostensible universality of international drug prohibition- 
a diametric opposition drawn between civilised human and the barbarous drugs, of 
rational thought against madness and hysteria, of the triumph of reason over 
submission to the appetite. These binaries are then pasted onto longer held discursive 
models of differences between races and regions of the earth. We can also read 
modernity’s poorly constructed sacred claims about human dominance over nature 
within these laws that demand the eradication of many naturally occurring 
substances.106 Yet, the drug laws themselves offer no ostensible indication of the 
difference that its application would cleave amongst the peoples of the world. 
Couched in the language of universal humanity, one would not, by merely reading the 
treaty, be made aware that the drafting process was dominated by hegemonic Western 
powers, who moulded the law to their own interests and particular notions of ideal 
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social ordering. 107  Nor do the treaties governing the War on Drugs offer any 
indication of the early drug prohibition, so indebted to the explicit racial prejudice 
that the New York Times would aid the movement for prohibition by printing scare 




This chapter has built on scholarship on the post-colonial element of 
international law to theorise its sacrificial structuring. Speaking to the productive 
force of international legal violence, Jennifer Beard articulates this argument in 
stating that, ‘international laws operate as a form of sanctioned violence to maintain 
the Westphalian system of sovereign states with an established order.109 However, 
moving beyond the post-colonial critique of liberal international law the notion of 
sacrifice offers an appreciation for the theological underpinnings of racialised legal 
violence for the cohering the communality of a diffuse international. Anghie focuses 
of how international law creates a subterranean distinction amongst peoples, 
critiquing the classical approach to international relations by stating how ‘a focus on 
the problem of order among sovereign states cannot illuminate the prior question of 
how certain states were excluded from the realm of sovereignty in the first place.’110 
However, as Robert Knox identifies, the myopia within Anghie’s separation of the 
‘dynamic of difference’ between the colonising/colonised worlds from the production 
of coherent order of an international community is that ‘it falsely assumes there is a 
duality between these two approaches’ when they are in fact ‘part of the same process 
of imperialism.’111 The theorisation of this process is what I have termed ‘sacrificial’ 
and it offers a lens through which to read the War on Drugs as a project of 
international law. My reading of the drug war follows the challenge Oscar Guardiola-
Rivera’s sets for legal scholarship to reveal ‘the logic of exclusion and surrogate 
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victimage at work in the functioning of the law.’112 The drug addict and drug 
trafficker remain within the international community and thereby within the scope of 
international law, however the immorality attributed to these figures emphasises their 
complete otherness to any universalising notion of humanity, rendering them an 
infestation that must be purified for the community of ideal humans to realise itself. I 
choose to place my focus upon the idea of sacrifice because as concept, it shines a 
light on the relation between those who are the victims of legal violence- in this 
instance case exemplified by the victims of the global enforcement of drug 
prohibition known as the War on Drugs - and the coherence or, better yet, the 
communality produced through this legal violence. 
The following chapters will unpack this history of drug prohibition as an 
international legal project. As I trace the historical trajectory of drug prohibition 
moving from a fringe idea to a governing norm over the course of a century, I will 
highlight the ways in which violence upon the subjectivity of the non-human- often 
embodied in the figure of the racial subaltern subject- informed the development of 
international law as its transitioned into a liberal, moral universalist posture. I will 
engage with the legal context that first birthed drug prohibition at the turn of the 
twentieth century, examining the liberal understanding of international law that 
influenced American internationalism, which in turn emboldened prohibitionists in 
their fledging efforts. This will require reviewing the influence of founding fathers of 
American international law such as James Brown Scott and Elihu Root, as well as the 
prohibitionists who worked under them, including Bishop Charles Henry Brent and 
Dr Hamilton Wright, in order to unpack the political and theoretical context in which 
drug prohibition was able to blossom as a legal project. However, prior to engaging 
with this twentieth-century story, the next chapter will unpack the philosophical 
antecedent that was recovered to anchor early American international law, the 
sixteenth-century jurisprudence of Francisco De Vitoria. Vitoria’s model of a 
universal legal framework to account for colonial relation between the Spanish and 
Amerindians at the start of European colonialism will be re-read as an early model of 
a ‘sacrificial’ international law that would later be an influence on American 
international law in the early 1900’s and, therefore, on the juridical context in which 
drug prohibition emerged. An examination of Vitoria’s key texts will illustrate how, 
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with his recovery providing the jurisprudential background to the birth of drug 
prohibition, the asymmetry in the violence of the drug war, becomes no longer 
arbitrary or contradictory, but reconcilable with a model of imperial violence 
accommodated within international law at its very conception.  
 









 In the introduction to this thesis, I commenced by illustrating how the 
catastrophe of the War on Drugs challenges assumptions about the rationality and 
progressive teleology of the law. The failure of the United Nations Single Convention 
on Narcotic Drugs, 1961 to ensure ‘the health and welfare of mankind’ is declared by 
the bodies of all those who have suffered social and material death in order to enforce 
a law that has proved unenforceable. The first chapters then built on the existing 
literature in drug policy scholarship, critical international legal scholarship and third 
world approaches to international law to outline an argument of reading the War on 
Drugs not as a contradiction within the progressive trajectory of twentieth century 
international law, but rather as an instantiation of the sacrificial violence that has been 
(re)generative of the international legal order in its expansive liberal and universalist 
guise. As the writings of Baudrillard and Derrida analysed in Chapter One show, the 
law speaks the very concept of ‘drugs’ into being by retroactively associating an 
existential harm with certain plants/foods and mandating the prohibition of this harm, 
through the violent capabilities of the law if necessary. As argued over the second 
chapter, violence does not exist in binary opposition to the law but is embedded 
within its workings. Moving to the international context, through René Girard’s 
understanding of social order being produced through sacrificial violence, I argued for 
a recognition of the role of violence in engendering the communality of the 
international legal order. This mapped out the understanding of a ‘sacrificial 
international’ that provides an insightful theory through which to explain international 
law’s reconciliation of a simultaneous peaceful ‘humanitarianism’ and violence of 
international drug prohibition, as I will illustrate over the course of this thesis.  
In this chapter, I will historicize the notion of a ‘sacrificial international’, 
commencing the historical arch of this thesis not in the twentieth century’s turn 
towards liberal, humanitarian international law but with the sixteenth-century 
antecedent for this turn that would be recovered just as drug prohibition began to 
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emerge. I will be largely engaging with the Spanish, or more accurately Salamancan 
jurisprudence that gave international law its form following the colonial encounter, 
particularly the work of the theologian Francisco De Vitoria. The reason for 
beginning the historical narrative of a thesis on the twentieth century drug war with a 
substantive engagement with Vitoria’s development of the juridical norms and 
principles of the Spanish sixteenth-century conquest of the Americas will become 
clearer over the subsequent chapters, but, in short, Vitoria serves as a crucial, 
prologue for the mode of international law within which the drug war would come 
into being, an element of prohibition that has been overlooked by scholarship in drug 
policy studies. Vitoria’s jurisprudence was resurrected and reworked in the early 
twentieth century to inform a shift towards moral universalism in international law, 
particularly by American international lawyers theorising the U.S.A’s own strand of 
liberal internationalism and its correlative campaign for international prohibition of 
drugs. Before engaging with the twin histories of twentieth century liberal 
international law and international drug prohibition over the course of Part B and Part 
C of this thesis, in this chapter, I will re-read both Vitoria’s jurisprudence and the 
more recent scholarship that has been produced on him to argue that the Vitoria’s 
inclusive/exclusion of the colonial subject within a modern notion of universal 
humanity lays the foundations for the fixing of the colonised in condition of 
‘damnation’, a condition which facilitates the sacrificial violence of the law that is 
illustrated by the present-day drug war.   
A consequence of the narrative I offer in this chapter is that it challenges 
received theoretical and historical orthodoxies about the development of international 
law. To read the persistence of an imperial violence within international law places 
my argument in opposition to the presuppositions of international law always moving 
towards an ever-greater universal peace.1 Therefore, it is necessary to commence this 
chapter by clarifying the methodological approach I am undertaking and the rationale 
I offer for adopting this ‘counter-history’ of international law. 
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charter/preamble/index.html> [accessed 3 August 2017]. 
	   69	  
 
3.2 Historicizing Sacrificial International Law 
 
‘Laws deceive … kings wear masks, … 
 power creates illusions [and] historians tell lies.’2 
Michel Foucault 
 
Questions of history play an essential role in the conceptualisation of 
international law. Implicit in international law’s claim to bring about a universal 
peace is an investment in the linear march of progress through history. In seeking to 
challenge international law’s claim, my argument will require an alternative 
perspective on international law’s history. Therefore, the historiography of this thesis 
will follow a perspective best described as the ‘mode of seeing that experiences 
history as catastrophe.’3 Incommensurable with the triumphalist coupling of the rise 
of international law with the rise of civilization, this mode of seeing history takes 
seriously the suffering of those who have experienced modernity as the shattering of 
culture. As a discipline, history has often presupposed the continuance of a nightmare 
from which the ‘damned’ are trying to awake.4  
In this chapter, my focus will be upon reading the colonial encounter as an 
‘origin’ of international law, exploring the ways in which notions of sacrifice marry 
with the jurisprudential accounting for an international legal order. Following on from 
this claim, the subsequent chapters of this thesis will show how the recovery of the 
colonial jurisprudence of the sixteenth century provided the intellectual context for 
the twentieth century international laws on drugs. The constellation of these 
widespread historical moments opens my thesis up to the challenge of engaging with 
historical moments too temporally disparate to bear relevance upon each other. I will 
respond to this challenge by mapping out the connections in the work of particular 
international jurists of these differing historical contexts. Furthermore, in addition to 
the tracing of a continuum within the ideas of jurists, to fully assert my claim of 
international legal order operating as sacrificial, my thesis will require a image of the 
past that allows history and theory to talk to each other, one in which history is not 
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4 James Joyce, Ulysses (London: Penguin, 2000), adapted from Stephen Dedalus quote: ‘History,’ 
Stephen said, ‘is a nightmare from which I am trying to awake’, p.32. 
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structured so as to fix the meaning of yesterday but where the past can be allowed to 
leap across ‘empty time’ and (re)charged with ‘the presence of the now.’5  
 
3.2.1 The Turn to History in International Legal Scholarship  
 
By commencing my argument with an engagement of the juridical structure of 
the colonial encounter, I place my work in the slipstream of a recent ‘turn to history’ 
in international legal scholarship.6 Revisiting the ideas of Grotius, Pufendorf or Vattel 
have become a common method for showing how the roots of international law can 
assist our understanding of today’s juridical issues. However, the approach to 
questions of history undertaken by recent international legal scholarship also invites 
criticism. International legal historians have been accused of indulging in the ‘the 
fallacy of constructing a meta-narrative.’7 More specifically, critics have disputed the 
value of trying to bring early modern jurisprudence to bear on a contemporary 
globalised context, dismissing such expansive histories as producing ‘a false 
continuity and connectedness that is in fact the work of the interpreter's mind.’8 
A common issue of contention concerns whether the attempt to connect 
disparate historical moments opens up the possibility of drawing historical 
conclusions in a speculative and casual manner, that is to say reading history out of 
context.9 Making claims that sweep together whole centuries, centuries that are in 
many ways divergent from one another and plural within themselves, is feared to lead 
to generalisation and anachronism, mortal sins in the study of history. Quentin 
Skinner is the historian often cited in order to warn against reading history out of 
                                                
5 Walter Benjamin, ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History’, Illuminations (trans. Harry Zohn and ed. 
Hannah Arendt) (London: Penguin, 1969), pp.253-265, p.261. 
6 See, for example, Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law,  
(Cambridge: Cambridge United Press, 2005); Matthew Craven, Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Maria Vogiatzi  
(eds.), Time, History and International Law (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007); Diane Kirkby 
and Catherine Coleborne (eds.), Law, History, Colonialism: The Reach of Empire (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2001); Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise 
and Fall of International Law 1870-1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
7 Georg Cavaller, ‘Vitoria, Grotius, Pufendorf, Wolff and Vattel: Accomplices of European 
Colonialism and Exploitation or True Cosmopolitans?’, Journal of the History of International Law, 10 
(2008), p.207. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ian Hunter, ‘Global Justice and Regional Metaphysics: On the Critical History of the Law of Nature 
and Nations’, Shaunnagh Dorsett & Ian Hunter (eds.), Law and Politics in British Colonial Thought: 
Transpositions of Empire (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p.17, ‘set against this dispersed array 
of contextually specific constructions the modern critical historiography of Jus Gentium begins to 
unravel.’  
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context. His manifestos recommend a corrective to the wild sweeping together of 
history, instead suggesting a methodological approach which tries to look at historical 
moments in relation to the norms of their time, taking up a responsibility to, as much 
as possible, represent history as it would have been experienced then and not as it is 
seen through a modern lens.10 This approach is taken as being properly sensitive to 
the oversights that can follow from the transfer of ideas into contexts that would never 
have been imagined at the time of writing. A contextualist method of inquiry instructs 
historians to view its ‘sources as the contemporaries of the authors would. And they 
should relate them to the contexts and concerns of the authors.’11 By tying historical 
truth to its sources, contextualists hope to free scholarship of speculations, wild leaps 
and conjecture. In some ways this method agrees with a positivist legal approach, 
which is itself an approach that seeks to answer the questions of law solely through 
finding the source of law, thereby separating modern law from a reliance on faith, 
enchantment or antecedents.  
However, to lock the past within the strict confines of its context may satisfy 
the historian’s demands for rigour, but it is an approach troubled by the lawyer’s 
disciplinary training. The law specifically relies on judges, legal practioners or legal 
scholars reading contemporary obligations in line with determinations of authorities 
made in a bygone era.12 To be a lawyer requires a familiarity with the practice of 
transposing meaning across time.13  Robert Gordon is apt in his statement that 
‘lawyers are driven by differentt purposes than historians; our job is to bring the past 
into the present and to turn it to present purposes.’14 Lawyers could be described as 
‘overtly presentist’ in that their discipline requires them to be ‘concerned to find 
continuities between past and present,’ while contextualist historians see such ‘naked 
presentism as a sin.’15 Furthermore, as Anne Orford has made clear, this element of 
legal scholarship is only amplified when discussing international law. For Orford, the 
universal claims of international law makes it ‘inherently genealogical, depending as 
                                                
10 See particularly Quentin Skinner, ‘Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas’, History and 
Theory, 3 (1969); or Quentin Skinner, ‘Interpretation and the Understanding of Speech Acts’, Visions 
of Politics: Volume I, Regarding Method (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
11 Randall Lesaffer, ‘International Law and its History: The Story of an Unrequited Love’, Time, 
History and International Law, p.38. 
12 Anne Orford, ‘On International Legal Method’, London Review of International Law, 1, 1, pp.173-
175. 
13 Ibid., p.175. 
14 Robert W. Gordon, ‘Foreword: The Arrival of Critical Historicism’, Stanford Law Review, 49 
(1997), pp.1023–9, p.1025. 
15 Ibid. 
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it does on the transmission of concepts, languages and norms across time and space. 
The past, far from being gone is constantly being retrieved as a source of 
rationalisation of present obligations.‘16 The temporal schema implicit in international 
law’s claims to universality frustrates a strict demarcation of past, present and future. 
A claim made by international law is always a claim made to be universally 
applicable, not just applicable for the immediate context. When international law 
offers a determination- such as certain plant-life called drugs are an evil that must be 
prohibited- this determination is taken as not only true in that moment but is 
retrospectively projected back in time to have always been true. While ‘professional 
history’s sense-making orthodoxies embrace a […] careful enforcement of distinction 
between past and present,’ legal scholars should appreciate that ‘meanings and 
arguments do not necessarily heed the neatness of chronological progression.’17  
Contextualist historians concern themselves with recovering ‘a dead past; a 
past unlike the present.’18 This past, once recovered as completely as possible, is then 
to be analysed and respected as distant from those of us who are studying it. Martti 
Koskenniemi argues against adopting a fundamentalist approach to contextualising 
law, stating: 
 
Regardless of the merits of placing historical subjects in their local 
contexts, critical legal history ought not rest content with this 
[contextualism]; it should not dispose of using materials drawn from 
other chronological moments, including studies of the longue durée 
and structural determination to assess the meaning and significance of 
the past.19 
 
In this thesis, I recognise the importance of reading thinkers and their works with 
regard to the context in which they were produced. Taking care to bare in mind the 
social and political conditions in which Vitoria and others were producing their ideas 
allows for a richer understanding of their significance. However, to understand fully a 
historical context requires more than simply imprisoning a writer and their ideas 
within a temporal boundary fixed by one’s biography. Skinner himself recognised the 
                                                
16 Orford, ‘On International Legal Method’, p.175. 
17 Chris Tomlins, ‘The Strait Gate: The Past, History, and Legal Scholarship’, Law, Culture and the 
Humanities, 5 (2009), pp.11–42, p.21; Orford, ‘On International Legal Method’, p.174. 
18 Robert W. Gordon, ‘Foreword: The Arrival of Critical Historicism’, Stanford Law Review, 49 
(1997), pp.1023–9, p.1025. 
19 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Vitoria and Us: Thoughts on Critical Histories of International Law’, 
Rechtsgeschichte – Legal History, 22 (2014), pp. 119–138, p.123. 
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problems that are presented by a short-sighted understanding of the relevant context 
for historical ideas, stating in a later article that revisited the contextualist manifesto 
‘There is no implication that the relevant context need be an immediate one.’20 
Scholars should engage with ‘whatever context enables us to appreciate the nature of 
the intervention’, a task that may require them ‘to engage in extremely wide-ranging 
as well as detailed historical research.’ 21 To myopically dismiss the diachronic is to 
embark upon a historiography that when applied to the study of law, attempts to turn 
it, along with other social sciences à la economics or sociology, into a discipline akin 
to a version of applied mathematics. Walter Benjamin provides ‘the corrective to this 
way of thinking, [which] lies in the conviction that history is not only a science but 
also a form of remembrance. What science has "established" can be modified by 
remembrance. Remembrance can make … the concluded (suffering) into something 
open-ended.”22 To seek to fix the meaning of historical moments in only a temporally 
restricted idea of context suggests that not only is the established past fully 
determined, fixed as foreign to contemporary eyes but also that the present moment is 
justified by its own context, alternative sources and narratives from the past 
obstructed from illuminating another world being possible. 23  Contrastingly, an 
approach to history that privileges new constellations of historical moments can 
illuminate the genealogies of contemporary given norms, so that what is presumed to 
be objective can be revealed to be constructed. Such an approach is, I argue, essential 
in order to unpack the genealogy of the jurisprudence that produces the contemporary 
War on Drugs. 
 
3.2.2 Colonial-historiography and The Politics of Erasure 
 
‘The settler makes history and is conscious of making it.’24 
Frantz Fanon 
 
                                                
20 Skinner, ‘Interpretation and the Understanding of Speech Acts’, p.116. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Walter Benjamin from an unsent letter to Horkheimer, quoted by Richard Wolin, ‘Experience and 
Materialism in Benjamin’s Passagenwerk’, in Benjamin: Philosophy, Aesthetics, History, ed. by Gary 
Smith (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press), p.225.   
23 Oscar Guardiola-Rivera, ‘Absolute Contingency and the Prescriptive Force of International Law’, in 
Events: The Force of International Law, ed. by Fleur Johns, Richard Joyce & Sundhya Pahuja, 
(London: Routledge, 2011). 
24 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (London: Penguin 2001), p.50. 
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A further reason for embarking upon a methodological approach that 
emphasises a history counter to orthodoxy is that it ties-in with the central argument 
of this thesis, which is to explain the War on Drugs through a recognition of a 
sacrificial mechanism underpinning the ‘humanitarianism’ of liberal international law. 
The argument that international legal order is produced through violence upon the 
colonised subject necessarily intersects with how the condition of becoming the 
colonised is itself always a temporally produced condition. In short, to be colonised is 
to be taken to be a pre-modern subject existing within modernity. Resultantly, the 
colonised become fixed upon a path of civilisation/progress/development that 
promises to erase the historical deficiency but serves only to perpetually defer the 
point of completion. Fanon recognised that the ‘damned’ can only free themselves 
from their purgatory through a recalibration of the ‘historical process.’ 25  He 
emphasises that the ‘immobility to which the native is condemned can only be called 
in question if the native decides to put an end to the history of colonization--the 
history of pillage,’ and begins a new programme of time through a new understanding 
of how the past informs the present.26  
My argument takes up this invitation by bringing to the surface the violence 
enacted on the colonised/racially subaltern subject by the law that is masked by the 
humanitarian rhetoric of liberal international law. Arguing for an understanding of the 
contemporary international community as generated through violence enacted on 
subjects constructed as legitimate victims is an argument that requires unpacking 
orthodox histories that mask or erase this violence. In other words, history writing 
often acts itself as a mode of discursive violence that aids the invisibility of the 
sacrificial mechanism I aim to uncover. To make this argument, a historiography must 
be adopted that takes account of and sees a connection between how the 
conquistador’s sword, the slaver’s ship, the plantation master’s whip, the judge’s 
gabble and the jailer’s keys have shaped the history that we currently understand as 
legitimate. This places my work in opposition to a narrative which sees international 
law as just an intra-European phenomenon, ‘a history of rules developed in the 
European state system since the 16th century which then spread to other continents 
and eventually the entire globe.’27 Girard’s theory details how the memory of the 
                                                
25 Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, p.35. 
26 Ibid., p.51. 
27 Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters, ‘Introduction: Towards a Global History of International Law’, 
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sacrificial violence must fade from the collective history of the order for the sacrificial 
mechanism to be effective.28 Unless the violence upon the colonised is uncovered the 
cyclical eruption of crisis and sacrifice persist in manner that is not even understood 
by those who enact the violence. To uncover the history of the sacrificial mechanism 
is to render its operation as void. My thesis attempts to perform such a history and 
thereby present a picture of international law that overrides the amnesia necessary for 
the sacrificial mechanism. In short, the chronology I engage with over the subsequent 
chapters is chosen not only to follow the spine of the thesis, provided by the drug 
prohibition treaties but also through emphasising the contexts of colonialism and war 
in which these treaties emerge. I aim for a constellation of historical moments that 
force a confrontation with what the law has been actively forgetting.29 
In my search for an alternative understanding for international legal order, I 
turn to the juridical framework that governed the colonial encounter in full 
recognition that all proclamations of origins are, by nature, contestable. As illustrated 
by my previous engagement with the Westphalian myth, every chosen origin invites a 
particular perspective upon the subject of study that is supposed to have been borne in 
that moment; those who elevate the Peace of Westphalia as the origin of international 
law, by extension tend to emphasise the secular, rationale and harmonious character 
claimed by international law. As opposed to assuming to escape such instrumental 
periodization, I will seek to recalibrate the point of origin in order to illuminate the 
presence of an alternative cohering anchor for international law. Through a 
concentrated focus on the juridical architecture of the colonial encounter, I will bring 
out that which has been forgotten so that the order formed can remain as it is. Rather 
than examining the legal framework of the colonial encounter in an impossible 
attempt to grasp a better understanding of that historical moment, I engage with it in 
order to cast a new light upon the problems of today. The historical work of this thesis 
will aim at the cracking open of the potential ordering of the globe offering a 
resistance against an understanding of the story of law or history as a story of 
                                                                                                                                      
in The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law, ed. by Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p.1. 
28 René Girard, Violence and the Sacred (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press 
1977), p.303; ‘the memory of the generative violence fades from the collective consciousness.’ Also 
see René Girard, Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World (New York: Continuum, 2003). 
29 Christopher Tomlins, ‘The Strait Gate: The Past, History, and Legal Scholarship’, Law, Culture and 
the Humanities, 5 (2009), pp.11-42, p.42. 
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completion, of closure.30 It is a history responding to a contemporary problem in 
terms of the piling of bodies on top of bodies through the drug war and to make an 
intervention in this concrete juridical and political issue. This approach is following 
the dictum of Susan Buck-Mross, who explains that the ‘question of history's meaning 
cannot be asked outside of time but only in the thick of human action, the way the 
question is posed, the methods of the inquiry, and the criteria of what counts as a 
legitimate answer all have political implications.’ 31  Ultimately, the historical 
trajectory offered by this thesis takes aim at a violence of the law and aspires to make 
it contingent, as opposed to inevitable, through exposure.32  
 
3.3 Vitoria, De Indis and The Making of a Sacrificial International 
 
Having defended the historical methodology I am applying, the remainder of 
this chapter will trace a history of international law that places its formative 
jurisprudence from the sixteenth century in conversation with the sacrificial structure 
I read within twentieth century liberal international legal order. My argument carries 
within it a claim about the origin of international law, yet one that continues my 
rebuttal of Westphalia as the most instructive point of departure from which to trace 
the formation of an international legal order. An alternative origin suggested by 
international legal historians is the works of Francisco de Vitoria, a sixteenth-century 
Spanish theologian and jurist who remains perhaps the most celebrated scholar to 
emerge from the famed School of Salamanca.33 More specifically, it is in two sets of 
Vitoria’s lectures- De Indis Noviter Inventis and De Jure Bellis Hispanorum in 
Barbaros- that international legal jurisprudence has accredited as being born.34The 
                                                
30 Christopher Tomlins and John Comaroff, ‘“Law as…”: Theory and Practice in Legal History’, U.C. 
Irvine Law Review, 1, 3 (2011), pp.1039-1079, p.1056. 
31 Susan Buck-Morss, Hegel, Haiti and Universal History, p.109 
32 A guiding example is provided by Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, The Many-Headed Hydra- 
Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 2000).  
33 See David Kennedy, ‘Primitive Legal Scholarship’, Harvard International Law Journal, 27, 1 
(1986), pp.1-98; James Brown Scott, The Spanish Origins of International Law (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1934); or Anthony Pagden, ‘Dispossessing the barbarian: The language of Spanish Thomism and 
the debate over the property rights of the American Indians,’ Anthony Pagden (ed.), The Languages of 
Political Theory in Early-Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p.80. 
‘Vitoria and his pupils, and the pupils of his pupils down to the generation of the Jesuits Luis de 
Molina (1535-1600) and Francisco Suarez (1548-1617), have come to be called “The School of 
Salamanca”, although the Italian term “seconda scholastica” is a better description.’ 
34 See Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law; or Peter 
Fitzpatrick, ‘Latin roots: The force of international law as event’, in Events: The Force of International 
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topic of these lectures are the juridical conceptualisation of the relations between the 
Spanish and the Amerindians, in other words, the ordering of the formative relations 
of the European colonial project. To posit Vitoria as an origin for international law is 
to accept that international law ‘did not precede and thereby effortlessly resolve the 
problem of Spanish-Indian relations; rather, international law was created out of the 
unique issues generated by the encounter between the Spanish and the Indians.’35 This 
shift towards seeing the colonial encounter as generative of international law is the 
first step towards illuminating a sacrificial international. The Vitorian schema of 
international law not only creates a new universal through marking difference but his 
juridical thought also corresponds with Girard’s understanding of community 
production through sacred violence. Specifically, the interior/exterior positionality 
that Girard mandates as necessary for the scapegoat to exorcise the intra-communal 
violence, marries with Vitoria’s inclusion of the Amerindian into the international 
legal order by fixing it in the condition of primary exclusion. This marrying of Vitoria 
with Giradian sacrifice will be revisited at length during later stages in this chapter. 
However, it is incumbent to firstly take stock of the scholarly conversation 
surrounding Vitoria in which I am intervening.  
 
3.3.1 Vitoria’s Contested Legacy 
 
The significance of Vitoria’s thought has been cause for contestation within 
international legal scholarship. The most celebrated scholar of the famed School of 
Salamanca, Vitoria commenced a tradition of Thomist interpretation of natural law 
that extended to the early seventeenth century through the work of his followers, 
including Luis de Molina and Francisco Suarez. Yet by the turn of the twentieth 
century, Vitoria’s influence was often reduced in histories of international law, his 
role in the formation of the discipline overshadowed by other forefathers, particularly 
Hugo Grotius. 36  However, Vitoria’s influence upon Grotius and his overall 
contribution to the birth of international law was resurrected by American legal 
scholar James Brown Scott in a series of writings and lectures in the early decades of 
                                                
35 See Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty, p.15. 
36 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Vitoria and Us’, p.121. 
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the twentieth century. 37  For Scott, Vitoria’s insistence on the humanity of the 
Amerindian in opposition to the prevailing consensus of his time, was an ideal point 
of origin in which he could ground his own conception of an international law 
founded a moral universalism. Following Vitoria, Scott argued that the source of 
communality lay within the liberal production of a single moral standard to be applied 
to all humanity.38 Scott claimed that ‘the corner-stone of Victoria's [sic] system was 
equality of states, applicable not merely to the states of Christendom and of Europe 
but also to the barbarian principalities in the Western World of Columbus.’39 Through 
this formulation of world order, Vitoria was celebrated for ‘for espousing the interests 
of indigenous populations against a predatory Spanish colonization of the 
Americas.’40 Consequently, juridical thought in the early twentieth century promoted 
an image of Vitoria as ‘a man of peace and religion… heroically turning against the 
colonial violence of his own countrymen.’41  
However, this image of Vitoria was punctured in by a rise of post-colonial 
critique against the Spanish Theologian, especially Antony Anghie’s book 
Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, published in 2005. 
Vitoria image as a liberal humanitarian was built upon his recognition of the legal 
rights of the Amerindian natives, decoupling the recognition of legal personality from 
the exclusive possession of the European or Christian he stated that ‘the conclusion of 
all that has been said is that the barbarians undoubtedly possessed as true dominion, 
both public and private, as any Christians.’42  However, Anghie revisited Vitoria’s 
jurisprudence and argued that within it lay an eventual accommodation of, rather than 
an opposition to, the brutalities of the Spanish conquista. Furthermore, as Martti 
Koskenniemi notes, there is an additional danger of Vitoria’s humanitarian 
accommodation of violence compared to explicit colonial apologists, ‘precisely 
because it is presented in the language of liberty and even equality.’43 Anghie did 
                                                
37 See James Brown Scott, The Spanish Origin of International Law (Union, New Jersey: The 
Lawbook Exchange Ltd, 2000); or James Brown Scott, The Catholic Conception of International Law 
(New Jersey: The Lawbook Exchange 2007).. 
38 Christopher Rossi, Broken Chain of Being: James Brown Scott and the Origins of Modern 
International Law (Leiden: Brill, 1998) p.10. 
39 Scott, The Spanish Origin of International Law, p. 281. 
40 Fitzpatrick, ‘Latin roots’, Events: The Force of International Law, p.48. 
41 Koskenniemi, ‘Vitoria and Us’, p.121. 
42 Francisco de Vitoria, ‘On the American Indians’, in Vitoria: Political Writings, ed. by Anthony 
Pagden and Jeremy Lawrance, trans. by Jeremy Lawrance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1991), pp.233-290, p.250 
43 Ibid., p.122. 
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recognise that Vitoria departed from justifying colonial violence through 
characterising the Amerindians as inferior species and natural salves, a position that 
held sway with preceding influential jurists such as Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda.44 
However, rather than uncritically celebrate Vitoria as a prototypical altruistic liberal 
humanist, Anghie spies within Vitoria’s thought a stipulation to his generosity; for 
while he may have seen the Amerindians as human, he did not see them to be quite as 
human as the Spanish (the pre-determined standard for humanity) leaving Vitoria to 
understand his task as 'creating a system of law to account for relations between 
societies which … belong to two very different cultural orders.’45 
Anghie’s critique was the apotheosis of a significant counter-narrative that had 
emerged to dissent against the celebration of Vitoria as the benevolent ‘defender of 
the Indians.’46 Robert Williams had already identified that Vitoria's jurisprudence 
‘justified the extension of Western power over the American Indians as an imperative 
of the European's vision of truth.’47 Furthermore, Carl Schmitt had also critiqued the 
humanitarian image of Vitoria, arguing that Vitoria’s ‘conclusions ultimately justified 
the conquista.’48 Anghie expanded on this line of critique by bringing in clearer focus 
the extent to which Vitoria’s schema, including the Amerindian within an 
international community yet forgiving the violence of the conquista, laid the structure 
for a ‘dynamic of difference’ within the single universal. 49  This ‘dynamic of 
difference’, Anghie argues, is the process through which international law produces 
and sustains an operative distinction between peoples presumed to be civilised and 
those presumed to be savage.50 Anghie traces this ‘dynamic of difference’ from 
Vitoria through to the Mandate System of the League of Nations in the interwar 
period, to the establishment of United Nations right up to the justifications for foreign 
intervention in the ‘war on terror.’51 
However, Anghie’s critique of Vitoria has, in turn, provoked a response by 
                                                
44 For more on Sepúlveda’s thought, see Lewis Hanke, All Mankind is One: A Study of the Disputation 
Between Bartolomé de Las Casas and Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda in 1550 on the Intellectual and 
Religious Capacity of the American Indians, (Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1994). Hanke 
tells us that for Sepúlveda, the natives were as inferior to the Spanish 'as monkeys were to men’ (p.84). 
45 Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty, p.16. 
46 Koskenniemi, ‘Vitoria and Us’, p.121. 
47 Robert A. Williams, The American Indian in Western Legal Thought. The Discourses of Conquest 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1990). pp. 6-8. 
48 Carl Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum 
(New York: Telos Press, 2013), p.113. 
49 Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty, p.4. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid., see chapters 3-6. 
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those who consider it important to retain Vitoria’s humanitarian legacy. Georg 
Cavallar accused Anghie of making ‘fanciful connections between Vitoria and the 
discipline of 19th century international law’ emphasising that the key concepts that 
being read in Vitoria’s work by post-colonial critique- race, colonialism, legal 
positivism etc- would have been alien to Vitoria and the time in which he delivered 
his lectures.52 Cavallar continues by arguing that it is ‘one-sided to present him 
[Vitoria] as an unequivocal accomplice of European colonialism’ and cites Vitoria’s 
personal letters commenting on the conquest of Peru by Pizzaro as evidence of the 
extent to which he was deeply horrified at the bloodlust displayed by the 
conquistadores.53 Vitoria’s reluctance to condemn them in more vehement terms 
publically should be accredited to the fear of political costs he would have had to 
endure for doing so.54 Ian Hunter also critiqued Anghie’s argument, claiming that 
Anghie and other postcolonial critics of Vitoria actually fail to extract themselves 
from the project of constructing a universal history that is itself inadvertently the 
product of a Eurocentric philosophical perspective. 55  Charging Anghie with 
committing the contexualist sin of anachronism, Hunter suggests that Vitoria’s 
jurisprudence would not have been received in the terms of facilitating or failing to 
facilitate a ‘global normative order or ‘international justice’, and cannot be 
understood by modern historians in this way either.’56 For Hunter, both Vitoria’s 
critics and defenders make the mistake of projecting his jurisprudence against a failed 
or already realised concept of ‘a transcendent global justice and universal history.’57  
However, in addition to the aforementioned limitations of contextualist 
histories for the study of law or jurisprudence, it should be noted that Anghie was not 
anachronistically reading a modern internationalism into the Vitoria’s thought. 
Rather, the value of Anghie’s argument lies in its insightfully appreciation of how, 
particularly through James Brown Scott, Vitoria’s jurisprudence ‘was systematically 
and carefully reconstructed in the United States of America at the dawn of the 
                                                
52 Georg Cavaller, ‘Vitoria, Grotius, Pufendorf, Wolff and Vattel: Accomplices of European 
Colonialism and Exploitation or True Cosmopolitans?’, Journal of the History of International Law, 10 
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53 Ibid., pp.209-211. 
54 Ibid., p.191. 
55 Ian Hunter, ‘Global Justice and Regional Metaphysics: On the Critical History of the Law of Nature 
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twentieth century to make sense of practices and institutions that were already 
reshaping the world.’58 It is this Vitoria, the ‘Vitoria in Washington’ that I will hold in 
conversation with the violence of drug prohibition.59 The ways in which Vitoria was 
recovered in Washington will be engaged with in greater depth in Part B where I will 
illustrate how this recovery emerged conterminous with the move towards drug 
prohibition. However, it is first necessary to engage fully with Vitoria’s jurisprudence 
before speaking to the significance of his recovery and the guidance it may provide 
towards recognising the War on Drugs as an instantiation of international law’s 
sacrificial structure.  
 
3.3.2 Vitoria, Colonialism and Modernity’s Theological Inheritance 
 
 
Having taken account of the scholarly debate surrounding Vitoria, my 
intervention will be a reading of his thoughts in relation to my own argument 
regarding the sacrificial moorings of international law. Vitoria provides an 
appropriate point of departure for unpacking the role of sacrifice in international law 
for not only does his thought directly concern the colonial context but it also disrupts 
the presumption of international law’s claim to an immanent ontological 
completeness as it ‘straddles the divide between a medieval world … and a 
secularized modernity.’ 60  In comparison with other potential ‘forefathers’ of 
international law, such as Grotius or Vattell, Vitoria’s work and biography is more 
challenging to force into modernity’s claims to a rational disenchantment of the 
world; even at his most humanist, the spectre of theology consistently haunts Vitoria’s 
jurisprudence. The twentieth-century recovery of Vitoria sought a secularisation of 
the Dominican friar through a celebration of his rebellion against medieval political 
authority. Vitoria not only rejected presumptions of the natural slavery of the 
colonised, he also turned against the received arguments that justified Spanish 
colonialism on the basis of the universal authority of the Christian church. For 
Vitoria, just because the colonised are heathens who have still be to brought into 
Christian faith, it does not allow the law to ‘deny to them, who have never done us 
any wrong, the rights we concede to Saracens and Jews, who have been continual 
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enemies of the Christian religion.’61 At one level, Vitoria’s shift in this regard should 
not be easily dismissed; in practice it meant that his response to the colonial question 
constituted both heresy [against the pope] and treason [against the Emperor] at the 
time.62 However, it must also be stressed Vitoria remained a theologian throughout, 
his Thomistic training, as well as his concern with the internal rivalry between 
Catholicism and Protestantism plaguing the Christian church at the time, remained 
central to his entire jurisprudence.63 In this bestriding of the divide between the 
modern and pre-modern, Vitoria’s thought contained a recognition of international 
law as focused on ‘not just on the assertion of a sovereign statehood but also on the 
quality, the communal quality, of the international.’ 64  In other words, Vitoria 
concerned himself with what would hold together an international legal order in the 
manner once performed by a transcendent external point of authority such i.e God.   
As the Prime Professor of Theology at the University of Salamanca, Vitoria 
interwove the religious and the political in responding to the key question of his time: 
what was the system of law that could account for and govern Spanish-Amerindian 
relations.65 His position made Vitoria an authority upon the important moral issues of 
the day and in 1537 a particularly pressing issue was the question of the legality of 
colonial governance. From the moment that confirmation of Christopher Columbus’ 
arrival in the Americas was received in Spain, the question of law became an urgent 
one. Upon his ‘discovery’, Columbus had dispatched a letter to Luis de Santangel, 
finance minister to the crown of Castille and Aragon, stating ‘I found many islands 
filled with people innumerable, and of them all I have taken possession for their 
highnesses, by proclamation made and with royal standard unfurled.’66 Implicit within 
Columbus’ statement is a provocation: ‘what meaning could his legal ceremonies 
have for the people who were ostensibly to be bound by them?’67 In other words, 
when the Spanish encountered the Amerindian on the American continent, what was 
the law that should be followed? Was there a universal law that could be referred to 
and if so, what held it together? This is the problematic that Vitoria was engaging 
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with in his relectiones.  
 
3.3.3 Bringing the Transcendent into the World 
 
Vitoria’s first step in thinking through the communality of the international 
was to eschew an explanation for a universal law that solely rested upon the dominion 
of respublica Christiana. Vitoria’s celebration as a prototypical liberal humanist came 
not only from a reading of his ‘generosity’ to the Amerindians, but also because he 
did so through the discourse of natural law rather than deferring to a divine law, 
claimed by the Christian Church as proffering upon it universal jurisdiction. 
Following Thomas Aquanis, Vitoria conceived of a natural law that was not opposed 
to divine law, but was accessible to human reason in a way that divine law was not. 
The natural law of Vitoria is still informed by a divine law but performs a shift in the 
scholastic tradition, but rejecting the claim of access to divine law as a potential 
ground for worldly jurisdictional authority. Divine law had provided the default mode 
of justifying the Spanish claim to dominium over the Americas prior to Vitoria’s 
intervention. Divine law invested into the Pope a universal jurisdiction on account of 
his divine mission to spread Christianity and therefore Christian sovereigns found 
their actions to be justified if recognised by the Pope. The Papal Bulls of Donation 
made by Alexander VI in 1493 had granted the Spanish dominion over all non-
Christians lands they might encounter in the western hemisphere and therefore, had 
seemingly provided the answer to question of law in relation to the conquista.68 
However, Vitoria revisited the question of Spanish-Amerindian relations commencing 
with an understanding that for divine law to govern relations between the Spanish and 
Amerindians would require it to be relatable to both Christians and heathens alike. 
Vitoria does not deny the universal spiritual authority of Christ, but recognises that 
this does not translate into stable grounds for a universal political authority to be 
claimed by the Pope being Christ’s earthly vicar. Vitoria tells us that while Christ 
‘may have spiritual power over the whole world, over unbelievers as much as the 
faithful…the Pope does not have that power over unbelievers’ evidenced by his 
inability to ‘excommunicate them or prevent them from marrying.’69 Ultimately, 
Vitoria makes apparent his shift away from the hegemony of Rome when he declares 
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‘the Pope is not civil or temporal lord of the whole world in the proper sense of the 
words “lordship” and “civil power.’70 Following Vitoria, for the Amerindians to be 
held to the laws of the Spanish crown on the grounds of divine law does not answer 
the question of law facing the colonial project, but rather serves only to displace from 
the Spanish onto the Papacy the imperative question of law. Vitoria instead argues 
that the grounds for a law governing the Spanish-Amerindian would ultimately have 
to be sourced from the human world. 
This humanist shift informed the subsequent image of Vitoria as a proto-
secularist. It is an image attested to not only by those who celebrate Vitoria, but also 
by critics like Anghie, who claims that ‘Vitoria clears the way for his own elaboration 
of a new, secular, international law’, reading his refusal of the papal missionary 
mandate to justify Spanish title over the Americas as creating ‘a new system of 
international law which essentially displaces divine law and its administrator, the 
Pope, and replaces it with natural law administered by a secular sovereign.’71 
However, the secularism of Vitoria’s thought can be overemphasised. It should noted 
that Vitoria always held himself to be a theologian. Vitoria did not distinguish 
theology from jurisprudence, which were intertwined within his schematic. 72 
Furthermore, Vitoria’s biography also offers qualification against the fixing of him as 
the forefather of law’s secularisation, it should be noted that Vitoria never sought to 
be a crown counsel or advocate and in his writings referred to jurists with derision.73 
Ultimately, when Vitoria addressed the legal questions of his day, he did so in 
recognition of their interlinkage with, rather than separation from, the questions of a 
theological nature. Vitoria writings betray the religious as anchoring the 
humanitarianism of the juridical in a manner denied by secularism of the twentieth 
century liberal international lawyers who recovered him.  
The extent to which the theological continued to inform Vitoria’s 
jurisprudence becomes of relevance when considering his understanding of the 
communality that held together international law. Vitoria’s refusal of the papal bulls 
set the terms for a new universal order, it was a shifting of the global order, away 
from a template which divided between ‘areas of Christian lawfulness and areas 
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without law, and thence ripe for free acquisition.’74 The delinking of the rights offered 
by law from a Christian monopoly signals an emerging shift from a notion of the 
Christian and the proselytising mandate, as the universal subject towards a notion of 
the ‘human’ and its eventual apotheosis in civilising mission. However, any sharp 
temporal demarcation between the medieval and the modern assumed by discourses 
of modernity is betrayed by Vitoria’s thought as well as his biography. Where my 
reading of Vitoria departs from Anghie’s post-colonial critique is in terms of extent to 
which we recognise the theological as still persisting within Vitoria’s jurisprudence. 
Vitoria’s shift from a world governed by divine law to one governed by natural law is 
not a shift that ‘displaces divine law … and replaces it with natural law’ as suggested 
by Anghie, but rather a shift that seeks to draw the transcendence of divine law into 
the natural world. As Kathleen Davis makes clear: 
 
Far from displacing divine law, Vitoria is advocating a particular 
understanding of the fundamental position of divine law in the 
world…. Shifting the authority over divine law from the precarious 
hold of the papacy, Vitoria articulates a comprehensive, universal 
legal theory that places all law (human/civil, natural, the law of 
nations) and all peoples (Christians and unbelievers of all types) under 
divine law.75  
 
There is not a break but rather a continuity from a monotheistic Christianity to a 
univocal ‘humanitarian’ international law. The resultant universal order that Vitoria 
seeks to ground in natural law continues to attribute to itself the totalising force of a 
transcendent deity. The interweaving of a theological notion of the transcendent with 
the leap affected to bring about the claim of Euro-modernity is indicated in the extent 
to which the Spanish colonialism, and therefore the birth of European colonisation of 
the globe, operated as a seamless joint Church-State venture.76 Vitoria’s universal 
legal order set the stage for a community of sovereign nation states to function as a 
deific surrogate in the age of Euro-modernity, arrogating upon itself an omnipotence 
that was previously the sole preserve of a jealous God. Vitoria may extract the 
political order of law from a reliance on this external authoritative reference point of a 
Christian God but he does so not by detaching from the reverential power of the 
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transcendent via atheistic mutilation, but rather, in a Promethean gesture, by stealing 
the transcendent reference point so as to bring it into the law itself. In short, there is 
much of the old theological epoch that persists in Vitoria’s schema. China Miélville 
goes some way towards illuminating the fallacy of Brown Scott’s characterisation of 
Vitoria as a modern, liberal secularist by identifying ‘Vitoria is neither the modern 
thinker nor the liberal he is sometimes painted. His spatial conceptualisation of early 
colonialism represents the last, brilliant applications of pre-modern categories to new 
problems.’77 With this analysis, Miélville is correct in identifying the extent to which 
the ‘pre-modern’ continued to inform Vitoria’s schema but he also misrecognises this 
as evidence of Vitoria producing a ‘paradoxical proto-modernity.’78 Stressing the 
concerns of materialism over the political-theological, Miélville overlooks the extent 
to which the pre-modern persistently informs not only Vitoria’s thought but also 
modernity itself more widely. Rather than Vitoria’s indebtedness to the pre-modern 
categorising him as proto-modern, his ability to straddle the sacred and the secular 
actually captures the nature of modernity, puncturing its claim to be founded on the 
disenchantment of the world. Modernity, with modern law as an exemplar par 
excellence, requires a transcendent move to advocate a settled origin, a fixed ground 
on which a secularised truth regime can be built. The paradox does not indicate a 
proto-modernity; the containment of the paradox is the act of modernity itself, helping 
us to understand ‘modern law as the realization yet denial of the sacred,’ rather than 
its binary opposition.79 
Therefore, the readings of Vitoria, by both champions and critics, which see 
the theologian as fathering a secular system of international law fail to appreciate the 
extent to which modernity and its correlative internationalism remained indebted to a 
religious metaphysics. In its claim to being ontologically complete, international law 
inherits the surpassing claims of a monotheistic deity. Read as a purely secular system 
of law, international law is then charged with offering the grounds for its own 
authority, inviting the questioning of how a social order can account for itself in 
entirety? However, if perceived in terms progressing from, rather than being a sharp 
break from, the preceding religious order of the Christendom then international law 
can be better understood ‘as an ironic apotheosis of the sacred rather than its utter 
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denial.’80  
The argument that modernity continues to derive its functionality from the 
religious is an argument that has found favour with critical scholars recently, 
prompting claims of a ‘return to theology.’81 Questions of law offer a prime location 
for this ‘return to theology.’ Girard offers guidance as to why the law has been a 
prime candidate for scholars searching for modernity’s religious inheritance by 
clarifying the role that religion served in preceding epochs. Rather than religion being 
simply the worship of an invisible God as it is now retrospectively constructed as, 
Girard shows how religion’s primary purpose was to provide a transcendental 
architecture through which to ‘subdue violence, to keep it from running wild.’82 A 
unitary social order was taken to be only possible through the invocation of a ‘religion 
[which] tames, trains, arms, and directs violent impulses as a defensive force against 
those forms of violence that society regards as inadmissible.’83 Girard recognises that 
it is this responsibility for containing violence within society that has been inherited 
by our modern legal systems. With law holding contagious violence in check, the 
modern mind is able to hold itself in contradistinction to the mind of the religious 
follower, whose consciousness is thereby temporally relegated to be a condition 
befitting of a darkened past.84 As Girard tells us, modernity’s dismissal of religion is a 
luxury only afforded by law’s inheritance of the cathartic mandate, it is only ‘because 
we have no need for it, religion itself appears senseless.’85 Yet not only does the law 
take over the mantle of containing contagious violence, it does so whilst being more 
adept at concealing of its workings. In the modern age, the juridical replaces the 
theological not because it is opposed to the religious but because it is even more 
effective in doing the work of the religious. Girard explains further by stating: 
 
The "curative" measures …become increasingly mysterious in their 
workings as they progress in efficiency. As the focal point of the 
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system shifts away from religion and the preventive approach is 
translated into judicial retribution, the aura of misunderstanding that 
has always formed a protective veil around the institution of sacrifice 
shifts as well, and becomes associated in turn with the machinery of 
the law.86 
 
Following Girard, it can be seen how imperative it is for the machinery of the law to 
deny its cathartic mandate and insist upon an exclusive concern with justice or order, 
relegating concepts such as sacrifice to the darkened past and darkened people law 
constitutes itself in opposition to. In short, as stated earlier, the law contains, in both 
senses, the violence and the sacred of the ‘primitive’ but misrecognises these elements 
within itself. This masking of the persisting sacred quality of law underwrites the 
recovery of Vitoria. As Peter Fitzpatrick argues, ‘the intensity of the opposition 
between modern law and the sacred is not because they are different but, rather, the 
same yet having to appear different and opposed.’87 This is only amplified when 
discussing international law and its claim to universal authority. If Vitoria does offer 
an ‘origin’ for modern jurisprudence, he does so through bringing his scholastic 
theological training to bear on questions of the colonial encounter, resulting in a 
universal schema that remains transcendent but no longer requires a unifying positive, 
external point of reference. Instead the impasse at the heart of the international legal 
order, the absence of an overarching authority to quell violent rivalry, is resolved by 
way of a negative move, the cathartic inclusive/exclusion of the other. Vitoria’s 
innovation is that he provides the structure for an international community to be 
brought into some sort of coherence by way negation; it is what other is not, despite 
the other being dammed to exist within its universal jurisdiction. This shift 
recalibrates our reading of Vitoria’s refusal to justify the conquista in the authority of 
Rome from being a critique of the violence of colonialism to in fact opening up a 
space for a further totalising form of violence. Kathleen Davis illustrates: 
 
This transcendent, spiritual claim [of Vitoria’s natural law of nations] is 
a far more sweeping and powerful argument for Spanish dominion in 
the Americas than any claim based on the Pope’s universal jurisdiction 
over the world. It is likewise more violent for it is ‘in the interests of the 
preservation of the peace’ that Vitoria can approve mass violence and 
the slaughter of innocents, which he otherwise finds unacceptable.88  
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Once Vitoria’s meditation on the Spanish-Amerindian relations is no longer held as a 
secular break from the past but rather understood as a reworking of the sacred into the 
modern at the point of origin, the door is opened to reinterpret his ultimate 
justification of the violence of colonialism along the contours of sacrifice.  
 
3.4 A Sacrificial Jus Gentium: The Inclusive/Exclusion of the Colonised 
As aforementioned, along with the picture of Vitoria as a proto-secularists, the 
other image of him that was propelled by his twentieth-century recovery was that of 
him being a great humanist, ‘a broad-minded, high-minded and charitable person’ 
who could serve as an inspiration for a new age of international humanitarianism. 89 
Vitoria was characterised as a jurist who was able to recognise the humanity of the 
Amerindian at a time that few others could. Scholars continue to celebrate Vitoria on 
account of how ‘his concept of human rights suggests a form of moral 
cosmopolitanism.’90 Again, it is important to recognise that Vitoria’s characterisation 
of the Amerindian did mark a shift from the naked dehumanisation contained in 
previous meditation upon Spanish-Amerindian relations as offered by the likes of 
Sepulveda. Sepulveda invoked a neo-Aristotelian concept of natural slavery to 
emphasise the inhumanity of the Amerindian’s, justifying Spanish pillaging of their 
lands and riches because the Amerindians existed in violation of the laws of nature. In 
contrast, Vitoria acknowledged the humanity of the Amerindians, a position that 
helped fuel his reputation as an audacious dissident against the excess of colonial 
violence.  However, Vitoria’s bringing of the Amerindian inside the borders of a 
universal humanity, ultimately only ‘endorses the imposition of Spanish rule on the 
Indians by another argument.’91 Building on this point made by Anghie and others, a 
further understanding of Vitoria’s inclusive/exclusion of the Amerindian into the 
universal order can be offered by the concept of sacrifice which highlights not only 
the theological underpinning of Vitoria’s schema but also guides us towards the 
productive role that the violence that would ultimately be endured by the colonised 
                                                
89 James Brown Scott, The Catholic Conception of International Law (New Jersey: The Lawbook 
Exchange 2007), p.3. 
90 Georg Cavaller, ‘Vitoria, Grotius, Pufendorf, Wolff and Vattel: Accomplices of European 
Colonialism and Exploitation or True Cosmopolitans?’ 10 Journal of the History of International Law 
(2008), p.192 
91 Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, p.22. 
	   90	  
once within the jurisdiction of a universal humanity whose vary basis was developed 
in opposition to them. Illustrating how Vitoria serves as a prototype for a ‘sacrificial’ 
liberal international law informs this innovative reading of Vitoria alongside Girard’s 
sacrificial mechanism.  
 
3.4.1 On the American Indians 
 
Vitoria begins his reflections On the American Indians by recognising that 
‘before the Spanish arrived, these barbarian’s possessed true dominion’ over their 
land as any Christian did over theirs.92 Deviating from Sepulveda’s strict take on 
Aristotle, Vitoria dismisses the idea that Amerindians fitted the model of natural 
slaves and therefore all excesses were licensed upon them. Vitoria read the 
Amerindian against the rivals of the Christian world, the ‘Saracens and Jews’, arguing 
that if the Spanish could recognise the humanity and legal rights of their ‘continual 
enemies’ then they could not deny that same recognition to the Amerindian.93 Vitoria 
invoked the authority of Aquinas in concluding that ‘it is no impediment for a man to 
be a true master, that he is an unbeliever.’94 To be a heathen did not cancel the 
humanity of unbelievers, therefore nor can it override the legal rights they enjoy in 
law. 
However, the Amerindians were invited in the universal community of 
mankind with a qualification: that if they were to be recognised as human, they had to 
behave like human beings and to be human was a predetermined standard already 
embodied by the Spanish. This is the inclusive/exclusion of the Vitorian schema. For 
Vitoria, the Indians’ possession of universal reason was a pre-requisite to being 
human and therefore being bound by jus gentium. However, this jus gentium 
presumed as ‘universal’ the particularities of Christian Spain. The presumption of 
‘human’ was developed in comparison to a standard already determined. Vitoria 
invites the Amerindian into the category of humanity but as Anghie states, this 
invitation can only be realised through the 'adoption or the imposition of the 
universally applicable practices of the Spanish.’95  
The cost of entering Vitoria’s universal humanity was that the Amerindian 
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was now be bound by a jus gentium which allowed the Spanish ‘right to travel and 
dwell’ in the Americas, the right to ‘trade with the barbarians’ and ‘the right to preach 
and announce the Gospel in the lands of the barbarians.’96  If the Amerindians denied 
the Spanish these rights, this would constitute ‘acts of war’ in accordance to Vitoria’s 
jurisprudence. As a result, the Spanish would then be fully justified in unleashing 
violence upon the Amerindians to enforce their rights. The extract below relays the 
point in full:  
 
If after the Spaniards have used all diligence, both in deed and in 
word, to show that nothing will come from them to interfere with the 
peace and well-being of the aborigines, the latter nevertheless persist 
in their hostility and do their best to destroy the Spaniards, they can 
make war on the Indians, no longer as on innocent folk, but as against 
forsworn enemies and may enforce against them all the rights of war, 
despoiling them of their goods, reducing them to captivity, deposing 
their former lords and setting up new ones. 
 
Vitoria presents these rights as neutral and reciprocal, implying that the Amerindians 
have as much right to travel and trade in Spain as the Spanish do in the Americas. 
Scott reads Vitoria’s ‘unlimited’ and ‘universal’ rights as evidence that Vitoria ‘treats 
Christians and non-Christians, Europeans and non-Europeans, upon a like footing.’97 
However, even if the privileging of the terms ‘Christian’ and ‘European’ in each 
respective binary was ignored, Vitoria’s rights could only be read as neutral when 
divorced from the material history they were being derived from. This myopia even 
strikes Scott, who acknowledges how Vitoria’s exemplar for illustrating a reciprocal 
right to trade being the Spanish having a right to dig for Amerindian gold and silver, 
items ‘in which his [Vitoria’s] countrymen were particularly interested,’ may betray 
an imbalance in this reciprocity.98 The postcolonial critique of Vitoria is at its most 
penetrating when addressing how a misrecognition of the lived reality of the Spanish-
Amerindian encounter underwrites Vitoria’s apparent humanism 99  Vitoria’s 
generosity in articulating a universal ‘right to travel’ ignores that movement between 
the Iberian peninsula and the ‘new-world’ was strictly one-way; to invite the 
Amerindian into an emerging world market through a universal ‘right to trade’ 
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overlooks the extent to which the Spanish-Amerindian trade took the form of plunder 
rather than exchange. The universal ‘right to proselytise’ did not envision the 
Amerindians having ‘the same rights of propaganda and intervention for their idolatry 
and religious fallacies as Spanish Christians.’100 In short, the material realities of the 
context to which he was writing meant that Vitoria’s jus gentium, which initially 
appears to legislate universal rights, in practice ultimately authorises Spanish 
incursion into the Americas. China Miélville captures the contradiction inherent in 
Vitoria’s universalism, labelling it ‘colonialism-in-equality.’101 For Miélville, this 
contradiction in Vitoria’s jurisprudence is what gives international law its form.102 
Miélville suggests ‘colonialism is in the very form, the structure of international law 
itself, predicated on global trade between inherently unequal polities, with unequal 
coercive violence implied in the very commodity form.’103 This statement illuminates 
how international law is structured so as to be formally inclusive while masking a 
violent exclusion of damned subjects from its universal order. 
Anghie’s work furthers the critique by recognising that for Vitoria ‘the issue 
of Indian personality’ is the question that anchors his reflections on the Spanish-
Amerindian encounter.104 His jurisprudence aims to fix the Amerindian as a being, 
one that is simultaneously inside and outside the boundaries of humanity. Vitoria’s 
invitation of the Amerindian into the universal realm simultaneously encloses the 
Amerindian within a purgatorial existence. Identifying the template for the paradox of 
colonial subjectivity, Anghie shows that in Vitoria’s scheme: 
 
The Indians belong to the universal realm like the Spanish […], 
Vitoria asserts, they have the facility of reason and hence a means of 
ascertaining jus gentium. However, the Indian is very different from 
the Spaniard because the Indian’s specific social and cultural practices 
are at variance from the practices required by the universal norms -- 
which in effect are Spanish practices – and which are applicable to 
both Indian and Spaniard. Thus the Indian is […] both alike and 
unlike the Spaniard.105 
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The Amerindians are awarded the capacity for reason and are therefore recognised as 
human by Vitoria, but in being so recognised they are also determined as failing to 
reach the standards that are expected of a human, at least in their present condition. 
The full realisation of the humanity of the colonised becomes contingent upon their 
improvement. This (im)possible development of the colonial subject underwrote the 
Vitorian schema as was recognised by Scott, the scholar largely responsible for 
Vitoria’s twentieth century recovery, within his celebration of Vitoria’s humanism: 
 
Victoria recognized that there were peoples in an imperfect state of 
civilization; but they were human beings, and human beings, to his 
way of thinking, should not be subject to exploitation, but should be 
fitted – if they were not already fit – to enjoy the rights of all human 
beings, as well as to be subjected to their duties.106 
 
However, the inclusion promised is always an inclusion deferred, as the Amerindian 
is invited into the universal whilst also becoming the constitutive outside against with 
the Spanish are contrasted. The Amerindian is trapped in an impossible position: full 
inclusion into the universal order is dependent upon being able to conform, to 
progress, or – borrowing from modern parlance – to develop, up to a standard that is, 
constituted by the Amerindian’s exclusion.107 Vitoria’s translation of a theological 
schema onto this questions of the new universal order is made most apparent when he 
draws on Aquinas, himself following Aristotle, to define the legitimate sovereign 
subjects of international laws as ‘perfect communities’, states that are self-sufficient, 
complete and ontologically whole within themselves.108 The totality of the godhead is 
imported into the sovereign states, who now constitute the basis for their own 
authority. In contradistinction to the perfect community, exemplified by Spanish (ergo 
European) community were the imperfect communities such as those inhabited by the 
Amerindians.109 It must be emphasised that for Vitoria, the imperfection of the 
Amerindian communities was not an essential feature of them, it was simply an 
indication of “something lacking.”110 Their potential made them not perfect but 
‘perfectible’, however the persistence of this logic into the twenty-first century 
                                                
106 Scott, The Spanish Origin of International Law, p.11. 
107 Fitzpatrick, The Revolutionary Past, p.121. 
108 Vitoria, ‘On the Essence of Law’, Vitoria: Political Writings, pp.260-261. 
109 Ibid, p.301: “A perfect community or commonwealth is therefore one which is complete in 
itself…such commonwealths are the kingdom of Castille and Aragon, and others of the same kind.” 
110 Vitoria, p.301. 
	   94	  
rhetoric of ‘developed and developing’ countries demonstrates just how indefinite 
Vitoria’s the promise of perfectible for the colonised has been.111 Here is the 
production of the purgatorial existence for the colonised that Fanon elegantly captures 
as damnation. 
  That Vitoria was not merely speaking to the condition of the Amerindian, but 
actively constructing them as a novel subjectivity through his jurisprudence, is 
suggested within the lecture title of De Indis Noviter Inventis. Noviter translates from 
Latin to English as to ‘reconstitute’ whilst the word 'inventis' can mean both 
‘discovery’ and ‘invention.’ These translations give suggestion to the dual work being 
undertaken by Vitoria’s lectures: to account for Spanish Amerindian relations post-
discovery’ but, moreover, to constitute the Amerindian, the prototypical colonial 
subject, as an innovative subjectivity. Ultimately, it is a subjectivity which is rendered 
naked before a legitimising and (re)generative violence. Vitoria’s jurisprudence 
allows the European to posit that ‘we’ are complete while ‘they’ are provisional, they 
can only become complete by becoming like us and to facilitate this development, any 
violence required to force them to do so is justified. 112 In fact, the aforementioned 
violence is read as not so, for it is now the purifying force exorcising the problem that 
had disturbed the completion of the whole, in this case a Europeanised universal. The 
universal human community can come into being by perfecting the ‘imperfect’ human 
subjects by violence if necessary.  
 
3.4.2 Vitoria’s Jurisprudence and the Spectre of Rivalry 
 
By unpacking Vitoria’s ultimate justification of the violence of the conquista 
whilst reading it alongside the cathartic properties of sacrificial violence, Vitoria’s 
model of colonialism-in-equality no longer appears contradictory but coherently 
mythic. By mythic, I refer to how sacrificial violence functions so as to be 
lawmaking. The mythic element of law serves as the ‘mute ground which enables … a 
unified ‘law’ and which brings together law’s contradictory existences into a 
patterned coherence.113 The ease of reading Vitoria alongside a notion of ‘sacrifice’ is 
facilitated by the context in which Vitoria was writing being one of contagious 
                                                
111 Oscar Guardiola-Rivera, What If Latin America Ruled the World? How the South Will Take the 
North Through the 21st Century (London: Bloomsbury), p.84. 
112 Guardiola-Rivera, ‘Absolute Contingency’, Events: The Force of International Law, p.37. 
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rivalry. The schism in the Christian church was an abiding concern of the day, as 
Ramon Hernandez describes:  
 
The revolution represented by Martin Luther's reforms had erupted in 
a manner that called into question the very internal constitution of 
ecclesiastical society. In the political order, the confrontation between 
Christian princes, the interminable wars between France and Spain, 
and the conflicts in Italy, Germany, and elsewhere in Europe, had 
never before acquired such intensity nor such sweeping proportions.114 
 
It is instructive to consider Vitoria thoughts on the conquista not only as an attempt to 
schematise Spanish-Amerindian relations but also as an attempt to abate the rivalry 
flaring within the Christendom. Anthony Pagden acknowledges that ‘Vitoria and his 
successors were far less concerned with the particulars of the American case than they 
were with the opportunities it provided for a refutation of Lutheran and later, 
Calvinist theories of sovereignty.’ 115  Hernandez offers further support for this 
viewpoint observations when he argues that as ‘Vitoria ascended to his professorship, 
war appeared to be an invincibly malignant tumour that had infected all of 
Christendom.’ 116  Therefore, if we follow this argument, we can read Vitoria’s 
writings as a reaction to a context in which ‘there was an urgent need to invoke the 
supreme argument of the natural unity of all peoples in order to definitively dissolve 
armed conflicts’117 For it should be recalled that, in response to the reformation which 
would shatter the Christendom within Vitoria’s lifetime, the ‘discovery’ of the 
Americas served as a release valve for a political order that was descending into the 
crisis of rivalry.118 Vitoria, along with the other juridical theologians of that time, can 
be read as trying to bring about unity within the European world as well as founding a 
universal order of legal recognition and it is by beginning with an understanding of 
the inclusive/exclusion of colonised within Vitoria’s jurisprudence as a response to 
fundamental rivalry, that the argument I have pursued in this chapter, that the 
resonance between Girard and Vitoria becomes further apparent. 
                                                
114 Ramon Hernandez, ‘The Internationalization of Francisco de Vitoria and Domingo De Soto’, 
Fordham International Law Journal, 15, 4, pp.1031-1059, p.1031. 
115 Pagden, ‘Dispossessing the barbarian’, p.83. 
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117 Ibid., p.1042. 
118 See Lewis Hanke, All Mankind is One, p.4-7 for discussion on the relationship between colonialism 
and the reformation. ‘Luther and Cortez were to be born in the same year: one to destroy the church the 
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Once Vitoria’s jurisprudence is recast as a project concerned with resolving 
contagious violence, the Girardian corollary would anticipate the production of a 
sacrificial victim on whom violence could be licensed in order to contain the 
exploding rivalry. In accordance with Girard, such a ‘victim should belong both to the 
inside and the outside of the community.’119 In order to produce such a subject, a 
discourse must be offered which rationalises a subject to be both alike and unlike the 
community, a distortion of the model, a failed realisation of what should be. It is 
through this process that the goal of making ‘the victim wholly sacrificeable’ is 
satisfied.120 As outlined above, Vitoria’s construction of the Amerindian mirrors the 
subjective qualities required of the Giradian victim. Traversing the boundaries of a 
projected universal humanity, the Amerindian of the Vitorian schema is exposed to a 
cathartic violence through being a subject both similar enough and different enough to 
absorb the rivalry that threatens to engulf the community as a whole. Viewed through 
Girard’s lens, Vitoria’s inclusion of the Amerindian into a universal humanity, so 
celebrated by Scott and others, becomes merely a necessary precursor for the violence 
that is ultimately visited upon the Amerindian, for unless the victim is initially read as 
within the bounds of the community, it cannot become a signifier for the rivalry 
within the community and the violence performed upon the victim’s body cannot to 
do its purifying work. In order to expunge the internal violence ‘continuity must be 
maintained’ between the community and victim.121 However, ‘there must also be 
discontinuity’, which Vitoria effects with formulation of the Amerindian 
personality.122 The violence upon the colonised is taken as necessitated by their own 
monstrosity. Anghie describes the paradoxical position Vitoria leaves the Amerindian 
in and how this position is naked to not only violence but a violence that it total and 
without any fixed point of conclusion, stating: 
 
Spanish war against the Indians is inevitable and endless. The Indian 
is ascribed with membership within an overarching system of jus 
gentium, with intention and volition; as a consequence of this, 
violence originates within Vitoria’s system through the Indians’ 
deviance.123 
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The structure of this violence will be shown to mirror the structure of the violence that 
the twentieth-century drug war would take in Chapter Eight. When read through a 
Girardian lens, international law’s mandate of producing a universal peace both 
within Vitoria’s response to a disintegrating Christendom and contemporary liberal 
international law seeking to contain the crisis of the First and Second World Wars in 
the twentieth century becomes intimately tied with empire and the violence visited 
upon the included/excluded subject. 
 
3.4.3 The Model of the Colonial Subject  
 
Vitoria’s theorisation of Spanish-Amerindian relations allows the juridical 
response to initial European colonial encounter to lay the groundwork for the creation 
of a novel ontological position, the modern colonial subject. The Amerindian served 
as the prototype for the subsequent colonial subjects that would emerge within and 
against European modernity. By the colonised subject, I specifically refer to an 
ontological category produced specifically through and in oppositional relation to 
European colonialism. Fanon takes us to the heart of the subjective identity in his 
mediation of the condition of blackness when he determines that  ‘to understand the 
being of the black man… not only must the black man be black; he must be black in 
relation to the white man.’124 While Fanon himself focuses on the condition of 
blackness, he declares that his analysis can be expanded to all colonised peoples, to 
‘every people in whose soul an inferiority complex has been created by the death and 
burial of its local cultural originality.’125 Fanon illustrates that the connection between 
different colonial identities is their ontological position in relation to European 
modernity. The category of the Black or the Negro is a product of occidental 
misrecognition, the same dynamic that had produced the Amerindian, the Oriental and 
other colonised subjectivities.126  
The colonised subject exists under and is structured by what Fanon terms as an 
‘atmosphere of violence’, referring to a mode of existence that is at all moments open 
                                                
124 Fanon, Black Skins, White Masks, (New York: Pluto Press, 2008), p.83. 
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being impacted upon by the force of the law.127 The violence serves an ordering 
function for the international community. Vitoria schema recognises importance of 
wrestling with law’s responsibility to effect a bringing together and once unpacked, 
offers a glimpse of the force that generates community in international law. Reading 
Vitoria alongside Girard points towards a violence upon the colonised subject from 
which the model for the liberal, humanitarian international legal order that would be 
recovered in the twentieth-century derives its unity. The narrative of the birth of the 
international community through the European colonial project is incompatible with 
contemporary international law’s universalist self-image. The violence upon the 
colonised must be recalibrated, misrecognised as legitimate in the manner of Vitoria’s 
innovative reworking of Spanish-Amerindian relations. The unpacking of this 
historical misrecognition, as performed in this chapter, is necessary in order expose 
the mechanism of sacrifice lying underneath the liberal humanitarianism acclaimed by 




In reading Vitoria’s works alongside Girard and his notion of social orders 
being produced through a sacrificial mechanism, I have attempted to show how 
Vitoria’s humanistic critique prefiguring an ultimate validation of the conquista 
provides an illustrative starting point through which to perceive the international legal 
order as being generated through violence upon the colonised subject. After clarifying 
the reasons for undertaking this engagement with history, I reviewed the current 
literature on Vitoria by taking account of the on-going contestation over his legacy. 
Appreciating how the model of the sacrificial mechanism maps onto the Vitorian 
schema helps to understand the concerns that informed both a recovery of Vitoria in 
the crisis of international order in the early twentieth century and the continuing 
relevance of his ideas for international legal scholarship today. My reading worked to 
reconcile the contemporary scholarly debate over whether Vitoria is a liberal 
humanitarian or a colonial apologist by illustrating how liberal humanism within 
Euro-modernity has itself been the result of and dependent upon a sacrificial relation 
to those held to traverse the boundaries of humanity. This is particularly important for 
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the trajectory of thesis as the ultimate focus of my engagement with Vitoria is not so 
much placed on his influence on early modern jurisprudence but on how his 
jurisprudence was recovered to guide international law and, in particular, a distinctly 
Americanised notion of liberal humanism in the twentieth century. Therefore, this 
chapter placed a focus on the historical antecedents for what I argue as a ‘sacrificial 
internationalism’ in contemporary international law, bringing together Vitoria’s image 
as a secular modernist with his biography as a trained and committed theologian in 
order to reveal the theological inheritance of our current international law. The 
impulse behind these claims has been to clarify the intellectual context that would 
ultimately produce the War on Drugs, before I offer a focused study of this 
particularly instantiation of a ‘sacrificial’ international law. 
In the next section of the thesis, I will show how, in the shadow of rivalry 
within the international order, a resurrection of interest in Vitoria occurred amongst 
jurists seeking to facilitate in new order of universal peace.129 An idealised Vitoria 
emerged as an intellectual forefather for international law, at a time in which the 
universal order of peace required regeneration, particularly by major jurists from the 
U.S.A. A major figure I will draw on inn this section is leading American 
international legal theorist, Dr. James Brown Scott, who carried forward this recovery 
of Vitoria, as a generation of forthright American internationalists sought to reshape 
international law for the twentieth century. Moreover, Part B of this thesis will 
illustrate how, emerging conterminously with the recovery of Vitoria, and being 
propelled by the same group of early twentieth century American internationalists, 
movement for international law to universally prohibit drugs was born. Moral 
reformers and Christian missionaries, whose anti-vice campaigning was largely 
dismissed as a fringe movement at the start of the twentieth century, found that their 
arguments for first anti-opium and then wider anti-drugs legislation aligned with the 
political and economic objectives as well as the general theoretical orientation of the 
founding generation of American international lawyers as the U.S.A emerged as a 
new major world power. In short, over the course of Part B of this thesis, I will show 
how the drug prohibitionist movement, in both its religious origins and construction 
of colonised and racial subaltern peoples as the included/excluded subject within a 
universal order, can be read to not only historically coincide with the recovery of 
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Vitoria for American international law but also theoretically to carry more than a faint 







The (Re)Turn Towards A Single Standard of Morality: 




4.1 Introduction  
 
 
In the previous chapter I reviewed the jurisprudence of international law’s 
‘forefather, Francisco De Vitoria and placed his thoughts in conversation with a 
theory of community production through sacrifice. I argued for a reading of Vitoria’s 
jurisprudence as sacrificial, placing his ultimate justification of violence upon the 
colonized subject, as articulated by postcolonial critics of Vitoria, in conversation 
with theoretical approaches that stress the persistence of a theological undercurrent to 
the presumed secularity of modern law. In addition, I made a further argument for 
understanding the colonized subject as operating as the sacrificial victim for the 
modern international legal order. The purpose of the previous chapter’s focus on 
sixteenth-century Salamanca in a thesis whose central concern is the contemporary 
War on Drugs was to unpack a key historical prelude to the liberal humanism that 
would emerge in international law over the twentieth century. I illustrated that not 
only does law mask the violence that is applied through its workings under the rubric 
of liberal humanism but that this form of productive masking, that I argue can be 
understood as ‘sacrificial’, has a much longer history than often accounted for. 
However, as I acknowledged in the previous chapter, an approach taking Vitoria as 
‘an origin’ for international law necessarily engages the on-going conversation 
concerning who is the ideal forefather of international law.  
Therefore, it is crucial to emphasize that, after initially influencing a 
generation of scholars who followed in his wake at the School of Salamanca in the 
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the conversation regarding the origin of 
international law became a conversation in which Vitoria was for a long-time absent, 
his legacy going into decline along with the loss of Iberian global hegemony. At the 
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height of European colonialism over the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, jurists 
such as Grotius or Vattel would override Vitoria’s influence as the Dutch, the 
Belgians, and most prominently the British and the French competed for global 
supremacy. It would only be once the rivalry within the European community had 
intensified beyond the point of crisis and it was essential that contagious violence be 
contained, that Vitoria’s ideas were resurrected. Carl Schmitt tells of how ‘after 
World War I, a "renaissance" of Vitoria and late Spanish scholasticism marked an 
especially interesting phenomenon in the history of international law.’1 The colonial 
order produced by the European empires had divided the globe into distinct spheres of 
sovereign states/empires and non-sovereign colonies, with the peoples inhabiting 
these divergent spaces becoming imbued with differing standards of international 
legal personality. However, the turn of twentieth century would bring about a shift in 
this theoretical basis of international order, with an expansive liberalism returning to 
the fore. It is this period of the early twentieth century, in which moves towards a 
renewal of the universalism and moralism of international law are made in the face of 
persisting crisis, that I will be engaging with, not only in this chapter, but across this 
entire second part of the thesis. In this chapter, I begin by emphasising the 
significance of the recovery of a jurisprudence of moral universal humanitarianism 
during this historical moment, propelled by Vitorian scholar James Brown Scott and a 
generation of forthright American internationalists that Scott would himself inspire. 
The importance of understanding how Vitoria’s legacy was recovered for the 
twentieth century and particularly the influence it would enjoy over an emerging 
American internationalism will be necessary to fully illuminate the intellectual 
context in which international drug prohibition would transition from a fringe idea 
championed by marginal moral reformers towards making its first steps into being a 
given norm of international law. It is my argument that this transition was able to gain 
currency in this era as a result of the turn of international law towards imposing what 
James Brown Scott called a ‘single standard of morality’ upon the world at large, a 
turn that was particularly influential upon an emergent internationalism in the U.S.A.2 
 
                                                
1 Carl Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum (New 
York: Telos Press), p.117. 
2 James Brown Scott, ‘A Single Standard of Morality for the Individual and the State,’ Presidential 
Address delivered at the Twenty-sixth Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, 
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4.2 James Brown Scott, Vitoria’s Recovery and American internationalism  
 
This section of my thesis will cover the twin histories of American drug 
prohibition and American international law over the first half of the twentieth century. 
How drug prohibition is theoretically reconciled with the liberalism of American 
international law will be the focus of my following chapters, however this chapter 
will offer a sustained engagement with the influence that Vitoria’s recovery had upon 
early American international law.  
Vitoria’s contribution to the birth of international law was resurrected in the 
early decades of the twentieth century and in the Anglosphere, the international 
lawyer largely responsible for Vitoria’s recovery was famed doyen of American 
internationalism, late nineteenth-century and early-twentieth century jurist Dr. James 
Brown Scott. Scott read Vitoria as the theoretical example that American 
International Law should draw upon as it emerged into the status of a global power.3 
Scott is himself now heralded as a major figure in the chronology of international law, 
celebrated as the man who ‘fathered and fostered the development of international 
law during its greatest period of history.’4 At the birth of the ‘American century’, 
Scott committed, in both thought and practice, to reinvigorating the idea of moral 
internationalism as the U.S.A. began to succeed the European continent as the world’s 
hegemonic power. Scott’s most prominent accolades include serving as the solicitor 
of the United States Department of State (1906-1911) and then becoming president of 
the American Society of International Law (1929-1939), as well as serving as the first 
editor of their journal, a position he held for seventeen years.5 The influence that Scott 
exerted upon early American international law can be read alongside the expansion of 
American internationalism and the emergence of what Ian Tyrell has referred to as 
‘America’s moral empire’ a mode of global hegemony that justified its power on the 
moral uplift of all peoples of the world.6 Scott would be closely tied, in both his 
personal and professional life, to Elihu Root, another jurist and statesman who would 
                                                
3 See James Brown Scott, The Catholic Conception of International Law (New Jersey: The Lawbook 
Exchange, 2007). 
4 Manley O. Hudson, Harvard Alumni Bulletin, XXXIII, 14 (1931),  
<http://www.lawbookexchange.com/pages/books/58233/george-a-finch-william-e-butler/adventures-
in-internationalism-a-biography-of-james-brown-scott> [accessed 09 March 2016]. 
5 George A Finch, ‘James Brown Scott, 1866-1943’, American Journal of International Law, 38, 183 
(1944), pp.188-194. 
6 Ian Tyrrell, Reforming the World: The Creation of America's Moral Empire, Reprint edition 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013). 
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himself serve as the Secretary of the War Department (1899–1904) and Secretary of 
the State Department (1905–9) and as the first president of the American Society of 
International Law (ASIL) until 1924.7 In his practice career, Scott embraced the 
legalist project for world order, working towards the establishment of the Permanent 
Court of International Justice and serving in Woodrow Wilson’s delegation for 
establishing the League of Nations. Scott has been described as ‘a faithful disciple of 
Root, sharing Root's belief in an incremental approach to the creation of institutions 
and practices that would lead to a peaceful world.’8 Together Root and Scott would be 
‘crucial to the development’ of American international law, serving as mentors for an 
entire generation of American internationalists actively reconstructing the global legal 
order.9 They drove both the study and practice of international law in America around 
the turn of the twentieth century, acting as the ‘legalist’ branch of a wider collection 
of missionaries and world federalists who historians have named the ‘American peace 
movement’- a movement concerned with constructing a new model for peace among 
the international community in response to the violence that was erupting within the 
competing European imperial states. 10  Root and Scott provided much of the 
organisational and intellectual energy for the ASIL, an organisation ‘driven almost 
entirely by the desire to give vitality to a mechanism for peace through law.”11 A 
study on the emergence of international law as a major discipline in the U.S.A, both 
academically and in practice, requires substantive engagement with the early years of 
the ASIL and the role that Root and Scott played within it, providing the intellectual 
and political foundation for the coming moral empire.  
A further element to appreciate is how a historiography of Root, Scott and the 
ASIL must position this emerging American international law within the moment of 
an international legal order in crisis. At the start of the century, mimetic violence 
between imperial European rivals was rapidly escaping any mechanisms for its 
suppression, requiring a reworking of theoretical models of the production of global 
                                                
7 Hatsue Shinohara, US International Lawyers in the Interwar Years: A Forgotten Crusade 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p.14. 
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Reform, 1889-1918 (New Jersey: Princeton University Press). 
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peace. The rise of American international law paralleled the descent of the European 
continent into an extended period of unchecked war that has been termed by 
historians as ‘the Second Thirty Years War.’12 This specific term of periodization 
seeks to capture how the outbreak of violence between European empires in the Great 
War was never fully contained by the ambitious, inter-war efforts to re-establish legal 
order and instead the wars of the first half of the twentieth century can be better read 
as one, continuous conflict that ran until the end of the Second World War. Under the 
shadow of this crisis, Root, Scott and the ASIL began to think through ‘international 
law as a war-prevention structure’, seeking to enhance an understanding of the 
discipline so that it functioned more effectively at forestalling the barbarism of 
international violence. 13  The concern with producing a legal framework for 
responding to the task of containing mimetic violence offers some suggestion behind 
Scott’s appeal to Francisco De Vitoria. Scott conceptualised ‘international order’ as a 
synonym for peace and it is this concern with the production of peace amongst an 
order structured to be in Hobbesian conflict that provokes my reading of him, and the 
generation of American jurists he influenced, alongside Vitoria and the notion of a 
‘sacrificial international’ illuminated in earlier chapters.14 It is important to recognise 
that, as biographers have stated, for Scott ‘international law was more than a study or 
a profession; it was, in fact, a religion.’15 Scott invested in ‘international law as the 
basic ordering system for peace’;16 this vision of international law parallels the 
Giradian understanding of how law, acting as the religion after the end of religion 
‘invariably strives to subdue violence, to keep it from running wild,’ and therefore 
allow for the communal production of peace.17As was the case with Vitoria, Scott 
produced his ideas under the auspices of crisis; his jurisprudence should be 
understood as a response to an urgent need for unity within an international 
community plagued by internal conflict.  
                                                
12 For references to ‘the Second Thirty Years War’, see Michael Howard, ‘A Thirty Years' War? The 
Two World Wars in Historical Perspective’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 3 (1993), pp. 
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Scott’s prominence as an international lawyer would span the era surrounding 
the First World War, meaning that he was practically, as well as intellectually, 
engaged with questions regarding the juridical possibilities and limitations of 
international peace. At the war’s beginning in 1914, Scott was appointed Special 
Advisor to the Department of State in matters of international law arising out of 
World War I, and at its conclusion he served as legal advisor to the American 
Commission to Negotiate Peace with Woodrow Wilson in Paris in 1918, assisting 
with the drafting of the Treaty of Versailles.18 It is in the shadow of this escalating 
conflict in the international order that Scott and a surrounding collection of American 
international jurists, diplomats and missionaries advanced a distinctly moralistic 
universalism that would lay the groundwork for the emergence of America’s moral 
empire over the course of the twentieth century.19  
 
4.2.1 Vitoria in Washington 
 
The emergence of the U.S.A onto the world stage accompanies a reworking of 
international law by its leading jurists. The concept of an ‘American international 
law’ becomes popular as a distinct term at the end of the nineteenth century and in the 
early twentieth century.20 Root and Scott, as the leaders of the first generation of 
American international lawyers, aided the development of this notion of ‘American 
international law’ that would inform both American foreign policy and wider 
international law over the twentieth century.21  Scott would be the figure most 
concerned with doing the theoretical and historical work required for grounding an 
American conception of a liberal international law and his search for historical 
antecedents drew him to the work of sixteenth-century Vitoria. Scott read Vitoria’s 
jurisprudential accounting for the relations between the Spanish imperialists and 
native Amerindians at the very birth of European Colonialism as being the origin of 
international law and the illustration of ideal legal order based on a moral 
universalism. As aforementioned, Scott’s championing of Vitoria did much to 
                                                
18 Anne Orford, ‘The Past as Law or History? The Relevance of Imperialism for Modern International 
Law,’ IILJ Working Paper 2012/2, History and Theory of International Law Series, p.12. 
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distinguish his vision of American international law from the prevailing jurisprudence 
of the time; the value of Vitoria had to be re-stated as the sixteenth century theologian 
had become a historical figure of decreasing relevance by the turn of the twentieth 
century.22 As Carl Schmitt states, it was ‘only after 1919 did Vitoria's name suddenly 
become known and famous’ in mainstream juridical debates.23 The apex of Scott’s 
public campaign to recover Vitoria and his legacy would come in the 1930’s, with 
Scott, through his influence as a grandee of American international law at this stage, 
championing the Spanish theologian as international law’s forgotten paterfamilias in a 
flurry of writings and lectures. He eventually became the driving force behind the 
establishment of the Vitoria-Suarez society, established in 1932 with a Spanish 
counterpart being instituted in 1936.24 However, Scott had been engaging with 
Vitoria’s work from his first reading of De Indis and De Belli Relectiones in 1906.25 
Scott elevated the legacy of Vitoria over the early decades of the twentieth century 
with the aim of placing international law in ‘its true historical light’ just as the 
discipline was being established in the U.S.A.26 As well as writing on Vitoria’s legacy 
himself, Scott directed his energies towards proliferating resources to support the 
wider study of the Salamancan, facilitating new English additions of Vitoria’s work 
through the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace while it was under the 
presidency of mentor Root.27 The new issues of Vitoria’s writings, published in 1917, 
give an indication of the growing interest in his work in the early years of American 
internationalism.  
Scott’s recovery of Vitoria ‘represents an incredible transmogrification of the 
postulates of natural law, from the Middle Ages to twentieth-century American Neo-
Thomism.’ 28  In Vitoria’s writings were the jurisprudential antecedents for the 
international law that American internationalism was seeking to ignite; that is, an 
international law that was unitary, cohesive and ontologically complete in its 
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encapsulation of all humanity. American internationalism took the form of being 
anchored to an abstract universal equality but one that conceals an actual material and 
juridical inequality in which only one of the terms in the relation is posited an the 
ideal, whilst the other term is set the (impossible) task of mimicking the ideal. We can 
see the structure of legitimised violence arising as the ideal can be taken to function as 
a unified background space for the world to be organised as it was once thought to be 
organised for God; this allows the protection of that ideal, even by warfare, to be just, 
in the same manner as Vitoria’s ultimate justification of Spanish violence upon the 
colonies if they failed to reach the standards of pre-determined universal norms was 
legitimate. The interweaving of Vitoria and his ideas with the early twentieth century 
construction of American international law is perhaps best captured by a vignette 
recounted in the eulogy for James Brown Scott, published by the American Journal of 
International Law after his passing: 
 
When the new building for the Department of Justice was completed 
in Washington, it was decided to adorn the ceremonial entrance 
leading from the court of honor with a series of mural panels depicting 
the great lawgivers of history... Unable to locate a likeness from 
which to paint the features of Victoria… the artist, hearing of Dr 
Scott's work, sought his advice on a portrait of his subject. 
Unfortunately, Dr Scott had to tell him that none could be found 
anywhere in the world. The artist returned to his mural and painted the 
figure of Victoria garbed true to life as a Dominican friar but with an 
excellent likeness of the head and hands of James Brown Scott. So 
there in the halls of justice at Washington, standing … is a good 
portrait of Dr Scott disguised in the habit of the Dominican theologian 
who expounded the law of nations one hundred years before the 
classic treatise of Grotius.29 
 
The image of the body of Vitoria combined with the face of American international 
law’s founding intellectual figure, James Brown Scott, provides an apt visual 
metaphor for the way Vitoria’s sacrificial-humanitarian jus gentium was recovered 
and remade in the service of America’s rising moral empire. Anne Orford recognises 
the allegorical significance of the above vignette, stating that ‘it is fitting that the 
entrance of the US Department of Justice displays a likeness of Scott in the guise of 
Vitoria, because it is the version of Vitoria created by Scott that would provide the 
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ideological justification for the universal law of the American century.’30 The images 
in question are reproduced below.  
 
Fig 1. Mural of Francisco De Vitoria at U.S. Department of Justice Building. 
Reproduced from Edward Gordon “The Art Of Justice, Or Queen For A Day”, 
available at The Green Bag Vol.15. (2012) 
  
Fig. 2 Image of Dr James Brown Scott alongside the depiction of Vitoria. Reproduced 
from Edward Gordon “The Art Of Justice, Or Queen For A Day”, available at The 
Green Bag Vol.15. (2012) 
 
 
The images above depict Scott, dressed as the figure of Vitoria, inheriting his 
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panoramic perspective of the world, overseeing a globe over which a single standard 
of morality can be cast. The making of the world into a singular whole, ontologically 
complete in itself, is suggested by this image and can be read in the theoretical 
approach to international law that the American mode of liberal international law 
would undertake. It presumes that the overseer has a panorama that can only be 
obtained from a fixed vantage point, making it the standard for the world, the 
objective norm judging and measuring the development of others. This is what is 
being depicted in the entrance to the US DoJ building: Scott as Vitoria contemplating 
the world, with an omniscient perspective of life on earth, as the world becomes an 
orb ready-at-hand, visible, and accessible.   
Vitoria’s legacy was recovered and reimagined by Scott as the model for an 
expanded moral universalism that would provide a jurisprudential alternative to the 
strict demarcation of sovereignty that separated the colonial and non-colonial worlds. 
However, in contrast to the ostensible humanitarian impulses acclaimed by 
intellectual forefathers like Scott and Root, Robert Vitalis has argued that American 
internationalism emerged through an intellectual focus on protecting the privileges of 
European peoples in the face of a rising tide of colour, specifically the anti-colonial 
struggles which were gathering momentum during the first half of the twentieth 
century. Consequently, for Vitalis, the study and practice of American 
internationalism was ‘shaped by and often directly concerned with advancing 
strategies to preserve and extend that hegemony.’31 Historian Benjamin Allen Coates 
furthers this argument by providing an extensive study of the connection between the 
rise of international law as both a profession and academic discipline in early 
twentieth century America and the emergence of an American ‘legalist empire’ 
following the conclusion of the Spanish-American War, which was, despite 
humanitarian proclamations, concerned with entrenching American hegemony. 32 
Emphasising the influence of lawyers like Elihu Root, John Bassett Moore and 
particularly James Brown Scott, Coates illustrates how an American model of 
international law managed to accommodate and rework older notions of empire for a 
world order that was losing its ability to contain inter-communal violence.33 With the 
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establishment of the American Society for international law (1906) and the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace (1910) the aforementioned jurists acquired 
institutional centres from which this reworking of the international legal order could 
be produced. And with Vitoria as a key intellectual antecedent for this emergent 
movement of international law in America, we can see how the sixteenth century 
theologian connects to one of the major projects for this generation of American 
internationalism, America’s steering of early twentieth century drug prohibition. The 
correlative question is can Vitoria also be read as the intellectual antecedent for a new 
mode of empire for the ‘American century’, one that did not rely on the acquisition of 
territorial supremacy or on an explicit racialised hierarchy of peoples but instead 
perpetuated a ‘dynamic of difference’ along new delineations?34 To explore this 
question it is worth reviewing the way in which the theory and practice of 
international law changed from the nineteenth to the twentieth century.  
 
4.2.2 Breaking From Nineteenth-Century Jurisprudence 
 
‘The Western world is in a perpetual state of crisis, 
 and the crisis is always spreading.’35 
René Girard  
 
The early twentieth-century recovery of Vitoria should be understood not as a 
marginal intellectual counter-culture but as indicative of a wider shift effecting 
international law at that historical moment. Scott’s engagements with Vitoria, in 
particular, have been misread by critics as unscholarly flights of fancy that do not 
offer much wider significance for historiographies of international law. For instance, 
Arthur Nussbaum derided Scott’s ‘extreme religious and political views’ as having 
caused him to have an ‘uncritical exaltation and bias’ for Vitoria.36 However, while 
Nussbaum is perceptive in his identification of the religious undercurrent to Scott’s 
Vitorian recovery, he is myopic in his under-appreciation of how this undercurrent 
was not merely a personal failing of Scott but a signpost for the theologically 
informed moralism re-emerging in international law in general at this time. This 
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moralism would go on to sustain twentieth century developments in international 
jurisprudence, beyond merely the recovery of Vitoria in the academy, as the focus of 
my subsequent chapters on the institutional developments of international law in the 
twentieth century will reveal. Christopher Rossi provides an apposite response to 
Nussbaum and other critiques, by arguing that ‘these attacks miss the lingering, albeit 
unrecognised power of his [Scott’s] significance, which now permeates international 
law.’37 Scott’s recovery of Vitoria’s moralistic universal humanism cast a shadow 
beyond the academic community invested in the sixteenth century theologian and 
even beyond the emergent generation of American internationalists that Scott was a 
mentor for; Scott’s anchoring of international law on a single standard of morality 
applicable to all humans continues to inform even contemporary appeals to 
‘international law’s universality and systematic completeness.’38  When, with an 
evangelical zeal, Scott called for jurists to abandon the ‘paths marked out by false 
prophets of international law’ and turn back to ‘the Vitorian principles which for four 
hundred years have pointed the path to an international law still of the future, in 
which law and morality shall be one and inseparable,’ he provided a historical-
philosophical grounding for the expansion in scope and depth that international law 
would undertake over the course of the century.39 While he endorsed the separation of 
church and state upon which the U.S.A was built, Scott read the fundamental problem 
of a collapsing of religion into law to be a problem of how ‘the church became 
political, without the state becoming moral.’40 Therefore, through recycling Vitoria in 
the service of his own historical moment, Scott offered a jurisprudential account of 
law that was cohered by a notion of ‘a single standard of morality’, one engaged with 
the ethical norms that bounded the individual lives of people, over and above the 
sovereign states they attached to. Scott explained this ideal further when stating: 
 
We have thus the measure of law: it must be moral and it must be 
spiritual in essence-whatever its material content-if it is to be 
consistent with the nature and dignity of humanity, in which right, 
not might, prevails ... Getting underneath the surface of the state, 
we have found it, not a personality, but a body corporate, with 
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many members. The international community, made up of states, 
will become a gigantic artificial person unless we continually look 
behind the outward form of each member and recognize 
humanity.41 
 
Counter to Nussbaum’s critique, such declarations are not evidence of Scott’s 
tendency to override reason with faith but rather illustrate the extent to which Scott 
was perceptive in understanding the point of transcendence that the recalibrated 
international law would have to occupy to be capable of realising ‘its perfected fruit, 
peace.’42 This is the same omniscient perspective that is captured in the synthesised 
mural of Vitoria and Scott that is painted at the DoJ building in Washington. Scott 
advanced a holistic conception of international law, envisaging an intimacy in the 
relationship between domestic and international legal systems that realised what he 
referred to as the ‘oneness of the world.’43 Scott’s international law erased the strict 
binaries between the people of the world and the states that wielded legal recognition 
on their behalf, for Scott ‘the artificial personality called the state…[which] in fact 
have no existence separate and distinct from their incorporators, -the people who have 
made them what they are.’44  For Scott, a return to moral universalism would 
necessitate an extension of international law to incorporate a world order 
ontologically complete in itself. This order would concern the lives of all individuals 
included within the universal subject of humanity, as Scott elucidates,  
 
There can not be two standards [of morality]. There must be a 
single standard for the human being applying to all of his 
activities...There can be but one standard for the groups of 
individuals which we call states. There can be but one standard 
for the groups of individuals which, taken together, form 
humanity, and the groups which, as such, compose the 
international community. Humanity needs and the world must 
have the moral interpretation of history.45 
 
While Scott was perhaps the most eloquent articulator of international law’s (re)turn 
to a moral humanism, he was far from a sole actor affecting this shift. Other American 
internationalist theorists of this era engaging with Vitoria included Quincy Wright 
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would drew on the Spanish theologian’s work, particularly in his writings on the 
problem of preventative war.46 Also, while Arthur Nussbaum critiqued the reading of 
Vitoria as an idealised liberal forefather for American international law, he still 
celebrated Vitoria as being ‘the first to set forth the notions (though not the terms) of 
freedom of commerce and freedom of the seas in international law.’47 The translation, 
publication and engagement with the writings of primarily Vitoria but also some of 
his Salamancan colleagues such as Francisco Suarez and Luis de Molina can be traced 
to the increased interest in Spanish jurisprudence after the America’s victory in the 
Spanish-American War turned the U.S.A into an empire, albeit reluctantly. Ignacio de 
la Rasilla del Moral is one scholar who has stressed the importance of this ‘unstudied 
cultural act of silent heritage that took place between the moribund Spanish Empire 
and the United States after the Spanish American War.’48 Furthermore, the interest in 
Vitoria only intensified with the crisis of the Great War, exposing the incapacity for 
international law as it was functioned at that moment to contain the violence of 
imperial rivalry. It is difficult to overstate the impact that the Great War had upon 
theoretical conceptions of the international legal order. Confidence in an exclusive 
international community of ‘civilised’ sovereign states disintegrated as the war 
provided the murderous apotheosis of inter-communal, imperial rivalry. The crisis of 
war had exposed the paucity of the theoretical grounding that anchored international 
law, as the discipline proved unable to contain the crescendo of violence that drew in 
empire after empire in mimetic rivalry, betraying the impotency of an overly-
rationalised, amoral international law in the face of sovereign excess. Moreover, the 
very structure of international law was radically transformed, with the post-war 
institution of the League of Nations providing the central body for facilitating a 
greater communality in the international arena. The recovery of Vitoria corresponds 
with these wider shifts in global politics and law. As Moral states, the universalism of 
the Vitorian recovery gained currency during the inter-war period as ‘a gradual 
restoration of natural law was argued against the perceived excesses of the attraction 
of positivism…. This renewed interest in natural law was, structurally, triggered by 
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the establishment of the first international institution with a permanent character.’49 
The return of Vitoria to inform American internationalism, as it emerged into 
hegemonic status, was both productive and indicative of the moral universalist turn 
that international law would undertake during the twentieth century. 
Over the course of the nineteenth century, international law became 
preoccupied by an intra-disciplinary debate between naturalism and positivism, a 
debate in which positivism would eventually gain pre-eminence.50 At the height of 
European colonialism, the influence of positivist jurisprudence directed international 
law away from its theologically-informed, natural law moorings towards a more 
scientific theoretical grounding. Moving away from anchoring international law upon 
moralistic notions such as what are rights, what is just or what is the good, positivist 
international law theorised an order based on the recognition of sovereignty and the 
task of harmonising the interests of the different sovereign entities. 51  The 
consequence of this shift for the international arena was to fix the state and its 
sovereign authority as ‘the most basic doctrinal and philosophical underpinnings for 
international law.’52 In conjunction with this insistence upon the authority of the 
sovereign state, positivism devised a clear set of objective rules, grounded in 
sovereign authority, which could be deduced solely through the engagement of 
reason.53 This meant that international law began to be shorn of its moralistic element 
through this turn towards ‘the very understanding of law as a science, which went 
global in the mid-nineteenth century.’54  The scientific method had become the 
preferred epistemological lens for a variety of disciplines within the European 
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enlightenment and law would be no exception. Anghie captures the significance of 
this nineteenth century shift to reading law as matters of technical difficulties: 
 
This scientific methodology favoured, then, a movement towards 
abstraction -- a propensity to rely upon a formulation of categories 
and their systematic exposition as a means of preserving order and 
arriving at the correct ‘solution’ to any particular problem. Legal 
science in the latter half of the nineteenth century was conceived of 
[...] as a struggle against chaos, which could be won only by 
ensuring the autonomy of law, and establishing and maintaining the 
taxonomies and principles, which existed, in fixed relations to each 
other.55   
 
Scott did not completely discard the efficacy of the scientific method; in fact he 
championed a scientific case method of scholarship as the preferred pedagogical tool 
of international legal education.56 However, in terms of a jurisprudential model for 
keeping the universal order cohesive, Scott warned against the dangers of an 
overemphasis on state sovereignty as the grounding unit of international law. 
Stressing the need to remember international law ultimately governed people, not 
only sovereigns, Scott stated that ‘if we continue to look upon the state as an 
artificial person, instead of a thing of men and women and children, we may end by 
being the victims of our Frankenstein-a soulless mechanical thing which inevitably 
destroys itself.’ 57 Scott credited the conflicting interests of great states as the source 
of the great explosions of violence in the international arena, illustrating an 
appreciation of the dangers of escalating rivalry amongst states unless constrained by 
a restraining force, what could be termed a shared universal culture.58 Scott decried 
nineteenth century jurisprudence’s abandonment of international law to ‘the dictates 
of the artificial entities which we call states’ and instead sought to influence 
international law, particularly in America, towards a reworking of Vitoria’s moral 
humanism for a renewed universal international community. 59  In fact, Scott’s 
recovery of a natural law jurisprudence for the twentieth century but one (at least 
ostensibly) detached from Christian foundations of medieval thought betrays a 
shared imperial orientation that underwrites the presumptions of any crude 
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distinction between natural law and positivism. As Rose Parfitt recognizes, the 
(re)turn of natural law at this historical moment remained as indebted to a euro-
centric theoretical foundations as nineteenth-century positivism. Grounding the 
sources of international law in the treaties of men like Vitoria and Suarez, who were 
seen to be able to ascertain, through the application of reason, an ‘unchanging natural 
law’ which could then be arrogated onto a universal humanity, the natural law 
conception of history continued to proffer a European conception of being as the 
basis for its own authority. As Parfitt states ‘[n]aturalist approaches to international 
law are, in other words, no less co-reliant on their positivist alternative than vice 
versa. Equally, natural law conceptions of history are therefore no less restrictive 
than their positivist successors.’ 60  The recovery of the Spanish ‘origins’ of 
international law offered a challenge to the presumptions of positivism as it had 
emerged in the nineteenth century but continued to share some of the same 
conceptual ground. While natural law jurisprudence stressed the necessary 
connection between law and morality, a deeper notion of morality remains 
insufficient to address international law’s indebtedness to the violence of European 
imperialism. The natural law tradition envisions that ‘international law consists of a 
set of universally applicable standards of morality, which are substantive (not simply 
procedural), discernable through reason or faith [….] and which give rise to moral 
obligations on the part of the people who make state policy.’61 The grounding for 
order that positivists placed on the relations of independent sovereigns is deepened in 
natural law to be based on the universality of norms that in-turn produce a shared 
imaging of lived condition for a universal subject of the human. What it fails to 
address is the European particularity of the universal human subject.  
 
4.2.3 The Return to a Moral Universalism 
 
The question of universalism becomes a pertinent one when tracing the shifts 
in jurisprudence from the nineteenth to the early twentieth century. In addition to 
decoupling law from its moral foundations, the positivist turn also stunted the 
universalism of the international legal order as had been imagined by the naturalists 
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like Vitoria. Jurists in the nineteenth century instead began to see international law as 
the exclusive property of civilized societies.62 With the delusions of scientific racism 
reaching their zenith at this time, jurists began to read the sovereignty of colonising 
and colonised peoples in terms of absolute difference. The invitation of 
colonised/racially subaltern peoples into a single universal subject entitled ‘humanity’ 
was curtailed in the face of the mainstreaming of scientific racism, which sought to 
fix, essentialize and explicitly hierarchize categories of peoples. Within legal 
discourses, positivism facilitated the exclusion of colonised societies from the 
international legal order through accentuating the sovereignty of a state as the 
fundamental condition for legal recognition. Contrasting with the Vitorian 
formulation in which the sovereignty of the colonised was never erased but rather 
deferred onto an indeterminate future, the over-determined distinction between the 
legal status of civilised and non-civilised societies offered by the legal positivists in 
essence ‘expelled the non-European world from the realm of law and society.’63  
Colonial expansion over the course of the nineteenth century had been 
justified through the unequivocal exclusion of the colonised from the obligations that 
members of the international community held for each other. In this sense the 
Vitorian paradox of the inclusive/exclusion condition for the colonised had slipped 
into a more rigid model of exclusion, in line with de riguer racial theories that 
emphasised the absolute difference of people. Jurists such as Edwin De Witt 
Dickinson and Lassa Francis Lawrence Oppenheim advocated for the disqualification 
of the colonised peoples from the international community, with Oppenheim 
declaring that they ‘remained as yet outside the circle of the family of nations […] 
and they were for those parts treated by the Christian powers according to 
discretion.’64 In offering the imperial states unbounded power over their colonial 
properties, positivist jurisprudence had ultimately severed international law’s 
aspirations towards a single universal order based on shared morals. Arnulf Becker 
Lorca illustrates further by explaining:  
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Nineteenth-century international law achieved global geographical 
scope by including two separate regimes: one governing relations 
between Western sovereigns under formal equality, and the other 
governing relations between Western and non-Western polities 
under inequality, granting special privileges to the former.65 
 
The positivist juridical model served to expedite European dominance of the world, a 
dominance that was spoken into being through treaties, conventions and other such 
techniques of law. The turn towards legal scientism demarcated the international legal 
order into separate spheres, resulting in a model of the international community that 
explicitly disregarded the majority of the world. Vitoria’s espousal for a moralistic 
universal humanism receded into the distance in the face of a jurisprudence that 
acclaimed the final disenchantment of the world.  
However, the jurisprudence of the nineteenth century would fall into crisis 
when ‘international law died its first death on 1 August 1914.’66 The international 
community, as in the internal group of sovereign imperial states, had indulged in 
voracious expansion into the colonised world, working under the presumption of 
internal peace amongst the community being sustained through a general balance-of-
powers, with each empire and its potential for violence pre-emptively cancelling out 
the threat of the other. However, with international legal jurisprudence now shorn of 
its moralism and universalism, its restraining powers would prove incapable of 
curtailing the contagion of violence once it did break out inside of the exclusive 
community. Overly-rationalised and detached from a concern with effecting 
communality, by the outbreak of the First World War, international law had 
deteriorated to being considered as little more than ‘a scrap of paper’ by the major 
world powers.67 The belief in an organic balance of power emerging amongst the 
European empires was exposed as a mere fantasy. Rather, as Anghie provocatively 
argues, ‘the balance of power system not only failed to prevent, but indeed, may have 
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contributed to the conflagration of the Great War.’68  
It is in this context that American international law emerges and in the face of 
this crisis that Scott’s recovery of Vitoria occurs, although not expressly stated in 
such terms. However, an appreciation of the scale of the challenge that the mimetic 
rivalry of the Great War presented international law helps explain the fervour with 
which Scott would call for a re-conceptualised jurisprudence that could produce a 
oneness in the world. At it’s most ambitious, such a vision of international law would 
realise a complete, universal moral framework governing individual human relations 
as well as statecraft. The inverse of such a law would be to turn those who transgress 
its dictates into universal negative figures, as Carl Schmitt identified when reading 
Scott’s return to Vitoria as facilitating an order in which in opponent would not be a 
rival but a criminal: 
 
Even in official and semi-official United States declarations there is a 
“return to older and sounder concepts of war," by which is meant, 
above all, Vitoria' s doctrines on free trade, freedom of propaganda, 
and just war.’ In this formulation ‘War should cease to be imply a 
legally recognized matter or only a matter of legal indifference; it 
again should become just in the sense that the aggressor…is declared 
to be a felon, meaning a criminal.69 
 
The moral universalism of the liberal American international law while informing the 
humanitarianism of conceptual international law also clears much of the conceptual 
terrain for producing legal imaginings of existential universal threats that must be not 
only defeated but eradicated.  
 
4.3 The First Generation of American International Law 
 
Scott serves not only as a major figure in the narrative of American 
international law but as an instantiation of a juridical movement that sought to 
develop a distinctly American approach to international law to then serve as a model 
to be imitated globally. In Juan Pablo Scarfi’s comprehensive intellectual history of 
how a distinctive idea of American international law spread across the Americas, he 
highlights that Scott, in his role as the founder of the Pan-American American 
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Institute of International Law (AIIL), acted as an ‘ethnocentric, conservative and anti-
pluralist international lawyer… affected by imperial ambitions and anxieties.’70 
Scott’s universalism emphasized the importance of exporting a US ideal into Latin 
America and the Caribbean, endeavouring to facilitate greater bonds across the region 
whilst maintaining or at least not questioning the existent hierarchal relationship 
between the US and its neighbours, including the right of intervention.71 Ignacio 
Moral supports Scarfi’s reading of Scott’s imperial ambitions for American 
international law, arguing that the Scott’s commitment to the AIIL was driven by a 
desire to see whether the principles of the US Declaration of Independence might be 
applicable across all continents of the Americas and thereby allow the US and its 
neighbours to begin to develop a universal notion of American international law, 
founded upon an American conception of the state-formation and an American 
conception of ideal, liberal government.72  Tracing the actions and discourse of 
American legalism at this moment disturbs the U.S.A’s given self-image as an anti-
imperial nation, particularly at this historical point in which it emerged onto the world 
stage through a certain contradistinction from the European empires. This informed a 
certain ambiguity within American international law towards the prevailing mode of 
conceptualizing international order at the turn of the century: empire. As Coates states 
in reference to the early generation of American jurists, ‘it is important to recognize 
that international lawyers were simultaneously idealists and imperialists, dreamers of 
world order and participants in imperial politics and administration.’73 Around the 
same time as the acquisition of Spanish territories, the U.S.A saw the establishment of 
the prominent and influential anti-imperialist league. With America’s founding myth 
being one of it’s own independence being achieved through anti-colonial struggle, a 
transition into the status an imperial power obviously provided a challenge to that 
identity. However, much of the force that law was able to exert was to bring together 
this anti-imperial undercurrent to American foreign policy with its status as an 
emerging global hegemonic power. In his history of the birth of the American Journal 
of International Law, Carl Launder argues that within the generation of early 
American internationalists ‘almost everyone’s anti-imperialism was an admixture of 
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imperialism and vice-versa.’74 Furthermore, he also stresses, following the insights of 
historian E.T.L. Love, that racial fears about the demography of the body politic of 
the U.S.A itself informed the argument across the imperialist/anti-imperialist divide, 
with even the anti-imperialist argument against the annexation of territories such as 
the Philippines in the late nineteenth century being couched in the language of 
preserving the whiteness of America.75 With American jurisprudence containing both 
the liberal, humanitarian element identified in Vitoria’s writings by those who 
champion him as an anti-imperialist and the insidious imperialism of the civilizational 
‘dynamic of difference’, the question of what maintains a cohesiveness to this vision 
international law therefore presents itself again.  
Some insight about a cohering anchor may be suggested by looking into the 
differentiating aspects of American internationalism when compared to European 
imperialism. As aforementioned, a central feature of positivist international law, 
prevalent in the European imperialist jurisprudence of the nineteenth century was a 
sharp distinction drawn between civilized and uncivilized states. 76 This facilitated a 
more explicit ‘dynamic of difference’ between the colonised and colonising worlds, 
with different legal rules being applied to differing worlds and peoples. American 
international law elevated to a greater extent a totality of world order, captured by 
Scott’s image of ‘a single standard of morality for the Individual and the State.’ The 
anti-imperialist line informed the stressing of a juridical equality of nation- states with 
a shared humanitarian notion of being at its centre. Of course, this is the model of 
international law that would become preeminent over the course of the twentieth 
century, particularly after the Second World War, with decolonisation, development 
and human rights taking up central roles in this ideological reconceptualization. 
However, the American model of liberal international law provided an essential 
prologue to this shift, with the impact of jurists in the early decades after 1900 helping 
to reshape both the theory and practice of international law. The (re)turn to morality 
and the notion of international law penetrating the lives of the individual mirrored the 
times in which wider culture, from the literature of T. S. Eliot, Henry James, and 
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Virginia Woolf to scientific investigations of Sigmund Freud, took up a concern with 
the exploring the internal sphere of human existence. Anghie argues that we should 
read the liberal and moralistic turn in international law as a response to this wider 
cultural movement, ‘it enabled international law and institutions to enter the interior, 
to address the unconscious, and thereby to administer ‘civilizing therapy’ to the body 
politic of the sovereign state.’77 As the cultural epoch now defined as modernism 
raised the wider understanding of matters of the individual human mind, law began to 
perceive human consciousness as a terrain that could be legislated over. As will be 
discussed further in the following chapter, this concern can be seen with the growing 
interest in matters of vice and morality that would emerge in international law over 
the early decades of the twentieth century.  
A further aspect to be considered in the making of early American 
international law is the role it played in facilitating the interests of American 
capitalism overseas. 78 The ideal of a universalist, liberal international law also 
contained the promise of levelling out the terrain of international trade, eschewing the 
competition of economic (and military) rivalry for the production of a shared legal 
framework in which American capital could operate. The jurisprudence of American 
international law is often silent on this economic aspect to its universalist vision, as 
Gomez identifies when he argues that what ‘Scott does not explicitly say is that this 
vision of an inevitable and desirable incorporation, by force if necessary, of all 
nations under one unified world-system, will unmistakably materialize into the 
modern civilization of industrial capitalism.’79 However, an appreciation of the 
capitalist incentive behind the jurisprudence of American international law helps in 
understanding why the study and practice of international law in the U.S.A in this era 
was indebted to the wealth of major industrialists such Andrew Carnegie. Carnegie, a 
close friend of Root, was one of the few non-lawyers in attendance at the 1905 dinner 
where Scott laid out the plans for the American Society of International Law.80 
Furthermore, through the Carnegie Endowment for Peace, established in 1910, he 
supported the endeavours of Root, Scott and their colleagues with extensive financial 
backing.81 Funds from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace provided for 
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the ASIL’s annual meetings, published journals, the growth of the study of 
international law in law schools and generally elevated the prominence of American 
international law.82 American international law’s turn away from the colonial order of 
the European empires was intertwined with this imperative for a legal terrain that was 
more amenable to capitalist interests than the intensifying order of imperial rivalry. 
Furthermore, accompanying this change in the vision of the ideal legal terrain for 
capitalist exchange can be was a change in understandings of war, moving away from 
the colonial assumptions of war being a method to increase economic accumulation 
towards an image of war as being an impediment to trade.  
It is crucial to appreciate the interconnection of the concerns about global 
legal order being unable to contain war or facilitate trade when unpacking the 
American internationalism of the early twentieth century. International legal scholar 
Gerry Simpson reads Scott jurisprudential contribution as arguing for an international 
law that recognised the importance of facilitating the interests of industry and 
commerce within a system of law that contained the potential for conflict presented 
by the rival economic interests of the major world powers.83 Despite producing his 
theories of international law in, first, the run up-to and then the aftermath of the Great 
War, Scott does not explicitly address the shadow of war that hangs over the 
international order at this moment. However, it is difficult to decouple his scholarly 
engagement with Vitoria’s model for a communal international order through free 
trade and a single standard of morality from the concerns of international law being 
unable to restrain war within Scott’s own era. Even critical American international 
lawyers like Nussbaum cited Vitoria as being ‘the first to set notions of…of freedom 
of commerce’ in the jurisprudence of international law. Vitoria acts as a key 
antecedent for the synthesising of economic liberalism and moral humanitarianism 
that would characterize not only American international law at that moment but come 




This chapter has focused upon a review and analysis of both the actors and 
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theories that informed American liberal international law at the turn of the twentieth 
century. In conversation with the preceding chapter, I emphasised how Vitoria’s 
sixteenth century jurisprudence not only resonated with America’s coming moral 
empire but was a major influence on one of its leading figures, Dr James Brown Scott, 
who through his influence over institutions such as the American Society of 
International Law and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace contributed 
greatly to both the emergence of American internationalism and the early twentieth 
century recovery of Vitoria as the ‘father of international law.’ It is through Scott’s 
resurrection of Vitoria in service of a crisis-ridden twentieth century, that we can 
connect Vitoria’s humanitarian critique of the naked colonial violence of Spanish 
imperialism with a (re)turn to a universal humanism within international law, which 
would provide the context for the birth of twentieth century drug prohibition. Scott’s 
explicit drawing on Vitoria accompanied and gave historical-philosophical substance, 
to a wider trend in American internationalism that gained prominence in the aftermath 
of the Spanish-American War at the end of the nineteenth century. Subsequent 
chapters of this thesis will illuminate how the conclusion of the Spanish-American 
War provided the geographical incentive for not only a theoretical recalibration in 
American internationalism, but also a practical instantiation of the problems that 
would arise for ‘America’s moral empire’ through the colonies acquired in the Treaty 
of Paris, particularly the question of opium in the Philippines. However, it is 
important to clarify, as I have done so above, the intellectual context that would 
inform the approach to this problem, hence the undertaking of the task in this chapter 
to show how  a further consequence of America inheriting Spanish colonies was the 
proximity this engendered between the legacy of Spanish jurists like Vitoria and the 
American mode of international law that would dominate the twentieth century.  
A renewed moral universalism, inherited from sixteenth century Salamanca, 
provides a telling intellectual background to Elihu Root, James Brown Scott and the 
ASIL’s construction of a liberal tradition of American international law. In the early 
twentieth century, international lawyers would act as a ‘foreign-policymaking elite’ 
within the U.S.A and to a level ‘unmatched before or since, the US government— the 
executive branch if not always the US Senate— embraced legalist proposals’ as a 
mechanism for constructing world order.85 As Coates’ historical scholarship tells us, 
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in practice it was a ‘relatively small group of men … present at the creation of the 
international law profession in the United States.’ These men, especially Root and 
Scott, along with the founding generation of the ASIL that they led, created the legal 
framework for an informal overseas American empire that continues to raise ‘difficult 
questions about international law’s promises of universalism and justice.’86 Scott’s 
recovery of Vitoria and the wider elevation of liberal humanitarian international law 
by these actors should be read as part of a committed project aimed towards 
developing an American tradition of international law, which would then feed into the 
institutionalisation of international law and the wider trajectory of universal order in 
the twentieth century.87  Though, it would ostensibly distinguish itself from the 
colonial legal order, this trend towards moral universalism in international law would 
not erase the colonial ‘dynamic of difference’ between the peoples of the world, but in 
keeping with Vitoria’s sixteenth-century jurisprudence, buried persisting material and 
juridical inequality within a totalising conception of humanity.  
The following chapter will follow on from the analysis of the birth of 
American international law conducted above by showing how it was also in this 
context, and again provoked by the inheritance of the Spanish colonies after 1898, 
that drug prohibition would take its first steps in the international arena. In addition to 
international drug prohibition being theoretically indebted to the notion of ‘a single 
standard of morality’ and fitting in with a notion of international law as concerned 
with the regulation of individual human life across the globe, drug prohibition also 
shares a historical point of origin with American international law. Many of the same 
actors discussed in this chapter play crucial supporting roles in the birth of 
international drug prohibition as previously fringe moral reformers mobilised the 
American government into making the first forays into multi-lateral drug prohibition 
in international law. It was under Root’s terms as Secretary of War and Secretary of 
State, and under Scott’s term as Solicitor of the State Department that the U.S.A 
would start the clock on international drug prohibition.88 Scholarship on this founding 
era of American international law has stressed how Root and Scott facilitated an 
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extension of America’s interests in the international arena through the joining of a 
number of international institutions and participating in the drafting of numerous 
international conventions.89  However, a still largely unexplored element of this 
internationalism is the role that Root, Scott and early American international law 
played in empowering the crusaders who would at this same moment bring about the 
first international laws on drugs.90   
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Chapter 5  
 






 The previous chapter reviewed the emergence of American liberal 
international law and focused on the leading figures such as Elihu Root and James 
Brown Scott, who drew on the moral universalism of Vitoria to envision a single 
standard of morality as the response to the crisis of the international community in the 
first half of the twentieth century. However, an under-researched element of this 
historical moment in international law is the manner in which this founding moment 
of American international law provided the context for the first international laws on 
drugs to emerge, driven by the same generation of forthright American 
internationalists. As mentioned in the first chapter of this thesis the early drug laws 
have been historicized by scholarship in drug policy studies but absent from the 
existent literature is a sustained reading of these laws in conjunction with the changes 
in American internationalism and wider international law in this era. Drug prohibition 
was in part both informed by, and helped produce, the hegemony that the U.S.A. 
would enjoy in the so-called ‘American century.’ The drive to prohibit drugs marks 
one of the U.S.A.’s first attempts to take a proactive role in international law, using 
‘drug diplomacy’ to not only increase its hegemonic status upon the international 
stage but, moreover, to recalibrate the wider structures and the operative function of 
international law.  
This chapter will place its focus on illuminating the interconnections that 
existed between Root, Scott and their influence at the U.S. state department as well 
over American international law more widely, and the early drug prohibitionists who 
would succeed in establishing the first multi-lateral, anti-drug treaties in international 
law. My argument will orientate around showing the ways in which the vision of a 
liberal international law, founded on a moral humanism, and driving American 
foreign policy at this time, was theoretically as well as historically consistent with the 
early moves towards draconian legal prohibition of drugs in the emerging moment 
American hegemonic power. In addition, I will illustrate the role that racial and 
	  129	  
imperial anxieties played in bringing the first drug laws into being, showing how 
Anghie’s ‘dynamic of difference’ persists within the proclaimed humanitarianism of 
the moral reformers and Christian missionaries who drove prohibition into law.  In 
short, this chapter will tell the story of the pre-War on Drugs and the debt it owed to a 
particular recalibration of the universal order that I have already described as 
‘sacrificial’, illustrating how the seeds of the contemporary drug war were laid in the 
emergence of an American moral universalism.  
 
 
5.2 Confessions of A European Opium Empire 
 
‘I do not readily believe that any man having once tasted 
 the divine luxuries of opium will afterwards descend 
 to the gross and mortal enjoyments of alcohol.’ 
Thomas De Quincey1 
  
 
With international drug prohibition becoming a given universal norm in the 
twentieth century, it becomes a challenge to recall how historically contingent our 
contemporary approach to ‘drugs’ are. The use of psychoactive substances for 
medicinal, social, religious, or nutritional purposes has been common throughout the 
world.2 Cultures have practiced a variety of methods of intoxication over time and 
with European colonialism producing a new framework for an interconnected world 
market, a wider assortment of psychoactive substances became more accessible to a 
greater array of the world’s people than they had been before.3 Furthermore, the 
wealth of European empires owed much to the trade of various psychoactive 
substances, whose value as commodities contributed much to the emergence of 
modern global capitalism through the expansion of European commerce into new 
regions and the expropriation of their resources. 4  The Vitorian insistence on 
international law guaranteeing the ‘right to trade’ realised itself through the 
mercantilism of early modern Europeans trading in resources ‘discovered’ in new 
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lands, prominent amongst which were ingestible, psychoactive substances such as 
tobacco, coffee, cacao, tea, sugar and distilled liquor, all of which were then turned 
into commodities to be mass produced and mass consumed. Included in this colonial 
commercialisation were also psychoactive substances such as opium, cannabis and 
cocaine, substances nowadays seen as morally and economically distinct from the 
aforementioned substances such as coffee and sugar. However, this is a distinction 
that has been produced through prohibition that is then retrospectively projected onto 
the past. For the merchants, the planters and the imperial industrialists engaging in the 
remaking of the world in Europe’s image, the various plants that we would later call 
‘drugs’ were seen as merely further sources of profit. Drugs like opium, cannabis and 
cocaine did not spread through the world by happenstance, many regionally popular 
psychoactive substances that European imperialists encountered - popular traditional 
drugs include such as qat, peyote or kava - did not become global commodities in the 
way the drugs now referred to in drug policy studies as ‘the big three’ did.5 A 
concerted effort was made by European imperialists to cultivate the supply of these 
substances due to their popularity with European consumers, particularly opium. 
Paralleling the increasing supply was a growing demand for such intoxicants within 
the European market. David Courtwright credits the increased demand for drugs like 
opium in Europe to the growing ability for the wealth of Europe to satisfy the basic 
needs of its population leaving them now free to give increasing focus to matters of 
pleasure and adventure. Couthwright explains that ‘drug commerce […] flourished in 
a world in which the hungry psyche was replacing the hungry belly.’6 This was 
particularly true for the bourgeois class of European society, who, with new-found 
wealth and a detachment from the narrow behavioural norms of old aristocratic 
society, encouraged experimentation with new substances and states of mind.  
The attraction of drug use in this era was perhaps best captured by Thomas De 
Quincey’s 1822 memoir Confessions of an English Opium Eater, which popularised 
an image of privileged drug dependence. De Quincey, along with fellow canonical 
literary figures who openly celebrated drug use, such as Samuel Coleridge and 
Charles Baudelaire, epitomised the fashion for drugs, particularly opium, that had 
taken hold within decadent European artistic circles in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. Opium was indulged in across all classes of European society, the 
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cheapness of the drug also allowing it to be an attractive intoxicant for those toiling 
masses of the newly industrialising cities.7 However, it was the artistic and wealthy 
classes who would eulogise the drug’s properties, celebrating opium as a facilitator of 
romantic sensibilities and a poetic imagination.8 For large swathes of the European 
bohemian class, opium promised the pathway to what Baudelaire termed an ‘artificial 
paradise.’9 The association between drug use and transgression was nascent at this 
time, drugs often symbolising a bohemian counterpoint to the conservative Europeans 
values; however, drugs were not read as conduits to physical and spiritual decay in the 
way they would be by twentieth century law. The absence of widespread moral or 
medical indictment against drug use in nineteenth century Europe is illustrated by the 
accommodation of opium trade displayed by the largest of the imperial powers and 
the hegemonic actor in the international community of that time, the British Empire. 
In 1895, the British government published a report by the Royal Commission on 
Opium, which had been tasked to investigate opium and potential problems from its 
use and trade over the course of two years. The Royal Commission on Opium 
concluded in its report that there was "no evidences of extensive moral or physical 
degradation" resulting from the use of opium in its colonial jewel of India.10 At the 
time of the late nineteenth century, the profits that the British Empire, along with its 
imperial rivals, acquired from the international trade in drugs overrode any concerns 
regarding the morality of their usage. The commercialised drugs trade and the taxes 
accrued from it were a major fiscal cornerstone for the European empires.11  
To remember that in the recent past, drugs were traded as legitimate 
commodities within the legal globalised marketplace provides an important point of 
departure from which to trace the emergence of prohibition in international law. 
Within the international legal order of formal colonialism, the European imperial 
states cultivated substantial traffic in opium, cannabis, coca and other psychoactive 
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substances that would latterly be labelled as drugs. 12  The apex of European 
exploitation through the trade in drugs was reached with the Opium Wars of the mid-
nineteenth century. The Opium Wars saw the British Empire, with occasional support 
from their French imperial rivals, wage war in order to force the Qing dynasty of 
China to accept the legal trade of opium from British merchants, thereby extending 
European control over the region as a whole.13 Contrasting with the way prohibition 
would be understood in the twentieth century drug war, in the nineteenth century 
English liberalism ‘had no difficulty construing the Opium War as a crusade for free 
trade and for liberty’, the moral imperative lay with those who wanted to trade the 
drug while the prohibitionists were characterized as the instance of an uncivilized 
violation of free capitalist exchange.14 In his seminal text unpacking liberalism as a 
political philosophy, On Liberty, John Stuart Mill critiques the idea of China 
attempting to legally prohibiting the trade of opium into their country for being 
‘interferences [that] are objectionable, not as infringements on the liberty of the 
producer or seller, but on that of the buyer.’15 Mill’s position on opium would be the 
argument that one would presume if taking liberalism’s claims at face value, as it 
claims to protect the individual liberty to engage in activities that do not harm any 
members of the community other than one’s own self. To consider why the rise of 
American liberalism coincided with a retreat from the classical liberal presumption of 
freedom of the drugs trade will be one of the tasks of this chapter but it is important to 
recognise how in the period of the Opium Wars, the European empires were willing to 
defend their right to trade these substances, even through warfare.  
The Opium Wars were a particularly violent moment in the European 
exploitation of the drugs trade at the time, however they do also provide an 
illustration of the extent to which the default position amongst the major empires was 
that psychoactive substances were further resources to be extracted from the colonial 
world, turned into a commodity and sold in a legal market in order to accumulate 
wealth. The extent to which the drugs trade was normalised at this time is evident by 
the lengths taken by the colonial powers to maximise their production of drugs. For 
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example, the British instituted wide-scale coca leaf cultivation in Jamaica, Sri Lanka 
and British Guyana. British coca production was then superseded by the Dutch, as the 
establishment of cocaine-manufacturing facilities in the colony of Java (Indonesia) 
made the Dutch the world’s leading cocaine producer.16 To appreciate the extent to 
which drugs served as a source of wealth for European empires invites the 
questioning of how their transition to being seen as existential dangers to idealised 
human social relations came about. David Courtwright identifies the anomaly of the 
criminalisation of drugs, as ‘political elites do not ordinarily kill the geese that lays 
their golden egg. Yet during the last hundred years, they have selectively abandoned a 
policy of taxed, legal commerce for one of greater restriction and prohibition achieved 
by domestic legislation and international treaties.’17 In the next section of this chapter, 
I will map out the historical trajectory that would take drugs from being profitable 
commodities within the global market to ‘transgressive substances’ universally 
prohibited by international law. Moreover, I will illuminate the ways in which this 
transition, spearheaded by America, would require a reconceptualization of the 
international community as whole, one which would recall Vitoria’s universal 
schema. 
 
5.3 Drug Prohibition as ‘the American Experiment’ 
 
Quincy Wright, a protégée of James Brown Scott and a leading American 
international theorist himself, provided in his 1924 article an illustrative historical 
framework to follow when tracing the development of early drug prohibition.18 
Wright identifies the first stage of prohibition as being the Chinese prohibition of 
opium, particularly from the British East Indies. He also includes bilateral treaties, 
agreed at the end of the nineteenth century by China with the U.S.A. and with Great 
Britain, both of which contained some element of control or restriction on the opium 
trade. The second stage for Wright ‘was inaugurated by the United States through 
President Roosevelt's call for an international Commission, which met at Shanghai in 
1909.’19 It is at this point that a consideration of drug prohibition as a problem of 
                                                
16 Buxton, The Political Economy of Narcotics, p.16. 
17 Courtwright, Forces of Habit, p.5. 
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multi-lateral international law can be seen to really commence. Moreover, when 
analysing drug prohibition as a multi-lateral, international juridical norm rather than 
just a temporary agreement between certain states at a particular moment, ‘universal’ 
drug prohibition only begins in earnest with the emergence of American 
prohibitionists on the international stage. Wright then offers the third stage of 
prohibition as beginning with the creation of the League of Nations, providing a new 
institutional centre for both drug prohibition and international law more widely.20 
This era will be the focus of the next chapter which centres on the development of 
prohibition in the League of Nations; Part C of this thesis will then address what legal 
scholar Rick Lines, following Wright, has called the ‘fourth state’ of prohibition, 
referring to the United Nations establishing our contemporary drug laws and the 
subsequent War on Drugs that followed in their wake.21 However, this chapter will 
engage with Wright’s second stage, with the birth of drug prohibition as a governing 
norm and specific focus of international law. Through an analysis of the theological, 
imperial and racial undercurrents beneath the ostensible ‘humanitarianism’ of drug 
prohibition in this moment, I will illustrate how the sacrificial dynamic that I argue 
anchors the War on Drugs in the second half of the twentieth century was present in 
the conceptualisation of prohibition at its very origin in international law.  
 The contribution of the United States of America to the emergence of 
international law’s prohibition of drugs is difficult to overstate. As Wright’s ‘first 
stage’ of prohibition reveals, there are of course distinct histories of the domestic or 
even bilateral prohibition of particular drugs by other countries that occurred prior to 
the twentieth century project of universal drug prohibition. However, when 
considering the distinctiveness of the multi-lateral, international legislative project to 
categorise whole collections of dangerous ‘drugs’ and prohibit them, historiography 
requires substantive consideration of the American campaign of prohibition. 
Moreover, the role that the U.S.A. would play in the transition of drugs from an 
accepted commodity for exchange in the global market into being an existential threat 
to the international community was both a product of, and would itself help produce, 
a wider reorientation of international law in the twentieth century under the shadow of 
rising American hegemony. William Butler Eldridge, in one of the first scholarly 
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engagements with drug laws, christened international drug prohibition as ‘The 
American Experiment.’22 Following in this trend, David Musto, would describe drug 
prohibition as quintessentially an ‘American Disease.’23 Therefore, through a focus on 
the distinctiveness of the American project of universal drug prohibition, the previous 
chapter’s engagement with the intellectual context of early American internationalism 
can be seen as necessary to prepare the terrain for this chapter’s analysis of why drug 
prohibition became a successful crusade for moralists and missionaries at this time. 
In taking up the role of the leader in the area of drug prohibition at it’s very 
origin, the U.S.A. would establish a unique level of influence over the international 
laws on drugs that is maintained up to and including the contemporary epoch. The 
prominent early prohibitionist Dr Hamilton Wright, for example, insisted that ‘the 
United States is due the credit of having initiated an international and national 
movement’ against drugs.24 The leadership role that America would play with regard 
to the War on Drugs would persist for the duration of the next century, as ‘the United 
States came to define and shape the drug “problem” and responses’ across the 
Globe.’ 25  Furthermore, the impact that the move towards international drug 
prohibition had on the United States, particularly in relation to its own role as an 
international actor, is also of crucial importance. Drug prohibition has been described 
as the ‘first significant foray by the United States onto the stage of global diplomacy’ 
pre-figuring, and in many ways providing the template for, the American vision of 
internationalism that it would promote over the rest of the ‘American Century’.26 As a 
result, despite the primary concern of this thesis being the question of what the War 
on Drugs betrays about the operation of international law, it is essential to engage 
with the history of how drug prohibition emerged within the domestic context of the 
U.S.A., considering the unique impact of that particular nation upon the course that 
international law would take in relation to drugs. Moreover, it is my argument that the 
very structure of international drug prohibition can be described as theodician: an 
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envisioning of the drug problem as an external infestation of the pure community to 
be addressed by violence against the source. This theodician structure of drug 
prohibition owes much to America’s own distinct legal order and its history of 
constituting political community through legalised violence upon the bodies of 
racially subaltern subjects. Therefore, an essential question to consider is the question 
of the role that race played within the U.S.A. and the whether the particular structure 
of relations between the races in that country would inform its history of drug 
prohibition, which would in turn inform drug prohibition at the international level.  
 
5.3.1 Race, Drugs and the Constitution of America 
 
Race underwrites the very juridical structure of America. In contrast to the 
major European empires, whose racialised colonial subjects were largely located 
overseas and thereby removed from the metropolitan body politic and the country’s 
internal legal systems, as a settler colony itself which became a hegemonic world 
power, the U.S.A. was required to confront the question of race inside of its own 
borders, resulting in the repeatedly-flawed answers to this question being etched 
within constitutions, statues and court cases that compose the national law. The 
question of race became an immediate corollary to American independence, did the 
self-evident truth ‘that all men are created equal’ extend to all men within America’s 
borders?27 Michelle Alexander explains that ‘the structure and content of the original 
[American] constitution was based largely on the effort to preserve a racial caste 
system.’ 28 The task of cohering a functional national community of unequal-equality 
is further challenged by the American constitution’s further task of having to hold 
together a popular democracy without the embodied sovereign of a ruling monarch. 
The language of America’s founding document promises ‘justice’ and ‘liberty’ within 
‘a more perfect union’, but the very constitution of that union was predicated upon a 
restriction of the humanity of the Black population through the three-fifths 
compromise.29 The idea within the U.S. constitution that Blacks were only three-fifths 
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of a person offers a codification of the essential impulse of all racist discourse, the 
impossible attempt to construct other human beings as not human. Reading the U.S. 
constitution from this perspective recalls Fanon’s notion of racism as a condition not 
of subjugation but of non-recognition, in that the resulting failure to recognise a social 
relation between the races means that that the minimal condition for law- a system of 
rules to be applicable to all- are not in place. The racist imperative to push certain 
humans outside the boundaries of humanity persisted through the American legal 
system beyond the abolition of slavery, informing laws from the Black Codes that 
followed the post-civil war Reconstruction to the Jim Crow laws that maintained 
legally segregated populations until the 1960’s. The story of America was, to a large 
extent, written through the mobilisation of the force of law to insist upon the fiction of 
race.30 By fiction of race, I refer to how ‘race’ as in distinct difference between 
peoples being attributable to skin colour does not exist in biological terms, however 
the colonial project and correlative racist laws have imbued this fiction with a 
material effect. The emergence of drug prohibition within America would take this 
story on to a new chapter.  
For most of the nineteenth century, as was the case in Europe, the legal use 
and trade of substances like cannabis, opium and cocaine was tolerated in America.31 
However, towards the close of that century, a pocket of municipal and state 
jurisdictions began to turn towards drug prohibition. A close interrogation of this 
historical moment finds both the early drug laws and the surrounding discourse 
saturated in the language of the fear of the racialised ‘other’. David Bewley-Taylor 
argues that America’s earliest recorded drug law, the 1875 City Ordinance against 
opium dens passed in San Francisco, was a law produced on ‘strictly ethnic grounds’, 
aimed against ‘Chinese immigrants’ practice of smoking opium’ and fuelled by a 
popular media obsessed with ‘images of ‘yellow fiends’ debauching white women 
and the youth of the nation.’32 Following San Francisco’s lead, other municipal and 
state legislators began to pass laws prohibiting the opium trade, laws shadowed by 
newspaper stories that portrayed opium as an insidious threat to all Americans, 
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causing even those with ‘respectable parentage’ to be lured into deviancy through the 
‘unmitigated evil’ of the Chinese opium dens.33 Opium functioned as a prime signifier 
of the orientalism that Edward Said famously critiqued.34 As a space, the opium den 
became associated in the popular imaginary with dark, smoky, licentious immorality. 
The first opium laws set a precedent for other drugs laws in their preoccupation to ban 
not only the drug itself but also the very subjectivity it is presumed to engender.  
The extent to which the first laws prohibiting opium required a shift in 
understandings of law’s power to produce particular subjects should also be 
recognised. As further initiatives were proposed in the wake of the San Francisco 
ordinance, legislators were initially nervous regarding this encroachment upon the 
individual freedom that, by orthodoxy, was credited as underwriting American liberal 
democracy. For instance, in 1887 the Californian Supreme court responded to a writ 
of habeas corpus against another city ordinance prohibiting opium, passed in the 
neighbouring city of Stockton, by declaring that ‘to prohibit vice is not ordinarily 
considered within the police power of the state [...] The object of the police power is 
to protect rights from the assaults of others, not to banish sin from the world.’35 Such 
deference towards personal liberty within the private sphere recalls the presumptions 
of liberalism as articulated earlier by John Stuart Mill’s position on drug prohibition 
and had been the norm in American law up until this moment, however, as drug 
prohibition began to be adopted by an increasing number of states, a shift of the 
boundaries of American liberalism would be affected. 
Following quickly in the wake of the first laws against opium came the 
prohibition of cocaine, with laws against its use and trade being implemented in 
several states.36 The trend of drug prohibition was further extended in the early years 
of the twentieth century as states also began passing laws against cannabis.37 These 
three plant-based psychoactive substances would become the main targets of the ‘War 
on Drugs’ that would be waged across the globe over the coming century. Scholars 
who have historicised drug laws have credited the prohibition of opium, cocaine and 
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cannabis in America to the popular association between these three drugs and 
America’s different racially subaltern populations. For example, David Musto 
emphasised how the preponderance of racialised drug stories at that time, such as the 
New York Times’ now infamous report shown below, entitled ‘Negro Cocaine 
‘Fiends’ Are a New Southern Menace’, illustrates the ‘white fear’ behind the shift 
away from the lassiez-faire approach to drugs.38  
 
Fig. 3 New York Times, Sunday February 8, 1914. Available at 
http://stopthedrugwar.org/taxonomy/term/189 [Accessed 07 January 17] 
 
William McAllister reinforces this argument by detailing how ‘in the United States 
cocaine’s popular association with blacks fuelled regulatory passions based on racial 
discrimination.’39 For Musto, the prohibition of cocaine cannot be unlinked from 
other mechanisms of legal violence inflicted on peoples racialised as black in early 
twentieth century America.40 Musto understands the prohibition of cocaine as just 
another instrument of control to be used by the law upon black bodies in conjunction 
with an arsenal that included segregation, voter restrictions and criminalisation. By 
extension, other scholars have read this same process of racialising, and thereby 
demonizing, particular drugs to have been applied, mutatis mutandi, to opium/Chinese 
immigrants and to cannabis/Mexican immigrants. The trajectory of state-by-state drug 
prohibition would eventually culminate with the establishment of drug prohibition as 
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the national law of the U.S.A. through the passing of the Harrison Narcotics Act of 
1914 at the federal level. The Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914 was instituted just 10 
months after the New York Times published the aforementioned story on the menace 
of ‘Negro Cocaine Fiends’.This led the act to be read by historians who see American 
drug prohibition as a mere veneer for continued racial violence as the apotheosises of 
the narrative in which drug prohibition was being produced in response to fear of the 
racial ‘other.’  
Legal scholar George Fisher has gone someway towards complicating the 
narrative of American drug prohibition emerging as solely a proxy-war against racial 
subalterns however, by revisiting the chronology of the first anti-drugs laws. 
Emphasising the extent to which the early American drugs laws were geographically 
dispersed, often being passed in States with a nominal presence of racial minorities, 
Fisher argues that prohibition laws could not have simply been a cynical attempt to 
visit legalized violence upon the racial minorities, whose being had become 
discursively interwoven with these drugs. 41  Instead, Fisher provides a counter-
narrative which privileges the role that the fear of addiction spreading among the 
white population of America played in prompting legislators to ban certain 
substances, rather than the demonization of drug use amongst racial others. Fisher 
shows that newspaper stories of a brewing drug epidemic amongst Americans 
racialised as white often preceded the now more infamous articles demonizing racial 
minorities. For Fisher, it was the effect drugs had upon the white youth, rather than 
effect they had on the negro or the oriental, that really concerned the local and state 
authorities pioneering drug prohibition. 42  Fisher ultimately argues that when 
historicizing prohibition, we should remember that ‘the earliest anti-drug laws sought 
to protect whites’ morals’ and it was only ‘in time…[that]… racial hatred infected 
enforcement of these laws and colo[u]red depictions of their violators.’43 Fisher 
accepts that drug laws did engender racialised violence in America but he places the 
source of the violence within the general society rather than within the laws 
themselves. 
Fisher’s rigorous engagement with the timeline of the early American drug 
laws does reveal the limitations of viewing the emergence of drug prohibition as 
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simply a surreptitious project to visit violence onto racial subaltern subjects. Fisher is 
correct in noting that a close reading of the history of the prohibition law’s troubles 
any narrow theoretical notion of racism being the driving force of these changes in 
law. However, Fisher’s understanding of the function of racism carries its own 
limitations, particularly when a Girardian perspective of racism as intertwined with 
the sacrificial purification of the community that Fisher’s argument recognises as 
being undertaken. In his push back against the history of drug laws as violence against 
racial others by another name, Fisher over-determines racism, reading it as purely the 
prejudiced construction of others and correlatively, if those others are not present, 
then questions of race is no longer at play. However, this perspective belies the extent 
to which race as a discourse produces ‘the self’ and ‘the normal’ as much as ‘the 
other’ and ‘the abnormal.’ As discussed earlier in this thesis, discourses of race allow 
the self to be produced and cohered through negation. In America racism was 
employed to produce a particular property called whiteness, a property that must be 
policed vigorously. Once you appreciate the productive power of racism and take the 
purification and protection of the idealised community as its centre of gravity, then 
the absence of racial others does not by itself preclude a particular community from 
undergoing persistent process of racial purification. It is the lie of racism that 
undesirable characteristics can be negatively projects to be the sole possession of 
racial subaltern; stalking this lie is the knowledge that all can regress, all can fall. The 
real fear of racism is the potential of those determined to be within the protected 
category of ‘whiteness’ to still descend into barbarity and monstrosity, if not 
consistently disciplined. An appreciation of this aspect of racism reconciles the 
rationale offered for early state-by-state drug prohibition by Fisher with the arguments 
those forwarded by Musto, Bewley-Taylor and others. The drug laws were driven in 
their early instantiations by the desire to protect a racialised fallacy of humanity, and 
the denial of failure to realise this fallacy would continue to inform drug prohibition 
throughout the twentieth century.44 The desire to establish a purified insular group is 
not opposed to the demonization of the other but the predicate for it.  
Fisher importantly redirects our focus towards the important role that the fear 
of white America to protect its community from contagion played in driving early 
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drug prohibition, rather than this being driven by the mere fear of racial others, but he 
overlooks the interconnection between these two elements of the same sacrificial 
racial dynamic. Furthermore, a dismissal of the racial undercurrents to early drug 
prohibition in the U.S.A. fails to appreciate the ways in which these transforming of 
these plants into Taussig’s transgressive substances is indebted to an association 
between racialised others and non-human conditions of existence under Euro-
modernity. As discussed at length in the first chapter of this thesis, the discursive fear 
of drugs is heavily indebted to the intertwinement between the substances themselves 
and the condition of racialised peoples, who are presumed to be weak of reason and 
will and instead constituted of pure appetite, therefore unable enter into social 
relations. As Taussig teaches us, drugs become transgressive when they are 
discursively read as the conduit to that condition of abjection embodied by the racial 
subaltern subject, no longer just a plant but drugs are now a source of contagion for 
the idealised community of rational and civilised humans.45 Once the ways in which 
the fear of drugs as contagion that married with the embodied contagion of race is 
fully appreciated, it is easier to understand why drugs caught the imagination as the 
enabler of violence from racial others, despite the fact that many of the early states to 
pass the laws had negligible racial minority populations. However, this thesis has 
advanced a reading of race not as merely material oppression but also the political-
theology of turning particular peoples into what Fanon perceptively described as the 
‘dammed’. Therefore, as my descriptor of drugs laws as operating ‘sacrificially’ 
suggests, prohibition in its early instantiation was also indebted to theology and the 
Christian proselytizing mission.  
 
5.3.2 The Religious Foundations of Drug Prohibition 
 
‘Therefore our mission is, or should be, one of self-conversion. 
How can we hope to convert others if we ourselves are not converted?’46 
James Brown Scott 
 
The history of drug prohibition, both within the U.S.A. and internationally, 
requires that proper credence be paid to the Christian leanings of the moral humanism 
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that informed it. The seeds of U.S. hegemony were sown through a transnational 
network of proselytising missionaries. The exporting of Christianity had been a 
persistent component of European imperialism, however it would acquire new 
impetus through the prodromal emerging of the U.S.A. as a world power. In seeking 
to reform the vice that they saw as infesting the lost souls of the world, institutions 
such as the World’s Woman’s Christian Temperance Union (WWCTU), the Young 
Men’s Christian Association (YMCA), and the Young Women’s Christian 
Association (YWCA) would clear the ground for the coming American moral 
empire.47 Moreover, international drug prohibition provides an archetypal example of 
the dialectical interplay between the church and state, through the early laws against 
drugs we can see how the ‘American government adapted to the new moral lobby and 
used drug reform as an instrument in regional and ultimately global policy.’48 
Missionaries such as William Dix, Wilbur Crafts and perhaps most famously Charles 
Henry Brent emerged as major actors crossing the religious and political arenas who 
were able to colour international drug policy and, by extension, the wider foreign 
policy aims of the Root-Scott led U.S. State department. Root’s own turn from 
accepting the drugs trade as legitimate part of the global marketplace towards 
pursuing international prohibition can be directly credited to his dialogue with 
missionaries; it was in the wake of receiving a flurry of letters and petitions from 
Wilbur Crafts that Root declared to the U.S. administrators in the Philippines: ‘the 
more I study the opium question the more reluctant I become to have your 
government sell opium.’49 The influence that the missionaries wielded over legislators 
had become a distinctive feature of American politics by the end of the nineteenth 
century. A convergence can be read between the Christian mission to eradicate vice 
from the world and the desire of U.S. hegemony to distinguish itself from European 
imperial powers. With an intertwinement of theological and imperial objectives 
fostered, the potential of international law as an increasingly prominent instrument for 
the enacting of both of these ambitions allows the drug prohibition to be theoretically 
synthesised with humanitarian protestations. As stated above, the American drive 
towards drug prohibition would aid the reshaping of international law towards a 
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concern with questions of the internal morality of individuals, a focus not only on 
prohibiting vice, but paying particular attention to prohibiting the traffic of vice, of 
policing the potential for vice to spread, infect and become contagious. 50  
The interweaving of the Christian mission to save souls with the fledging era 
of the crusade against drugs is encapsulated by the biography of Bishop Charles 
Henry Brent. Bishop Brent was the most influential of the Christian missionaries who 
would leverage, and be leveraged by, Elihu Root in furtherance of the prohibition of 
drugs, notably the Reverend Hampden C. Du Bose of Soochow, the Reverend Wilbur 
Crafts and Bishop Homer C. Stuntz.51 Charles Henry Brent was elected as the first 
Episcopal Bishop of the Philippine Islands in 1901, after the U.S.A. acquired the 
territory following victory in the Spanish-American War. However, along with the 
Islands came the inheritance of an ‘opium problem’ through the drug being used by 
the indigenous population. Missionaries in the Philippines, like Brent, began to 
consider the prohibition of opium as an extension of their proselytising mandate. 
Acting as the vanguard of America’s moral empire, these reformers perceived the 
drug as an impediment to ‘the natives’ conversion to Christianity and a potential 
source of barbaric ‘contagion that must be prevented from infecting the American 
bodies.’ 52  Disavowing the strict coloniser/colonised division common of formal 
European colonialism, the liberal humanitarianism of American ‘informal’ empire 
placed the Americans conceptually in greater proximity to the indigenous populations, 
thereby inviting greater vigilance against potential sources of contagion being 
transferred from the ‘native’ to the American.   
 
5.3.3 Bishop Brent, Opium and the Civilising of the Native 
 
The development of prohibitionist drug laws should be read alongside the 
production of a distinct jurisdictional sphere for the people of the Philippines 
following the Spanish-American War. American expansionism over the course of the 
nineteenth century had functioned through the annexation of land, followed by the 
incorporation of that land into the Union, then to be repopulated with Americans of 
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European descent. 53  However, the Spanish ceding of sovereignty over several 
territories to the U.S.A. in the Treaty of Paris, 1898 provoked an innovative juridical 
response in America, as ‘law and policymakers were interested in developing a new 
expansionist policy that would enable the U.S. to permanently annex territories 
without being bound to create new states or incorporate the non-Anglo-Saxon 
inhabitants of these territories into the U.S.’54 The resulting legal contestations over 
this question, collectively referred to as the Insular Cases, have been read by legal 
scholars as betraying the form of American inclusive/exclusive internationalism.55 
Informed by the juridical framework that had been applied to address America’s 
indigenous problem of the ‘Indian’, the Insular cases established in law the 
disqualification of America’s ‘colonial’ subjects from the rights and protections 
enjoyed by U.S. citizens through the constitution.56 America included the peoples of 
the former Spanish colonies within an aggregated jurisdictional sphere but without 
them acquiring the full rights of a citizen of the U.S.A. Therefore, while American 
jurisprudence did not construct the islands of the Philippines, along with Cuba, Puerto 
Rico, and Guam as colonial states equivalent to the prevailing model of European 
empire, there was also no plan for their full incorporation into the Union as had been 
America’s default practice upon acquiring new states over the nineteenth century. As 
a result, the people of these islands were suspended in a juridical condition that has 
been described by scholars of American expansion as a state of ‘inclusive 
exclusion.’ 57  This descriptor immediately recalls the positionality of Vitoria’s 
Amerindian ward and Girard’s scapegoat, read together at length in earlier chapters. 
The inclusive/exclusion of America’s newly acquired colonised subjects underwrote 
the emergence of America’s moral empire, as well as providing the context for the 
birth of international drug prohibition. The innovations of the colonial juridical 
structure to facilitate the governance of the Philippines and America’s other 
acquisitions from the Treaty of Paris, 1898, served as essential pre-conditions for the 
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success that the missionaries and moral reformers who were championing opium 
prohibition would enjoy.  
Initially, the U.S. government rebutted the missionaries’ concerns, citing that 
‘opium was tolerated in other colonial regimes’; however, the legal trade of opium 
challenged the core basis of what the missionaries saw as the distinguishing quality of 
American informal imperialism which was acting as ‘moral uplift and an example to 
imperial powers.’ 58  In the run-up to the 1904 presidential election, President 
Roosevelt relented to the pressure of the missionaries, and instructed his Secretary of 
War, Elihu Root, to have the Philippine Commission, the U.S. body governing the 
Philippines, establish a committee to investigate the opium problem.59 Root chose 
Bishop Brent to head up this committee, encouraged by the fact that, despite Brent 
being ‘one of the sternest opponents of opium amongst the missionaries’, he was not 
as fanatical as the likes of Crafts and instead displayed a finer understanding of 
diplomacy and statecraft.60 Brent’s approach to the indigenous populations reflected 
the inclusive/exclusion of America’s juridical approach to the Philippines. While 
Brent refuted formal colonialism as it had been exercised by the European powers, he 
always remained ‘certain of the natives' inability to govern themselves.’61 Brent’s 
interweaving of an ‘informal’ imperialism with his prohibitionist advocacy was 
indicative of how the opium problem fitted within the wider orientation of American 
internationalism. As Ian Tyrell tells us: 
 
In the treatment of the opium issue, it was not simply a moral 
coalition triumphing over a passive government. The American 
government adapted to the new moral lobby and used drug reform as 
an instrument in regional and ultimately global policy. Collusion 
between reformers and governments began to shape American 
diplomacy in distinctive ways.62  
  
An example of the way the state and the moral reformers converged can be seen in 
Brent’s collusion with the Presidency to mobilise the international community against 
opium. Brent raised the need for an international meeting addressing the opium 
problem in his letters to President Roosevelt from as early as 1906.63 This pressure 
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eventually bore fruit with the first international meeting on drug prohibition held in 
Shanghai, China in 1909. Although only a set of agreed recommendations emerged 
from this meeting as opposed to a full treaty, it commenced the trend towards 
prohibition that would intensify over the century. The Shanghai meeting followed in 
the wake of the Brussels Sugar Convention 1902, which scholars have read as being 
the first modern, multi-lateral international trade treaty.64 The interplay between the 
legitimate economic sphere- exemplified by the regulation of one psychoactive 
substance, sugar- and the transgressive, illegitimate economic sphere- exemplified by 
the prohibition of another psychoactive substance, opium- is apparent in these two 
early examples of the multi-lateral, international agreement.  
The 1909 meeting of the Shanghai Opium Commission provides the first 
marker in international law’s shift towards universal drug prohibition. 65  Root 
appointed Brent to serve as the chairman for the Commission, establishing a structure 
in which an American drug crusader is able to guide the meeting as a whole.66 In 
attendance at this meeting were representatives from the United States of America, 
Austria-Hungary, China, France, Germany, United Kingdom, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, Persia, Portugal, Russia and Siam.67 The driving force behind this 
meeting remained the U.S.A., which had canvassed the largely indifferent European 
powers and pressured them into beginning to conceive of the drugs trade along moral 
and not just economic terms. Moreover, as Ian Tyrell tells us, the American 
‘objectives were not merely moral…they were strategic as well. Brent and Roosevelt 
wished to use the opium issue to effect regional political change.’68 The U.S.A. 
employed the issue of drug prohibition to begin to insert itself at the head of an 
international legal order, make drug prohibition one of the first examples of the 
U.S.A. taking up the omniscient, panoramic positionality that we see Scott (in the 
guise of Vitoria) taking up in the mural in Washington, as analysed in my previous 
chapter. Brent’s ally and America’s chief negotiator at the 1909 meeting, Dr Hamilton 
Wright would later admit that it was “not entirely from altruistic motives that the state 
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department went about the crusade against opium… [But]… it looked like a good 
business move as well as a long stride in the direction of the good of mankind.”69 
Historians of drug policy have echoed this reading by arguing that the U.S. State 
department threw its weight behind the drive for anti-opium legislation partly due to 
the economic advantages afforded by the erosion of European domination of the trade 
with China, allowing a synthesis to emerge between the objectives of moral crusaders 
coincided with and economic objectives of the U.S.A as a rising world power.70 The 
Shanghai Commission was ultimately unable to establish binding international law 
upon the attending countries, the European imperial powers remained unenthusiastic 
about pushing their lucrative drug industries outside of the bounds of legal commerce 
and instead the delegates settled upon a set of diluted recommendations to present 
back to their signatory governments. However, Brent and the U.S.A. had been 
successful in sounding the starting gun on what would become the War on Drugs over 
the course of the American Century. 71 
Following the Shanghai meeting, the next challenge for the drug crusade was 
to apply pressure on the attending states to codify the recommendations that had been 
produced into a binding, multi-lateral international treaty. The continuing pressure led 
to The Hague Opium Conference in 1911, once again chaired by Brent.72 This time 
the countries did agree to binding law, as the delegates signed up to the first 
international, multi-lateral legal treaty prohibiting drugs, the International Opium 
Convention of The Hague, 1912. The preamble of this treaty declared an ambition of 
‘advancing a step further on the road opened by the International Commission of 
Shanghai of 1909’, which meant committing to bringing about ‘the gradual 
suppression of the abuse of opium, morphine, and cocaine, as also of the drugs 
prepared or derived from these substances.’73 The provisions of this treaty, which 
were scheduled to enter into force in 1915, instructed that signatory parties must 
‘enact effective laws or regulations for the control of the production and distribution 
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of raw opium.’74 Parties also signed up to ‘enact pharmacy laws or regulations to 
confine to medical and legitimate purposes the manufacture, sale, and use of 
morphine, cocaine, and their respective salts.’75 However, the stringency of this first 
international drug prohibition treaty was watered down by the colonial powers in the 
negotiations, still, at this moment in time, reluctant to give up their profitable drug 
trades. As a result, the drafting of the treaty was ‘loosely worded’ and did not contain 
the necessary mechanisms to oversee the implementation of its determinations.76 
Moreover, a condition of the treaty that was agreed was for its provisions to not come 
into effect until they had been ratified by all signatory governments, a consensus that 
proved impossible to achieve within the pre-World War I context of heightened 
rivalry between major imperial powers. However, by lobbying for and then chairing 
the 1909 and 1912 conferences, Brent had overseen the birth of drug prohibition in 
international law. In his fruitful collaborations with the Root-Scott State Department, 
Brent had established the legislative ground on which future prohibitionists could 
build.  
That an Anglican minister, committed to fulfilling the civilising mission 
through the church and the law, should have been one of the midwives bringing 
international drug prohibition as we know it into being, disturbs the contemporary 
presumption that though the drugs laws’ contradict the orthodoxies of liberalism, they 
do so through a pure scientific concern with harm. The religious undercurrent to the 
prohibitionist narrative was essential in fuelling not only the changes in law but also 
changes in common understandings of the word ‘drugs’, which during this era was 
gradually imbued with the connotations of existential evil.77 This religious influence 
informs the general arguments of this thesis regarding the operative function of the 
global ‘War on Drugs’. Brent served to ‘exert considerable influence upon the course 
of the movement’ for drug prohibition, not only by drawing upon a Christian 
metaphysics in his understanding of the drug problem, but also by utilising his 
connections through the global Christian network in order to emphasise the danger of 
drug use to governments across a variety of different cultures and traditions.78 By 
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revisiting the work of Brent and his contemporaries, the religiosity inscribed into drug 
prohibition from its offset becomes evermore perceptible, supporting the theoretical 
argument of the international laws on drugs acting as an instantiation of sacrifice and 
the religious inheritance of the modern juridical system.  
The religiosity of drug prohibition helps to unpack the basis for law’s 
dogmatic commitment to its provisions in the face of empirical failure. Drug laws 
betray the underlying ease of translation between religious proscription and the 
prohibitions of the law. Girard provides guidance in his writings on the full 
significance of the final of the Ten Commandments being a prohibition not of an 
action, but of a desire: the imposition that “You shall not covet.”79 For Girard, the 
prohibition of desire is not installed to be ‘needlessly repressive’, rather social orders 
necessarily erect symbolic prohibitions in an attempt to forestall a Hobbesian war of 
all against all. 80  Through Girard we see how both religious prohibitions and 
international law’s prohibition of drugs rest on a presupposition that there is a 
violence implicit in desire, encased only by the total prohibition of it, that is far more 
destructive to the social order than the violence required to reinforce the prohibition.81 
The interconnection laid out above between Christian proselytization of American 
missionaries and the early international drug laws speaks further to the extent to 
which the ‘War on Drugs’ can be understood to marry with the structure of sacrifice.  
 
5.3.4 Hamilton Wright and the Racial Underpinnings of Drug Prohibition 
 
The early history of drug prohibition also lends itself towards a collapsing of 
the binary between the international and national legislative spheres. Drug laws can 
be understood as a textbook example of Scott’s espousal of an international law 
inseparably interwoven with municipal systems of law.82 As illustrated above, the 
domestic movement towards drug prohibition within America propelled the 
emergence of the first international laws against drugs. However, the dialectic 
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between these two legal spheres remained open as the authority of the new 
international laws would in turn compel Federal legislation against the drug trade to 
be enacted in the U.S.A. Following the aggressive drug diplomacy practised overseas 
by Brent, Wright and others, it was clear that ‘it would be humiliating for the United 
States to demand controls by other nations but have no exemplary laws of its own.’83 
After the first international treaty prohibiting drugs, the 1912 Hague International 
Opium Convention, was signed, Wright returned to the U.S.A. ‘with two goals: 
increasing the number of signatories to the Convention and dispelling any doubt that 
this nation [U.S.A.] would pass the necessary domestic legislation.’84 Renewed calls 
for the Federal government to pass nationwide drug prohibition were now cast 
explicitly in terms of the U.S.A. failing to satisfy its international obligations.85 Once 
the U.S. Senate had ratified the treaty in 1913, it invited further pressure to enact the 
relevant domestic legislation as was mandated by treaty provisions. This pressure 
would ultimately bear fruit with the Harrison Act 1914, despite dissent about law 
taking such an invasive role in individual lives.86 A shifting of American liberal 
democracy, from the aforementioned assumption that ‘to prohibit vice is not 
ordinarily considered within the police power of the state,’ was realised through the 
Harrison Act.87 It was a shifting provoked by the authority of international law, at the 
same time as the presuppositions of American liberalism were being brought to bear 
on a reorientation of the international. The moral reformers were able to leverage the 
universal authority of international law to produce a national consensus on drug 
prohibition. McAllister details how ‘in the ensuing decade, the Harrison Act 
underwent numerous court challenges. [However], Federal officials often cited the 
international obligations incurred under the 1912 Hague Opium Convention as a key 
justification in defending the statute.’ 88  The interplay between national and 
international spheres of legal ordering is illustrated through drug prohibition’s birth. 
The international laws on drugs were the universalization of a particular American 
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moral humanism, while in-turn redefining that very particular that had informed it. 
The early days of drug prohibition serve as an exemplar of the fluid interplay between 
the concentric spheres of national and international law, as can be traced through the 
career of one of Bishop Brent’s main collaborators in the production of these first 
international drug laws, Dr Hamilton Wright.  
Dr Hamilton Wright is another major figure in the story of the international 
laws on drugs but he also played a significant role in domestic American drug 
prohibition, to the extent that historians have dubbed him ‘the father of American 
narcotic law.’89 Hamilton Wright was a neuropathologist, with a purely scientific 
interest in opium, prior to being approached, unsolicited, by Elihu Root and James 
Brown Scott’s State Department to head up the American Opium Commission in 
1908. This position resulted in Wright serving as the U.S. delegate for the 1909 
meeting of the Shanghai Opium Commission and the 1911 Opium conference at The 
Hague that led to the 1912 Hague International Opium Convention. It was by charge 
of Scott, then Solicitor for the State Department, that Hamilton Wright represented 
the U.S.A. at these conferences.90 Wright had not been involved in the debate around 
the legality of drugs prior to his appointment. However, upon taking up position with 
the State Department, Wright would develop a convert’s fanaticism with drug 
prohibition, making the banning of drugs, rather than the study of drugs, the primary 
focus of his work for the rest of his life. Even following Wright’s early death in 1917, 
his wife Elizabeth Wright carried on the prohibitionist cause as a Member of the 
League of Nations Opium Committee.91 In these early days of international drug 
prohibition, Hamilton Wright was ‘entrusted with the framing and carrying out of 
American foreign policy in regard to traffic in narcotics.’92 However, Wright also 
credited the leadership of the State Department for setting the tone for drug 
prohibition, stating that ‘Elihu Root, the then Secretary of State, formulated a plan, 
the design of which was to bring the Far Eastern opium traffic to an end, it being plain 
that that traffic was generally regarded as deplorable.’93 Furthermore, Wright also 
cited James Brown Scott as giving the direction under which his report on the 
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Shanghai opium Commission was delivered.94 The influence of the leadership on the 
State Department on Wright’s prohibition is confirmed in the following statement:  
 
Secretary Root […] was largely responsible for the fixed 
determination of the United States not to tolerate the misuse of opium 
in the Philippines by any class of their inhabitants. Although no 
formal declaration was made as to further international action in 
regard to opium production, traffic, and misuse, it was nevertheless 
recognized that such action was necessary.95 
 
 
Wright’s scientific background would suggest a grounding of his evaluation of the 
harms of psychoactive substances in the language of objective and neutral scientific 
rationalism. However, reference to a State Department report he delivered to 
Congress in 1910 finds Wright’s arguments littered with the same racialised 
demonization and anxieties regarding contagion that had been popularized through 
the American media at the time. In his report, presented between the international 
conferences at which he would represent the U.S.A., Wright argues that ‘it has been 
authoritatively stated that cocaine is often the direct incentive to the crime of rape by 
negroes of the South and other sections of the country.’96 Wright’s report consistently 
conflates the threat of the drugs with the threat of the racial other, claiming that 
‘cocaine […] has proved to be a creator of criminals and unusual forms of violence, it 
has been a potent incentive in driving the humbler negroes all over the country to 
abnormal crimes.’97 Moreover, further extracts lend themselves to George Fisher’s 
argument regarding drug prohibition being driven by the fear of a corruption of the 
idealised (ergo whitened) American subject. Wright describes cocaine as ‘used by 
those concerned in the white-slave traffic to corrupt young girls, and that when the 
habit of using the drug has been established it is but a short time before the latter fall 
to the ranks of prostitution.’98 Within this report, drugs are imagined not only as 
vessels for the inherent monstrosity of racial others but also as potential provocation 
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for white Americans to ‘denigrate’ themselves, recalling all the racial implications 
etymologically contained in the very word denigrate.99  
Wright’s report provides a microcosm for how the fear of contagion amongst 
the white population sat comfortably alongside the demonization of the racial other in 
the early days of prohibition; for, as aforementioned, they function not in 
contradiction to each other but as different sides of the same coin, two elements of a 
single dynamic, which I have termed as ‘sacrificial’. The attempt to produce a 
rarefied, idealised subject through the enclosure of negative characteristics with the 
body of ‘the other’ is troubled by the impossibility of fully determining either the 
idealised subject or the damned other in a fixed condition. To take one’s identity from 
the negation of the other, whilst at the same time arrogating one’s identity into a 
universal, mandates having to contain the discarded negative characteristics. Violence 
upon the embodied figure of negation, upon ‘the damned’ subject is enacted with the 
aim of expunging negative characteristics, lest they infect the purified social order. 
However, underlying the sacrificial structure is the recognition of its proscribed 
categories being porous, that the signs of infection that are projected onto the body of 
the damned have always already escaped and multiplied. The fear of classifications of 
difference being in fact porous stalks the modern discourse of race; the violence, the 
animalism, the deviancy projected onto the racial subaltern subject is a betrayal of 
what exists in-potentia within the idealised human subject of Euro-modernity. James 
Baldwin poetically captured the misrecognition that grounds the discourse of racism 
when he asked white America: “if it’s true that your invention reveals you, then who 
is the nigger?”100 In more juridical terms, Foucault also argues that what drives the 
law’s forceful insistence upon given norms is this same fear of the ever-present 
potential for the resurrection of the abnormal within the social order. 101 The normal is 
constituted through the invention and then casting out of the abnormal. Law sought to 
produce society as a cohesive whole through the violent exclusion of negative 
characteristics, yet underlying the violent exclusion of the abnormal remains the 
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actual impossibility of that exclusion in absolute terms, leaving always open 
possibilities for ‘transgression of natural limits, the transgression of classifications, of 
the table, and the law as a table.’102 Wright’s 1910 State Department report to the U.S. 
Congress, serves as an artefact illustrating the extent to which the birth of prohibition 
relied on drugs being imagined as a conduit to this transgression, an enabler through 
which the contagion that was refined out of a cohesive social order could re-enter and 
re-infect the community. In other words, Wright’s report reinforces Michael Taussig’s 
argument of drugs being read as ‘transgressive substances.’103 A review of the early 
drug laws, both within the U.S.A. and in the international arena through American 
leadership, support Taussig reading of the fear of drugs as indebted to drugs being 
imagined as a ‘contagion that is material, spiritual and deadly.’104 Furthermore, this 
imagining is facilitated by an ease of transfer between the demonised figure that 
emerged at this time of the junkie- the addict, the user enslaved by drugs, thereby 
robbed of the reason and will that make them human- and the racially subaltern 
subject- the oriental, the nigger, the amerindian- with both figures constructed as a 




This chapter has placed a critical focus on an under-researched project of early 
American international law, the birth of international drug prohibition, and placed it 
in conversation with wider conceptual framework of a ‘sacrificial’ liberal 
humanitarianism driving American international law at the turn of the twentieth 
century. Reading together the emergence of international drug prohibition as a multi-
lateral, totalising universal norm with the reworking of the international law by 
American jurists looking to engender what Scott termed as ‘a single standard of 
morality’ to globe, we can see how the birth of drug prohibition owed much to 
intellectual and political context of ‘sacrificial’ moral universalism that facilitated a 
dramatic turn away from the liberal presumptions of free-trade. When we look at the 
critique of Vitorian moral universalism that has been offered by post-colonial legal 
theorists such as Anthony Anghie and Peter Fitzpatrick, we gain a richer 
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understanding of how the persistence of masked racial hierarchies and imperial 
standards of civilization could operate within the acclaimed humanitarianism of early 
drug prohibition.105 Scott and Root constructed a tradition of American international 
law that departed from the strict colonial relations of European empires but 
maintained a veiled hierarchy between ‘the West and Rest’ within its universalism. 
Similarly, we can see how the racialised persistence of a discursive association of 
different bodies with differing levels of civilization within a single moral standard 
informed the prohibition of drugs, combined with drugs becoming discursively 
constructed as an internal pathogen endangering a reciprocal universal humanity. This 
theoretical understanding of drugs invites Brent, Wright and others to seek to save the 
souls of natives and racial subalterns, sounding the legislative start gun on a war that 
was to devastate these communities over the coming century. 
 As stated in the introductory chapters, the notion of a sacrificial international 
law maintains a relation to the process of how violence is used to cure violence, a 
mode of expansive universalism arises in an attempt to contain an outbreak of warfare 
but maintaining the dynamic of difference between peoples. Therefore, the 
importance of the crisis of the Great War in allowing both American international law 
and American-led international drug prohibition to transition into the global norm is a 
necessary focus of an analysis of the history of the international laws on drugs. 
Therefore, the next chapter will engage with how the legislative response to the Great 
War provided a new institutional centre for international law in the League of 
Nations, which would, in turn, become fertile terrain for prohibitionists to produce a 
number of stricter and more expansive international drug laws.  
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The Turn to Institutionalisation: Drug Prohibition in the 





The previous chapter reviewed the history of the emergence of drug 
prohibition as a multi-lateral project of international law, detailing the central role that 
prohibitionist missionaries played in mobilising the U.S. State Department into 
organising the first major drug prohibition conference, the International Opium 
Commission meeting in 1909 in Shanghai. Furthermore, in that chapter, I emphasised 
the relationship that existed between prohibitionists such as Bishop Charles Henry 
Brent and Dr Hamilton Wright, and the leading actors of American international law, 
particularly Elihu Root and James Brown Scott. I also argued for reading an 
understanding of early drug prohibition as intellectually as well as politically indebted 
to the shift towards a ‘single standard of morality’ in American liberal international 
law as theorised by Scott. Drug prohibition, an idea that began the century as the 
reserve of fringe moral reformers, began to turn into the universal norm that it is 
today through the conceptualisation of drugs as a contamination of a single standard 
for humanity. This argument, as developed within the context of American trusteeship 
of the Philippines, encouraged the State Department to lend its considerable support 
to the task of making drug prohibition a key innovation of an emergent American 
internationalism.   
This chapter bridges the origin of international drug prohibition with the legal 
and political structure for the late twentieth-century War on Drugs, which will be 
performed over the final chapters. In this chapter, I will show how the outbreak of war 
facilitated a wider turn towards moral universalism in the international order and this 
provided fertile terrain for drug prohibition to grow and become institutionalised. This 
turn previews the organisational and legislative framework that will be discussed in 
the forthcoming chapters in the Part C, which focuses on the United Nations 
legislation that governs the contemporary War on Drugs. This chapter will focus on 
the importance of the role played by the precursor to the United Nations, the inter-war 
period’s fledging attempt at institutionalising international law, the League of 
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Nations, in establishing and expanding drug prohibition as a norm of international 
law.  
The League of Nations provided a space for an increase in the scope of 
international law, which would now not only concern itself with questions of war, 
trade or territory but also with the individual lives of the peoples of the world, making 
issues of welfare, health, and hygiene into new concerns of international law.1 As 
Stephen Legg has said the League was ‘central to an emergent transnational (if 
inherently Eurocentric) epistemic community investigating the causes of poverty and 
disease.’ 2  However, I seek to further Legg by stressing how this community was 
constituted not just through a fixing of Europe as its centre but also through the 
inclusive/exclusion of the non-European, colonised subject in a condition of perpetual 
‘trusteeship’ that to bring it within the inner identity of the community whilst being 
always already disavowed. Furthermore, in this chapter, I also show how drug 
prohibition, shown previously to be the prohibition of psychoactive substances 
discursively associated with colonised peoples, benefitted from the reimagined 
horizons of international law in this period. In addition, I will read the League as 
being influenced by the vision of a liberal, humanitarian international law that, as has 
been argued, characterised American internationalism since the turn-of-the century. 
Despite the U.S.A’s ultimate failure to join the League, the institution remains a key 
marker and moment of acceleration in the general trajectory of international law 
towards operating on an expansive moral basis. As Ignacio de la Rasilla del Moral 
suggests ‘the pre-Wilsonian generation of US international lawyers, their work in 
favour of these internationalist goals contributed to nurture the intellectual 
international legal soil on the eve of the Great War in the United States and, 
undoubtedly, inspired the post-Great War establishment of the League of Nations.’3 
Finally, my subsequent argument will read the theoretical and organisational changes 
occurring in international law at this period as a response to a period of contagious 
violence that has been historicised as ‘the second thirty years war.’ This term of 
periodization arises from historians who read the continuities between the Great War 
and the Second World War as not only one singular period of international crisis but 
                                                
1 Stephen Legg, “The Life of Individuals as well as of Nations’: International Law and the League of 
Nations’ Anti-Trafficking Governmentalities" Leiden Journal of International Law 25 (2012), pp. 647–
664, p.653 
2 Legg, p.655. 
3 Ignacio de la Rasilla del Moral, ‘The Ambivalent Shadow of the Pre-Wilsonian Rise of International 
Law’, Erasmus Law Review, 7, 2, (2014) pp.80-97, p.82. 
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also argue for its similarity of to the ‘first’ Thirty Years War in which early modern 
Europe imploded into contagious, violent rivalry until contained by the Peace of 
Westphalia, the conventional birthdate of international law. 4 With an escape of 
warfare from its confines being a consistent threat over the first half of the century, 
the crusade of drug prohibition would increasingly be posited as a project that an 
international community could cohere around, leading to the imperial powers 
accepting greater and greater restrictions on their drugs trades despite the potential 
profits on offer. In addition to the consistent threat of an outbreak of violence between 
the rival empires haunting international law, this era also had to contend with the 
growing potential of violent decolonisation. The invitation of the colonised into the 
international community, which I will show as commencing though the League, 
sought to abate the potential of violent decolonisation as jurisprudence of 
international law (re)turned to a focus on cohering a communal global order. 
However, drug prohibition becoming an increasing norm of international law over 
this same period shows how a new axis of imperial relations was beginning to 
concretise within the ostensible move away from colonisation, only masked by 
sanctification in the name of universal humanity. Therefore, this chapter will further 
the historical narrative illuminating the ways in which international drug prohibition 
and the changing structure of international law were not merely contemporaneous but 
were also theoretically consistent with each other and with the general trajectory 
towards a ‘sacrificial’ international law.  
 
6.2 A New Actor for A New Order: The League of Nations and the Shadow of 
Contagious Violence 
 
‘There was no large difference between the principles of  
the Mandate System and those of the Berlin Conference.’5 
David Lloyd George, British Prime Minister 
 
                                                
4 The ‘Second Thirty Years War’ is a term used by historians to refer to the continuous period of 
international rivalry that spans the First and Second World Wars. For further, see Charles Feinstein, 
Peter Temin, and Gianni Toniolo, The World Economy between the Wars (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008); or P.M.H. Bell, The Origins of the Second World War in Europe (London: Routledge, 
2014). 
5 Nathaniel Berman, ‘In the Wake of Empire’, American University International Law Review, 14, 6, 
p.1526. <http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu /cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1339&context=auilr> 
[accessed 24 June 2013]. 
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The outbreak of contagious violence during the Great War shattered prevailing 
conceptions of how communality was generated in the international community. 
Subsequently, when the war finally concluded with the Treaty of Versailles, there was 
a widespread reinvestment in the power of international law to act as a ‘reconstructive 
doctrine’ and bring about the return to an order on peace.6 The problem of the 
structure of international order became a primary concern of the politicians, jurists 
and diplomats tasked with reorganising the international order, provoking immediate 
questions regarding law’s ability to engender community. As discussed in previous 
chapters, the presumptions of nineteenth-century positivism, producing order through 
the recognition of sovereignty and accompanied by a strict demarcation between the 
international community of sovereign states and the non-sovereign colonised world, 
had been exposed as unable to contain violence. With confidence lost in nineteenth-
century assumptions, lawyers recognised that ‘peace and development had to be 
artificially created.’ 7  In response to this challenge, novel legal forms and 
unprecedented institutional frameworks were constructed in order for international 
law to be rejuvenated.  
The establishment of the League of Nations served as the most dramatic 
innovation of the inter-war period. As David Kennedy explains, the jurisprudential 
panic caused by the Great War provoked ‘the move to institutions’ in international 
law, with the League of Nations (referred to as the League hereafter) providing a 
novel attempt to establish an organisational home for international law. 8  This 
institution signalled an increased collective responsibility for the administration and 
organisation of the international community and promised to serve as a new bulwark 
against the mimetic violence that had been seen in the Great War. The League was 
innovative in terms of both structure and ambition. As Susan Pedersen argues ‘the 
League was always imagined as something more than a meeting ground for sovereign 
states: it was to rise above national hatreds and defend nothing less than ‘civilisation’ 
itself.’9 The League can also be read as providing institutional form to an already on-
                                                
6 For further details on the ‘reconstructive doctrine’ see Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: 
The Structure of International Legal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
7 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Nationalism, Universalism, Empire: International Law in 1871 and 1919’, paper 
presented at the Conference, Whose international Community? Universalism and the Legacies of 
Empire’, Columbia University, April 29-30 (2005), p.41. 
8 David Kennedy, ‘The Move to Institutions’, Cardozo Law Review, 8, pp.841- 988. 
9 Sue Pedersen, The Guardians: The League of Nations and The Crisis of Empire (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2015), p.6.   
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going, wider theoretical departure from nineteenth-century positivism, which, in its 
fetishized separation of law from morality, was taken to ‘have endorsed, if not 
facilitated, the tragedy of the First World War.’10 As Martti Koskenniemi recognises, 
for international law to effectively function as a ‘reconstructive doctrine’ following 
the end of the Great War, it was necessary for the discipline to reengage, at least in a 
qualified manner, with the ideas of natural law with the aim of tightening the binds of 
international order.11 Positivism had discredited the theological naturalism of the 
sixteenth and seventeenth-century law of nations to the extent that it could no longer 
function as an explicit basis for international order. However, Koskenniemi details 
how more sophisticated international lawyers in the inter-war period sought to 
respond to positivism’s own crisis after the Great War by cloaking a partial 
reconsideration of naturalist ideas under the guise of a general jurisprudence of 
international law.12 This jurisprudential shift, while dismissing the latent Christian 
mysticism of early-modern thinkers like Vitoria, imbued the League with an 
emboldened utopian federalism, grounded on a vision of liberal humanism that 
recalled the earlier imaginings of the law of nations. Natural law’s philosophical 
assertion of law as deriving its coherence from a transcendent, universalising point of 
centre- traditionally the figure of God but in the secularised discourse of modernity 
replaced by a conception of universal humanity- allowed for a certain resonance with 
the post-Great War settlement seeking to ground international law on a set of common 
principles, whilst remaining explicitly tied to an order to sovereign, nation-states. 
However, in this iteration, the anchoring of a vision of universal humanism would be 
achieved by way of a negative move. As will be shown below, a persisting standard of 
civilisation within the League allowed its fledging vision of an international 
community to be constituted in opposition to a colonial subjectivity that it 
simultaneously sought to bring within its ‘trusteeship’. In its ambition to serve as a 
space in which the international community could not only congregate but also 
actively produce a broader communality amongst the international order, the League 
can be read, as argued by Pedersen, as both a product of and response to the twentieth 
century’s crisis of empire.13  
                                                
10 Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty,  p.125. 
11 Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, p.187. 
12 Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870–
1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2001) pp.353-365 
13 Pedersen, The Guardians, pp.1-15 
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6.2.1 A Restructuring of Empire 
 
The creation of the League serves as a historical marker for the shift away 
from an international order predicated on the demarcation between sovereign empires 
and subjugated colonial peoples to a universal order of formally equal, independent 
states. Though the process of formal decolonisation is often attributed to the era of the 
United Nations, it was the League that first provided an institutional setting in which 
the calls for decolonisation began to gain traction.14 The League also initiated a 
change in the juridical condition of the colonised subject, offering through the 
Mandate System a structural innovation that began the process of international law 
transitioning away from direct colonialism. The Mandate System was the response 
devised by the League to the problem of managing the colonial territories of the 
defeated Central Powers of the Great War. Rather than the victors simply acquiring 
the colonies of the German, Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires as the spoils of 
war, the victors were instead appointed as mandatories or administrators of the 
colonies on behalf of the League, with an explicit requirement ‘to protect the interests 
of backward people, to promote their welfare and development and to guide them 
toward self-government and, in certain cases, independence’ interwoven into the new 
roles.15 Envisioned by a plan for the League of Nations drafted by General Jan C. 
Smuts, the Mandate System sought to bring about a world in which the ‘European 
Empires will all have disappeared’ and an open-door approach to global trade that 
engenders ‘no reason for bitterness or rivalry among the great States.’16 It exemplified 
the League’s departure from an order of imperialism, seen as the root cause of the 
inflamed passions that led to war, instead presenting itself as a neutral, technocratic 
institution, opposed to the naked self-interest that drove the internationalism of the 
colonial powers.17 While maintaining an underlying vision of a difference between 
the ‘advanced’ and ‘backwards’ people of the worlds along colonial lines of division, 
the League moved away from explicitly racialised explanations for this division 
                                                
14 Anghie, p.115. 
15 Ibid, p.120. 
16 J. C. Smuts, The League of Nations: A Practical Suggestion (New York: The Nation Press, 1919), 
p.28 Available at https://archive.org/details/leagueofnationsp00smutuoft [Accessed 06 April 2016] 
17 Donatella Alessandrini, ‘The World Trade Organization and Development: Victory of “Rational 
Choice”?’ in Events: The Force of International Law ed. by Fleur Johns, Richard Joyce & Sundhya 
Pahuja (London: Routledge, 2011), pp.207-222, p.209.  
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towards ideas that preview the contemporary discourse of development, justifying the 
division through different political and economic capabilities. Moreover, this 
alternative model for persisting imperial relations promise a temporal change from the 
scientific racism of the apex of European colonialism, the notion of ‘advanced’ 
nations placing ‘backwards’ peoples under their ‘tutelage’ until they reach a stage of 
development in which they can rule themselves suggests that the hierarchical relations 
are not designed to be permanent, however, the presence of this rhetoric in Vitoria’s 
sixteenth-century schema and in contemporary discussions on development betray the 
indeterminacy of this promise.18 The League acclaimed an ambitious new vision for 
international law, while all the time continuing to take for granted the colonial 
division between an industrial core and agricultural periphery that would inform the 
spatial and juridical order of this changing world.19 
  In the negotiations that created the League at the end of the Great War, the 
Americans had argued for the creation of the Mandate System, with the ideological 
inspiration for the system being the U.S. trusteeship of the Philippines and other 
territories acquired following the Spanish-American War, which was the focus of 
earlier chapters of this thesis.20 The Mandate System fixed within international law 
the concept of ‘trusteeship’ in a manner that recalled how American ‘imperialism’ 
privileged a conceptualisation of a temporary rather than fixed hierarchy and one that 
would saw its sole purpose as for the benefit of the colonised. Supporting the thread 
connecting Scott and American internationalism to the establishment of the League, 
the ‘trusteeship’ of the Mandate System carried more than a faint echo of Vitoria's 
conception of the Amerindian ward, as Anthony Anghie has illustrated at length.21 
Anghie highlights how the jurists of the League sought to draw upon Vitoria 
inclusive/exclusion of the colonial subject within his communal international law, 
justifying a continuing hierarchy between the colonial and colonised worlds as a 
necessary precursory for a coherent notion of universal humanity to emerge.22 The 
infantilising of the Amerindian performed by Vitoria’s jurisprudence once the ideas of 
                                                
18 See Article 22 of Covenant of The Leagues of Nations, Available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/parti.asp [Accessed 06 April 2016]. Refer to previous chapters for 
discussions on Vitoria’s jurisprudence as a precursory for development discussions 
19 Michael Fakhri, ‘The 1937 International Sugar Agreement: Neo-Colonial Cuba and Economic 
Aspects of the League of Nations’, Leiden Journal of International Law, 24, 4, pp.899-922. 
20 Anghie, p.140. 
21 Ibid, p.145. 
22 Ibid 
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natural slavery had been rejected, had that consequence of masking the violence of 
European conquest whilst never delegitimising the project outright. Anghie argues for 
seeing the Mandate System as a recovery of this schematic, stating: 
 
The Mandate System was now presented as an elaboration of the 
important ideas first enunciated by Vitoria, that had been neglected 
and dismissed, together with so much else of value in international 
jurisprudence, as a result of the dominance of positivism, which now 
was itself discredited. The circle was complete: in seeking to end 
colonialism, international law returned to the origins of the colonial 
encounter.23 
 
Therefore, it must be emphasised that the Mandate System, whilst it served as a shift 
away from the high-point of European imperialism, should still be read as a (re)turn to 
international legal order that gestured towards a universal community while 
maintaining a ‘dynamic of difference’ between the European and non-European 
worlds.  
Through the Mandate System, the League brought about a mutation in the 
workings of empire but it did not fully decouple itself from international law’s 
colonial legacy. Rather, the jurists that oversaw its administration ‘took it as a given 
that the Mandates System should aim to uphold humane principles of colonial rule, 
not to plan its supersession.’24 The Mandate System, and the wider League of 
Nations, can be understood as being caught in what Nathaniel Berman has termed as a 
‘perilous ambivalence’; in that it was beginning to imagine ‘an enlightened, 
supranational world’ and, yet, remained ‘inextricably tied to a colonially demarcated 
legal order.’25 Moreover, it is important to emphasise, as historian Sue Perseden 
detailed at length, that the Mandate System was not an ambitious yet marginal 
initiative of the League, but instead represented the crux of the League’s raison 
d’etre- the challenge of reconceptualising empire in the wake of the European intra-
imperial violence of the Great War.26 While the recovery of the League’s role in 
emergent decolonisation struggles can tend to emphasise an overly positive picture of 
the institution as a key historical marker in the shift towards the formal recognition of 
                                                
23 Ibid 
24 Pedersen, The Guardians, p.109. 
25 Nathaniel Berman, ‘A Perilous Ambivalence: Nationalist Desire, Legal Autonomy, and the Limits of 
the Interwar Framework’, Harvard International Law Journal, 33, pp.353-379, p.356. 
26 For further reading on the full importance of the Mandate System to the ideology of the League of 
Nations and interwar international law more widely, see Pedersen, The Guardians. 
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universal sovereign equality in international law, the institution can also be read as a 
moment of the reworking and restructuring of empire. As Rose Parfitt details, rather 
than being a project solely committed to the facilitation of universal equality, ‘the 
manufacture of sovereign inequality was one of the League’s most characteristic 
functions’ and the Mandate System, with its explicit notions of humanitarian 
trusteeship and debt to the American model of protectorate offers a telling example of 
how sovereign inequality was fortified within this shift towards equality.27 
 The Mandate System was topic of interest to American internationalists, as 
might be expected when considering the aforementioned similarity to America’s own 
paternalistic universalism. International theorists such as Quincy Wright and Parker 
Moon produced extensive studies of the Mandate System.28 This interest in the 
Mandate System reflects how it was through the interwar period, the relation between 
the colonising and colonised worlds began to be translated from the language of fixed, 
essential superiority into the language of differing gradations of progress and 
development. The changing axis of imperial relations can been seen as already present 
within the founding Covenant of The League of Nations, where Article 22 declares 
the League’s responsibility to the colonised world: 
 
To those colonies…. which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to 
stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern 
world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and 
development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation.29 
  
The League, particularly through the Mandate System, provided the institutional form 
for international law’s inclusive/exclusion of the colonised subject, that would serve 
as a telling precursory to the position racially subaltern peoples would occupy in the 
formally decolonised world that would emerge after the Second World War, as will 
be reviewed in subsequent chapters. Moreover, this qualified expansion of the 
boundaries of international law, was also an important organisational development in 
facilitating the exponential growth of drug prohibition over the interwar period.  
 
                                                
27 Rose Parfitt, ‘Empire des Negres Blancs: The Hybridity of International Personality and the 
Abyssinia Crisis of 1935-36’, p.851. 
28 See Quincy Wright, Mandates Under the League of Nations (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press 1930), or Parker Moon, Imperialism and Word Politics (New York: MacMillan 1930). 
29 See Article 22 of Covenant of The Leagues of Nations, Available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/parti.asp [Accessed 06 April 2016]. 
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6.2.2 Individuals As Well As Nations 
 
A further element of the project undertaken by the League was to widen and 
deepen the terrain of issues that became the concern of international law. This 
mirrored the theoretical shift in international law that Scott sought to recovery in 
championing of ‘international law’s completeness, universality, perfectibility and 
inseparable connection to municipal systems of law.’30 At the centre of this vision is 
an international law moored upon morality, with the dictates recovered from Vitoria 
interwoven into a twentieth century universal order in which ‘a single standard of 
morality’ would be shared not just by all states but by all peoples.31 A concern with 
international law going beyond matters of statecraft towards questions of normative 
morality provides another point of connection between Vitoria’s writings and the 
international jurisprudence of the interwar period. This concern would acquire 
institutional force through the engagements of League of Nations. Stephen Legg 
illustrates how the League, in a further break from the positivism of the nineteenth 
century, took up the task of intervening in the everyday lives of the peoples within 
nations, taking up questions of health, economics and moral standards of people as 
questions that would now become the concern of international law.32 The League 
institutionalised an idea of the maintenance of global peace being no longer just a 
matter of international relations but also dependent on the production of a universal 
ideal of human life, one conforming to a single moral standard. International law 
would, from now on, be concerned with producing idealised human subjects through 
the regulation of individuals as well as of nations and in addition to issues of sex and 
morality, drugs can be understood to play a central role in this shift.33 This moralism 
was still constituted through geo-politics. Despite the rise of domestic alcohol 
prohibition across a variety of jurisdictions in this period, there was no great appetite 
for international legislative control outside the liquor traffic control that was exercised 
by the Mandate system in Africa. The failure of alcohol prohibition to be taken up by 
this moralist turn in international law could be credited to the fact that but as ‘the 
                                                
30 Christopher Rossi, Christopher Rossi, Broken Chain of Being: James Brown Scott and the Origins of 
Modern International Law (Leiden: Brill 1998) p.20. 
31 James Brown Scott, ‘A Single Standard of Morality for the Individual and the State’, Presidential 
Address delivered at the Twenty-sixth Annual meeting of the American Society of International Law, 
Vol. 26 (1932) p.20. 
32 Legg, p.648. 
33 Ibid., p.664. 
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League of Nations was almost entirely European and alcohol use was deeply 
embedded in European culture’ while drug use, as shown before was more closely 
associated with the racial other and therefore, it had to be prohibited in order to 
facilitate the emergence of an idealized international community.34 This increased 
scope of the League indicated a return to the idea of the international as communal, 
and to law as moral norms that span through and across national borders and 
sovereign authority, tying the universal together.35 This turn towards issues of a 
communal nature would marry with suspicions regarding potential sources of 
contagion that could corrupt the morality of the international community. This 
concern with morality caused the League to direct a significant amount of energy on 
policing illicit traffic between states.36 The League therefore provided fertile terrain 
for the escalation of international drug prohibition.  
 
6.3 The Chronology of Drug Prohibition within The League of Nations 
 
The shift towards international law taking on questions of individual morality 
meant that the era of the League would prove to be particular fruitful for drug 
prohibition. As Toby Seddon has said, we must read, ‘the First World War as a 
critical moment of change in the positioning of different psychoactive substances.37 
The war itself expanded the vision of what international law was capable of, with 
inter-allied resource co-ordination efforts during the war influencing the scale and 
ambition of the multi-lateral treaties produced in the post-war, institutionalised legal 
order.38 This can help account for the exponential increase in drug prohibition treaties 
that would emerge in the decades following the war. The first drug prohibition treaty, 
the 1912 Hague International Opium Convention, was only universalised through a 
provision within the Treaty of Versailles. The Treaty of Versailles contained a clause 
requiring ratification of the 1912 Hague International Opium Convention by all 
signatories to the peace treaty.39 It also founded the League of Nations, and ensured 
                                                
34 Kettil Bruun, Lynn Parr and Ingemar Rexed, The Gentlemen's Club: International Control of Drugs 
and Alcohol (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), p.13 
35 Ibid., p.648. 
36 Ibid., pp.647–664. 
37 Toby Seddon, ‘Inventing Drugs: A Genealogy of a Regulatory Concept’, Journal of Law and 
Society, 43, 3 (September 2016), pp. 393-415, p.408. 
38 Michael Fakhri, ‘The 1937 International Sugar Agreement’, p.904. 
39Article 295 of the Treaty of Versailles states: ‘Those of the High Contracting Parties who have not 
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that this institution granted drug prohibition a place of importance within its very 
constitution. In the Covenant of The League of Nations, Article 23 (c) declares that 
member states will entrust ‘the League with the general supervision over the 
execution of agreements with regard to… the traffic in opium and other dangerous 
drugs.’40 The inclusion of a provision to control drugs within the founding of the 
League furthered the movement of drug prohibition towards being an established 
norm for international law. Furthermore, an early resolution of the League would 
establish the Opium Advisory Committee (OAC) in 1920, an organ within the League 
tasked with overseeing the drugs trade as the law shifted towards greater 
prohibition.41  
A famous weakness of the League at large is that, despite it being the vision of 
Woodrow Wilson, the internal politics of the U.S.A. eventually blocked its entry. 
Resultantly, internationalists both within the League and within the U.S.A saw drugs 
as an issue that could entice America back towards joining her abandoned progeny.42 
Therefore, the actions undertaken regarding drug prohibition within the League were 
all still generally framed by the ideas of American prohibitionists. David Begley-
Taylor identifies the extent to which the U.S.A continued to operate as an anchor for 
the international drug laws in this period, stating ‘the League's philosophy and 
accompanying legislation reflected the US preference for supply-side approaches to 
drug control over any etiological and demand-side considerations.’43 The U.S.A, as 
‘the world’s most remorseless advocate of stringent drug control measures’ ensured 
that the League placed its ‘emphasis on supply control and law enforcement’ meaning 
that the problem of drugs continued to be associated primarily with the areas and 
peoples understood to produce the substances, not with the reasons for their growing 
demand in Western society.44 William McAllister highlights how in its approach to 
                                                                                                                                      
January 23, 1912, agree to bring the said Convention into force, and for this purpose to enact the 
necessary legislation without delay and in any case within a period of twelve months from the coming 
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41 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, A Century of Drug Control (2008), 
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the drug problem ‘the League concentrated on helping “normal” and “deserving” 
people, not least because doing so enabled all parties to avoid troublesome questions 
about societal factors contributing to deviant behaviour.’45 Efforts by different organs 
within the League to expand the approach of the law beyond the supply-side bias 
were explicitly stifled by American pressure, despite her non-membership.46  
A plethora of new international treaties on drugs were passed in the era of the 
League, establishing the model of the multi-lateral international treaty as the primary 
instrument of drug prohibition going forward, as had been argued by Bishop Brent 
and other American prohibitionists earlier. The inter-war prohibition would first bear 
fruit through an opium conference held in Geneva in 1924, which led to a second 
international treaty on opium being signed, namely the 1925 Agreement Concerning 
the Manufacture of, Internal Trade in, and Use of Prepared Opium. This agreement 
promised ‘to bring about the gradual and effective suppression of the manufacture of, 
internal trade in and use of prepared opium.’47 Also signed at the time was the new 
International Opium Convention, 1925, which in addition to reinforcing the 
restrictions on opium, marked a crucial turning point in international laws on drugs as, 
for the first time, an international treaty extended the scope of prohibition to include 
the drug of cannabis.48 However, the United States ultimately refused to sign the 
International Opium Convention, 1925 after the treaty failed to satisfactorily limit the 
prohibition of the another major plant-based drug that had been demonised by 
American prohibitionists, coca. 49  The decision by the U.S.A to pull out of 
International Opium Convention, 1925 as there was no likelihood of obtaining 
complete control of all opium and coca leaf derivatives was, however, described by 
Quincy Wright as ‘not in accord with the procedure of cooperation as outlined by Mr. 
Root in 1907’ for how America should try to cultivate universality in the project of 
                                                
45 Ibid., p.50. 
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internationalizing drug prohibition.50 Coca, and its derivative cocaine, had been 
supressed to a partial extent in the 1912 Hague International Opium Convention, but 
drug prohibitionists now wished to use this latest opium convention to limit 
production to only ‘medical and scientific needs’, following the supply-side heavy 
prohibitionist policy referred to as ‘the American principle’ by the President of the 
conference.51 However, America’s non-membership of the League limited its ability 
to dictate the terms of treaties, therefore allowing European empires still invested in 
the production of cocaine to resist the inclusion of such strenuous prohibition terms. 
The U.S.A continued to advocate for drug prohibition to be enacted through the heavy 
control of the supply of drugs, a structure that would of course have the consequence 
of ‘externalising’ its own drug problem. Wright even admits that ‘if large areas of 
American land had long been given to the production of the poppy we would be less 
anxious to extend the domain of international questions to this field.’52 The U.S.A did 
sign up to the next drug treaty produced through the League, the Convention for 
Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs, 1931. 
The impact of the Great Depression on the global economy at the end of the 1920’s 
invited a reinforcement of prohibition laws as the illegal market in drugs emerged as a 
major shadow economy. 53  However, in a manner that would prove prophetic, 
increasing prohibition only saw drug markets continue to expand. The League 
convened a further conference on drugs in 1936, the main outcome of which was the 
signing of the 1936 Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous 
Drugs.54 The 1936 treaty was the first time international law explicitly focused on 
drug trafficking and declared drug trafficking as criminal. Article 2 of this 
convention, by recommending that drug trafficking should result in ‘imprisonment, or 
other penalties of deprivation of liberty’ introduced into international law the 
connection between drug offences and criminal sanctions that would become 
inextricable as the War on Drugs intensified over the latter half of the twentieth 
                                                
50 Quincy Wright, ‘The American Withdrawal from the Opium Conference’, The American Journal Of 
International Law, 19, pp.348-355, p.355. 
51 Ibid., p.53. ‘The president of the conference, Sir Malcolm Delevingne (UK) concluded: “The 
American principle for a limitation of production to medical and scientific purposes, though accepted 
as a principle both by the Advisory Committee on the Traffic in Opium and the Assembly, has not been 
included in the Convention as a contractual obligation.”’ 
52 Wright, ‘The American Withdrawal From The Opium Conference’, p.353. 
53 Ibid., p.53. 
54 Ibid., p.56. 
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century.55 The 1936 Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous 
Drugs illustrates the rising emphasis on using law’s punitive capabilities to enforce 
drug prohibition over the course of the interwar years. However, the 1936 treaty was 
still not stringent enough for the United States, who would once again refuse to sign 
and ratify this convention.56 Moreover, the spectre of inter-imperial rivalry had again 
begun to haunt international law by this time, with countries such as Germany and 
Japan no longer participating in international conferences. Ultimately, just 13 
countries signed and ratified the 1936 trafficking convention, a treaty that only came 
into effect in 1939, by which time the international community was once again 
engulfed by contagious violence with the onset of the Second World War.   
 
6.4 Drug Laws as fixed in International Law 
 
The League of Nations did much to advance drug prohibition, normalising 
many of the tenets and structures that would eventually form the War on Drugs. 
However, from the standpoint of an advocate for drug prohibition, the ultimate failure 
of the League to bring about uniformity, both within drug control and within wider 
international relations, would frustrate the project of universal drug prohibition at this 
historical juncture. The re-emergence of the spectre of rivalry amongst the 
international community would bring a close to this chapter of international law’s 
engagement with drug prohibition. The League had been conceptualised so as to 
affect a restraint on such rivalry, with the Wilsonian American internationalists 
imagining the institution as a forum for the production of a collaborative and 
communal international order. However, with the U.S.A ultimately unable to take up 
membership, a problem compounded by the exclusion from the League of major 
powers such as the Soviet Union and Germany, the universalist ambitions for the 
League were permanently stunted.57 Despite imaginings of a new universal order, the 
League remained ‘very much an imperialists’ club.’58  The League would eventually 
disintegrate as nation after nation withdrew from the institution in preparation for 
                                                
55 Article 2, ‘The 1936 Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs’, 
<https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=VI-
11&chapter=6&lang=en> [accessed 9 March 2016]. 
56 Ibid., p.58. 
57 Pedersen, The Guardians, p.8. 
58 Ibid., p.61. 
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another global conflict.59 As a result, drug prohibition would not become a priority for 
the international community again until this explosion of inter-nation-state violence 
had been abated and a new international legal order had to be constructed.  
However, the failure of inter-war drug prohibition does not diminish the 
significance of transition that occurred in international law’s approach to drugs during 
this era. Julia Buxton captures the importance of the innovations of the League’s 
moves towards drug prohibition, describing how:  
 
The control model was all the more remarkable as it was the first 
instance in which states had surrendered overview of their sovereign 
affairs to an international body. Drug control was also groundbreaking, 
because it led to the introduction of uniform penal sanctions across 
countries and established principles of criminal law on an international 
basis.60 
 
Overall it was in the early twentieth century  in which the U.S.A began to take its first 
steps into the office of global hegemonic power and the early drug prohibition was 
both a cause and product of this shift. However, these laws would not achieve the 
necessary universality they required to take full effect, as the U.S.A still lacked the 
‘sufficient international muscle to dictate its drug control policies and therefore export 
the ideal of prohibition.’61 Still inter-war drug prohibition served to clear the ground 




   
                                                
59 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, A Century of Drug Control, p.57. ‘Germany left after the 
National-socialists came to power. Japan left the League of Nations in 1933 after the League had 
voiced opposition to the invasion of the Chinese territory of Manchuria. Italy withdrew in 1937, of its 
invasion of Ethiopia. The Soviet Union, which had only joined the League of Nations in 1934, had to 
leave it in 1939 following its aggression against Finland.’  
60 Julia Buxton, ‘The Historical Foundations of Narcotics Control’, Innocent Bystanders: Developing 
Countries and the War on Drugs ed. by Philip Keefer and Norman Loayza (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and The World Bank, 2010) 
61-94, p. 78. 
61 Bewley-Taylor, ‘The American Crusade: The Internationalization Of Drug Prohibition’, p.73. 
62 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, A Century of Drug Control, p.55. 
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TABLE I: Pre-WWII International Law on Drugs 
 
6.4.1 Quincy Wright and The Three Tenets of Drug Prohibition 
 
For this final section of the chapter, in order to fully unpack the relations 
between the American imagining of a moral humanistic international law and the 
emergent drug war of the early twentieth century, I turn to the writings of one of 
James Brown Scott’s successors as a major theorist of American internationalism, 
Quincy Wright.63 With another international crisis- the Second World War- appearing 
on the horizon, a new generation of American internationalists, who had been 
produced through the ASIL, began to take the reins from figures like Root and Scott. 
Amongst the most notable members of this new guard was Quincy Wright, a noted 
political scientist who had made his name in the arena of international law.64 The 
influence of the founding ASIL generation upon Wright’s world-view is clear, he had 
                                                
63 Quincy Wright has also been read as engaging in a conflict of politics with the Root-Scott generation 
of the ASIL. Hatsue Shinohara describes Wright as part of an upstart generation which seized power 
from the traditionalist wing of the ASIL. While it is true Wright had points of disagreement with Scott 
and especial Root and Lasing, it cannot be denied that they influenced his jurisprudence greatly, as well 
as gave him the platform from which to construct a fully realised universal international law. 
64 Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr, The American Society of International Law's First Century: 1906-2006, 
(Boston: Brill 2006), p.77. 
(1909) Final Resolutions of the 
International Opium Commission (not a 
treaty) 
Did not enter into force 
(1912) International Opium Convention Entered into force 28th of June 1919 
(1925) Agreement concerning the 
Manufacture of, Internal Trade in, and 
Use of Prepared Opium 
Entered into force 28 July 1926 
(1925) International Opium Convention Entered into force 25th of September 
1928 
(1931) Convention for Limiting the 
Manufacture and Regulating the 
Distribution of Narcotic Drugs 
Entered into force 9th of July 1933 
(1936) Convention for the Suppression of 
the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs 
Entered into force 26th of October 1939 
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been in epistolary dialogue with Scott from the time he wrote his doctoral dissertation 
on “The Enforcement of International Law through Municipal Law in the United 
States,” completed in 1915.65 Wright served as an instructor of international law at 
Harvard University, before becoming amongst America’s foremost theorists of 
internationalism after joining the University of Minnesota.66 Quincy Wright would 
eventually serve as an adviser to the U.S. State Department in 1943–45 and to the 
International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg in 1945, before following in the 
footsteps of Root and Scott to become the President of the ASIL in 1955-56.  
A prolific writer, Wright would publish 515 articles during his lifetime on a 
plethora of issues of international law. 67  However, two questions that Wright 
repeatedly engaged with were the two issues that I seek to interweave over the course 
of this thesis, the emergence of the international laws that prohibit drugs and the 
production of an international ‘community of nations’ that could maintain a peace 
within a coherent universal order. Wright aggravated the re(generation) of a 
universalist jurisprudence that I have traced earlier in Scott’s writings and in the 
general orientation of early American international law. Emerging in the wake of 
Scott’s endeavours, Wright crafted his understanding of international law in explicit 
opposition to the claims of nineteenth-century jurisprudence that non-European 
peoples were outside the boundaries of international law.68 Quincy Wright advocated 
an international community that did not insist upon a juridical distinction between the 
European and non-European worlds, following in the wake of Vitoria and Scott, in 
expanding the scope of international law to include those previously dismissed as too 
savage to be bounded within the law.69 Overcoming intellectual rivals who sought to 
                                                
65 Hatsue Shinohara, US International Lawyers in the Interwar Years: A Forgotten Crusade 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) p.27. In a Letter: ‘Wright asked Scott about the 
possibility of publishing his dissertation through an arrangement with the Carnegie Endowment, but 
Scott suggested that publishing the entire work would be difficult, and instead offered to publish one 
chapter in the AJIL.’ 
66 Ibid., pp.27-28 
67 Ibid., p.27. 
68 Quincy Wright, ‘The Bombardment Of Damascus’, American Journal of International Law, 20 
(1926) pp.265-266. 
69 James Lorimer, The Institutes of the Law of Nations: A Treatise of the Juridical Relations of 
Separate Political Communities Vol.1 (Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons, 1883), pp.100-102. 
In the nineteenth century, noted English jurist, Lorimer established a triparted conception of both the 
earth and the humans that inhabited it. His first zone, the innermost core was the fully civilised Europe. 
The second sphere was the barbarous states, states that did not standard of civilisation set by the 
European states but could be recognised as enjoying a quasi-sovereignty. Lorimer’s final category was 
the ‘savage peoples’ who he dismissed as the ‘residue of mankind’ their dominance by the European 
states, simply natural.  
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maintain the strict demarcation between civilised and uncivilised peoples, he 
confirmed an expanded moral universalism as the essential quality of American 
internationalism.70 However, as with the above theorists, Wright’s inclusion of the 
colonised subject carried an asterisk. Echoing Article 22 of the League Covenant and 
its description of ‘peoples not yet able to stand by themselves,’ Wright moved away 
from talk of the barbaric or savage, recasting the civilised/colonised divide as one 
based on ‘immaturity.’71 Wright’s jurisprudence took note of Vitoria’s legacy, tying 
the sixteenth-century theologian into a tradition of moral humanitarianism, alongside 
Bartolome de las Casas, Thomas Clarkson and William Wilberforce.72 Like the 
individuals he names in the above linage, Wright was himself informed by an abiding 
Christianity, his political work serving as an ‘expression of his invigorating Unitarian 
faith’, Unitarianism being the belief in the singularity of God as a ontological 
complete whole, as opposed to the tripartite structure of the trinity.73 Wright’s 
interventions in international law remained informed by the moral humanitarian 
tradition, therefore making his consistent interest in international drug prohibition 
unsurprising.  
With drug prohibition established within international law, the theoretical 
grounding of these new drug laws invited cause for reflection by international legal 
scholars. Quincy Wright responded at length in his 1924 essay on ‘The Opium 
Question.’74 In this essay, Wright systematized drug prohibition by grounding it upon 
three specific tenets and, in doing so he articulated the tenets that would underwrite 
the War on Drugs as it intensified over the century. Wright’s first tenet is that there is 
a general acceptance that ‘the use of opium for purposes other than medicinal or 
scientific is an evil.’75 In an early invocation of the theodicy that would eventually 
play out on the very body of law that birthed the drug war and that I will unpack in 
my next chapter, Wright firmly fixed the idea drugs being theorized as an existential 
threat. Wright’s second tenet proclaims that ‘the non-medical use of opium and 
                                                
70 See Elbridge Colby, ‘How To Fight Savage Tribes’, The American Journal of International Law, 21, 
2 (Apr. 1927), pp. 279-288. Colby’s article was a response to Wright’s ‘The Bombardment Of 
Damascus’, rebuking Wright for ignoring the essential distinction between European and non-
Europeans. 
71 Ibid, p.265. 
72 Wright, Mandates Under the League of Nations, p.9. 
73 Karl Deutsch, ‘Quincy Wright: Author of A Study of War, 1890-1970’, 
<http://www.harvardsquarelibrary.org/biographies/quincy-wright/> [accessed 4 April 2016]. 
74 Wright, ‘The Opium Question’, pp.281-295. 
75 Ibid., p.293. 
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narcotic drugs can only be suppressed by curtailing their production.’ 76  The 
structuring of the violent enforcement of drug prohibition alongside the axis of 
production, as opposed to consumption, would, of course, have major racial and geo-
political consequences. Crucially, the asymmetry that this approach would facilitate 
between European and non-European worlds was not unrecognised by Wright, he 
acknowledges that drugs such as opium and coca require the  ‘peculiar climate’ of 
non-European countries, making clear the underlying connections between place, 
peoples and proximity to universalised norms of human subjectivity that anchor the 
understanding of these drugs as ‘transgressive substances.’77 As discussed in the first 
chapter of this thesis, the idea of particular climates producing not only groups of 
peoples predisposed to indolence, profligacy and appetite over reason but also certain 
plants/foods that if ingested can exacerbate and disseminate these characteristics, has 
a long history dating back to inter-connection between biology and colonialism 
imagined through the European conquest of the ‘new world.’ Wright’s argument for 
supply-side prohibition, targeting the force of law against the areas (and therefore 
peoples) seen as the source of drugs echoes this the early identification between 
racialised others and ‘transgressive substances’ that Taussig illuminates.78 Finally, 
Wright’s third general tenet for drug prohibition declared that ‘drug control cannot be 
effective unless it is international.’79 For him it was clear that ‘production must be 
restricted everywhere or it will be useless,’ making the only form through which drug 
prohibition could conceivably be realised a universal form. The multi-lateral, 
international legal treaty became the primary vehicle for drug prohibition as had been 
argued for by the American missionaries and moral reformers at the turn of the 
twentieth century. 
Wright’s argument supports a reading of drug prohibition in this era providing a 
path through which an Americanised vision of international order could be fully 
brought into being. As aforementioned, Wright sharply criticised the withdrawal of 
America from the 1925 Geneva Opium conference and the subsequent International 
Opium Convention.80 For Wright, drug prohibition should be prioritised as an area of 
law that exemplified the general trend of international law, stating that: 
                                                
76 Ibid., p.295. 
77 Ibid., p.294. 
78 Taussig, My Cocaine Museum, p.xiii 
79 Wright, ‘The Opium Question’, p.295. 
80 Wright, ‘The American Withdrawal from the Opium Conference’, pp.349-52. 
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Domestic questions are continually travelling to the domain of 
international. Recognition of the need of international co-operation to 
achieve national ends…[means that] questions formerly domestic is 
no longer so. It therefore […] no surprise that the country which five 
years ago was ready to declare the suppression of traffic in opium and 
dangerous drugs wholly domestic, should now take the lead in 
insisting that not only traffic in but also production of such drugs is 
subject to international regulation.81  
 
Wright’s critique of America’s uneven engagement with the drug treaties illustrates 
the developments and limitations that international drug prohibition faced in the 
interwar period. Aware of how a residual parochialism in American domestic politics 
risked puncturing a communal international law, Wright’s theorization of the inter-
war drug treaties offered a template for the resonance between moral humanitarianism 




In this chapter I unpacked the changes in the interwar period on the level of 
restrictions placed on the international trade of particular psychoactive substances. In 
explaining the sudden plethora of international drug prohibition treaties in the 
interwar period, I argue for the importance of placing the changes in law in the 
context of a wider shift in international law towards institutionalisation, moralism and 
universalism. Recalling international law’s foundational challenge of attempting to 
produce peace amongst an order of rivals absent a cohering sovereign authority, the 
crisis of the Great War encouraged a turn away from nineteenth-century positivist 
jurisprudence and presumptions of a balance of power. Moreover, the aftermath of the 
Great War saw international take its first steps away from the formal colonial division 
of the world with the construction of the ‘Mandate System’ promising a (re)turn to 
moral, humanitarianism. Finally, there was also an expansion of the interests of 
international law to encompass issues of the health and morality of individual peoples. 
The prevailing tendency in both popular discourse and mainstream scholarship is to 
read to the League of Nations as a failed attempt at institutionalizing an international 
legal framework. On the contrary, critical legal scholars have shown the institution as 
                                                
81 Ibid., p.354. 
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being considerable successful in turning the formal colonial world order of European 
imperialism towards the expansive, moral universalism of contemporary international 
law.82  
The early international drug laws that have been historicized in Part B of this 
thesis are not peripheral but central for understanding the changes in American 
internationalism and wider international law in this era. With the drive to prohibit 
drugs, the United States began to take a proactive role in international law. This 
persisted even as a non-member of the League, however, as was detailed above, the 
U.S.A’s ultimately uneven embrace of the institution would cripple both the 
international drug laws and the restructured international legal order more widely. 
Moreover, within a turn towards humanitarianism, international law continued 
masking the persistence of discursive colonial distinctions under a renewed 
imagination of single international community with shared standard of morality. As 
jurists sought to expand the depth and scope of international law in response to the 
overspill of violence from the Great War, the workings of empire were reoriented, but 
not erased. This chapter traced how the trend towards the structure of what I have 
termed as a ‘sacrificial’ international law intensified over the interwar period. To read 
the League as another marker in the trend across the twentieth century to a 
‘sacrificial’ international law is to follow Susan Pedersen and place the League’s 
reworking of empire at the heart of the project as a whole.83 Within this wider shift, 
the narrative of drugs produced in the U.S.A at the turn of the century, as a contagion 
that threatened the thoroughly racialised conception of the universal 'human' subject, 
was internationalised through a series of treaties and conferences. As we can see 
through Quincy Wright’s three tenets of drug prohibition, the international laws on 
drugs can be read as being structured so as to already suggest the violence that would 
be legitimised upon the racial subaltern subject in service of prohibition. However, 
with the spectre of rivalry never fully abating within this era of the ‘Second Thirty 
Years War’, the full extent of the violent impact of drug prohibition would not be 
appreciated a until new set of laws, drafted in a post-Second World War international 
legal order, would give rise to what is now known as the War on Drugs.  
 
                                                
82 See Fleur Johns, Thomas Skouteris & Wouter Werner (eds.), ‘The League of Nations and the 
Construction of the Periphery’, Leiden Journal of International Law 24, 4, pp.797-798. 






Evil and Humanitarianism:  
Exploring the ‘Theodicy of European Modernity’ 




Part B read the emergence of international drug prohibition alongside 
the revision of international legal order that occurred during the first half of the 
twentieth century. I conducted a historical review of the rise of the U.S.A. as a 
major power and highlighted the importance of American jurists theorising a 
liberal tradition of international law through a recovery of a Vitorian legacy. 
Moreover, I unpacked the historical and theoretical connections between 
pioneering American international lawyers such as James Brown Scott and 
Elihu Root and the early generation of drug warriors, such as Hamilton Wright 
and Bishop Brent who came to prominence during Root and Scott’s period in 
control of the U.S. State Department. The final chapter of the previous section 
detailed how the international laws governing drugs expanded at an exponential 
rate in the League of Nations and placed that development in the context of the 
changing scope and focus of international law in this era. However, I also 
highlighted the limitations and failure of the early drug control treaties to exert 
any significant control over the drugs trade. The inter-war period made a 
fledging attempt at synthesising a single moral standard with a changing axis of 
empire in which infantile/backwards people could be offered protection from 
themselves in the name of humanity itself, as illustrated by the 
institutionalisation of the idea of colonialism as ‘trusteeship’ through the 
mandate system. However, this vision of a universal moral humanism was 
drowned under a tidal wave of conflict, requiring a renewed investment in the 
communality of international law before universal drug prohibition could be 
realised. 
In this chapter, I will continue to unpack the interconnection between 
international legal order and international drug prohibition. I will trace the 
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(re)generation of a renewed international legal order following the violence of 
the Second World War – with the U.S.A crystallising its status as the 
hegemonic actor – alongside the establishment of the legislative basis for what 
would eventually be termed the War on Drugs, visiting violence upon so many 
in the latter-half of the twentieth century. 
The chapter will begin with a reflection upon the tensions that underlay 
the reconstruction of the international legal order following the Second World 
War, particularly the establishment of a new institutional centre in the United 
Nations. I will be tracing the extent to which the United Nations maintained the 
ambitions of the preceding League of Nations, while at the same time seeking 
to overcome the failures of the League through the facilitation of a more 
thoroughly realised synthesis of universalism and hierarchy. I will also review 
the specific laws that produced the legislative framework that continues to 
govern contemporary international drug prohibition. The legal treaties that 
confirmed international drug prohibition as a norm of international law, 
particularly the United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, 
will be read alongside other founding documents of the post-war international 
order such as the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and 
the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, in order to illustrate how drug prohibition was not peripheral but 
rather played a key role in cohering the post-war international legal order. 
Also, in this chapter, I will unpack the significance of the U.S.A. 
continuing to exert a disproportionate influence upon international drug 
prohibition. In the efforts to fully establish universal drug prohibition as a given 
norm of international law over the second-half of the twentieth century, drug 
treaties are produced in a context of formal colonisation giving way to a post-
colonial, liberal international law. The geo-political structure of the post-war 
drug treaties facilitated the later inequality of the spread of violence that would 
emerge in the endeavour of enforcing a ‘drug-free world’. Drug prohibition 
provides a lens through which to trace the turn towards what can be termed as 
the militarization of peace. Recalling the juridico-theological, Vitorian roots of 
modern liberal international law, the problem of theodicy- of accounting for the 
presence of evil within an order acclaimed as ontologically complete in itself- 
will be argued to have been transferred from medieval scholasticism to the 
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economic and political questions of the contemporary international law. Critical 
legal scholarship has produced some telling contributions towards unpacking 
the underlying imperialism or secularised theology of the United Nations and 
its correlative legal projects such as development and human rights. 1 However, 
in centring the international of laws on drugs, I will further this theoretical line 
through making explicit not only one more instance of how the theological was 
smuggled into the secular, but also, unpacking how the explicit theological 
roots and language of drug prohibition, combined with its asymmetrical 
distribution of the violence across the globe illustrate the theodicy of post-war 
international law endeavoured to outlaw violence by employing its purifying 
force on an imagined negation deemed legitimate. However, before applying 
my focus to the role of drug prohibition within post-war international law, it is 
again necessary to analyse the context of international law in which these laws 
emerged. 
 
7.2 The Second Attempt at Institutionalising a Communal International 
Legal Order 
 
The crisis of the Second World War exceeded even the Great War. 
Mimetic violence erupted within the borders of Europe again, with inter-war 
international law proving insufficient at containing conflict. Moreover, the 
violence released within Europe bore the mark of the processes of racialization 
that had been cultivated through European imperialism, this process reaching 
its apogee with genocide now being perpetrated within the inter-European 
community. The unique nature of the horrors of the Jewish Holocaust is fully 
recognised, however, scholars – in their efforts to better understand the 
holocaust – take care to show that it did not emerge free of historical 
precedents.2  
                                                
1 See Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge United Press, 2005); Sundhya Pahuja, Decolonising International Law: Development, 
Economic Growth and the Politics of Universality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); 
Samuel Moyn, Christian Human Rights (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016); or 
Jennifer Beard, The Political Economy of Desire: International Law, Development and the Nation 
State (Oxford: Routledge-Cavendish, 2006).  
2 For scholarship that links colonialism and genocide in a systematic way, see Colonialism and 
Genocide ed. by Dirk Moses and Dan Stone (London: Routledge, 2007); or Enzo Traverso, The Origins 
of Nazi Violence (New York: The New Press, 2003). 
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When examining the causes of European Fascism, intellectuals as 
diverse as Hannah Arendt and Aimé Césaire have diagnosed its origins in the 
excesses of nineteenth and early twentieth century European colonialism.3 This 
argument has been given renewed strength by contemporary historians such as 
Enzo Traverso and Domenico Losurdo. 4  The racial theory underpinning 
European colonialism- predicated on a belief that physical characteristics 
signified an absolute difference in nature between humans- was applied to 
Europeans in the mid-twentieth century as the political project of Fascism, at 
least as it manifested in Germany, sought to concretise the racial hierarchies in 
a fixed political structure. Fanon, following Césaire, perhaps best described the 
linage behind Fascism when he stated that ‘Nazism transformed the whole of 
Europe into a veritable colony.’5 Nazism can be understood as essentially a 
colonial project now imported into the European body politic: a model of 
settler-colonialism in which self-determined racially superior peoples sought to 
expropriate living space (lebensraum) and resources from those deemed 
inferior. However, as a colonial project, Nazism did not confine these processes 
of plunder and dispossession to those outside Europe but applied them to 
Europeans themselves, thereby producing finer dynamics of difference, 
distinctions internal to the nation (such as the enemy within, the partisan, the 
unreconstructed immigrant). The racialised process of what is termed later in 
this chapter as ‘the theodicy of modernity’, the process of turning a peoples into 
‘a problem’ provides the ontological structure for genocide, with the ‘problem’ 
always carrying the potential resolution of a ‘final solution.’ The Second World 
War had meant that international law had not only failed to restrain the eruption 
of violence within Europe but had also failed to provide any semblance of 
protection to vulnerable Europeans targeted for extermination. However, the 
response to this crisis was not the abandonment of international law but rather a 
recommitment to producing a communal international law. The need for 
international law to check the possible excesses of national law had been only 
reaffirmed by horrors that had been performed through valid national laws 
                                                
3 See Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (Fort Washington: Harcourt, 1973); and Aimé 
Césaire, Discourse on Colonialism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1950). 
4 See Traverso, The Origins of Nazi Violence, and Domenico Losurdo, War and Revolution: Rethinking 
the Twentieth Century (London: Verso, 2015). 
5 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (London: Penguin, 2001), p.100. 
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within European fascist states.6 Consequently, the crisis of war provoked a full-
scale commitment to the theoretical and institutional regeneration of 
international law. 
However, a result of the limitations of inter-war international law meant 
that the post-war international law was always going to be imagined in 
contradistinction to the League of Nations. As an institution, the League had 
become politically toxic post-war, thereby mandating that any successive 
international organisations effect a clean break from it, at least publicly, in 
order to establish legitimacy.7 The successor to the League would ultimately 
emerge in the form of the United Nations, a new anchoring institution for 
international law that promised to succeed where the League had failed. 
Looking to close the book on the period of mimetic conflict in the international 
community, the Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations boldly promises 
to ‘save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.’8 The post-war legal 
order was structured to aim for the ‘outlawing’ of war; in addition to the 
Charter’s commitment to end the ‘scourge of war’ the Nuremberg tribunal 
cemented into international law the idea of war as a crime and dismissed 
sovereign prerogative as any defence for wars of aggression.  
However, the United Nations was not as much of a break from the 
League as popularly conceived; the raison d’etre for the new organisation was 
inherited from its predecessor: it too sought to provide an administrative centre 
for the function of international law, only this time imbued with an even more 
ambitious utopianism. In its tripartite governing structure of legislature, 
executive and Security Council the UN was, in many ways, a continuation of 
the earlier institution. Rather than discarding the underlying aims and 
institutional structures of the League, the UN ‘was the product of evolution not 
revolution’ and it would be largely determined by the success and the 
limitations of the League.9 In analysing the context in which drug prohibition 
would finally be established as a universal norm, it is important to recognise the 
                                                
6 Pahuja, Decolonising International Law, p.33. 
7 Mark Mazower, No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United 
Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2009), p.14. 
8 ‘Preamble’, The Charter of the United Nations (San Francisco: 1945) 
<http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/preamble/index.html> [accessed 3 August 2017]. 
9 Mazower, No Enchanted Palace, p.17. 
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extent to which post-war international law continued the trend towards liberal 
jurisprudence within international law that had been emerging since the turn of 
the century.  
 Also, it should be stressed that before the United Nations became a 
peacetime organisation, it was a wartime alliance.10 The planning of the United 
Nations and the new international legal order began in the midst of the war, 
with the outlines of the UN system becoming visible in the conclusions of the 
meetings of the great allied powers in Moscow (1941), Dumbarton Oaks (1944) 
and Yalta (1945).11 These meetings furthered the need for the U.S.A, the 
U.S.S.R. and the British Empire to maintain their wartime alliance. The failure 
of great powers to transcend their rivalries in the 1930’s had contributed to the 
international community’s inability to contain the rise of fascism.12 As a result, 
the proposals that emerged for a post-war international order were underwritten 
by the concern to achieve a universalism that had largely escaped the League. 
Alternative structures for international organisation (such as a formal Anglo-
American alliance or a system of powerful regional councils with a small 
coordinating centre run by the main allied structures) were floated but 
ultimately discarded. The proposal produced at these preliminary meetings – 
particularly at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference– would form the basis of the 
discussions that would take place at the United Nations’ formative conference 
in San Francisco in 1944, and these proposals sketched out, what has been 
termed, essentially ‘a warmed-up League.’13  
 
7.2.1 The Synthesising of Hierarchy and Egalitarianism 
 
The proposals for the UN offered a shift in the structure of international 
community but never fully decoupled from the hierarchy produced through 
imperialism. Whilst ostensibly motivated by an impetus to imagine a new 
egalitarian institution of peace, there was a darker side to the inclusivity being 
                                                
10 Ibid., p.273. 
11 Gerry Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal 
Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p.169. 
12 The Nazis had exploited the growing rivalry between the Capitalist and Communist states, signing 
different treaties with each side, whilst at all times preparing for war. 
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championed by the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. 14  Whilst the UN would 
eventually offer a vision of all nations as equally self-governing, in practice 
only a few nations would retain within their sovereignty a licence to enact 
violence in the international arena. 
As detailed in the previous chapter, the League was hampered by the 
driving force in its creation, the U.S.A, abandoning it, before being 
subsequently further undermined by the withdrawal of other countries, 
including the U.S.S.R., Germany, Japan, Italy and Spain. In order to not repeat 
the failings of the League, the new post-war international legal order was 
designed to ensure the major world powers would be fully embedded from the 
outset. However, the imperative to ensure the participation of major powers 
highlights a tension with the principle of sovereign equality acclaimed by the 
reformulation of the international community. Mazower illuminates the way 
that the discussions that preceded the UN were read by globally, stating: 
 
The proposals that emerged from the Dumbarton Oaks 
discussions left the rest of the world distinctly underwhelmed. 
Bearing in its fundamentals a remarkable resemblance to the 
prewar League, the proposed new peacetime organization 
differed [from the League] in one important respect only – in 
the extensive new power it gave to the permanent members of 
the Security Council.15 
 
 
Ultimately, the Dumbarton Oaks proposals would crystallise in a conference 
held in San Francisco in 1945, which resulted in the establishment the United 
Nations. The popular memory of the founding of the UN is now one linked to 
universal commitment to a new order of peace, an order based on the idea of 
equality of nations.  
The founding of the UN is further historicized as the apotheosis of the 
U.S.A’s engagement with the international legal order, which had been 
increasing over the course of the twentieth century. However, as detailed in my 
previous chapter, the condition of America’s increasing embrace of 
international law was predicated upon and implemented through the 
internationalisation of American liberalism. As aforementioned, a tradition of 
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jurisprudence had emerged, particularly through the first generation of 
international lawyers that orbited the American Society of International Law, 
which understood American liberalism as devoid of violence, particularly 
racialised violence, and therefore presented as being in opposition to ideology, 
empire and domination. America’s leadership was to bring into being a new 
model of international community, and this was to be reflected in the United 
Nations as its institutional centre. To a certain extent, the founding of the UN 
did reflect a shift in the mode of international legal ordering. Gerry Simpson 
describes how in San Francisco ‘there was an egalitarianism or democracy that 
had been missing at, say, Versailles or Vienna.’16 However, the shared vision of 
the wartime alliance pre-determined the boundaries of this egalitarianism. With 
regard to the general orientation of post-war international law, underneath the 
rhetoric of universality and equality persisted a presupposition that 
‘international organisation was to be worked out in advance by the elite states’ 
thereby ensuring the persistence of material and juridical inequality.17  In no 
area of the UN was this imbalance of power made more explicit than in the 
permanent status and exceptional powers that the allied victors of the Second 
World War were granted on the UN Security Council. Seeking to address a 
major failing of the post-Great War international legal order which had been 
hamstrung by an absence of enforcement power, the Security Council was 
established as one of the six principal organs of the United Nations, imbued 
with the power not only to recognise new members of the UN, but also to 
authorise military intervention by the institution.18 The UN was granted the 
military provisions required to enforce the determinations of international law, 
with the Security Council enjoying exclusive jurisdiction over this violence 
wielding/peacekeeping element of the new international legal order. However, 
the Security Council was also designed so as to be the most hierarchical of the 
UN’s organs, with permanent seats being granted to the wartime alliance of the 
U.S.A., France, the U.S.S.R, Great Britain and China The structure of the 
Security Council theoretically allowed the Great Powers, in their new role as 
permanent members of the Security Council, to determine the administering of 
                                                
16 Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States, p.179. 
17 Ibid., p.172. 
18 See ‘What is the security Council?’ Available at https://www.un.org/en/sc/about/ [accessed 9 April 
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violence within the post-war universal legal order. Moreover, the Security 
Council structure was designed to ensure a permanence of this hierarchy within 
the UN, as it became a requirement for the five states with permanent seats on 
the Security Council (often referred to as the P5) to all agree on any 
fundamental reforms of the UN system before those reforms become effective, 
thereby making attempts to recalibrate the distribution of power within the UN 
reliant on the generosity of those who currently hold power.19 
Therefore, while sovereign equality was formally crystallised within the 
UN the persistence of inequality in the structure of the institution ensured that 
some states would remain more equal than others. No recognition of this 
structural inequality is present within the text of the UN’s founding documents, 
as Gerry Simpson argues, ‘the Great Powers did not wish to have this 
justification articulated in the UN Charter itself’ which professed only equality 
amongst nations.20 Furthermore, these dynamics underwriting the UN were not 
unique but can be tied to a tradition of American liberalism that was 
internationalised through the work of lawyers like Elihu Root and James Brown 
Scott, as Simpson makes clear. 
 
The problem for the drafters of the UN Charter was exactly that 
which faced […] the likes of James Brown Scott during The Hague 
Conference of 1907. How could the principle of sovereign equality 
[…] be reconciled with the realist imperatives of Great Power 
hegemony?21 
 
Following in the wake of reading drug prohibition within the context of American 
liberal international law, the drug prohibition conventions that emerged through 
the United Nations can be understood as the culmination of a trend towards a 
moral universalism in international law across the twentieth century. Dispensing 
with the strict demarcation of humanity into the categories of civilised/colonised 
that had been established in international law through European imperialism, a 
shift towards a universal model of international community sought to contain all of 
humanity, even the deviant elements, within a single totality. The strict colonial 
division of humanity was impossible to sustain, with the horrors of two World 
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Wars undermining the presumptions of civilisation that the European world had 
bestowed upon itself. Yoriko Otomo’s argument of post-war international law 
functioning as a technology to manage the risk of war that lay underneath the 
promise of globalised trade across a post-colonial international community is a 
convincing one.22 A key element of the management of risk can be seen in the 
outlawing of violence present in the UN’s promise to end the ‘scourge of war’ but 
also through how in practice, the ability to wield legal violence was entrusted into 
the exclusive hands of a few great powers. To understand the structural inequality 
within the international law’s promise of equality helps to clarify the uneven 
nature of how violence would continue to be visited upon particular peoples, even 
within the egalitarianism of the post-war UN system. 
 
7.2.2 The United Nations and the Legacy of Empire 
 
The persistence of empire within the UN’s promise of universality is 
particularly well illustrated by Mark Mazower’s scholarship on the history of the 
institution.23 Highlighting the relation between the old colonial world order and 
the UN, Mazower details how career-long imperialists such as Winston Churchill 
and Jan Smuts took an active role in the design of the post-war legal order because 
they ‘saw the proposed new international security architecture centred on the UN 
as a way to cement white rule, not give it up.’24 Though the UN Charter speaks of 
a desire ‘to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and 
social advancement of all peoples’, for Mazower such a proclamation is 
compromised when we ‘remember that it was Jan Smuts, the South African 
premier and architect of white settler nationalism, who did more than anyone to 
argue for, and help draft, the UN's stirring preamble.’25 Despite the United States 
now assuming the reigns of global leadership, the requirement to maintain a unity 
amongst the Great Powers ensured that any explicit anti-colonialism within 
American visions of world order was, at least partially, muted when transferred to 
the international arena. As a result, the issue of ‘the colonial problem’ was 
                                                
22 Yoriko Otomo, Unconditional Life: The Postwar International Law Settlement (Oxford: Oxford 
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23 See Mazower, Governing the World and Mazower, No Enchanted Palace, 
24 Mazower, Governing the World, p.342. 
25 Mazower, No Enchanted Palace, p.9. 
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decentred in the conversations that professed to be creating a truly universal legal 
order. The Dumbarton Oaks proposals did not address the issue of colonialism, 
and in the lead-up to the San Francisco Conference, British pressure forced the 
U.S.A. to surrender its initial proposals to have the UN enjoy supervisory powers 
over to all colonial territories.26 The UN's subsequent emergence as a vehicle for 
decolonization has tended to obscure the extent to which, much like the League, it 
was an institution indebted to empire and envisioned by the colonial powers as a 
mechanism that would entrench their privileges not, dismantle them.27 
For the peoples still under colonial rule, the promise of the United Nations 
was recognised to be qualified, at best. Seeing the contradictions in the new 
institution, ‘they feared that the UN represented a step backward, and that the 
Great Powers were seeking, under the guise of internationalism, to create a new 
world directorate, far more frightening than the old Holy Alliance because of the 
awesome technology at its disposal’ which gave them the exclusive control over 
legitimised international violence.28 At the founding conference in San Francisco, 
the interests of colonial territories were minimised, despite the rhetoric of 
inclusivity. Mazower explains:  
 
Many left the founding conference at San Francisco in 1945 believing 
that the world body they were being asked to sign up to was shot 
through with hypocrisy. They saw its universalizing rhetoric of 
freedom and rights as all too partial a veil masking the consolidation of 
a great power directorate that was not as different from the Axis 
powers, in its imperious attitude to how the world's weak and poor 
should be governed, as it should have been.29  
 
The masking of a persisting colonial antagonism can be read even within the Charter 
of the UN, which largely abdicated the task of anti-colonialism. In the Charter, the 
problem of persisting colonial oppression was masked through recasting colonies as 
‘non-self-governing territories’.30 Moreover, the European empires escaped any direct 
admonition, as the Charter did not require that they make any moves towards 
decolonization, or subject their colonial territories to UN supervision, only that they 
                                                
26 Mazower, Governing the World, p.344. 
27 Mazower, No Enchanted Palace, p.17. 
28 Mazower, Governing the World, p.289. The Holy Alliance was a loose organization of European 
sovereigns, who formed an alliance with the Second Peace of Paris after defeating of Napoleon. 
29 Mazower, No Enchanted Palace, p.8. 
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‘recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are 
paramount and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote. . . the well-being of 
the inhabitants of these territories’.31 As a result, the United Nations, at least initially, 
suppressed any drive to decolonise the colonial world, ultimately bringing into being 
a legal order that recalibrated but also resurrected the hierarchical structure of the 
previous epoch.32  
 
7.2.3 The UN and the Vitorian Legacy 
 
The re-reading of the United Nations’ origin offered above reconciles the 
organisational centre of the contemporary international legal order with jurisprudence 
produced by Francisco de Vitoria in the sixteenth century. Earlier chapters of this 
thesis focused on Vitoria’s theorisation of a communal international law and 
illustrated the extent to which his inclusive/exclusion of the colonial subject operated 
as sacrificial. The Vitorian recovery provides an intellectual tradition in which the UN 
can be rooted. Pekka Niemela emphasises the ways in which the establishment of the 
UN carries forward the Vitoriain legacy by showing how the UN Charter paralleled 
Vitoria’s jurisprudence, echoing the Salamancan theologian in the following ways: 
 
That Vitoria's vision and the Charter acknowledge the equal 
standing of all nations, at least formally; that Vitoria's international 
law and the "Charter-led" international law impose normative 
demands on state behavior, efficiently delimiting state behavior 
horizontally and vertically, and as a corollary, that law and politics 
are distinct phenomenon; and, finally, that there is an agency that 
embodies these benevolent ideas and in which crucial decisions 
affecting their realization are made. For Vitoria the agency is the 
European-universal culture in general, whereas the 
constitutionalist's agency is the United Nations whose operation 
embodies the pursuit of European-universal ideals.33 
 
Both the universalizing ambition of the UN and its arrogation of universalism 
masking a particular image of Euro-modernity operating within a totalising claim can 
connected back Vitoria’s original schema for international law. The Salamancan 
friar’s influence upon the UN was memorialised in physical form with a bust being 
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displayed in the halls of the UN in New York City, the bust inscribed with the title 
‘fundador del derecho de gentes’- founder of international law. 
 
Fig 4. Bust of Francisco De Vitoria at United Nations Headquarters in New 
York. Reproduced from UN Multimeda.org, available at 
http://www.unmultimedia.org/photo/detail.jsp?id=118/118523&key=75&quer
y=%22Mark%20Garten%22%20AND%20category:%22UN%20Headquarters
%22&sf [Accessed 09 September 2016]  
 
Critical scholars have read the creation of the United Nations in 1945 as the 
institutional realisation of Vitoria's doctrine.34 Rather than being only relevant to the 
context of the sixteenth century, ‘Vitoria's work resembles, in many ways, the vision 
and ethos of today's international lawyers.’35 Moreover, Vitoria’s tradition would not 
only be carried forward in the halls of the UN by lawyers and diplomats, theologians 
from Vitoria’s order would gain consultative status in the UN in 1998 under the title 
of "Dominicans for Justice and Peace" and understood their rationale for engagement 
with the juridical to be the continuation of Vitoria’s foundational theorisation of 
human rights.36 The Fray Francisco de Vitoria Justice Fund was created by the 
Dominican Order in 2004 to sustain the Vitorian legacy within the UN, a gesture that 
arguably cements the line of continuum from the Salamancan juridico-theology of the 
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sixteenth century to the halls of the modern United Nations and geopolitics.37  
 The extent to which a theological inheritance would come to bear on the 
United Nations project has been illuminated by critical legal scholarship with regard 
to UN laws on international development, international criminal law and international 
human rights.38 Sundhya Pahuja attests that the post-war legal order’s investment in 
the concept of development for former colonies ‘operates as just such a faith, most 
particularly as a belief in the way to bring salvation to mankind’39 Similarly, Samuel 
Moyn locates the emergence of the UN human rights framework within a 
recalibration by Christianity of the arena of religious action, highlighting how both 
the Protestant and Catholic churches turned to universal human rights in the 1940’s in 
response to their own failure to halt the slide of religious conservatism into European 
Fascism in the preceding decades.40 Moyn’s reading of post-war human rights recasts 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as hailing from the Christian tradition of 
trying to constitute and sustain social order in the face of crisis, as opposed to the 
more orthodox reading of UN human rights as the apotheosis of the secularised 
promise of the rights of man rooted in late eighteenth-century’s era of revolution.41  
To unpack the theological underpinning of the UN’s attempt to facilitate a 
universal community points us towards the debt that the promise of ending the 
‘scourge of war’ owed to a vision of law outlawing violence unless enacted in a name 
of a universal humanity, a task could only be undertaken by a chosen, exclusive group 
of states. With the international order being envisioned as a totalised whole, war 
becomes a sacred mechanism for defending that whole and we begin the shift from 
war as model “politics” to war as (international) “policing” and only the ‘civilised’ 
nations who claimed for themselves the office of being able to oversee the globe 
could be entrusted with the powers of policing. It within this context that drug 
prohibition would re-emerge as a universal norm of international law. The UN would 
become the institutional site for the ultimate success in the mid-to-late twentieth 
                                                
37 The Delegation of the Order of Preachers to the United Nations, ‘De Vitoria Fund’, 
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38 For a reading on the theology of international law and development, see Pahuja, Decolonising 
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century of the idea of international drug prohibition, an idea that at the start of that 
century had been confined to fringe moral reformers. Drug prohibition offers an 
exemplary site through which to examine international law’s theological inheritance, 
with the religious roots from which drug laws emerged being so explicit. Whilst the 
missionaries who first brought drug prohibition into the arena of international law 
would wield decreasing influence in legislative debates within the UN, the jurists, 
diplomats and scientists who would carry their project forward would also preserve, 
in both their language and their world-view, the theological imaginary that modernity 
had claimed itself as constituted against.42 Drug prohibition in the UN setup the 
legislative framework for what would become the War on Drugs and this was an early 
instantiation of how war after the end of war would be explicitly presented as being in 
the interests of mankind as a whole. The rest of this chapter will review the history of 
drug laws within the early years of the post-war international legal order, before 
unpacking the presence of this theological inheritance within the body of these laws, 
opening the door for the violence of the War on Drugs to operate as sacrificial.   
 
7.3 Drug Prohibition during the Crisis of War  
 
 
With the United Nations providing an institutional home, the issue of drug 
prohibition once again emerged as a concern for this international community. The 
crisis of the war had disrupted the legislative framework of drug prohibition that had 
been constructed over the course of the first half of the twentieth century. However, 
war also helped rectify what had been a growing division in international drug 
prohibition between the U.S.A., as the nation that had driven prohibition since the 
1909 Shanghai Opium Commission meeting, and the League of Nations, the 
institution that, despite America’s abandonment, had become the forum that housed 
the laws on drugs. War brought these two constitutive parts back together again; the 
League had been headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland, but with Europe imploding 
                                                
42 It should be recognized that although drug prohibition became more bureaucratic and less explicitly 
missionary, Christian groups such as the International Conference of Catholic Charities, the 
International Federation of Women Lawyers, the World Alliance of Young Men's Christian 
Associations, and the World Women's Christian Temperance Union continued to attend the CND’s 
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Conference for the Adoption of a Single Convention. See S. K. Chatterjee, Legal Aspects of 
International Drug Control (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981), p.57; or the UN Bulletin on the 
Tenth Session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-
analysis/bulletin/bulletin_1955-01-01_2_page005.html> [accessed 4 June 2015]. 
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into violence, the League’s drug control apparatus moved to Washington, allowing 
the system as a whole to come under increased American influence once again.43 
Counter-intuitively, the war resulted in unifying international drug control and 
solidifying America’s hegemonic role within this transnational system.44 The U.S.A. 
ensured that the existent drug control treaties did not cease to function during the war, 
employing its considerable national resources to maintain the global monitoring of 
legitimate and illegitimate international narcotics trade. 45  Moreover, it is worth 
restating the dual mandate of drug prohibition is to demarcate which legal, medicinal 
and palliative drugs are legitimate, as well determine illegal ‘transgressive substances’ 
as illegitimate. War only intensified the need for countries to ensure a consistent 
supply of the first category of drugs, those deemed by law to offer medical benefits. 
Prior to the war, the market for legitimate pharmaceutical products was dominated by 
the European imperial powers, who cultivated the drugs in raw materials form in their 
colonies, before manufacturing and then selling the drugs to a global medical and 
scientific community. The Second World War disturbed this chain of production, with 
trade routes between empires and colonies being cut off by the conflict. For example, 
‘the Japanese occupation of Java, combined with British and American naval 
blockades of the Atlantic, cut off the European market from supplies of coca leaves 
and crude cocaine’ thereby crippling production and supply. 46  However, with 
America’s trade routes to sources of drugs in their raw material form – particularly in 
Latin America – being relatively uninterrupted, the U.S.A. was able to establish 
control of the global pharmaceutical market as a consequence of the war.47 The 
U.S.A. would use the chaos of the international conflict to consolidate control over 
the coca markets of Bolivia and Peru – which now lacked alternative customers for 
their raw materials – thereby emerging as the major provider able to satisfy the 
increasing demand for manufactured pharmaceuticals in the Western Hemisphere.48 
When the war ended, the U.S.A was firmly in control of both the legal drugs market 
and the apparatus erected to police the illegal drug market. The U.S.A. also took the 
                                                
43 John Collins, ‘Regulations and Prohibitions: Anglo-American Relations and International Drug 
Control, 1939-1964’. (doctoral dissertation, the London School of Economics, January 2015), p.74. 
44 For further reading on how the war resulted in increased American influence over drug prohibition, 
see Suzanna Reiss, We Sell Drugs: The Alchemy of US Empire (Oakland: University of California 
Press, 2014), Chapter 1. 
45 Reiss, We Sell Drugs, p.20. 
46Ibid., p.25. 
47 Ibid., p.15. 
48 Ibid., Chapter 1. 
	  195	  
opportunity to implement their own drug control laws in the occupied territories 
acquired from the defeated Axis powers at the end of the conflict, ensuring that the 
American model of supply control would remain the default model of drug 
prohibition.49  
 
7.3.1 Harry Anslinger and The Battle for Post-War Drug Control 
 
The most influential prohibitionist of the mid-twentieth century was the first 
commissioner of the U.S. Treasury Department's Federal Bureau of Narcotics, Harry 
J. Anslinger. Scholarly consensus maintains that ‘few public officials have waged as 
relentless a War on Drugs as Harry Anslinger’.50 Anslinger enjoyed an extensive 
reign as America’s leading drug warrior, his period as the head of the Federal Bureau 
of Narcotics stretched over thirty-two years, from 1930-1962, making him ‘the only 
man ever to run a U.S. security agency longer than J. Edgar Hoover.’51 Anslinger 
elevated drug prohibition into a central tenet of American domestic and foreign policy 
and in doing so, he managed to secure both his own position and that of his fledging 
agency.52 Anslinger’s campaign for drug prohibition borrowed heavily from the 
tactics that were employed at the birth of American drug prohibition in the early 
twentieth century. He advanced drug laws by equating them with existential threats 
that promised to infest and corrupt the American body politic, interweaving with an 
insistence on associating the drugs trade with ethnic and ideological threats. 
Anslinger’s beliefs would manifests in public proclamations that insisted that ‘various 
"third world" communist nations functioned as the foreign source of illicit drugs’, 
with distribution in America being facilitated by immigrants and racial others, whose 
loyalty to the American state was always already in question.53 Douglas Kinder 
encapsulates Anslinger’s approach to prohibition when he states that, ‘ultimately, 
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Harry Anslinger updated the early twentieth century drug restrictionists' pattern of 
linking ethnic and foreign elements with drug trafficking’. 54 It should also be noted 
that this vision of drugs as linked with ethnic and foreign sources was only one 
element of Anslinger’s personal racist opinions, which also informed his disgust with 
music and culture that he associated with racial subalterns.55 However, drugs were the 
central issue Anslinger saw at the heart of these other cultural fears.  
Anslinger further mirrored the path of earlier prohibitionists like Hamilton 
Wright by endeavouring to internationalise his vision of prohibition, painting a 
picture of a drugs trade that characterised it as an existential threat to the international 
community. Rising American hegemony infused Anslinger and his network of drug 
diplomats with the power to realise this vision. During the crisis of the war, 
Anslinger, supplemented by the efforts of old League-era prohibitionists such as 
Hamilton Wright’s widow Elizabeth Wright, began to construct a post-war legislative 
basis for universal prohibition by merging prohibitionist drug policy ideology with 
desired wartime outcomes.56 The chaos of war had upturned the given order of the 
international, and the U.S.A. sought to re-cohere this order around a universalization 
of American economic and social norms 
However, initially the efforts of Anslinger and his acolytes, referred to by 
scholars of drug prohibition such as John Collins as ‘the inner circle’, were 
frustrated, as drug prohibition received minimal attention during the San Francisco 
conference that would found the major institution of the post-war international 
legal order, the Unite Nations.57 At the San Francisco conference founding the UN 
there was a concern with the new institution avoiding the mistakes of the League 
by ensuring that all the major countries were included as member states. 
Therefore, the State Department minimised the issue of drug prohibition as it was 
a contentious and potentially divisive point amongst America’s allies, particularly 
the European imperial powers. As a result, the UN Charter, unlike the League’s 
founding Charter, would contain no provision for addressing prohibition. The San 
Francisco conference placed Anslinger and his ‘inner circle’ of American 
prohibitionists on the back foot. With the UN Preparatory Commission 
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negotiations scheduled to take place in London, where the proposal of the Charter 
was turned into a functional organisation, Anslinger drew on his connections with 
the Hurst newspapers to begin to orchestrate a press campaign to pressure the 
State Department to reprioritise drug prohibition. 58  The Women’s Christian 
Temperance Union again aided the cause of prohibition by publically campaigning 
that the UN Charter left ‘the world open to traffic’ and that opium control was ‘left 
out of the Charter in deference to the profit motive of certain nations’, referring to 
America’s European allies.59 
In London, Anslinger’s acolyte Helen Moorhead was able to ensure, through 
the support of Chinese ally of the ‘inner circle’ Victor Hoo, that a Commission on 
Narcotic Drugs (CND) was to be established at the first session of the UN’s 
Economic and Social Council.60 The CND would become one of the UN’s principle 
instruments for managing drug prohibition, emerging as the primary forum in which 
international drug policy would be formulated. The establishment of the CND, 
alongside an independent Division on Narcotic Drugs (DND) within the Department 
of Social Affairs of the Secretariat of the UN established by the UN Secretary General 
as well as the transfer of the Drug Supervisory Body (DSB) and the Permanent 
Control Opium board (PCOB) from the League into the UN, put in place the 
architecture for governing drug prohibition in the post-war international law. Collins 
emphasises the line of continuum that exists between the technical instruments 
through which the League had sought to enforce its drug treaties and those that would 
be adopted by the UN, crediting Anslinger and the ‘inner circle’ for having ‘salvaged 
the system’s key apparatus during the war, overseen its transfer to the new UNO and 
ensured it was highlighted as a priority for post-war international cooperation’.61 
Moreover, the endeavours of the drug warriors ensured that within the post-war 
international legal order, the control of drugs would continue to be approached as an 
issue of law and morality, requiring enforcement and punishment, rather than based 
upon alternative perspectives which prioritised health or economic concerns.  
 
7.3.2 The 1953 Opium Protocol and Exhaustion of Moral Prohibitionism  
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With the operational structure for drug prohibition in place at the UN, the 
prohibitionists turned their attention to reinforcing the laws upon which the system 
stood. As aforementioned, the treaties that had been established through the League 
had been limited in their effectiveness, meaning prohibition would require a more 
ambitious legislative framework if the UN was to succeed where the League failed. 
The most ambitious project undertaken was to clear the confusion produced through 
multiple, overlapping drug treaties by creating a single, comprehensive drug 
convention. The aim of synthesising and consolidating the preceding international 
drug prohibition treaties into one unified instrument sits alongside the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 or the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1948 as a major project of totalising post-war 
legal ordering but is comparatively under-researched. Drafting on the Single 
Convention commenced alongside these other treaties in 1948, but it was not until 
1961 that an acceptable third draft was ready.62 The scale of the task of consolidating 
the existing drug treaties into a single, unified treaty is demonstrated by the fact that it 
would take thirteen years to produce the Single Convention, with further drugs laws 
emerging in the meantime, most notably The Protocol for Limiting and Regulating 
the Cultivation of the Poppy Plant, the Production of, International and Wholesale 
Trade in, and Use of Opium, 1953 (referred to as The 1953 Opium Protocol 
hereafter). The Opium Protocol Conference met in May 1953 in New York, the 
location of this conference being in the U.S.A. as opposed to Geneva only amplifying 
the influence that Anslinger, as the President of the Conference, and his ‘inner circle’ 
of hard-line prohibitionists enjoyed over the process. In the face of opposition – even 
from some of America’s major international allies – the draconian negotiating attitude 
taken up by ‘the inner circle’ at this conference ensured that ‘the 1953 Opium 
Protocol contained the most stringent drug-control provisions yet embodied in 
international law.’63 Its provisions extended the import and export controls from 
opium trade to opium poppy cultivation, a development that was a breakthrough for 
the American prohibitionists, who had been agitating for cultivation limitations in 
previous agreements.64 The 1953 Opium Protocol was taken as a personal victory for 
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Anslinger.65 Despite the fact that the 1953 Opium Protocol had only been viewed as 
an interim agreement that the PCOB could use to administer prohibition until the 
Single Convention could be agreed, Anslinger, as the President of the Conference, 
celebrated the treaty – particularly its limitation of opium use to exclusively medical 
and scientific purposes – as the great culmination of 44 years of international efforts 
by prohibitionists.66 The aggressive mode of advocacy pursued by ‘the inner circle’ 
ensured that the 1953 Opium Protocol was pushed through to completion, however 
the shortcomings of these forceful tactics were that they failed to inspire the 
universality that would be required for the treaty to ultimately take effect. Analysing 
the 1953 Opium Protocol, it becomes apparent that Anslinger and his supporters 
misunderstood the nature of legal force, believing that directly dictating the terms of 
the agreement was as effective as ensuring governing norms through masking 
particular interests through arrogating universality. While France supported the 
agreement, the aggressive restrictions driven into the treaty by Anslinger and his 
acolytes alienated other major allies, particularly the U.K.67 As a result, though the 
1953 Opium Protocol was signed, it did not receive the sufficient number of 
ratifications to come into force for the remainder of the decade. Traditional imperial 
powers Britain and the Netherlands, both with large drug trades, would not ratify the 
treaty, neither would the Soviets, who shunned it, claiming its provisions infringed on 
state sovereignty.68 Furthermore, the 1953 Opium Protocol required the adherence of 
three of the seven recognised opium-producing countries in order to come into force, 
and it was the refusal of opium producing nations Turkey, Yugoslavia, and Greece to 
ratify the treaty that would ultimately frustrate its ability to enter into force. 
Anslinger aimed for the 1953 Opium Protocol to herald a new era of draconian 
international drug prohibition. However, in effect, the 1953 Opium Protocol 
represented the conclusion of this style of international drug prohibition advocacy.69 
While prohibition had been driven by the efforts of American moralists since the turn 
of the century, the focus on universality that anchored the post-Second Word War 
international community did not lend itself to laws being forced through by a small 
band of well-organised, committed anti-drug zealots. Displeased with the 1953 
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Opium Protocol the international community turned its attention to the on-going 
drafting of the Single Convention, with the aim of influencing the new treaty, aware 
that if realised, it would have the effect of overshadowing all previous international 
drug prohibition treaties.  
 
7.4 The Road Towards the Single Convention 
 
As the most ambitious legal treaty of drug prohibition yet attempted, the 
drafting process for the Single Convention was particularly protracted, requiring three 
drafts in order to produce a workable document, with a fledging CND struggling to 
cohere the multiple interests into a workable text. The first draft, produced in the early 
1950’s, was rejected in 1955. The second draft, produced in 1956, ‘proved too 
confusing to act as a serviceable document because it contained many conflicting 
clauses’.70 Finally, in 1958, the CND produced a third draft that could be taken to a 
UN conference to iron out. In January 1961, 73 national delegations met in New York 
for the United Nations Conference on Narcotic Drugs. There was a shared incentive 
for both producer states and the imperial drug powers to create a treaty less onerous 
that the 1953 Opium Protocol, itself still frustrated in limbo. 71  Moreover, the 
American delegation were also less dogmatic than at previous conferences; 
Anslinger’s influence had begun to decline as he took greater time away from 
Washington to care for his wife and the State Department had begun to tire of his 
belligerent style.72 He had taken to boycotting the CND meetings when they were 
held in Geneva, however he did appear as chairman in 1957 when the CND 
assembled in New York – further reducing his influence as his erratic and 
domineering style isolated him from his international allies.73 The State Department 
did not share Anslinger’s passion for the 1953 Opium Protocol, preferring a Single 
Convention that could consolidate drug prohibition in a unified, functioning regime, 
without alienating too many of America’s allies or upsetting the balance of the post-
war international order.74 
The states that were unhappy with the 1953 Opium Protocol were able to 
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ensure that it would be among the nine previous drug treaties that would be 
terminated when the Single Convention entered into force.75 However, the Single 
Convention would not fully decouple international law on drugs from Anslinger’s 
draconian vision of drug prohibition. Article 2 confirmed that use of the most heavily 
prohibited substances would be limited to ‘medical and scientific research only’ as 
Anslinger had envisioned.76 The Single Convention also further extended licensing, 
reporting and certification mechanisms for drugs to apply to raw drug plant materials, 
particularly targeting the ‘the opium poppy, the coca bush, the cannabis plant, poppy 
straw and cannabis leaves’.77 The focus on these raw material drug plants recalls how 
the project of prohibition seeks to make illegal the very plant life/vegetation of the 
earth through a discursive association with transgressive subjectivities. The Single 
Convention’s attempt to categorise the world’s vegetation is revealed by the 
scheduling system that the treaty would employ. The scheduling system, first 
introduced in the 1931 Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the 
Distribution of Narcotic Drugs, was extended to four schedules, with the drugs 
considered to be most dangerous classified as Schedule I or IV. The major plant based 
drugs – cannabis, opium, heroin and cocaine – were all listed in the most dangerous 
schedules. However, as Taussig and Sheik have illustrated in earlier chapters, the 
synthesis of biology and racialisation helps produce the global geographical 
imbalance As will be discussed further in the following chapter, the rendering of raw 
drug plant materials as illegal established the foundation for the aerial fumigation and 
agrarian reform programmes of the drug war, which, due to the supply control focus 
of prohibition would impact producers and suppliers of the Global South 
disproportionately. William McAllister details that: 
 
The ‘schedules of control’ outlined by the Single Convention 
discriminated against the interests of producers. Raw materials and 
simple concoctions such as heroin and cocaine suffered under the 
more severe restrictions of schedules I and IV. Certain manufactured 
(primarily codeine-based) narcotics received somewhat more lenient 
treatment in schedules II and III.78 
 
The distinction drawn between plant-based or raw drugs and ‘manufactured’ narcotics 
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parallels the distinction between raw materials and added-value commodities that 
dependency theorists and critical economists have read into the uneven nature of the 
post-world economic order, even arguing for these economic structures to be 
understood as an alternative means of imperialism.79 The turning of warfare into the 
reserve of a weapon of a (Europeanised) universal humanity fuelled the 
environmental devastation visited upon nature as conceptualised in a dichotomy of 
either resources for extraction or threats to be eradicated. Moreover, the requirement 
that the Single Convention placed upon producing countries to centralise and then 
eradicate drug cultivation, production and consumption ensured that they would be 
carrying the heaviest burden when it came to realising the treaty’s aims.80 In terms of 
enforcing those aims, a further innovation of the Single Convention was that it 
restructured the administrative apparatus of international drug control, with the PCOB 
(now named the Permanent Central Board) and the DSB merged into a single body of 
experts to be called the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB).81 The INCB 
was given the power to collect estimates of dug use from states, calculate its own 
estimates for states that failed to comply, and recommend an embargo on the import 
and export of drugs to a country if it was unsatisfied with its conduct.82 The INCB 
would join the CND as another institutional pillar for the UN apparatus for drug 
prohibition.  
In Anslinger’s absence, and under pressure from the State Department to be 
conciliatory, the US delegation that attended the Single Convention conference had 
failed to produce an agreement that was as hard-line as he had envisioned. Anslinger 
responded to the treaty by denigrating it public, while focusing his energy on trying to 
activate the 1953 Opium Protocol, which could be achieved through the ratification of 
one more of the opium-producing states recognised by the treaty. Anslinger aimed to 
override the Single Convention by bringing the 1953 Opium Protocol into effect and 
making it, rather than the Single Convention, the basis for post-war international drug 
prohibition.83 He took his opposition to the Single Convention onto the international 
stage, ending his policy of boycotting CND meetings held in Geneva rather than New 
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York, by going to Geneva in 1962 to lead a US delegation committed to promoting 
support for the 1953 Opium Protocol.84 If the ratification of the 1953 Opium Protocol 
could be secured, it could then form the basis of a more extensive and strict Single 
Convention in due time.85 Anslinger’s efforts were initially successful, as he was able 
to convince Greece to ratify the 1953 Opium Protocol, thereby bringing it into effect. 
However, Anslinger’s attempt to upend the Single Convention ultimately proved 
ineffective. Completing the trend of the centre of gravity of international drug 
prohibition moving from emerging from American internationalism into a norm of an 
institutionalised international law, the UN responded to Anslinger’s aggression by 
focusing their efforts on ensuring the success of the Single Convention. The treaty 
entered into force in December 1964 when it met Article 41’s requirement of 40 
ratifications.86 Once the Single Convention came into force, the 1953 Opium Protocol 
was extinguished. The United States initially boycotted the Single Convention but the 
State Department eventually won its internal dispute with Anslinger, allowing the 
U.S.A. to ratify the Single Convention in 1967.87  
 
7.4.1 The Fixing of the Structure of Prohibition 
 
Harry Anslinger retired from his post as FBN Commissioner in 1962 but 
continued to represent the U.S.A internationally. For the remainder of the decade he 
attended CND sessions as the chief American delegate, still playing a key role in 
formulating and promoting drug policy.88 He resigned from his post as head of the 
American CND delegation in 1969, before passing away in 1975. Anslinger remains 
the most significant prohibitionist of the twentieth century and the international 
diplomat whose contribution helped to ensure that drug prohibition would survive the 
transition from the League to UN.89  Moreover, as a bridge between the early 
twentieth-century American moral crusaders, such as Bishop Brent and Hamilton 
Wright, and the post-World War II realisation of a universal legal architecture for 
drug prohibition, Anslinger’s career offers a lens through which we can see the extent 
to which the jurisprudence behind contemporary drug prohibition remains informed 
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by the moralism of the past. Though it ultimately escaped Anslinger’s control, the 
Single Convention remains indebted to the norms of drug prohibition that had been 
produced through half-a-century of moralist advocacy and campaigning and these 
norms continued share much of Anslinger’s fear about the existential danger of drugs. 
The Single Convention confirmed in international law that the approach that would be 
universally pursued in order to combat recreational use of opium, cocaine and 
cannabis – the big three ‘narcotics’ – was to target the ‘sources’ of this infestation. 
The orientation of ‘supply control’ strategy functions to externalize this problem, 
locating it as invading from outside of the boundaries of the good, international 
community, and therefore imagining the community as being able to cohere itself, if 
only it could be without this problem. Unlike Anslinger, the Single Convention does 
not explicitly associate the danger of drugs with racialised others but this association 
remains an unspoken presumption of the law. 
The extent of American influence over the Single Convention has been a topic 
of scholarly contestation. David Bewley-Taylor argues that ‘US dominance in the UN 
control system ensured that the Single Convention created a Western-orientated 
prohibitive framework for international drug control.’90 Alternatively, John Collins 
stresses the importance of a struggle between Britain and the U.S.A as informing the 
orientation of post-war drug prohibition. For Collins, it is the interplay between the 
emerging hegemony of America and the declining hegemony of the British Empire 
with ‘the US favouring immediate and strict prohibition and the UK favouring 
incrementalism and various forms of regulation, [that] would determine not just their 
own relationship, but also the shape of the international drug control system going 
forward’.91 Collins’ study describes how, once the chaos of war had disrupted 
Britain’s connections to her imperial drug monopolies, both major powers recognised 
their shared role in cohering the various global interests into a consensus around 
prohibition, ‘deploying a mixture of sticks and carrots, which only a joint Anglo-
American effort could effectively wield’.92 Whilst accepting that US prohibitionists, 
led by Anslinger, initially drove this partnership, Collins reads the British response as 
ultimately determining the ground for the international drug laws. For Collins, 
‘Anslinger’s failure reflected a broader shift in international drug diplomacy’ with the 
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zealotry advocacy of the moral reformers giving way to the more technocratic 
regulators of the new international order.93 However, an overemphasis on reading of 
the Single Convention as an example of US failure minimises the extent to which the 
norms that Anslinger, or more accurately the tradition of American moral 
prohibitionism of which he was representative, discursively constituted the very 
grounds on which this treaty would emerge. Also, I would argue that the shift from 
the moralistic missionaries to technocratic management indicates not so much a 
dramatic sea-change in drug prohibition but a glimpse of how the turn to management 
allowed for the uneven distribution and application by a single bureaucratic centre of 
the unleashing of violence. As will be discussed at greater length in the following 
chapter, to assume that post-war international drug prohibition becomes a matter of 
apolitical regulation would be to overlook the extent to which the violence that would 
be unleashed in the War on Drugs, despite the empirical evidence of its futility, can be 
found as present in the laws enacted in this period. The bureaucrats can play the role 
of moral zealots themselves, especially when the actions of the law are posited in the 
name of universal humanity. The international secretariat does not overwrite the 
zealotry of American prohibitionism but rather absorbs and then masks this zealotry 
within itself.    
 
7.5 Evil In The Single Convention 
 
An indication of the extent to which discursive norms of juridical-theological 
prohibitionism informed the orientation of the Single Convention can be appreciated 
through a close reading of the treaty, and particularly the preamble of the treaty, 
which is the section charged with the task of summarising and holding the document 
together as a cohesive whole. A specific emphasis on the importance of the language 
of the preamble follows the Vienna Convention On The Law Of Treaties, which 
determines that when interpreting international treaties, the preamble must hold 
significant weight on top of the provisions of the treaty.94 The importance of the 
preamble in international law is only reinforced in the Single Convention, where the 
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preamble was drafted so as to ‘encapsulate the core aims of the Convention.’95 
A close reading of the preamble shows the full significance of interpreting and 
understanding the provisions of the Single Convention through it. Undertaking such a 
close reading of the language of the law follows in the wake of a notable linguistic 
turn in critical legal studies in recent decades.96 With notable engagements with 
technologies of language such as semiotics, hermeneutics and deconstruction, legal 
scholarship has advanced the idea that if the law indeed does contain, in both senses 
of the word, the violence of the society within it, then that violence will be spied as 
present upon the body of the law, i.e. the text of the treaties, statues and judicial 
decisions. In following with a textual analysis of the law, a close reading of the 
preamble of the Single Convention synthesises with my reading of drug laws as 
sacrificial by providing an immediate challenge to any presumptions of scientific 
objectivity. Particular attention is drawn to the section stating: 
 
Addiction to narcotic drugs constitutes a serious evil for the 
individual and is fraught with social and economic danger to 
mankind.  
 
Conscious of their duty to prevent and combat this evil, [the parties 
agree upon]… coordinated and universal action.97 
 
Drug policy scholarship has already highlighted the curiosity of the reference to the 
concept of ‘evil’ within this international legal treaty. Law is the presumed relegation 
of the theological to the past through a secular turn to modernity. Therefore, recent 
scholars, particularly Rick Lines, have queried why specifically drugs demanded the 
return of such theological language when other defining legal treaties of the post-war 
international legal order escape such description. Lines highlights that other treaties 
such as the 1973 International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the 
Crime of Apartheid contain no allusions to apartheid being an ‘evil’, neither does the 
1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the 1956 Supplementary 
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Convention on the Abolition of Slavery or even the 1948 Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide refer to their subjects as 
‘evil’.98 Christopher Hobson extends Lines’ critique by problematizing the criteria of 
harm being employed within the ‘post-war legal order’ when he states that, ‘among 
all the possible wrongdoing and bad things that exist in the world, it is slightly 
counterintuitive that drugs are the only one to be labelled as “evil” in international 
law’.99 As detailed in my previous section, the description of drugs as ‘evil’ has a long 
historical legacy, with the rhetoric of everything ranging from the newspaper article 
reporting on America’s first drug law, to the report delivered to the US congress by 
early international drug diplomat Hamilton Wright and the writings of Quincy 
Wright, all containing the description of drugs and drug use as ‘evil’. The ‘evil’ of 
drugs is not simply a reference to the potential physical harm of addiction, as Jacques 
Derrida argues, other addictive substances such as alcohol and tobacco are not 
discursively branded with the stigma of existential evil.100 The conceptualization of 
drugs as ‘evil’ not only speaks to the religious and missionary roots from which 
international drug prohibition emerged, moreover, the appeal not to a legal definition 
of wrongdoing, or to a moral wrong but to ‘evil’, a specifically theological category, 
speaks to the extent to which international law would continue to draw on a 
conception of the universal indebted to the religious. Evil functions so as to render the 
object as outside of politics, it becomes an existential threat to the social order and 
thereby all actions required to eradicate it become justified. This externalization not 
only fuses differential sectors of the global population against a common enemy, but 
also does so through materialising this symbolic threat in the body of the specified 
contagion. 
            The immediate problematic offered by the use of ‘evil’ in the Single 
Convention is the task of discerning what form ‘evil’ takes within a godless discourse 
such as that claimed by modern international law. As discussed at length in the 
introductory chapter, international law understands itself as both informed by and 
giving rise to the secularising imperative of modernity. Therefore, how should we 
understand evil in the ‘secular’ world? Mark Fisher captures the theoretical challenge 
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provided by the continuing appeal to the concept of evil in our secular world when he 
explores what he calls ‘the new problem of evil’ -the question of what is the content of 
evil ‘for an age that no longer believes in evil’?101 Fisher understands our continuing 
reliance on the idea of evil as a result of an inability to reconcile the ideal models of 
modernity with the systematic failings these models produce in practice. 102 Law, 
particular international law with its totalising conceptions of universal humanity, 
functions as such an imagined systematic ideal, allowing the concept of evil to 
continue to have currency within its discourse despite it ostensible secularity.  
 It is unique to find an example of law’s theological anchoring as unmasked as 
it can be found to be in service of normalising drug prohibition, however. The Single 
Convention is not the only time the rhetoric of evil has been used in relations to 
problems of international order, although substantial research has failed to produce 
another example in which the word itself appears in actual text of an international 
treaty. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri overlook the Single Convention when they 
describe the category of a crime against humanity as ‘perhaps the legal concept that 
most clearly makes concrete this notion of evil’103 Furthermore, Robert Meister 
critiques the construction of the post-war human rights legal framework as the attempt 
to use the discourse of human rights to relegate evil onto the past and promises a new 
international order. Within the discourse of human rights, evil is rendered as a time of 
‘cyclical violence’, an era in which violence would escalate and persist without end, 
which an embrace of the faith of human rights can put an end to.104 The effect of this 
discourse is to depoliticise historical crimes and therefore delegitimise demands for 
human rights to deliver a punitive or financial, rather than moral, form of justice. 
However, the presence of the conceptualisation of drugs as evil within the text of the 
law allows drug prohibition to function as a particularly telling instantiation of the 
dynamics that Hardt, Negri and Meister identify.  
While studies of human rights and humanitarian law help illuminate the 
constitution of post-war international law against a theologically indebted conception 
of evil, the explicit example of the Single Convention and its preamble remains largely 
overlooked by critical legal scholarship. The key to decoding this question of evil 
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within the Single Convention is to note the placement of evil in oppositional 
relationally to a universal mankind. The invocation of ‘mankind’ as being in 
existential danger from drugs in the preamble of the Single Convention provides a 
telling instance of international law’s arrogation of the universal, law’s claim to speak 
on behalf of all humanity. Moreover, post-war international law was particularly 
explicit in anchoring a universal community on a notion of ‘humanity’ as the shared 
quality of all members.105 Taking up the task of translating the transcendent office of 
God for a secularised world, Carl Schmitt adapted Proudhon’s classic claim that ‘he 
who invokes God is trying to cheat’ into the idea that in the modern age, whoever 
‘invokes humanity is trying to cheat.’106  Schmitt’s understanding of the call to 
humanity operating as a deific surrogate recognises the importance of this totalising 
claim to international law’s universal authority. To simply claim that equality applies 
to all humans, as the major founding documents of the post-war international legal 
order a fond to do, allows complete circumvention of the more crucial question of how 
the human is produced. Moreover, it ignores the history of exclusion that has 
underwritten the idea of a universal humanity. As Peter Fitzpatrick argues, 
Europeanised notions of humanity have often facilitated the disqualification of people 
with ‘certain physical characteristics, usually skin colour, from the order of the 
law.’107 International law has been adept at employing this exclusionary capacity of 
the concept of humanity to facilitate the visiting of violence upon particular 
subjects.108 This dual character of the category of humanity, the capacity to both 
compel within an all-inclusive humanity and to expel utterly from that same ‘all’, 
points towards reading ‘humanity’ against those who are included in a position of 
exclusion within the global order of modernity, those that Frantz Fanon would 
describe as Les Damnes.109  
Fanonian scholar Lewis Gordon translates the concept of evil into the register 
of the secular modern through reading Fanon’s ‘damned’ as ‘the theodicy of European 
modernity’. 110  Gordon’s oxymoronic description of the relationship between the 
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damned, those subjects constituted as legitimate victims through the colonial 
encounter and the global order they exist within resurrects the concept of theodicy: the 
theological tradition of accounting for the evidential problem of evil within God’s 
omnipotence. While the use of the word ‘evil’ in the preamble of the Single 
Convention has provoked academic questioning – as shown in the work of Lines or 
Hobson – there has been an absence of scholarly engagements that have sought to read 
the preamble within longer traditions of characterising evil.  
 
7.5.1 Augustine’s Accounting for The Evidential Problem of Evil 
 
           To take seriously the task of unpacking the significance of the idea of ‘evil’ 
within the Single Convention, a further understanding of the religious analysis of the 
concept is required. The tradition of the Christian thought on the concept of evil is 
extensive, with perhaps no engagement more famous than the one offered by Saint 
Augustine of Hippo. Augustine took up the problem of theodicy, seeking to explain 
through his writings how God’s transcendent goodness and the self-evident presence 
of worldly evil could be reconciled. The problematic that had to be faced was whether 
it was outside of the power of God to simply erase evil contained in the world. If so, 
how could scholastics maintain a claim of God’s omnipotence? Was evil external to 
God’s will? If it was, then it disrupted God’s omnipotence and if it was not, then it 
disrupted God’s claim to be the good.111 
Augustine responded by arguing that all that exists comes from God, but once 
existent, it is no longer able to persist in the same state of immutable goodness as its 
creator. A deterioration from the form in which it was created always lies in potential 
for all that exists, and when something does deteriorate or depart from the form of the 
good as designed by the creator, it is at that point, for Augustine, that we can diagnose 
the emergence of ‘evil’.112 Augustine recognises evil as dependent upon the notion of 
the good, stating that ‘the evil cannot exist at all without the good, or in a thing that is 
not a good. On the other hand, the good can exist without evil’.113 Augustine’s 
schematic commences from a recognition that, before being made by the omnipotence 
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of God, non-being was the state of existence for all creation, therefore the denigration 
of the form from which God made his worldly creations functions through the re-
emergence of that initial state of non-being into the lived condition of being. 
Augustine reads evil as always already included within the good in a manner that 
parallels the Platonic understanding of non-being as always already present within 
being. It is through this synthesis of Platonic philosophy and monotheistic Christian 
belief that Augustine is able to cast evil as ‘not a nature but a kind of non-being’.114 
The resulting schematic maintains evil as being within the omnipotent good of God, 
whilst always remaining as constituted in opposition to it. For Augustine, evil should 
not be imagined as an entity in itself as he argues ‘[f]or what is that which we call evil 
but the absence of good?’115 Evil does not possess a nature itself; it consists only as 
the failed realisation of what should be: the good. Evil is merely privation, in the 
manner roughly analogous to sickness as the absence of health or darkness as the 
absence of light. As illustrated above, for Augustine evil does not exist outside of 
God, therefore God’s omnipotence contains evil while sustaining an oppositional 
relationality to it. Evil is as an anti-thesis, but an anti-thesis that remains included 
within the totality of the thesis. 
Augustine’s schematic provides a starting point from which begin to unpack 
the presence of ‘evil’ in the preamble of the Single Convention, which makes a 
secularised claim to ontological completeness through an invocation of a universal 
‘mankind’. Furthermore a line of continuum can be drawn from Augustinian 
principles of evil to the anchoring foundations of international law through Thomas 
Aquinas, who both carried forward Augustinian thought and served as the primary 
influence on Vitoria. Having brought the transcendent reference point of God into the 
world itself through modernity’s construction of universal humanity, international law 
mirrors the movement of the Augustinian schema, by placing the contradictions of 
this universal legal order as exterior to the community. However, for the law to 
remain universal, those contradictions, as with evil in theodicy, must also be included 
within the totality. A resultant paralysis befalls those who are deemed outside this 
universal humanity, for they must be utterly excluded by law whilst simultaneously 
being ultimately included. This is the damnation that Fanon speaks to when 
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translating the metaphysical structure of theology into the material reality of our 
modern global order. 
 
7.5.2 Fanon and the ‘theodicy of Euro-Modernity’ 
 
For Fanon, modernity was formed through the encasing of particular bodies 
within this paradoxical space of included/exclusion; the subject position of the 
contradictions of modernity is to be damned to reside in what he describes as ‘the 
zone of non-being’.116 This ‘zone of non-being’, for Fanon, encapsulates the lived 
experience of the racial/colonised other. Recalling Augustine’s classic description of 
evil, Fanon understands the racial other as being fixed in a condition of privation. As 
a subject, the racial other serves as the failed realization of what should be: the 
rational, autonomous, modern (white/European) human. For Fanon, it was a necessary 
function that within ‘the totalitarian character of colonial exploitation the settler paints 
the native as a sort of quintessence of evil’.117 The racial/colonial other exists only in 
‘negation’ and it is through this state of negation against the idealised humanity of 
euro-modernity that it takes on the condition of absolute evil within an ostensibly 
secularised world. Fanon further clarifies by arguing that within this world order the 
racial/colonial other ‘is the corrosive element, destroying all that comes near him; he 
is the deforming element, disfiguring all that has to do with beauty or morality; he is 
the depository of maleficent powers, the unconscious and irretrievable instrument of 
blind forces.’ 118  Lewis Gordon emphasises the parallels between Fanon’s 
understanding of ‘the damned’ and Augustine’s response to the problem of theodicy 
by stating:  
 
Western thought […] led to a theodicy of Western civilisation […] 
systems that were complete and intrinsically legitimate in all aspects 
of human life […] while its incompleteness, its failure to be so, 
hallmarks the ‘dark side of thought’ lived by those constantly 
crushed under its heels, remained a constant source of anxiety […] 
People of colour, particularly black people live the contradictions of 
this self-deception.119 
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Following the structure of theodicy, the racial subaltern subject cannot be truly other 
to the universal humanity of international law, lest that humanity not be truly 
universal and the system not be truly complete. Yet those who the have been 
historically disqualified from the status of humanity exist as ‘the not-yet’ within this 
schematic, damned by the invitation to civilise, progress or develop towards a 
‘perfect’ state of humanity in a process that is indefinitely deferred. Just as Vitoria’s 
conceptualisation of a universal humanity was thoroughly saturated with the 
particularities of Spanish cultural and political norms, thereby enclosing the 
Amerindian within a damning inclusive/exclusion, the deific surrogate of ‘humanity’, 
so celebrated by post-war international law and proclaimed as the enemy of the ‘evil’ 
of drugs by the preamble of the Single Convention, contains its own anti-thesis within 
its totality. The discourse of modernity is exposed as theologically informed when we 
appreciate how, within its Eurocentric logic, the colonised/racially subaltern subject 
takes on ‘the principle of evil’.120 The modern global order becomes invested in the 
image of the racially subaltern subject, the human in privation, as evil. 121 Fanon 
guides us in appreciating how the ontological structure Augustine called upon to 
account for evil is transformed under modernity into the explanation for the racial 
subaltern subject. For within modernity’s universal mankind, the racial other ‘is not a 
man’.122 Instead, he ‘is declared insensible to ethics; he represents not only the 
absence of values, but also the negation of values. He is, let us dare to admit, the 
enemy of values, and in this sense he is the absolute evil’.123  This preceding quote 
from Les Damnés de la terre offers the only reference to Fanon’s previous book Black 
Skins, White Masks in his 1961 posthumous classic, illustrating the importance of the 
configuration of the native as ‘evil’ within the wider theoretical schema of world 
ordering that Fanon seeks to illuminate. 124  This theological connection of the 
enclosing of the subjectivity of the colonised in privation – detailed in Black Skins, 
White Masks – with the world order that sustains itself through the licensing of 
violence upon that ‘evil’ subject – as detailed in Les Damnés de la terre – provides 
the key link between Fanon’s two outstanding scholarly contributions, and therefore 
                                                
120 Fanon, Black Skins, White Masks, p.147. 
121 Gordon, Through the Zone of Nonbeing, p.20. 
122 Fanon, Black Skins, White Masks, p.8. 
123 Fanon, Wretched of the Earth, p.8. 
124 Ibid., p.40. 
	  214	  
his intellectual project as a whole. The reading of these twin elements of the Fanonian 
schematic together illuminates its parallels with the logic of sacrifice, which I have 
analysed across this thesis. Like Girard’s scapegoat, Fanon’s racial/colonised other 
orders the community that it is expelled from. The community seeks to take form by 
casting out its own negative imaginings, encased in a body that can be sacrificed.   
               The unpacking of the ‘theodicy of European modernity’ provides a 
telling lens through which to re-read the curiosity of ‘evil’ being the anchor of the 
Single Convention. The call for the force of law to be deployed against drugs in 
defence of a universal humanity functions not simply as a call against the drugs as 
an entity, but moreover, as a call for the force of law to purify the very subjectivity 
that these drugs are feared to engender: the irrational, unhinged, non-human 
human. This is the subject position that has been embodied by the racial other 
within the discourse of modernity. An appreciation of ‘the theodicy of modernity’ 
offers potential answers to the questions about the use of ‘evil’ in the Single 
Convention by pointing towards an explanation grounded in a concern with the 
consequences of the treaty, which would lay the groundwork the War on Drugs, 
shown in the my introduction to be amongst the most racially discriminatory of 
modern international legal projects.  
 The humanitarianism of post-war international law remained indebted to 
the theological anchor of world order. Meister uncovers the presence of  
‘monotheistic violence’ underneath human rights by which he means ‘a violence 
that claims to break the cycle of violence.’125 For Meister monotheistic violence is 
not only a matter of ‘containing what Girard calls “mimetic rivalry” but becomes, 
instead a matter of defending a God who is now revealed to have always been on 
the side of victims.’126 Meister argues that the humanitarianism prevalent in post-
war international law ‘misunderstands itself to be the last monotheism because it 
claims to be the religion of humanity as such’127 The impulse for communality 
through the last religion of ‘humanity’ would take institutional form in the United 
Nations. The UN thereby became the site in which drug prohibition could achieve 
a level of universalism previously unattainable, with the eventual consolidation of 
previous drug treaties into a Single Convention serving as the legislative 
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foundation of this new era of prohibition. However, despite the claims towards 
universalism, both the UN as an institution and the Single Convention as a treaty 
contained within their totality an inclusion of the colonial/racial subaltern subject 
in a condition of primary exclusion. As detailed in my previous chapters, universal 
drug prohibition emerged into international law through the endeavours of 
American prohibition missionaries. The signing of the Single Convention, and the 
accompanying political defeat of Harry Anslinger, marked the conclusion of 
international laws on drugs being formed through this mode of advocacy. 
However, the language employed in the preamble of this treaty shows how deeply 
embedded normative assumptions about the ‘evil’ of drugs and their threat to a 
universal ‘mankind’ had become.128 Christopher Hobson tells us how ‘at the very 
outset of the conference [for the Single Convention] drugs were defined in 
reference to evil, and throughout delegates would regularly frame the issue in 
these terms’.129 The equating of drugs as a conduit for a denigrated form of 
humanity, thereby a correlative evil within the schema of ‘the secular theology’ 
that is international law, had become so deep-seated as to have entered into the 
very language of the legal text that announced prohibition, without challenge. The 
repeated drafts of the treaty, produced over a thirteen-year period, all maintained 
the description of drug addiction as ‘evil’. Taken in conjunction with the supply-
side focus that had also been embedded into universal drug prohibition, the Single 
Convention can be read to have crystallised in its universalism the structure of 
sacrifice that would be fully realised through the War on Drugs during the 
subsequent decades. Anthropologists have detailed how drug use and 
experimentation has enjoyed cultural and ritualistic significance within human 
cultures since time immemorial, however with the preamble of the Single 
Convention, a conceptualisation of drugs that was indebted to Euro-modernity – 
namely of drugs as a foreign affliction infecting the community of universal 
mankind to be purged through force of law being directed at the source – was now 
enshrined as a universal norm in international law. This reading points us towards 
a better understanding of why an asymmetry of violence would be visited on 
specific peoples through the drug war.  
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7.5.3 Adolf Lande and Theodicy in the Drafting of the Single Convention 
 
The structure of theodicy that I have argued for drug law above can be read 
within the output of another influential figure of post-war drug prohibition: Adolf 
Lande. As a former Secretary of the Permanent Central Narcotics Board and Drug 
Supervisory Body, Lande took on the significant role of the being the primary drafter 
of the Single Convention.130 Unlike Anslinger and other American prohibitionists, 
Lande was an international lawyer by trade, having cultivated his expertise in this 
discipline by working in the American government during the Second World War.131 
However, despite his career path making him a bureaucrat within the international 
secretariat and therefore being formerly separate from Anslinger and his ‘inner 
circle’, Lande remained ‘a close supporter and associate of Anslinger’.132 Lande 
provides an example of how the norms of American drug prohibition would continue 
to inform the objective universalism of the UN drug laws despite break between 
Anslinger and the international community. Lande would subsequently go on to serve 
as the first secretary of the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), the 
institution established to enforce the UN drug treaties.133 Through his writings on 
international law and his work as an international drug prohibitionist, Lande provides 
an exemplar par excellence of the synthesis between a particular vision of 
international legal order and an impetus towards a moral universalism that was 
contained in the post-war international laws on drug prohibition.  
Lande’s theoretically engaged with international law’s potential to reconcile 
the legal principle of the equality of states with the hegemony that had been exercised 
by the Great Powers over history. Referencing the works of American international 
law forefathers Elihu Root and James Brown Scott, Lande was able to read together 
the rise of a vision of an equality of states alongside the realisation of a particular 
tradition of American liberalism.134 He understood sovereign equality as having 
acquired more purchase in the early twentieth century, as the strict hierarchical status 
of European empires began to dissipate and states began instead to coalesce around 
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shared interests.135 Lande recognised the progression that had been achieved by ‘the 
discontinuation […] of the Great Powers to claim by their actions a position of legal 
superiority’. 136  In appreciation of the significance of facilitating a unity in 
international legal ordering, Lande’s writings offered a vision of a system of 
international law that could organise everyday human life along a shared set of moral 
norms.137 Lande would be presented with an opportunity to realise this vision of 
international law through the central role he would play in the establishment of a legal 
structure for post-war drug prohibition. 
Lande accepted the basic ideas that had been normalised in the first half of the 
twentieth century. For Lande, the inter-war drug control system had had ‘considerable 
success, and no need has been felt for changing its basic features’.138 He emphasised 
that the failures of the system were not so much conceptual as they were structural, 
the multiplicity of treaties and administrative bodies that had been developed to 
govern drug prohibition ‘led to an unwieldiness in the law itself, including obscurities 
and inconsistencies’.139 Lande recognised the laws of universal drug prohibition 
functioned with insufficient universality during the inter-war period. Despite his 
commitment to realising this universality, Lande would maintain an alliance with 
Anslinger and his more didactic methods for establishing drug prohibition. Anslinger 
had introduced Lande to the field of international drug prohibition and despite 
Lande’s office within the UN requiring impartiality, David Bewley-Taylor’s 
‘examination of Lande’s correspondence with Anslinger reveals the extent of the 
supposedly civil servant’s pro-American stance on international drug control.’140 
Ultimately, Lande shared Anslinger’s vision of drug prohibition as being a universal 
project, but one that could only be entrusted to the leadership of Western (or more 
particularly American) prohibitionists. 141 The racial and cultural prejudices that had 
informed American drug prohibition as a whole ensured that ‘Lande, much like 
Hamilton Wright and other international campaigners, including Anslinger, continued 
                                                
135 Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States, p.128. 
136 Lande, ‘Revindication of the Principle’, p.286. 
137 See Philip Jessup, Adolf Lande, Oliver J. Lissitzyn, and Joseph P. Chamberlain, International 
Organization (New York: Carnegie: Endowment for International Peace, Columbia University Press 
1955). 
138 Adolf Lande, ‘The Single Convention On Narcotic Drugs, 1961’, International Organization, 16, 04 
(September 1962), pp.776-797, p.778. 
139 Ibid. 
140 Bewley-Taylor, The United States And International Drug Control, pp.79-80. 
141 Ibid, p.81. 
	  218	  
to associate drug use with non-western, particularly non-American peoples’.142  With 
his tenure at the UN coinciding with an expansion of nations who were exerting their 
presence both in the organisation at-large and its drug control institutions in 
particular, Lande expressed to Anslinger his fears that ‘UN drug control apparatus 
was being staffed increasingly by non-westerners. He felt this lowered the standards 
maintained by the Western personnel, who, he believed, appreciated the importance 
of strict international control’.143 
Lande’s personal importance to the Single Convention is evidenced by his role 
as not only the primary drafter of the treaty but that he was also the writer of the 
commentary for Single Convention, which would also aid the interpretation of the 
treaty provisions. Lande concluded his work on the Single Convention confident that 
through its implementation ‘opium eating, smoking, coca leaf chewing, and hashish 
consumption will thus finally be outlawed throughout the world’.144 A tracing of 
Lande’s progression into becoming the international jurist responsible for the actual 
writing of the laws of prohibition offers a telling instance of the elevation of the 
norms of American drug prohibition into hegemonic status within international law. 
The understanding of drug use, outside of a narrowly defined register of scientific and 
medical use, as being an ‘evil’ which international law had to purify from within 
humanity was now no longer a fringe position advocate by small group of moralists 
and missionaries but fixed as universal by the authority of international law, by 
objective and impartial administrators. The bureaucrats could be understood as the 




            This chapter reviewed how drug prohibition was salvaged during the crisis 
of war by American endeavour, ensuring that in the post-war legal order it finally 
becoming a norm for international law. The United Nations provided the 
institutional setting for new drug laws that were more ambitious that any 
previously attempted, particular the totalising Single Convention. However, 
despite the ostensible egalitarianism of the UN, it remains important to recognise 
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the extent to which the organisation was both discursively and structurally 
informed by a persisting ‘dynamic of difference’, especially when seeking to 
unpack the orientation that the drug laws it produced would take. The particular 
imagination of what constituted a universal ‘mankind’ would bear significant 
importance within the drug laws that conceptualised the object of prohibition as an 
existential ‘evil’ threat to humanity. Recalling the mythical component of law that 
allows it to attain its operative function discussed in earlier chapters of this thesis, 
the preamble of the Single Convention illuminates the way the myth of drugs as 
‘evil’ – conceptualised in racialised and religious discourse of early prohibition – 
sustained the determinations of this ostensibly technocratic legal treaty. The 
international legal order, seizing the reigns from Harry Anslinger and his mode of 
dogmatic American prohibition, managed to cohere the plethora of cultural 
attitudes and economic interests surrounding drug use across the globe into single 
statement that could ground a new era of drug law. In doing so, international law 
confirmed the closure, but also the ascendency, of the tradition of moralistic drug 
warriors that had made drug prohibition a norm within the international 
community. American prohibitionists read the post-war drug laws as ensuring that 
finally ‘the possibility of stopping the wholesale illicit traffic in narcotic drugs is a 
reality’.145 However, the next chapter will analyse the failure of the ambition to 
end the illegitimate traffic of drugs to manifest, as well as examining the actual 
impact of Single Convention and other post-war drug treaties.  
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The preceding chapter focused on how international drug prohibition, 
following aborted attempts in the first half of the twentieth century, was realised 
as an accepted norm of international law with the signing of the UN Single 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, the United Nations’ major drug 
prohibition treaty that sought to capture the aims of all the previous drug 
prohibition treaties signed over the past half-a-century. Following the violence 
of the Second World War, a reconstituted international legal order – with the 
United Nations and its promise to save ‘succeeding generations from the scourge 
of war’ at the centre – accepted universal drug prohibition as a key tenet of post-
war international law.1 Consequently, the Single Convention was informed by 
the humanitarian impulse acclaimed by post-war international law, expressed in 
the language of peace and salvation. The treaty’s promise to protect ‘the health 
and welfare of mankind’ from the ‘evil’ of drugs -as it was described in the 
preamble to the Single Convention - married with the wider recovery of an 
operative communality in international law following the escalation of violence 
during the Second World War.2  
At that historical moment, the shadows of Auschwitz and Hiroshima both 
offered a glimpse of the end of days, thereby inspiring a renewed commitment to 
producing a coherent universal notion of humanity to congeal the legal order. 
The U.S.A, after half a century of ambitious internationalism, now began to fully 
embrace its own hegemonic role within the international community. Earlier, I 
traced the parallel histories of the international laws prohibiting drugs, and the 
shift of the international legal order from the formal division between the 
sovereign civilised world and non-sovereign colonies to the expansive moral 
universalism of the twentieth century. This chapter will conclude the primary 
narrative thread of my thesis by reviewing how these two histories converged in 
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realisation of a full-scale, global War on Drugs at the end of the twentieth 
century, as well as the extent to which the asymmetrical violence of drug war 
could be considered as what I have termed, following Girard and others, 
sacrificial. The term ‘sacrificial’ stresses an imperial structuring of international 
law that forgoes the formal division of the world produced through European 
colonialism for a totalising conception of a universal humanity, but one within 
which political and economic relations of empire maintain operative 
functionality. As described in the previous chapters, a key contribution of this 
thesis has been to argue for reading this dynamic within both international law 
on drugs, as an instantiation, and international law more widely. The idea of a 
sacrificial underpinning to the universalism of liberal international law advances 
understandings of both drug policy studies and critical international law, opening 
up potential further avenues of research that ties together scholarship on post-
colonial/ decolonial international law with the drug war as an obvious but under-
theorised example. Twentieth-century American internationalism, and 
subsequently, post-war international law, invoked a commitment to the ending 
of war and facilitating global trade through an investment in universalism, 
holding itself in contradistinction to the colonial order’s expulsion of swathes of 
humanity from legal recognition. However, reading the War on Drugs within the 
context of these wider transformations of international law betrays that, despite 
the impetus to contain global violence driving the formation of the UN and the 
post-war legal framework, war would not disappear but rather shift in mode, 
from crises between rival sovereign states to collective assault upon a ‘threat’ to 
the universal order.  
The focus of this chapter will be on the insight that the War on Drugs can 
bring to wider theories of violence within the international arena following the 
peace acclaimed by post-war international law. I will be draw on literature 
concerned with the emergence of what has been called ‘new war’, the turn of 
away from interstate conflict.3 The chapter begins with a necessary engagement 
with the international laws that entered into force in the 1970’s and 1980’s in 
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order to strengthen the provisions of the Single Convention. Following an 
engagement with the provisions of the final drug treaties, I assert a reading of the 
drug war that acts as a complement and a corrective to the wealth of critical legal 
scholarship which has, overlooking the historical and theoretical significance of 
the drug war, identified the subsequent ‘War on Terror’ as the prime 
contemporary example of the way violence is managed within the acclaimed 
humanitarianism of post-war international law. This shift in focus is a further 
original contribution of this thesis, presenting the drug war as not only a 
precursory but also prophetic instantiation of war after the ‘end’ of war.  
Shifting the telling instance of ‘new war’ in the contemporary legal order 
from the War on Terror to the War on Drugs brings into clear focus the 
continuum that exists from the current crisis of American hegemony to the very 
birth American internationalism. As discussed in Part B of this thesis, drug 
prohibition emerged onto the international stage concurrently with a (re)turn to a 
liberal, humanitarian jurisprudence in international law. However, critical 
scholarship has ignored it in favour of the War on Terror as a site of analysis.4 In 
one of his final intellectual contributions, Battling to the End, René Girard 
would lend support to this focus on the War on Terror, reading it as representing 
the final failure of law’s capacity to restrain violence across the globe through 
sacrifice.5 While marked by asymmetrical violence, for Girard, the War on 
Terror shows global order as unhinged from any mechanism of pacification, 
with the futility of scapegoating exposed in the ever-increasing state of crisis. In 
the context of the War on Terror, ‘ancient archaic fears resurface today with new 
faces, but no sacrifice will save us from them.’6 However, this reading of the 
War on Terror, I argue, while insightful, lacks a substantial appreciation of the 
extent to which the War on Drugs previewed and cleared a juridical pathway for 
the later conflict as well as the political distinctions in the presumptions of 
mimetic violence that weaken Girard’s reading of the War on Terror. The 
significance of the engagement with the War on Drugs across this thesis comes 
from its historical trajectory which, through a legislative chronology that 
                                                
4 John Strawson, ‘Introduction: In The Name of the Law’, in Law after Ground Zero, ed. by John 
Strawson (London: Routledge, 2002) p.xix. 
5 Rene Girard, Battling to the End: Conversations with Benoît Chantre (East Lansing: Michigan State 
University Press, 2010). 
6 Ibid., p.24. 
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commences with 1909 Shanghai Opium Commission, offers a wider perspective 
of international law’s referral to a sacrificial mechanism than that offered by 
Girard and other theorists’ focus on the ‘new’ War on Terror. Furthermore, 
Girard’s disregard of the drug war, is not incidental but is borne of his failure to 
recognise the impact that decolonisation and the entrance of the formerly 
excluded into the world order impacted the way in which violence would be 
legitimised in the subsequent epoch. Girard’s reading of the War on Terror 
underplays how the protagonist of these new wars - the excluded subaltern, the 
formerly colonised, the racial others in the West - marry with the position of the 
included/excluded ‘sacrificial victim’ that his own grand theory uncovered. My 
illustration of how the drug war was born co-currently with shift of international 
law from the civilised/colonised separation to the liberal, post-colonial order of 
formal sovereign equality can serve as a corrective to this gap in Girard’s 
reading of contemporary international violence.  
Therefore, I argue that by commencing with the post-9/11 re-emergence 
of the ‘scourge of war’, scholars overlook the way in which much of the 
sacrificial dynamic being read in the War on Terror was previewed in the 
preceding War on Drugs. Moreover, a focus on the asymmetrical violence of the 
drug war turns attention to the regions and identities that have suffered the 
disproportionate cost of drug prohibition enforcement. Despite the international 
laws on drugs being written in language of neutral legal platitudes, the structure 
that the War on Drugs actually took once enacted allowed for its consequences 
to be amplified in Latin America, as shown by the successive frontlines of 
Colombia and Mexico, and for the racially subaltern, particularly Black, 
populations of U.S.A and Europe.  
This chapter will complete that historical narrative by offering a reading 
of the emergence of the War on Drugs from the 1970’s onwards, the culmination 
of a century of ambitious international legislative innovations, as a telling 
instance of twentieth century liberal international law’s attempt to cohere a 
‘universal’ community though referral to a ‘sacrificial’ international. First, I will 
review the international laws signed in the final decades of the century that 
strengthened legal foundations for drug war, before exploring how the 
entwinement of the humanitarian rationale behind the drug war with the de-
territorialised form that the conflict would take gave rise to a novel form of 
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managed war. By placing a specific focus on the material impact of the drug 
war, particular within key battlegrounds such as Cali, Colombia and Juarez, 
Mexico which will each be engaged with in-depth, this chapter will seek to 
return to the problem presented in the introduction to this thesis by concentrating 
on the human casualties of drug prohibition and exploring how they can be 
theoretically reconciled with the defence of universal humanity espoused within 
the law itself. 
 
8.2 Reinforcing the Legal Framework and Declaring War 
 
Before unpacking the violence of the drug war, it is important to review 
the actual laws through which the enforcement of drug prohibition would be 
executed.7 The last decades of the twentieth century would see an expansion and 
reinforcement of the international laws prohibiting drugs. While the Single 
Convention aimed to be the final word on the issue of drugs, the impossibility of 
such a task is betrayed by the subsequent treaties and amendments enshrined in 
law during the 1970’s and 1980’s. Furthermore, these new international drugs 
treaties are best read as the legislative foundation for the War on Drugs, for the 
enforcement these laws facilitated an escalation of violence that ensured that 
drug prohibition was not only described as, but also in large parts of the world 
materially experienced as, a war. Therefore, following a brief review of the most 
recent international drug treaties, taking seriously the task of reading the drug 
war as a material, rather than just metaphorical war will be the focus of the 
remainder of this chapter. The importance of such a reading lies in the insight it 
offers about the relation between war, law and international order. In 
understanding the drug war as being informed by the impulse to fix an 
international order through producing the idealised universal human subject and 
containing the monstrous contagion that threatens a violent upending of order, a 
theoretical account for international law’s disregard for the victims of the drug 
war can be made. Furthermore, some guidance can be offered as to how the 
                                                
7 As with the work on the Single Convention in the previous chapter, my engagement with the 
international drug treaties will be to summarise the key elements of the treaty as a whole. An in-depth 
review of each provision is not the focus of this thesis. For such an engagement, please see S. K. 
Chatterjee, Legal Aspects of International Drug Control, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981); or Neil 
Boister, The Suppression of Illicit Drugs through International Law (doctoral thesis, University of 
Nottingham, 1998). 
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nexus of international law and empire continue to operate in liberal, post-
colonial world, allowing for the re-reading of other contemporary global 
conflicts, particularly the War on Terror. 
 
8.2.1 The UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971 
 
Following the epochal Single Convention, the next major development in the 
chronology of international laws on drugs was the UN Convention on Psychotropic 
Substances of 1971 (referred to hereafter as the Psychotropic Convention). The 
Psychotropic Convention was drafted to address the way in which the Single 
Convention, with its focus on organic plant-based drugs, principally the big three 
(Opium, Cannabis and Cocaine) and their derivatives, failed to anticipate the next set 
of ‘transgressive substances’ to attain popularity in the post-war era. Particularly in 
the U.S.A and Western Europe, the years following the ratification of the Single 
Convention would ironically see an increase in the use of substances not addressed by 
that treaty, as a new youth culture began to valorise new drugs such as amphetamines, 
and hallucinogens like mescaline and lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), through their 
music, art and activism.8 The 1960’s saw drugs becoming a cultural dividing line for 
much of the political upheaval occurring across the West in that era.9 International 
law would respond to this shift in counter-cultural drug use in July 1971 in Vienna, as 
the international community signed a new treaty to expand the list of drugs that would 
be prohibited by international law.  
The Psychotropic Convention was written to operate in a manner that mirrored 
the structure of the Single Convention. Like its predecessor, it also divided the 
prohibited drugs into four schedules, ranked according to a perception of harm. The 
Convention does not limit the cultivation of plants from which psychotropic 
substances are made; it does, however, place limitations on the manufacture, export 
and import of the prohibited psychotropic substances through systems of recording 
and supervision of trade, inspections, licensing and penal provisions.10 Furthermore, 
Article 5 continues the norm of limiting the trade and use of these substances to 
                                                
8 Neil Boister, The Suppression of Illicit Drugs through International Law, p. 55. 
9 William McAllister, Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century (London: Routledge, 2000), p.219. 
10 Article 3 (3), The UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971. 
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‘medical and scientific purposes.’11 The treaty further reinforced the authority of the 
International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), which was established by the Single 
Convention, ensuring the parties would have to furnish the INCB with reports of their 
compliance with the treaty’s provisions. Further empowering the INCB was also the 
inclusion of greater enforcement powers that it could use to hold to account parties 
not fulfilling their treaty obligations.12 The INCB reproduces in the Psychotropic 
Convention the disciplinary position it occupies within the Single Convention. 
However, the location in which the psychotropic substances were produced limited 
the weight of prohibition; unlike the organic plant based drugs, grown largely in the 
former colonial world, that were the target of the Single Convention, this Treaty 
concerned the interests of Western pharmaceutical companies and scientific 
communities. The geographical shift was not inconsequential in the outcome of the 
final Treaty. The provisions were coloured by the way ‘Western industrial powers, 
[…] argued for the type of loopholes they had opposed in 1961.’13 Adolf Lande, 
whose work in theorising international law and drafting the Single Convention is 
reviewed in the previous chapter, was instructed to produce the drafts of the 
Psychotropic Convention despite the fact that ‘Lande had always demonstrated an 
affinity toward the interests of the principal western powers.’14 William McAllister’s 
historical review of the drug treaties illustrates how Lande commenced from the 
assumption that the same level of control exerted through the Single Convention 
could not be imposed on Western pharmaceutical industries producing psychotropic 
drugs. In the treaty conference itself, the United States, so often the driver of stricter 
control in international drug law, adopted a more reasonable tone under ‘the influence 
of pharmaceutical firms, the research community, government health bureaucrats, and 
physicians’ leading to the American delegation pursuing a treaty ‘that struck a 
balance between legal, administrative, economic, social, and scientific interests.’15 
Moreover, the Psychotropic Convention would recognise the need to provide some 
counter to the demand for the substances, therefore easing the overall reliance on 
                                                
11 Article 5, The UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971. 
12 Article 16, Article 16-19. The UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971. 
13 William McAllister, p.231. 
14 Ibid., p.229. 
15 Ibid., p.231. 
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supply control. 16  Overall, the Psychotropic Convention included a set of 
amphetamines, barbiturates and psychedelics into the same sphere of prohibition as 
the plant-based ‘big three’ of opium, coca and cannabis-based drugs but with a lighter 
degree of enforcement to be placed upon the producers of these drugs. 
Despite the shifts in the degree of prohibition in the Psychotropic Convention, 
the overall orientation of the Treaty does not disturb the general trend of drug 
prohibition in international law since the turn of the century. Article 22 of the treaty 
emphasises how an undertone of punitive prohibition continues to ground this Treaty, 
mandating that ‘each Party shall treat as a punishable offence, when committed 
intentionally, any action contrary to a law or regulation adopted in pursuance of its 
obligations under this Convention, and shall ensure that serious offences shall be 
liable to adequate punishment, particularly by imprisonment or other penalty of 
deprivation of liberty.’17 This ‘penal provision’ remains subject to the domestic law of 
the Treaty signatories and therefore allows a certain nuance when read in conjunction 
with the provisions for demand reduction (treatment/education/rehabilitation) that can 
act as an alternative to imprisonment. Nevertheless, it shows how the underlying link 
between drug use and criminality was reinforced and expanded upon by the 
Psychotropic Convention. With this treaty, another major stone was laid in what 
would be the legislative framework for the War on Drugs. 
 
8.2.2 The Declaration of War 
 
In addition to the signing of the Psychotropic Convention, 1971 also saw the 
official declaration for the start of the ‘the War on Drugs’ announced in a speech 
made by President Richard Nixon to the United States Congress on Drug Abuse 
Prevention and Control on June 17th.18 By announcing an intensification of drug 
prohibition, Nixon was responding to not only the growing fashion in drug 
experimentation through the counter-culture of the 1960’s, but also to the political 
movements of that era that threatened the prevailing social order. In an era of rising 
                                                
16 Article 20 (1), The UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971 recognises the need ‘for the 
early identification, treatment, education, after-care, rehabilitation and social reintegration’ to limit the 
use of these substances.  
17 Article 22, The UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971. 
18 Richard Nixon, ‘Special Message to the Congress on Drug Abuse Prevention and Control’, June 17, 
1971. The American Presidency Project, ed. by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley. 
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3048> [accessed 7 October 2015]. 
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black power, civil rights and anti-war movements, Nixon had been elected under the 
promise of reinstating ‘law and order.’ Following in the tradition of American 
prohibitionism, Nixon identified the use and trade of drugs as an existential threat to 
the functioning of this law and order. Echoing the conception of drugs acting as a 
‘contagion’ that, as I have shown across earlier chapters, was established through 
legislation and discourse since the turn of the century, Nixon decried drugs as ‘a 
problem which afflicts both the body and the soul of America’ and declared that to 
combat this affliction, his administration would initiate a host of new laws and 
policies.19  
It is important to state that not all of Nixon’s anti-drug initiatives were aimed 
at repressing supply. While many laws did increase law enforcement powers 
domestically, Nixon also established a Special Action Office to coordinate research, 
treatment, and educational efforts across the country in a bid to curb demand for 
drugs.20 However, with regard to the international arena, Nixon’s administration 
continued the general trend towards advancing prohibition through increasing the 
force of international law against the producers and suppliers of this ‘contagion’. In 
the June 17th speech given to the Congress of the United States, Nixon declared that in 
order to ‘wage an effective war against heroin addiction, we must have international 
cooperation. In order to secure such cooperation, I am initiating a worldwide 
escalation in our existing programs for the control of narcotics traffic.’ 21 
Acknowledging the use of America’s economic power to further its vision of 
international law, Nixon mentioned in his speech how ‘the United States has already 
pledged $2 million to a Special Fund created on April 1 of this year by the Secretary 
General of the United Nations and aimed at planning and executing a concerted UN 
effort against the world drug problem.’22 However, an escalation of drug prohibition 
would require not only further resources but also further laws, and as a result, the 
Nixon administration campaigned to reinforce the legislative framework of 
international drug prohibition, starting by revisiting the Single Convention. As 
reviewed in the previous chapter, the shift in the centre of gravity of drug prohibition 
from the U.S.A. to an international bureaucracy resulted in a Single Convention that 
                                                
19 Ibid. 
20 William McAllister, Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century (London: Routledge 2000), p.233-
235. 
21 Richard Nixon, ‘Special Message to the Congress on Drug Abuse Prevention and Control’. 
22 Ibid.  
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was not as strict as that envisaged by Harry Anslinger and the American drug 
warriors. However, with the declaration of a War on Drugs, American prohibitionists 
began working towards strengthening the Single Convention. 23  Prohibitionists 
‘aggressively solicited the support of other governments throughout 1971’ and under 
pressure from Washington, the UN decided to host a conference in Geneva in March 
1972 to amend the Single Convention.24  
 
8.2.3 The Protocol Amending The 1961 Single Convention, 1972 
 
The Conference in Geneva in 1972 resulted in the signing of The Protocol 
Amending The 1961 Single Convention (herein referred to as the 1972 Protocol). The 
1972 Protocol had the effect of expanding the membership and the powers of the 
INCB, strengthening the laws targeted specifically at the cultivation of drugs, 
increasing the mechanisms for co-operation amongst international parties, as well as 
recognising the efficacy of demand-side policies such as education and rehabilitation. 
Crucially, the 1972 Protocol also focused on increasing the power of extradition to be 
used as a weapon in the drug war. The power to extradite drug traffickers from the 
developing world to jurisdictions such as the U.S.A, which acclaimed a superior 
system of law, became a power tool for universalising the scope of prohibition 
enforcement. The power of extradition within the treaties further betrays the fallacy 
that all nations were equal in the project of enforcing drug prohibition, the power to 
wield the force of law against the producers and suppliers of drugs continued to 
emanate from the hegemonic western nations, particularly the U.S.A. Extradition 
Article 14 of the 1972 Protocol replaced the weak extradition clause provided in 
Article 36(2)(b) of the Single Convention with a more robust clause that required any 
extradition agreement concluded between two countries to include drug-related 
offences automatically. Neil Boister clarifies that the ‘aim of the American sponsors 
of the amendment was to make drug offences automatically extraditable and thus to 
facilitate extradition between states whose bilateral extradition treaties did not 
mention drug offences or between states that did not have such treaties at all.’25 The 
presumption of extradition in drug cases is that the law will, in practice, facilitate only 
the extradition of traffickers from the Global South being transported to face justice in 
                                                
23 William McAllister, p.235. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Neil Boister, The Suppression Of Illicit Drugs Through International Law, p.201. 
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the Global North, with little thought given to the possibility of this dynamic working 
in reverse. The extradition provisions would become increasingly potent weapons, 
particular for the U.S.A against Latin American drug traffickers as the drug war 
progressed over the following decades. 
Overall, the 1972 Protocol continued the trend of the general escalation of 
international drug prohibition towards fixing as a global legal norm the notion of drug 
use/drug trafficking as an existential threat to humanity. Extradition would become an 
increasingly useful tool in establishing the narcotrafficante as not just a criminal 
within a particular state but as an enemy against a ‘universal mankind.’ In Boister’s 
reading, ‘the 1961, 1971 and 1972 instruments can be seen as a slow and uneven 
progression towards an extension of jurisdiction and a facilitation of extradition.’26 
This progression of increasing legislative power in the area of strict enforcement of 
drug prohibition would reach fruition with the next major development regarding 
international laws on drugs.  
 
8.2.4 The United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs 
and Psychotropic Substances, 1988 
 
Despite (or perhaps as a result of) the plethora of drug prohibition laws 
enacted over the previous decades, the international drugs trade reached 
unprecedented heights in 1980’s. As a result in 1984, the UN General Assembly 
directed the Economic and Social Council to instruct the Commission on Narcotic 
Drugs to begin to draft another convention, this time dealing directly with the issue of 
trafficking.27 Eventually, from the 25th of November to the 20th of December 1988, a 
plenary conference convened in Vienna.28 Delegates from 106 states attended the 
plenary conference, concluding by agreeing the United Nations Convention Against 
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988 (hereafter 
referred to as the 1988 Convention). International law had previously tried to address 
specifically the trafficking aspect of the drugs trade with the 1936 Convention for the 
Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs. However with this treaty being 
the last of the League of Nations treaties, its efficacy was subsumed by the conflict of 
                                                
26 Ibid., p.209. 
27 Ibid., p.62. 
28 Ibid., p.64. 
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the coming Second World War.  
As with the Single Convention, the 1988 Convention sets out its stall in its 
preamble, declaring that `illicit traffic is an international criminal activity.’29 The 
treaty targeted the wider social and economic elements that facilitate narcotics 
trafficking, providing new provisions and expanding existing powers for extradition. 
Article 2 restates that central objective, declaring that the ‘purpose of this Convention 
is to promote co-operation among the Parties so that they may address more 
effectively the various aspects of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic 
substances having an international dimension.’30 Furthermore, following the trend of 
the 1972 Protocol, the 1988 Convention strengthened the extradition provisions in the 
international drug prohibition legal framework making acts such as money 
laundering, or the manufacture, transport, and distribution of equipment and 
precursory substances extraditable offences.31 Extradition to the United States became 
a primary weapon of the drug war over the coming decades. The 1988 Convention 
further concretised the drugs trade as being not just prohibited but also criminalised in 
law. While the Single Convention obligated Parties to make the cultivation of drugs 
‘punishable offences’, the 1988 Convention goes a step further and compels Parties to 
make it a ‘criminal offence.’32 The 1988 Convention came into force on the 11th of 
November 1990, with the new, stringent legislative instrument arriving just in time to 
mark the commencement of the UN’s official ‘Decade Against Drug Abuse’. At a 
plenary meeting on the 23rd of February 1990, the General Assembly adopted a 
resolution declaring ‘the period from 1991 to 2000 the United Nations Decade 
Against Drug Abuse.’33 A global programme of action was agreed to ensure further 
                                                
29 Preamble, 'The United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances 1988. UNODC. <https://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention_1988_en.pdf> [11 
August 2017]. 
30 Article 2, 'The United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances 1988 
31 Article 12, 'The United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances 1988 
32 Article 3, 1, (a) (iv), The United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances 1988: ‘the manufacture, transport or distribution of equipment used in the 
manufacture of illicit drugs, as well as the manufacture, transport or distribution of precursor 
chemicals, knowing that they are used for the illicit manufacture of drugs, have to be made criminal 
offences’. 
33 Paragraph 29, Political Declaration and Global Programme of Action adopted by General Assembly 
at its seventeenth special session, ‘devoted to the question of international co-operation against illicit 
production, supply, demand, trafficking and distribution of narcotic drugs and psychotropic 
substances.’ 
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co-operation on a multilateral level to support the drug prohibition mechanisms that 
had been created by the three major UN drug conventions.  
 The decision by the UN to label the 1990’s as ‘Decade Against Drug Abuse’ 
was not mere hype; the decade would see a dramatic escalation in the War on Drugs. 
The spectre of rivalry that had haunted the international community since the post-
war emergence of the Cold War dissipated with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. 
The U.S.A. became more confident again in its universalist imaginings after the fall 
of the communist bloc, recovering the connection of American internationalism to a 
vision of the inevitable triumph of a moral universalism in a manner that echoed 
James Brown Scott, Elihu Root and the generation of American international lawyers 
who developed this tradition at the start of the century.34 The delay between the 
Single Convention as the major post-war international treaty and the height of the 
drug war in the 1990’s resonates with a similar historical arch with regard to Human 
Rights, as despite the legal framework being implemented in the immediate post-war 
era, it is only with the Carter government deescalating Cold War rivalry for a renewed 
vision of globalisation that Human Rights breakthrough as a project with real 
institutional weight.35 Comparably, drug prohibition only crystallises into a full-scale 
War on Drugs as what George H.W. Bush described as a ‘New World Order’ began to 
appear into view.36 As a result, greater totality in the international legal order allowed 
for an expansion of laws that operated on a global scale, with the rapid increase in 
international drug prohibition enforcement amongst the most explosive of 
instantiations of this trend. As in the first decade of the century, drug prohibition 
again became a key topic of discussion at the American Society of International Law 
meetings. 37  Representing the U.S Department of State, lawyer Robert Kimmitt 
exemplified the renewed confidence of American prohibitionists in the international 
drug war at the American Society of International Law in 1990, stating:  
                                                
34 See a similar argument made in Robert Vitalis, White World Order, Black Power Politics: The Birth 
of American International Relations (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2015), p.165-168. 
35 Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2012). 
36 George H.W. Bush gave a speech entitled ‘Toward a New World Order’, September 11, 1990. (The 
American Presidency Project, ed. by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley) 
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=19253> [accessed 6 January 2017]. For further, see From 
Cold War to New World Order: The Foreign Policy of George H.W. Bush, ed. by Meenekshi Bose and 
Rosanna Perott (Westport: Praeger Publishing, 2002). 
37 Robert M. Kimmitt, ‘International Law in the War on Narcotics’, in  




The longer-term prognosis for this effort, based on a number of 
developments in the past year, is relatively good. Global attention on 
international narcotics control as a key transnational issue has focused 
on international law as an effective vehicle for addressing this 
borderless issue. Policy makers are using the levers of international 
law more vigorously than ever to address this issue. Indeed, the 
prospect of enhanced international legal cooperation may find one of 
its brightest realisations in the world War on Drugs.38 
 
Crediting the U.S.A for leading the way and other governments for co-operating, 
Kimmitt proclaims the 1988 Convention and the renewed investment in the War on 
Drugs as the most significant evolution of international law following the conclusion 
of the Cold War.39 The 1988 Convention is offered not just as the reinforcement of 
the international laws on drugs but as the manifestation of the universalisation of 
American legalism; for Kimmitt the stringent measures aimed at erasing drug 
trafficking in ‘this convention represent the internationalisation of many U.S. legal 
standards to create a level international playing field.’40 Legal force in the endeavour 
of prohibition operates not only through state enforcement against production and 
supply of drugs, but also through asset seizure, shipment interceptions, crop 
eradication and extradition procedures.41 American internationalism would further 
mobilise subtle pressure in order to ensure further compliance with the drug treaties, 
resulting in the countries of the Global South carrying the heaviest burden of 
prohibition. American soft power included tying the enforcement of drug prohibition 
to other international obligations, providing large amounts of funding to the CND and 
other UN organisations and developing an annual system of certification, which 
ensured countries complied with Washington's anti-drug policies on penalty of losing 
American financial assistance or trade relations.42 Through this expansive territorial 
scope, the universality of the War on Drugs was reinforced so as to provide no 
jurisdictional exterior to prohibition to which traffickers could escape. Kimmit 
captures the optimism of this moment in the closing sentence of his ASIL 
presentation, stating:  
                                                
38 Ibid., p.304. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid., p.305. 
41 Ibid. 
42 William McAllister, p.235. 
	  234	  
 
If we can meet the challenge of expanding and adapting international 
law to assist all nations in this transnational War on Drugs, future 
casebooks will conclude, in their final chapter, that the potential of 
international law was well realized and humanity well served.43  
 
Such belief in the War on Drugs as being able to universally eradicate the ‘evil’ of 
non-legitimate drug use reached its zenith in this epoch. The age of globalisation fully 
crystallised the understanding of drugs as a contagious embodiment of a negation of 
humanity that had been cultivated over the previous century of prohibition. With 
international law’s vision of universal humanity becoming more confident in light of 
the decline of Cold War rivalry, the temptation to construct a ‘new problem of evil’ as 
Mark Fisher describes it and to lock any failings of the system within a set of objects 
that could be then externalised, informed the increasing ambition of drug prohibition 
in this moment.44 The confidence that informed the ‘Decade Against Drug Abuse’ is 
perhaps most clearly illustrated by the 1998 United Nations General Assembly 
Special Session on the World Drug Problem, which was held under the slogan: ‘A 
Drug Free World – We Can Do It’.45 Yet the empirical failure of the drug war to 
achieve its stated objectives of ‘a drug free world’ is detailed by the ever-increasing 
numbers of drug use, trade, addiction and deaths that have accompanied the timespan 
of prohibition.46 After analysing not only the specific laws that govern international 
drug prohibition but also the historical, political and intellectual contexts in which 
these laws emerged, I return to the problematic that provoked my argument, asking 
whether the empirical failure of the drug war, as evidenced by the piling of bodies on 
top of bodies in the impossible, indefinite attempt to enforce the provisions of the law, 
can further understandings of the relationship between global legal ordering and 
legalised violence in the contemporary moment? What does international law’s 
fidelity to a war that persistently fails to meet its own stated objectives tell us about 
the workings of war after war and how law seeks to manage global violence?  
 
 
                                                
43 Ibid., p.307. 
44 Mark Fisher, “The New Problem of Evil” in Aeshetic Justice: Intersecting Artistic and Moral 
Perspectives ed. by Pascal Gielen and Niels Van Tomme (Amsterdam: Valiz 2015)pp.45-55, p.50 
45 See the 1998 United Nations General Assembly: Special Session on the World Drug Problem, 8-10 
June 1998. <http://www.un.org/ga/20special/> [accessed 8 October 2016]. 
46 See Introductory chapter 
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8.3 Why War? 
‘We intend to do what is necessary to end the drug menace 
…to eliminate… this dark, evil enemy within.’ 
President Ronald Reagan47 
 
 
Over and above offering a comprehensive review of the international laws on 
drugs since the 1909 Shanghai Opium Convention, this thesis synthesises 
post/decolonial theory and political-theological readings of law by arguing for 
understanding the War on Drugs as an instantiation of a sacrificial international law. 
As previously mentioned, Richard Nixon first employed the idea of a ‘War on Drugs’ 
in 1971 and as a phrase to describe the international prohibition of drugs, it was 
further popularised during the presidencies of Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush and 
Bill Clinton in the 1980’s and 1990’s. Each president advocated a militarisation of 
drug prohibition at a discursive as well as material level. In a 1982 radio address to 
the nation, Reagan declared that ‘few things in my life have frightened me as much as 
the drug epidemic’ before defiantly declaring ‘we've taken down the surrender flag 
and run up the battle flag […] we're going to win the War on Drugs.’48 In a famous 
1989 speech, Reagan’s successor, George H.W Bush, held up a bag of ‘crack cocaine 
seized […] by Drug Enforcement agents in a park just across the street from the 
White House’ advancing an idea that drugs being so close to the seat of American 
state power being an act of aggression by the transgressive substances themselves that 
had to be retaliated against. Bush duly responded in kind with escalated military 
rhetoric, concluding his speech by declaring ‘the War on Drugs will be hard-won, 
neighborhood by neighborhood, block by block, child by child.’49 Following Bush, 
and illustrating the scale of the embrace of the drug war across the American political 
spectrum, a change in the government to Bill Clinton and the Democrats did not 
herald much change in the rhetoric or polices of the U.S. government in pursuit of 
drug prohibition. In a speech at the end of his presidency made alongside his 
Colombian counterpart Andres Pastrana, Clinton commended Colombia for having 
                                                
47 Ronald Reagan, ‘Remarks Announcing Federal Initiatives Against Drug Trafficking and Organized 
Crime’, October 14, 1982. The American Presidency Project, ed. by Gerhard Peters and John T. 
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48 Ronald Reagan, ‘Radio Address to the Nation on Federal Drug Policy’, October 2, 1982, The 
American Presidency Project, ed. by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley. 
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=43085> [accessed 11 August 2017]. 
49 George H.W Bush, ‘Address to the Nation on the National Drug Control Strategy’, September 5, 
1989. The American Presidency Project, ed. by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley 
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=17472> [accessed 11 August 2017] 
	  236	  
taken on the ‘cause of burden sharing in the war on illegal drugs across the globe’ and 
assured Pastrana that they would no longer have to carry so much of ‘the burden of 
the international drug war.’50 The description of the international effort to prohibit 
drugs as being a ‘War on Drugs’ has been subsumed into popular discourse, inviting 
the questions about the attraction of the concept of war to describe an ostensibly 
humanitarian international legal project that this thesis has worked to unpack. Drug 
prohibition was characterised in its defining legislative instrument as saving 
‘mankind’ from an existential ‘evil’; what form did war take when enacted not by 
nation against nation but being managed by a collective arrogation of humanity 
against a common, internal enemy? Moreover, with the drug war being produced 
through, rather than against the United Nations - an institution established to save 
‘succeeding generations from the scourge of war’- how does it reconcile with the 
international law’s post-war commitment to cohering a universal peace? 51  The 
following sections will seek to draw some insight from the drug war into the nature of 
‘new war’ under contemporary international law. 
 
8.3.1 On Law and New War 
 
Like the description of drugs as ‘evil’ in the Single Convention, the use of the 
idea of ‘war’, is never merely a question of semantics. Particularly within the 
discourse of international law, to name something as a war shapes the form in which 
it is realised.52 In his major intervention on the relationship between war and law, 
David Kennedy argues that when ‘we call what we are doing “war,” we mean to 
stress its discontinuity from the normal routines of peacetime. Differences among us 
are now to be set aside.’53 However, as Kennedy’s work further elaborates, while war 
continues to create unity through opposition to a common enemy, in the current 
historical moment, war does not so much mark a discontinuity from the everyday, but 
instead it becomes a force that is performed through our daily routines, including 
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through the workings of the law. Rather than international law being a pacifying 
force, or at least an overarching mechanism detached from war and judging its 
legality, it has become a vehicle which war works itself through. In Kennedy’s words, 
‘warfare has become a modern legal institution.’54 War is spoken into being by the 
determinations of international law, through the construction of a particular enemy as 
being against a universal humanity, and thereby allowing ‘killing, maiming, 
humiliating, wounding people…[to be]…legally privileged, authorised, permitted, 
and justified.’55 To appreciate war as working its way through international law, 
rather than against international law, is essential for making sense of the changes that 
the nature of war has undergone following the end of the Second World War. 
Violence persists in the international order following law’s commitment to banish the 
‘scourge of war’ but violence becomes the protection of a ‘universal’ conception of 
humanity that only the transgression of can legitimises a purifying violence as a just 
response. 
The exponential growth of the destructive capacities of military technology 
over the course of the two world wars made traditional war, as in symmetrical war 
between rival sovereign nation-states, an increasingly apocalyptic prospect.56 The 
Cold War maintained a state of paralysis between the rival blocs due to the mutually 
destructive capabilities of both parties. The absence of direct, full-scale military 
conflict between the U.S.A and USSR added support to the argument that history had 
moved passed symmetrical warfare. Of course, the Cold War cannot be merely taken 
as a triumph of a new era of international peace. Globally, the Cold War resulted in a 
mountain of casualties, mostly in the theatre of what was termed the Third World; the 
unacknowledged third-term anchoring the two rival power blocs. The post-WWII 
decline in symmetrical warfare has not caused the end of all international conflict. 
Rather, scholars of international law and international relations began to talk of the 
emergence of the ‘new wars.’57 
The fervour that informed the moral universalism of post-WWII international 
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law was indebted to an ostensible opposition to war and violence. The production of a 
universal peace was the raison d’être of the United Nations as it aimed to end ‘the 
scourge of war.’58 Not only through the establishment of the UN, but also through the 
development of the Nuremberg principles and the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, the post-war moment acclaimed a legislative framework that permanently 
contained the potential of mimetic conflict erupting inter-nationally. However, the 
grand humanitarian claims masked how the cohering of an international legal order, 
particularly through normative demands such as the demand for universal prohibition 
of drugs, continued to require the violence of law to be managed and wielded out. 
Therefore, while a decline in the mode of conflict that was the concern of this 
moment of international law came about, – symmetrical war between rival, major 
sovereign nation-states – the mutation towards what has been termed the ‘new wars’ 
has produced conflicts that escape previous theoretical models of war by being 
indeterminate, abstracted and with no defined point of conclusion. A body of 
literature has emerged tracing these changes in the nature of war; a common assertion 
among many theorists of ‘new war’ is that by the turn of the twenty-first century, 
understandings of globalised violence must extend beyond those offered by the 
common reading of Carl von Clausewitz, the major theorist of international war.  
Nineteenth-century Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz provided 
the canonical account of modern international conflict with his famed treatise, entitled 
On War.59 Clausewitz’s engagement with the nature of war following modern state 
formation produced the famous description of war as ‘the continuation of policy 
[politics] by other means.’60 This description spoke to a continuity that exists between 
political objectives and acts of war; war is an instrument of politics that is wielded to 
achieve specific aims.61 As Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri state, Clausewitz’s 
recognition of war as a continuation of politics ‘represented a moment of 
enlightenment insofar as it conceived war as a form of political action and/or sanction 
and thus implied an international legal framework of modern warfare.’62 However, the 
Clausewitzian definition as commonly employed is premised on an incompatibility of 
war with normal human interest, viewing the politics in which war functions as the 
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continuation of the competing objectives of sovereign states, as opposed to the 
everyday ordering of human life. Moreover, the understanding of war as being 
instrumentalised to produce specific outcomes is complicated by the shift of the 
nature of war away from conflicts between nation-states to the ‘new wars’ which blur 
the distinction between a state of war and a state of peace. Hardt and Negri provide a 
telling account of the birth of new war, historicising its emergence to the United 
States and the Soviet Union signing the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 1972, after 
which ‘[w]ar became constrained. Rather than all-out, large-scale combat, the great 
superpowers began to engage in high-intensity police actions.’63 War in this mode 
does not threaten the global social and legal order as it had in the first half of the 
twentieth century; it rather becomes a means for constructing and reproducing that 
order.64  
A further element of this paradoxical legitimate violence sustaining order is 
that the condition of the violence is perpetual; a key marker of new war is an 
indefinite character. Hardt and Negri elaborate by stating: 
 
A war to create and maintain social order can have no end. It must 
involve the continuous, uninterrupted exercise of power and violence. In 
other words, one cannot win such a war, or, rather, it has to be won again 
every day. War has thus become virtually indistinguishable from police 
activity.65 
 
The historical synchronicity between Hardt and Negri’s birth date for ‘new war’, 
Richard Nixon’s signing of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 1972, and the same 
president declaring a ‘War on Drugs’ less than a year earlier is immediately striking. 
In colloquial terms, ‘war’ is often used as a metaphor, however, the difference 
between the drug war and the using war metaphorically is that the violence of the 
drug war, while perhaps abstracted, is not figurative. Hardt and Negri recognise that it 
is ‘with the War on Drugs, […] and more so with the twenty-first-century war on 
terrorism, the rhetoric of war begins to develop a more concrete character.’66 The drug 
war, paving the way for the War on Terror, was more than the use of war as a 
metaphor but also employed the methods of armed combat, lethal force, incarceration, 
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violence, asset seizure and land dispossession that are common in traditional war. 
Drawing upon a synthesise of police and military power, the ‘new wars’ tend to 
penetrate beyond the realm presumed of traditional sovereign state conflict; in these 
conflicts ‘there is increasingly little difference between outside and inside, between 
foreign conflicts and homeland security’ and this is a dynamic that clearly marks the 
drug war. 67  
 The new wars are notably indeterminate, both spatially and temporally; they 
are not wars executed by one nation-state or one empire against another, but instead 
invoke for all humanity to be conscripted against a common enemy. Moreover, the 
abstraction that is common to ‘new wars’ informs the definition of this enemy. The 
discursive construction of the ‘new objects of War – drugs, terrorism’– function so 
that these enemies are not antagonisms in the classical mode of an enemy at war, not 
recognised rivals as most common of inter-state conflict; they are rather conceived as 
contagions within a universal order, ‘symptoms of a disordered reality that poses a 
threat to security.’68 As explored in my previous discussions on the theodicy of 
modernity, the conception of the universal as a holistic singularity produces enemies 
of the universal as internal enemies, denigrated forms of the ideal that serve as ‘an 
experimentum crucis for the definition of legitimacy’ demonstrating not only what the 
force of international law opposes but what it saves us from within ourselves.69 As 
Mark Fisher describes, the imagining of our enemies as internal contagions betray a 
persisting failure of ostensibly secularised discourses, such as law, to imagine 
alternative ways of constituting themselves outside appeal to the theological, ‘we 
know there are no grounds anymore for belief in evil, yet we find ourselves unable to 
give up acting as if we believe in it.’70 The structure of ‘new war’ illustrates how, in 
service of a humanitarian impulse, the contagions that are the ‘evil’ enemy in this 
mode of war become what must be purified for the unified order of humanity to 
cohere itself.  
However, despite being indebted to their work, a point of departure I hold 
between my reading of the drug war and the functioning of ‘new war’ as described by 
Hardt and Negri comes in their understanding the ‘new wars’ as signalling the decline 
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of international law and ‘the rise in its stead of a global or imperial form of law.’71 
Hardt and Negri, taking a narrow, Westphalian understanding of international law as 
the positive law governing the interactions of competing sovereign nations, seek to 
employ the concept of ‘global law’ as a distinct mode of reading the totalising scope 
of legal violence at the turn of the millennium.72 In contrast, my reading of the 
‘origins’ of international law in Vitorian jurisprudence shifts focus to the totalising, 
cohering impulse already present within international law.  
Hardt and Negri overlook the significance of the recovery of Vitoria within 
the American internationalism that they then go on to credit as bringing about the rise 
of ‘global’ law. Moreover, their reading of the ‘new wars’ located them as operating 
primarily on a biopolitical register, taking new war’s internalisation of conflict within 
the communal whole to betray a managerialism being enacted on the global body 
politic, which leads to a disciplinary mechanism producing the ideal post-modern 
subject. Absent from this mode of critique is a full appreciation of juridical-
theological underpinnings of international law’s totalising impulse. The blurring of 
war and peace effected by ‘the new war’ allows for a violence, I would argue, better 
understood as sacrificial, in that it aims to produce order through legitimised violence. 
Placing international law’s ‘origin’ within Vitoria’s translation of the deific order of 
being onto a jurisprudence accounting for Amerindian-Spanish (mis)relations, allows 
for a re-reading of Hardt and Negri’s shifting of ‘international law’ into ‘global law’ 
as instead the (re)turn to the origins of international law. By this I mean a law focused 
on the ‘inter’ of the international, law as not merely a technology for control and 
management of globalisation but law as concerned with producing an immanent 
communality among sovereign states. A longer reading of history sees the shifts in 
twentieth-century internationalism as not merely the emergence of post-modern, 
biopolitical violence but as a (re)turn to a sacrificial violence that, I have argued, 
produced and sustained the arrogated universalism of Euro-modernity.  
Reading Hardt and Negri’s conception of ‘new war’ in relation to Vitoria 
takes us back to Vitoria’s lectures on Spanish-Amerindian relations, and particularly 
his lectures on the law of war, written as a continuation of his thoughts on the 
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jurisdictional position of the De Indis.73 Here, Vitoria posits war as a method through 
which the universal can bring about the transformation in the subjective condition of 
the Amerindian. In this lecture, Vitoria anchored the jurisdictional basis for just war 
in the responsibility to intervene on behalf on the natives: legal violence legitimised 
by the impulse to save the natives from themselves. Subsequently, contemporary 
scholars have identified in Vitoria’s lecture the origins of what would, centuries later, 
come to be called humanitarian intervention.74 In the post-war international legal 
order, despite the United Nations Charter proclaiming against unprovoked attacks by 
one sovereign state upon another, humanitarian intervention, militarised action to 
prevent the abuse of human rights within a state, became an increasingly common 
basis for war. Returning to the Vitorian origin of humanitarian intervention, a 
sustaining element can be spied in the recognition of this form of corrective warfare 
being, in Vitoria own words, ‘perpetual.’75 Vitoria states that ‘when the war is at that 
pass that the indiscriminate spoliation of all enemy-subjects alike and the seizure of 
all their goods are justifiable, then it is also justifiable to carry all enemy-subjects off 
into captivity, whether they be guilty or guiltless.’76 We can see that within this 
schema, where the basis for the war is the transformation of the Amerindian into a 
universal subject, the war becomes absolute, unbound by the restrictions and 
limitations that apply in conflicts between recognised sovereign states. The aim of the 
conflict is not the defeat of another sovereign’s military force, which would be 
achieved through obtaining a recognisable set of objectives, but it is instead to bring a 
population into communality with a universal mankind, a task that carries the 
potential for temporal and spatial indeterminacy. The structure of Vitoria’s war of 
intervention is what I have described as sacrificial with its basis being in the marking 
out of a subject or group of subjects from the totalising universal norm, before it then 
‘justifies the waging of a limitless war’ upon those subjects in order to constitute the 
oneness of the universal.77  
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8.3.2 Asymmetrical Warfare and the Contemporary Futility of Sacrifice 
 
With a greater appreciation of the sacrificial impulse behind the ‘new war’ 
than that offered by Hardt and Negri, Rene Girard offers his own sustained 
engagement with challenge of late twentieth/early twenty-first century war and the 
shift away from the what has been taken to be the Clausewitzian model of 
international conflict. In one of his final works, a dialogue with collaborator Benoît 
Chantre entitled Battling to the End, Girard reads the mimetic crisis that always 
haunts the international society as having escaped the confines of the sacrificial 
mechanism, reading within Clausewitz’s canonical account of modern international 
warfare the recognition of this always present potential for absolute war to escape the 
limitations of legal ordering.78 Girard emphasised that Clausewitz’s famed conception 
of war as instrumentalised for political gain only arrives after the Prussian General’s 
initial consideration that the real driver of international conflict may in fact be an 
undercurrent primordial rivalry that lusts after war for war’s sake. Clausewitz 
acknowledges a potential for mimetic violence to engulf any basis for order. 
However, after flirting with conceptualising war as an ‘absolute manifestation of 
violence’, Clausewitz ultimately concludes that, in practice, war is contained by the 
machinations of political ambitions, stating that ‘war springs from some political 
purpose, it is natural that the prime cause of its existence will remain the supreme 
consideration in conducting it.’79 Ultimately for Clausewitz the calculations of the 
practical warfare would function as a restraint against the realisation of the theoretical 
absolute war. However, Girard reads within Clausewitz’s early speculation on 
absolute war a shared recognition of war as perhaps always already being not a	  political	   but ‘a total social phenomenon.’80 For Girard, an ostensible focus on the 
military strategies and political objectives of ‘real wars’ in On War only masks the 
haunting presence of ‘absolute war’ operating underneath, the fear of violence 
released from its confines without a point of conclusion in sight. Moreover, Girard 
continues to argue that as the Second World War had functioned as the apotheosis of 
symmetrical warfare between sovereign nation states and empires, the new mode of 
conflict- what Hardt and Negri would independently call ‘new war’- removed the idea 
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of total war from the category of abstraction and made it reality.  
Understanding contemporary global conflict as evidence of his theory of 
mimetic violence, Girard tries to recover the underdeveloped concept of ‘absolute 
war,’ discarded after the early chapters of On War. This apocalyptic shadow, ever-
haunting the presupposition of war as the extension of politics, bears relevance for the 
post-Second World War, globalised legal order. Absolute war exceeds political 
expediency, it is rather a full expression of the mimetic rivalry Girard shows as 
underscoring all conflict. Girard reads Clausewitz as having intuitions very similar to 
his own.81 Through a re-reading of the work of the Prussian General, Girard was able 
to translate his work from an anthropological setting to become a lens through which 
to view international crisis in the late twentieth century.82 The mimetic crisis that 
erupted in the twentieth century had lain in-potentia since the Napoleonic 
expansionism that informed Clausewitz’s writings.83 With the aftermath of the Second 
World War bring an end to the age of formal empires, the international community 
ostensibly lacked an organising logic. After this point Girard argues that  ‘violence 
steals a march on politics’, as war becomes an endeavour in which ‘victory can no 
longer be relative, it can only be total.’84 In this structure, enemies in war are no 
longer political rivals to be defeated but existential threats who must be wholly 
eradicated. Recalling Vitoria’s criteria for a just war being the transgression of the 
‘universal’ norms of jus gentium, the ‘universalism’ of post-war liberal international 
law gives rise to the very spectre is seeks to contain: ‘total war’, only the war of 
annihilation is not enacted against all but upon just particular embodiments of 
universal negation.  
Written in relation to the aftermath of 9/11, Battling to the End conceptualises 
the international order at the turn of the millennium as functioning as an accelerated 
‘worldwide empire of violence.’85 The globalisation of post-war legal order had given 
rise to the acceleration of undifferentiation, escalating the mimetic crisis. However, 
Girard places his focus on the War on Terror as an example of the contemporary 
failure of scapegoating to produce unanimity. Whereas in archaic social orders, the 
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sacrificial mechanism could focus violence upon ‘a victim whose destruction made 
the return to order possible,’ the juridical inheritance of process in modernity was 
disturbed by the ruptures of violence that marked the first half of the twentieth 
century, particularly the apocalyptic potential of Auschwitz and Hiroshima. That 
‘there can no longer be any unanimity about the guilt of the victims,’ thereby unmasks 
the fallacy of a distinction between the community and the scapegoat.86 However, 
absent from Girard’s reading of post-war world order is a sustained consideration of 
the major shift towards undifferentiation following the end of the Second World War: 
decolonisation. Girard fails to engage with formal decolonisation and the way in 
which post-war international law tries to erase the strict colonial division between the 
peoples of the world but only through the (impossible) attempt to ‘develop’ the 
colonised into the same form of the colonisers, imposing a (Europeanised) single 
standard of morality across a universal humanity. However, ‘dynamics of difference’ 
still persist within this universal and this can be seen in how violence in the 
international order is not released everywhere, rather certain areas and populations 
provide a vastly disproportionate amount of the casualties.  
Girard’s acknowledgement of the massacre of civilians occurring through the 
War on Terror stops short of accounting for the geographic and racialised asymmetry 
of the violence being enacted in by ‘new war.’ The frame of war in these conflicts has 
drawn a preponderance of victims from those categorised within what Judith Butler 
calls ‘ungrievable life.’87 The shift to ‘new war’ crystallised the ‘division of the globe 
into grievable and ungrievable lives from the perspective of those who wage war.’88 
Furthermore, this division has not occurred upon arbitrary lines; crucial to the 
violence of the drug war within a liberal, post-war international legal order is the 
subjective identities of its predominant victims, peoples disproportionately drawn 
from peoples and regions formerly colonised. As acknowledged throughout this 
thesis, the structure of prohibition enforcement has ensured that the force of the law 
would fall heaviest on those countries where organic, plant-based drugs are produced, 
upon indigenous peoples whose subjectivity was seen as discursively intertwined with 
these transgressive substances and upon racially subaltern communities traditionally 
excluded from the ‘legitimate’ economic sphere, thereby attracted to this illegitimate 
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counter-side of global trade. While post-war decolonisation erased the formal colonial 
distinctions between peoples in facilitation of the rise of a universal conception of 
humanity, the new wars, subsequently invoked in defence of that very conception of 
universal humanity, re-inscribe the racial and geographical distinctions between 
European and non-European peoples, while, in law repudiating any hierarchy of life 
presumed between these categories. 
Reading Clausewitz in opposition to his great contemporary Hegel, Girard’s 
insight is in recognising that the Hegelian dialectic offered as productive of the order 
of Euro-modernity in fact takes the form of a duel; ‘merciless battle between twins,’ 
leading to escalation unless contained by the sacrifice of the unrecognised third 
term.89 However, whilst Girard offers a corrective to Clausewitz’s ultimate retreat into 
the prospect of politics rather than sacrifice containing mimetic war, Frantz Fanon 
offers a further corrective of Girard’s myopia over how sacrifice functions in 
globalised political order by specifying a condition of lived subjectivity – the 
‘dammed’ of the earth- whose endurance of legitimised violence function in much the 
same manner as scapegoats but in service of a ‘universal’ humanity. Fanon illustrates 
that the colonised/racial subaltern figure acts as the unrecognised third term that 
underwrites the Hegelian dialectic. 90  Those subjects and geographical regions 
produced in Euro-modernity as the site of colonial extraction are excluded from the 
reciprocity that is the foundation not only of Hegelian dialectics but also of 
international legal subjectivity. Fanon understands the colonised/racially subaltern 
subject is the invisible third anchoring the Hegelian dialectic of recognition, excluded 
from the sphere of reciprocity and yet imprisoned within its midst. Oscar Guardiola-
Rivera captures this argument in his own critique of the communality within legal 
ordering, stating that: 
 
The premise according to which Group Survival is necessarily 
desirable and conflict undesirable serves as a screen that blinds us 
from the truth: that the security and survival of the group (defined in 
terms of reciprocal visibility) […] depends upon the sacrifice of the 
absent person, Fanon’s colonised black person.91 
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Through his reading of Clausewitz, Girard understands international order as not 
realising itself through organic synthesis but rather through reference to sacrifice in 
order to contain absolute war. However, by overlooking the parallels between the 
form taken by post-war decolonisation and the process of undifferentiation, Girard 
fails to appreciate the racial component of the asymmetry of violence within ‘new 
war.’ Could this oversight be corrected through an engagement with the drug war 
prior to the War on Terror? Exemplifying much of the post-Clausewitzian shift in 
warfare, the drug war operates against a symbolic enemy, but one seen as embodied 
in the figure of the drug addict or trafficker and in the transgressive substances that 
they trade, in defence of a totalising notion of humanity. 92  The preamble of the 
Single Convention, as analysed in the previous chapter, provides a particularly telling 
example of this structure. As the totalising notion of humanity that grounds 
international legal order must be consistently reproduced to sustain itself, the drug 
war becomes perpetual and absolute, a war that is an end in itself. In the laws that 
established the War on Drugs as a global norm can be understood as a declaration of 
absolute war against the discursively produced universal negation but masked in the 
moral language of humanitarianism.	  The perpetual nature of the drug war is betrayed 
by the ever-growing numbers of shipments seized, acres eradicated, and drug 
traffickers arrested as evidence of the success of the law, ignore the on-going 
impossibility of reducing drug use, supply or trade of drugs.93  
 A major consequence of the drug war has been the expansion of the black 
population in prison, not only in the U.S.A but in countries such as the U.K. and 
Brazil as well.94 The war announced by Nixon in the aftermath of the end of formal 
legal racial discrimination in America and as shown in my earlier chapters the long 
history of drug prohibition has been indebted to racialised fears of contagion from the 
onset. The correlative expansion of police power, the prison system and the global 
scope of American hegemonic power through the drug laws remain informed by these 
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historic fears. A wealth of academic scholarship and empirical policy research has 
established the links between the enhancement of drug laws century and the late 
twentieth century explosion of the prison population.95 The drug war, famously 
decried as ‘the New Jim Crow’ by Michelle Alexander, contributed greatly to a 
situation in which ‘the United States imprisons a larger percentage of its black 
population than South Africa did at the height of apartheid.’96 Angela Y. Davis 
provides the racial dimension missed by the Foucauldian critique of prisons as 
disciplinary mechanisms, by emphasising how the phenomenal rise in drug-related 
imprisonment following the 1980’s escalation of the drug war illuminates the pivotal 
role played by racism in sustaining society’s ideological investment in prisons.97 
Moreover, Ruth Wilson Gilmore illustrates the relationship between the drug laws 
and the three-strikes law implemented in California, leading to a flood of new bodies 
entering the prison system for life, over three-quarters of which were Black and 
Latino.98 The consequences of imprisonment for drug trafficking, particularly in the 
U.S.A, are so severe that they are not adequately described as a mere temporary 
denial of liberty but as visiting upon the convict what Colin Dayan describes as a 
‘civil death’, a long-term loss of personhood that goes ‘way beyond the logic of 
punishment’ though barring the individual from access to many of the necessities of 
life (employment/housing/political representation) even long after release. 99  The 
prohibition of drugs led to a redeployment and crystallisation of notions of the 
inherent criminality of the Black populations of Europe and America; a discursive 
symbiosis between illicit peoples and illicit substances result in the contemporary 
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system of mass incarceration being built on the back of these mythologies. 100 
Moreover, drug laws have been utilised to reinforce violent border policing.101 The 
end of the twentieth century would see Latin America emerge as a major frontier of 
the drug war. Two countries in particular – Colombia and Mexico – became the main 
theatres of conflict and the remainder of this chapter will focus on the impact of drug 
enforcement on these regions.102 
 
 
8.4 Plan Colombia and The Making of a Limpieza 
 
 
An especially potent exemplar of the escalation of the War on Drugs in the 
1990’s came with an initiative referred to as Plan Colombia. Colombia had become 
the world’s largest cocaine supplier after deindustrialisation and neoliberal 
agricultural reforms resulted in driving those cast out by the ‘legitimate economy’ 
into the illicit production market.103 Oscar Guardiola-Rivera reads the drug war and 
neoliberalism as twin elements of a Janus-faced ‘humanitarian intervention’ into 
Colombia by the U.S.A.104 In this form, ‘humanitarianism’ has the effect of de-
politicizing war, making the destruction of both human and plant life and the seizure 
of land and resources from indigenous/Afro-Colombian populations appear as a moral 
endeavour, enacted to save them from themselves. Furthermore, the drugs trade was 
equated with radical opposition groups such as FARC and ELN.105 Following a 
deterioration in relations between America and Colombia over counter-narcotics 
policy during the 1990’s, with the U.S.A refusing to certify Colombia as co-operating 
in the War on Drugs in 1996 and 1997 over suspicions that Colombian President 
Ernesto Samper Pizano had ties with the Cali Cartel, his successor President Andrés 
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Pastrana re-established ties with America. In 1999, Pastrana secured the return of U.S 
certification before drawing up an aid plan for Colombia to provide sustainable 
economic support to cultivators. However, as Julia Buxton informs us, American 
directives redirected what had become ‘Plan Colombia’ from a peace plan into a 
battle plan, as ‘nearly 80 per cent of the financing provided by the USA was ring-
fenced for military assistance, with the entire funding package dependent on 
Colombian acceptance of an eradication strategy based on aerial fumigation.’106 
Whilst the original intention for Plan Colombia had been to combine an increase in 
enforcement capabilities with greater investment in development and social 
programmes, in practice the scheme privileged the militarisation of drug enforcement 
with the legal and security infrastructure of the country being strengthened in 
anticipation of an escalation of the drug war as entwined with other 
counterinsurgency initiatives.107 Plan Colombia’s goal was to reduce the cultivation, 
processing, and distribution of illegal narcotics by 50% in 6 years. 108 The failure of 
Plan Colombia is evident from the reports of the United States Government 
Accountability Office, which found that coca cultivation and cocaine production in 
Colombia had increased by about 15% and 4%, respectively between 2000-2006.109 
This increase occurred despite the U.S State and Defense departments providing 
nearly $4.9 billion to the Colombian military and National Police Force to combat 
narcotic trafficking and $1.3 billion for a wide range of social, economic, and justice 
sector programs between 2000-2008.110 Moreover, in contradiction to the presumption 
of the Colombian drug war as being ‘lawless’, Plan Colombia directed much of its 
funding towards reinforcing the rule of law. $239 million was spent on expanding 
legal reach against drug traffickers through judicial reform and legal capacity 
building.111 This expansion of the rule of law, as opposed to bringing about a decline 
in cocaine production, resulted in the escalation of a ‘drug-fuelled conflict [that] 
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killed 32,436 people between 1998 and 2008 and displaced an additional 3.4 million,’ 
while cocaine production from Colombia increased by 17% over the same period.112  
In this moment the relationship between law and violence appears as complementary 
rather than oppositional. As legal scholar Alvaro Santos highlights, to read the crisis 
of the drug war in areas such as Colombia as an example of lawlessness fails to 
appreciate the extent to which the violence is produced through, rather than against, 
the law. Santos details that:   
 
The illegal market, its producers, suppliers, distributers, and 
consumers do not operate in a lawless world but in one constituted by 
multiple layers of law: international conventions that declare some 
substances illegal and forbid their commerce, domestic regulation that 
criminalizes their production, distribution, and consumption, and so 
on. So the first task is to identify the legal regimes at play, not only 
the foreground regime governing drugs, but the background regimes 
governing the sale and distribution of weapons, as well as financial 
laws governing-implicitly-what cartels can do with their proceeds.113 
 
Upon understanding the violence of the drug war as working through the laws on 
prohibition, the increase of the rule of law through Plan Colombia coinciding with an 
increase in violence and cocaine production no longer appears contradictory; it is 
rather consistent within a sacrificial legal order. After touring Cali, Colombia in 2001 
(in the midst of Plan Colombia) Michael Taussig provides an immersive account of 
sacrificial violence being visited upon this region through the method of the 
anthropologist's field diary, later published as Law in a Lawless Land. 114 Subsuming 
himself into the communities of Amerindians and peasants who are the primary 
victims of Colombia’s drug war violence, Taussig learns from these communities the 
operative functions that this legitimised violence plays from the perspective of those 
who experience it. Subtitling this book as the ‘Diary of a Limpieza in Colombia’, 
Taussig places the focus on the purifying power underlying the violence in Colombia, 
which was popular described as a Limpieza – the cleansing. As a word, Limpieza 
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contains two interwoven understandings in common usage in Colombia: the older 
meaning referring to a traditional practice of spiritual healing which cleanses the body 
of sick person or house after it has been infested by malevolent sorcery; however, in 
the wake political violence within the country, limpieza took on an additional 
meaning as the description for the public acts of purifying violence.115 This time 
concerned with cleansing the corrupting forces of a body politic rather than the body 
of a person, limpieza came to refer to the, often public, slaughtering of ‘undesirables’ 
by paramilitary forces. Those determined to be delinquents or degenerates, a category 
that recycled familiar tropes of peoples involved in drugs or in league with the 
guerrillas, are purified from the social order through mass execution. Among those 
rendered most exposed to this violence are those known locally as ‘Vicioso’, meaning 
‘druggie’.116 Drugs are awarded a transformative power here again, capable of turning 
a life into something sacrificial, serving as an agent of the contagion. The limpieza 
carries out the act of sacrifice, purifying the internal contagion with the promise of 
containing violence with violence but instead just providing the structure for perpetual 
war. 
 Taussig’s title captures the presence of the law within this context of sacrificial 
violence; the limpieza doesn’t happen outside of the gaze of the law but again, often 
realises itself through the law. While the public executions may be carried out by 
paramilitaries, these killings are often state-sponsored or at best occur under the 
complicit gaze of the state. Disturbing the presumption that such violence happens in 
the absence of law, Taussig describes: 
 
The brazenness of the killing today takes your breath away, in broad 
daylight, in the street – the exact opposite of anonymity. This is not 
some remote hamlet where are no police or law courts. This is a town 
just forty-five minutes by road from Cali, police, 5 judges, 3 district 
attorneys, a jail with 120 prisoners, and an elaborate judicial system.117  
 
 
Whilst the ostensible targets of the limpieza are narcotrafficantes/guerrillas, the 
expansive scope of the violence and the impunity with which it is enacted allow the 
production of a constant fear and uncertainty amongst the general population as ‘one 
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never really knows who next will be murdered, tortured, intimidated, or run-out-of-
town.’118   
The entire region that Taussig visits, Valle del Cauca, in the Cali region of 
Colombia that endured the brunt of the drug war, could be read to exist in juridical 
theodicy that parallels Fanon’s ‘zone of non-being’.119 The population exists within 
the scope of the law but in a condition of exclusion, allowing for violence enacted 
upon their being to not sufficiently disturb the order of the law. Instead, one could 
argue, it even constitutes and sustains the order of the law, recalling the notion of 
sacrifice. Drawing on both Benjamin and Nietzsche’s critique of legal violence, 
Taussig describes how ‘the violence of law is not only a question of guns, handcuffs, 
and gaols, but, far worse, what gives that violence its edge and its lip-smacking 
satisfaction is deceit in the service of justice [. . .] is it so surprising that the paras and 
the police are virtually the same?’120 Of course, Taussig does recognise that the 
representatives of the law are not the only source of violence in the region and he 
notes that the traffickers are not above employing paramilitaries to wield 
indiscriminate violence amongst target populations themselves.121 However, despite 
their shared contributions to the culture of violence, Taussig does not suggest that we 
accept any false equivalency between the traffickers and state, as only the violence 
from the state is infused with the claim to jurisdictional production. Talking of the 
drug traffickers as a response to the violence of the state, Taussig states that 
‘criminals become hardened by observing that they and the police use the same 
methods, except with the police, the methods are worse because the police excuse 
their actions in the name of justice.’122 The impetus to enforce law and order gives the 
limpieza its cleansing quality, with drug laws a key element in this network of 
violence. We see how the laws on drugs create the conditions for both the state to 
violently enforce that prohibition and for the traffickers, in response, to violently 
circumvent the law’s determinations. Only the violence of the law is rendered 
legitimate by post-war legal order’s attempt to manage violence across the globe. The 
violence of the traffickers is read as the deviant aberration of social order that causes 
the justified violence of the law but if we take seriously the question of causality, it 
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must be recognised that the escalating tactics of drug cartels and gangs are at least 
partly dependent on the laws they are trying to overcome. Drug cultivation, trade and 
usage existed for centuries without being an excessively violent practice prior to 
prohibition. The cleansing violence that Taussig describes, both the enforcement and 
evading of prohibition, can be read as rooted in the law. 
 
8.4.1 The Merida Initiative as Plan Mexico 
 
‘[Juarez] is not a breakdown of the social order. [Juarez] is the new order.’123 
Charles Bowden 
 
The failings of Plan Colombia did not precipitate a change of approach in 
international drug prohibition. As the epicentre of the drug war in Latin America has 
shifted from Colombia to Mexico, the Merida Initiative was established in 2008 to 
reinforce the United States’ financial and military support for drug prohibition 
enforcement to the Central American region.124 The similarities between the Merida 
Initiative and the earlier Plan Colombia are captured by the scheme often being 
described as ‘Plan Mexico’ by scholars and activists.125 Following in the manner of 
Plan Colombia, the Merida Initiative facilitated American provision of military 
weaponry, surveillance technology and inspection equipment, technical advice and 
training of law enforcement units to the Mexican government, all in service of an 
escalation of the drug war. Between 2008-2010 the U.S government spent $1.15 
billion in Mexico alone through the Merida Initiative with a further $275 million 
being spent in other key drug war fronts in Central America and the Caribbean such 
as the Dominican Republic and Haiti.126 The Merida Initiative provided much of the 
firepower that fuelled Mexican President Felipe Calderón’s government’s embrace of 
the War on Drugs during his six-year term (2006-2012). Yet, predictably, the 
consequences of ‘Plan Mexico’ have not been dissimilar to its Colombian 
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predecessor; evidence of its empirical failure is shown by how Mexico’s ‘overall 
homicide rate grew by over 260% from 2007 to 2010.’127 A particularly violent 
epicentre of the Mexican drug war has been Ciudad Juárez, where ‘the rate of killings 
per 100,000 inhabitants rose from 14.4 in 2007, to 75.2 in 2008, to 108.5 in 2009.’128 
This resulted in the 2009 murder rate in Juarez’s rate being ‘one of the highest in the 
world, far surpassing Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, and Medellin, Colombia.’129 Anabel 
Hernández captures the failings of the Plan Mexico by stating: 
 
Calderón’s time in office has left Mexico ablaze. There is only one 
victor in his so-called War on Drugs: Joaquín Loera Guzmán, El 
Chapo […] during Calderón’s six-year term, Guzmán became the 
most powerful drug trafficker in history, while his enemies were 
decimated. El Chapo’s empire is Calderón’s chief legacy.130  
 
In Jean Franco’s analysis of the pattern shared by extreme eruptions of violence 
across Latin America, she argues that the very construction of modernity is dependent 
upon the violent exclusion from the realm of subjectivity of those populations not 
considered to be human.131 Describing the current situation in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, 
as “Apocalypse Now,” Franco notes how the spectacular modes of violence across 
this city (and across Latin America as a whole) often target the already victimised 
subjectivities of women or indigenous communities.132 However, while in agreement 
with Franco’s insights, it is also important to read the escalation of the drug war in 
Mexico in the early 2000’s as the counter-side of a globalised market place of 
exchange, intertwined with neoliberalism and the rise of trade agreements like the 
North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). With NAFTA facilitating the 
erasure of the economic border between the U.S.A and Mexico for the service of free 
exchange of goods and services, the City of Juárez emerged as the principal site for 
Mexico’s export economy. This includes drugs where the biggest market for the trade 
remains the U.S.A., the same country driving the enforcement of prohibition. Deborah 
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Weissman explains that ‘geography is central to Cd. Juárez's standing as a location 
from which to understand the consequences of the maquila [factories run by U.S. 
company in Mexico] development strategies.’133 The proximity of Juárez to the 
American border aids the transformation of the city into a terrain of transience and 
contingency, a condition necessary for sacrifice. Juárez’s location opens it up to a 
gravitational pull from the U.S.A. that, over time, erodes the structures and 
institutions that would ground the city. Juárez becomes a city whose collective 
subjectivity is determined vis-à-vis its relationship with America as tens of thousands 
of migrants travel into the city annually.134 This transience and precariousness is 
invited by the economic imperative to create the necessary conditions for a successful 
free-trade zone along the border. However, the social structure in Juárez has suffered, 
with overall income levels falling sharply, whilst disparities in wealth have expanded, 
making the instability of inequality the norm.135 The expanding population means that 
unemployment in Juárez has only increased ‘even as maquilas have created jobs in the 
export zone.’136 The impact of neoliberalisation has been to transform the city into 
one that is sacrificial before the global legal and economic order. Prior to the 
neoliberalisation of the city in the 1990’s, ‘Ciudad Juárez was considered a 
reasonably safe place; it is now known as a social disaster and one of the most 
distressed urban areas in the Western Hemisphere.’137 The drug war is not merely a 
by-product of this process of neoliberalisation: it is an integral part of it. The cartels 
recruit from the same surplus of population produced by the maquila development 
strategy; acting as the counter-side of the globalised economy, the cartels supply of an 
in-demand commodity sparks an eruption of legitimised violence that is facilitated 
through and justified in international law.138   
 The same conditions that make Juárez a centre-point for free exchange of 
commodity goods across formal jurisdictional boundaries also make it a place in 
which illegal commodities can be smuggled along with legitimate ones, the profits 
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becoming indiscernible from each other upon entering the financial institutions. 
Juárez, as a point of connection between the drug producing countries of Latin 
America and the world’s largest drug consumption market of the U.S.A, becomes a 
focal point of drugs trade, a foreseeable development when considering the impact of 
NAFTA, as a surplus of illegal commerce often accompanies the desired legitimate 
trade. The potential wealth offered by the drugs trade combined with the insecurity of 
a transient population only amplifies the tension between the liberal economic 
imperative for global free trade and the ‘humanitarian’ legal imperative for global 
prohibition of drugs.139 Furthermore, the impact of NAFTA contributed to Mexico 
becoming not just a transit country for drugs but also a producer. Similarly to 
Colombia, the agricultural reforms demanded of Mexico by neoliberal economic 
dogma to dismantle protectionism, divided up communal lands under the premise of 
making them more competitive, leading to falling incomes and rising unemployment. 
Farmers turned to narcotics production to sustain an income; the move into a sector 
with greater potential profit returns.140 As a result, drugs became another product to 
be transported through Ciudad Juárez to satisfy the demand of the U.S.A., as that 
nation amplified the force of law against drugs as the illegitimate element of the 
desired global economic order.  
 
8.5 The War on Terror as the Juridical Inheritance of the Drug War 
 
Taking the historical narrative of this thesis up to the contemporary concerns 
of the international order, the War on Drugs can be read as to clearing the pathway for 
the War on Terror. The prevailing trend in critical legal scholarship has been to read 
many of the elements I have sought to illustrate as being at the roots of the drug war- 
from the debt to sacrifice, to the Vitorian influence upon American internationalism- 
as being key historical and theoretical strands that informed the War on Terror as it 
emerged at the start of the twenty-first century. However, this reading, while often 
insightful, overlooks the legislative ground that had been cleared for anti-terror 
legalism by the preceding War on Drugs. In terms of the rhetoric of militarisation of 
peace, the abstracted war on nouns, the construction of the universal in opposition to a 
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deviant contagion, the War on Terror inherited much from War on Drugs as an earlier 
example of an absolute, new war.  
When reading the critical legal scholarship on the War on Terror, the parallels 
with the sacrificial ordering of the War on Drugs as illustrated over the course of this 
thesis becomes striking. Peter Fitzpatrick, noting how the War on Terror spans an 
indefinite, universal scope whilst simultaneously casting its abstracted enemy as 
excluded from this universal, describes this war as taking the concept of ‘a human 
rights war to something like its ultimate extent. That is the espousal of human rights 
along with the values taken as sustaining them-values of civilisation, freedom and 
democracy – are operatively combined with their extension throughout the globe 
through the waging of war on those who are deemed opponents.’141 Echoing this 
focus on the War on Terror as executed in the name of a universal humanity, Costas 
Douzinas argues that the ‘continuous reference to humanitarianism, therefore, indicate 
that our recent wars are a return to the premodern idea of just war conducted 
according to the modern protocols of police action.’ 142  Recognising that 
‘humanitarian wars return us to… the ancient link between the sacred and the legal,’ 
Douzinas understands the necessity of the abstracted enemy of the War on Terror 
being pseudonymous as reflecting the imperative through constituting a universal 
humanity in opposition to it.143 Yet despite the many of the characteristics of the War 
on Terror identified above being previewed in the War on Drugs, critical legal 
scholars, including Fitzpatrick and Douzinas, overlook the continuity between the two 
‘new wars’, instead reading the War on Drugs as a metaphorical war where ‘military 
means are not supposed to assume predominance’144 I propose that the emphasis that 
the War on Drugs has placed on militarised enforcement of prohibition, such as Plan 
Colombia or Meridia initiative/Plan Mexico, offers significant challenge to the 
reading of the War on Drugs as not being a heavily militarised means. As a 
particularly telling instantiation of the synthesis of police and military power that 
emerged in the international arena over the later-half of the twentieth century, the 
drug war cannot be fittingly described as a merely a metaphorical use of the concept 
of war once we place a focus on the death, displacement and detention that has been 
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produced since prohibition.  
Critical scholarship on the War on Terror has ralso ead its juridical origin 
emerging through Vitoria, or more specifically the recovery of Vitoria that drove the 
emergence of American internationalism over the twentieth century. As emerging in 
parallel with this recovery, international drug prohibition appears to be a gap in the 
literature that could enrich critical readings of the later War on Terror. Anthony 
Anghie in particular draws a direct linage from the War on Terror, particularly the 
invasion of Iraq, to the U.S. occupation of the Philippines at the turn of the twentieth 
century.145 However, in this reading Anghie misses the importance of the U.S 
occupation of the Philippines for provoking international drug prohibition and leading 
to first international legal agreement on drugs at the 1909 Shanghai Opium 
Conference. Anghie credits Elihu Root, U.S Secretary of War and then Secretary of 
State, for laying the blueprint for the mode of American internationalism that 
continued to inform the humanitarian War on Terror in the twenty-first century.146 
However, he makes this argument without full appreciation of Root’s role in directing 
the earlier efforts of international drug prohibition by the likes of Bishop Brent and 
Hamilton Wright who, under Root and James Brown Scott’s State Department, laid 
the first legislative foundations on which the international War on Drugs would be 
built.  
Ultimately, the importance of the American internationalism of the turn of the 
twentieth century to the juridical basis of the ‘new’ wars is recognised not only by 
scholars but also within case law. In Boumediene v. Bush, Supreme Court Justices 
invoke the territorial precedents developed by the ‘Insular Cases’ to define the 
jurisdictional positionality of ‘enemy combatants’ in the War on Terror.147 The 
Insular Cases, engaged with earlier in this thesis as the historical parallel of the 
emerging drug prohibitionism of American internationalism, allowed the U.S.A. to 
rule its newly acquired protectorates such as the Philippines as ‘unincorporated 
territories’. As reviewed in Part B, the U.S.A. began to develop this 
inclusive/exclusive juridical personality for the peoples of the territories acquired in 
the aftermath of the 1898 Spanish-American War. In Boumedine v Bush, the US 
                                                
145 For Anghie’s reading of the War on Terror as rooted in Ehilu Root and the US occupation of the 
unincorporated territories, see Anthony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of 
International Law, Chapter 6: pp.273-309. 
146 Ibid.  
147 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
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Supreme Court explicitly drew on the inclusive/exclusive juridical personality 
developed in the Insular Cases to reject the denial of habeas corpus to enemy 
combatants held in Guantanamo Bay. The doctrine of unincorporated territories 
developed at the very origin of American internationalism was shown to still carry 
juridical purchase as Justice Kennedy, in delivering the opinion of the court, states 
that this ‘century-old doctrine informs our analysis in the present matter.’148 The 
decision in Boumedine v Bush, consolidated with the decision in Al Odah v. United 
States, allowed the US Supreme Court to temper the excesses of the Bush 
administration, foreclosing the possibility of placing the enemy combatants in the 
War on Terror beyond the law, both constitutional and international, in a legal black 
hole. However, as Charles R.Venator-Santiago makes clear, in Boumedine and the 
other Guantanamo Bay cases, while the Supreme Court was ‘willing to curtail the 
efforts of the Bush administration to claim “absolute and unlimited” powers, it was 
unwilling to declare the torture and detention camps altogether unconstitutional.’149 In 
alignment with the pattern of American internationalism, the detainees were caught in 
an inclusive/exclusion, being included within a legal order that continues to tolerate 
their indefinite detention. For Venator-Santiago, the juridical paradox offered to the 
Guantanamo detainees exemplified American imperialism, ‘a totalising system, while 
simultaneously appearing to promote the rule of law and democracy.’150 Further 
critical legal scholarship has also highlighted the paradoxical juridical position of 
‘enemy combatants’ in the War on Terror as being not excluded but held by the law in 
an indeterminate, infinitely delayed inclusion.151  This reading is only enriched 
through an appreciation of way in which the War on Drugs served as a precursory and 




This thesis began with the paradox of the drug war as posited against law’s 
claim to expel the ‘scourge of war.’ This chapter has reviewed how the post-war shift 
                                                
148 Boumedine v. Bush. 
149 Charles R. Venator-Santiago ‘Inverted Totalitarianism and the U.S. Territorial Doctrine’, in Revista 
de Pensamiento Jurídico 30, 3 (2012) 295-310., p.303. 
150 Ibid, p.306. 
151 See for example Stewart Motha, ‘Guantanamo Bay, Abandoned Being, and the Constitution of 
Jurisdiction’ in Jurisprudence of Jurisdiction, (2006) ed. by Shaun McVeigh (London: Routledge-
Cavendish, 2007) pp.63-84. 
	  261	  
to ‘new war’ was both shaped by and helped shape international law and its 
relationship to war. The question posited in the introduction of this thesis, of how the 
piling of bodies upon bodies produced through the drug war could work in 
conjunction with post-war international law’s ‘humanitarianism’, is responded to by 
this chapter’s study of how the new mode of warfare blurred the distinctions between 
police activity and military conflict. Moreover, the century between the birth of 
international drug prohibition and the mass incarceration, aerial fumigation and 
paramilitary killings of the War on Drugs, saw international law transition towards a 
liberal universalism. With international law, or its correlative universal humanity, 
being invoked in service of new war, the structure of war moves from rivalry to 
sacrificial as the international community as a whole is claimed to coalesce in order to 
expel its degenerate elements. From this perspective, the implications of the Vitorian 
recovery and its ‘careful elaboration of the relationship between humanitarianism, 
intervention, war, and transformation’ can be understood more clearly. 152 The War on 
Drugs escalated in parallel with the triumph of human rights as they became the 
default vocabulary through which international law expressed its claim for universal 
peace.153 Yet notions of legal order remained undisturbed by the law-making violence 
that emerged from drug prohibition. The silence of the discourses of international law 
or human rights in addressing the plight of the victims of drug war betrays their lives 
as ungrievable; sacrifices to be made in service of bringing an international 
community into being, through the casting out the ‘evil’ of drugs.  
A secondary concern in this chapter has been to draw the critical attention 
often focused on the War on Terror towards the drug war. The shared roots of the War 
on Drugs and the War on Terror are not merely a question of parallel juridical 
projects. Proper contextualisation recognises the pathway cleared by the former in 
order to bring the latter conflict into being.154 For instance, the measures introduced 
by the USA PATRIOT Act, 2001, including extending wiretapping capabilities and 
widening surveillance powers, were measures ‘recycled from earlier legislative efforts 
                                                
152 Anthony Anghie, ‘The War on Terror and Iraq in Historical Perspective’ in Osgoode Hall Law 
Journal 43, 1/2 (2005), pp.45-65, p.61. 
153 For an in-depth study of the rise on Human Rights from the 1970’s onwards see Samuel Moyn, The 
Last Utopia: Human Rights in History. 
154 See Christopher Ingraham, ‘The Shared Roots of the War on Drugs and the War on Terror, in One 
Chart’, Washington Post, April 14 2015, 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/04/14/the-­‐shared-­‐roots-­‐of-­‐the-­‐war-­‐on-­‐drugs-­‐and-­‐the-­‐war-­‐on-­‐terror-­‐in-­‐one-­‐chart/>	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that were said to be essential for the international War on Drugs.’155 Girard’s neglect 
the impact that decolonisation had upon the orientation of the international 
community, of the merger of police and military power exemplified by the drug war 
and of the asymmetry of violence being enacted through ‘new war’ results in a 
misreading of the War on Terror as the heralding of the end times, missing the 
continuances it carries from previous outbreaks of international violence. The 
bleeding of the War on Drugs into the War on Terror does give credence to Girard’s 
reading of the reference to the sacrificial mechanism as no longer being capable of 
producing order amongst the contemporary international.  
Therefore, a problem presents itself to international law: a problem of 
articulating a new concept of universalism, untied from a logic of totalisation and 
sacrifice.  
 
                                                
155 Michael McCahill, ‘Globalisation, surveillance, and the “war” on terror’, in Globalisation, 
Citizenship and the War on Terror, ed. by Maurice Mullard and Bankole Cole (Cheltenham: Edward 




‘If for centuries and centuries there has been coca consumption, 
how is it possible to end this with one agreement?’ 
Evo Morales, CND 2009 
 
Commencing with a review of the empirical failure of the War on Drugs to 
achieve its stated ambitions, with a specific focus placed on the bodies that have been 
lost in this failure, the central problematic addressed over the course of this thesis has 
been the question of how we can theoretically reconcile the rise of liberal 
international law over the twentieth century, particularly post-war international law’s 
claim to dispel the ‘scourge of war’, with the violence that has been produced through 
the War on Drugs. The correlative question also asked was that of how we explain the 
racial and geographic asymmetry in who has suffered through the drug war if we 
accept post-war, post-colonial international law’s stated turn towards universal 
humanism. This question carries significance in contributing to understandings of 
how violence remains operative in the discipline of law and, specifically, the sub-
discipline of international law. My efforts to answer this question has a required 
reading of the War on Drugs specifically as a problem of law, in contrast to a 
prevailing trend in scholarship on this topic which has largely either overlooked the 
failings of the drug war or located them within factors external to the law. I engaged 
with the drug war as a challenge to conventional understandings of international law. 
 I began my response to the problem of the violence of the drug war by 
positioning my reading against conventional understandings of law as constituted in 
opposition to violence, ‘law as the peaceful alternative to the chaos and fury of a 
fictive state of nature.’1 International law, perhaps even more explicitly than a 
domestic legal order deriving from a central sovereign authority, acclaims a 
spontaneous production of peace as the foundation for the order, as illustrated by the 
propensity for conventional theory of international law to read the founding event of 
modern international law to be the Peace of Westphalia of 1648.2 This historical 
narrative decouples international law from the colonial sphere of violence that 
produces and continues to sustain it. A reading of the social/material death caused by 
                                                
1 Austin Sarat and Thomas R. Kearns (eds), Law's Violence (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
1995) p.3. 
2 Jennifer Beard, ‘The International Law in Force: Anachronistic Ethics and Divine Violence’, 
published in Events: The Force of International Law, ed. by Fluer Johns, Richard Joyce & Sundhya 
Pahuja (Routledge, 2011). 
	  264	  
the drug war as produced through the law, not through the failings of any outside 
social factors but a betrayal of the law’s foundational opposition to violence, presents 
a paradox for the general architecture of international law, which, if its promise of 
constraining violence in the international order is placed alongside the simultaneous 
commitment to the war on drugs suggests a structure in which law seeks to free the 
international community from war, by war. Following the work of Benjamin and 
Cover on the law’s ultimate indebtedness to violence, my reading of the drug war 
took up the mantle of interrogating the wider problematic of constructing and 
sustaining law as an operative order through violence, through the development of a 
theory of what I have termed a ‘sacrificial’ international law. Adding to an 
understanding of ‘law’s violence’ by also drawing on traditions of scholarship that 
have read, firstly a persisting imperial structure within the universalism of liberal 
international law and secondly, a theological undercurrent to the acclaim secularity of 
modern law, I offered an image of international law operating as ‘sacrificial’, in order 
to show the empirical failure of drug laws, as detailed in the introduction, wasn’t a 
suggestion of law as simply inefficient, for law does not cease to possessing the 
content of law simply because it doesn’t achieve its aims. Neither was I claiming that 
law is merely paradoxical. Instead, through the concept of sacrifice, I have 
endeavoured to illustrate how universalism of international law as conceptualised 
over the twentieth century, sought to respond to the central problematic of 
international order-the maintenance of peace amongst sovereign rivals without a 
cohering central authority- by accepting legal violence upon populations positioned as 
both inside and outside the international community. The concept of sacrifice I 
employ borrows initially from René Girard’s conception of communal formation and 
sustainment through the violent sacrifice of an included/excluded scapegoat. 3 
However, in order to expand Girard’s concept, this notion of sacrifice takes the 
positionality of inclusion/exclusion that is essential for the sacrificial victim, and 
synthesises it with Frantz Fanon’s understanding of the colonial/racially subaltern 
subject as ‘Damned’ within a world in which they are constructed in negation, or as 
Fanon terms it, caught in the ‘zone of non-being’.4 Furthermore, I also drew on 
Michael Taussig’s recognition of the relationship between the demonisation of the 
                                                
3 Rene Girard, Violence and the Sacred, (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1977). 
4 Frantz Fanon, Black Skins, White Masks, (New York: Pluto Press, 2008), p.2. 
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colonial/racially subaltern subject and the fetishisation of mythic commodities. 
Exploring how this structure of trying to create order through a cleansing violence, a 
Limpieza as called in Colombia, functions in the heart of drug war, Taussig sees how 
drugs are discursively imbued with a transgressive (or transformative) power, which 
is to be contained by Limpieza. Tying these conceptual frameworks together, I offered 
an account of how illicit drugs, as the quintessential ‘transgressive substances’ of the 
twentieth century, function as a signifier for a symbolic notion of sub-humanity 
against which the communality of international law could be constituted. My critique, 
following Fitzpatrick amongst others, has been to argue that whenever a particular 
mode of humanity embarks upon an attempt at universalization and a fixing of itself 
as the idealised model, ‘there is an inexorable exclusion and sacrificing of others- of 
those who are other to that emplacement of universal freedom.’5 In terms of the drug 
war, the sacrifice has been borne by those who inhabit Fanon’s category of ‘the 
damned.’ While the racial and geographical asymmetry of the impact of drug 
prohibition is already well-established in the literature in drug policy studies, the 
theoretical significance of this asymmetry has been unexplored, with scholarship 
largely overlooking the insights of post-colonial, decolonial or critical race theorists 
in unpacking this problematic. In reading the drug war as a specifically legal 
phenomenon, as in a war produced through rather than against the workings of the 
law, I also sought to correct an absence across the field of drug policy studies to 
significantly engage with either the theoretical readings of legal violence or the 
wealth of scholarship that illustrates the intimate relationship between international 
law and empire. Mining the early issues of the American Journal of International Law 
for reports of early prohibitionists, as well as drawing on an as of yet underdeveloped 
connection between prohibitionists like Bishop Brent and the leading jurists of 
American international law like Dr James Brown Scott, I argued that drug prohibition 
in international law was born in the context of a historical shift in the mode of empire. 
Therefore, the question of empire and the change from the formal division between 
the civilised/colonised worlds to the expansive moral universalism of twentieth 
century international law lies at the heart of any examination the emergence of the 
drug war.  
                                                
5 Peter Fitzpatrick, ‘Enduring Right’, in Law After Ground, ed. by John Strawson (London: The 
Glasshouse Press, 2002), p.39. 
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 A further original contribution of this thesis has been to provide an 
intervention into the critical legal scholarship that is concerned with persisting 
imperial violence within the operation of contemporary international law, and to 
correct the general omission of the drug war from the examples cited as prime sites in 
which this theory can be illustrated. My argument emphasises how the War on Drugs 
is not a peripheral, idiosyncratic project of international law but instead betrays the 
core of liberal international law over the twentieth century. Moreover, alongside 
post/decolonial readings of international law sits another body of scholarship 
concerned with the significance of international law’s theological inheritance. Again, 
the literature has looked to the War on Terror or human rights to reveal the political 
theology of international law while overlooking the example of the drug war, despite 
this being an international legal project historically born of the Christian mission to 
save souls that continues to employ the language of theology in supposedly 
secularised legal instruments. Finally, the last intervention was to show how the War 
on Drugs fits within a shift in the nature of war over the course of the twentieth 
century. Tracing the transition from the state-against-state (or more accurately 
empire-against-empire) conflicts that devastated the first half of the century to the 
‘new wars’, where warfare is now executed in the name of a ‘universal humanity’ by 
the international community at large, re-reading the drug war as being not merely a 
metaphorical offers an early indication of this wider change occurring in international 
conflict.  
 
Review of The Progression Of Thesis 
 
 The arc of the thesis was structured into three parts. In Part A the theoretical 
and historical work required to develop the concept of a ‘sacrificial international’ was 
undertaken. Chapter One focused on unpacking the concept of drugs, showing how 
the very discursive ground on which drugs stood was interwoven with the legal 
prohibition of these transgressive substances and their association with the fear of the 
negation of humanity, taken as embodied in racially subaltern peoples. Following 
Derrida and Taussig, we can see how ‘Drugs’ are taken to act as a conduit towards the 
form of an imagined non-human. The chapter concluded by illustrating how this 
vision of drugs, as a internal contagion disturbing the communality of social ordering, 
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informs the legitimisation of the violence enacted in order to try and eradicate this 
contagion.  
Chapter Two identified the impossibility of international law to account for 
itself in positive terms and thereby refers to a cohering negation so as to constitute 
itself as an order. Citing the reading of international law developed by Anthony 
Anghie and TWAIL scholarship, this chapter advanced understandings of 
international law as indebted to European colonialism by illuminating the political-
theological dimensions of this process through a notion of a ‘sacrificial’ international 
law. I commenced with an interpretation of the Girardian theory of sacrifice to show 
how legitimised violence is deployed to contain, in both senses, any escalation of 
violence that threatens to engulf community. Crucial is the inclusion of the scapegoat 
into the community but in a condition of indefinite exclusion, thereby allowing the 
violence enacted to not take the form of a further act of aggression, but instead to be 
justified by the scapegoat’s own failure to realise the ideal form celebrated by the 
community into which it was invited. Drawing on Fanon to further the Girardian 
analysis, I read the sacrificial victim as therefore ‘damned’ by this misrecognition. 
The key insight of Chapter Two was to offer this notion of sacrifice as a model for 
reading the persistence of imperial violence after the end of formal colonialism, and 
its relation to international legal ordering over the course of the twentieth century. 
From this theoretical standpoint, I argued for a fresh lens that could reconcile the 
perpetual violence of the drug war with the simultaneous proclamations of peace and 
universal humanitarianism declared in the drug treaties.  
Chapter Three concerns the historical basis for a sacrificial international law, 
returning to the ‘origin’ of international law, taken by leading American lawyers of 
the turn of the twentieth century to be located in the sixteenth century Spanish-
Amerindian colonial encounter and the jurisprudence developed by Salamancan 
theologian Francisco de Vitoria. Engaging with Vitoria’s canonical lectures on the 
topic of Spanish-Amerindian relations, De Indis Noviter Inventis and De Jure Bellis 
Hispanorum in Barbaros, I illustrated how Vitoria’s juridical schema contained not 
only the construction of what Anthony Anghie describes as a ‘dynamic of difference’ 
within its bold claim to a universal humanity but also highlighting that the inclusion 
of the colonial subject into a universal notion of humanity was a prefix for a 
legitimised violence to be enacted if that violence is to do the cathartic work of the 
‘sacrifice.’ The interior/exterior positionality that is occupied by the scapegoat in 
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order to exorcise intra-communal violence maps onto the legal personality produced 
by Vitoria for the colonised.  
Part B offered an innovative reading together of the birth of drug prohibition 
alongside early American international law. Chapter Four extended the significance 
of the earlier reading of Vitorian jurisprudence by showing the influence that 
Salamancan thought had upon international law as it would emerge as a discipline in 
the U.S.A, most notably through Dr. James Brown Scott. I analysed how Scott 
recovered Vitoria to serve as the key theoretical antecedent for the U.S.A to follow in 
its own ‘turn’ towards internationalism. Alongside mentor Elihu Root, Scott 
influenced the form that American international law would take. Stressing the 
significance of the Vitorian recovery, I traced how Vitoria’s juridical-theology that 
informed Scott's appeal for ‘a single standard of morality’ in international law.  
Chapter Five detailed the emergence of drug prohibition as a concern for 
American internationalists following the acquisition of the Philippines in the 1898 
Spanish-American War. Under the tenure of Root and Scott at the State Department, 
religious missionaries such as Bishop Charles Henry Brent and Wilbur Crafts gained 
significant mileage in their campaign to establish drug prohibition as international 
law. Moreover, I also emphasised how explicit racialised fears of drugs as a conduit 
towards a denigrated form of humanity informed the prohibition of what drug policy 
scholars call ‘the big three’- opium, cocaine and marijuana- within America, before 
illustrating how those same fears were internationalised with the first opium treaties. 
Re-reading the ideas of race held by key prohibitionists like Brent and Hamilton 
Wright, I argued that the concurrency of the rise of Scott’s investment in the 
‘oneness’ of international law with the success that drug prohibitionists would find 
through under his tenure at State Department was not coincidental but theoretically 
coherent.  
Chapter Six chronicled the creation of multiple drug control treaties over the 
interwar period alongside the shift towards institutionalisation in international law. I 
showed how the First World War provoked a crisis within the positivist assumptions 
of a fixed ‘balance of power’ as international law failed to restrain contagious 
violence breaking out amongst the European empires. I connect the shifts in the 
organisation of the international legal order and the greater concern of the questions 
of communality following war with America’s entry onto the international stage, 
detailed in the previous chapter, and a correlative, nascent universalist jurisprudence. 
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This turn was shown to inform the establishment of the League of Nations, despite 
America’s ultimate abandonment of this project. Chapter Six also highlighted the 
importance of the League as a forum for facilitating the early shifts away from formal 
colonialism through the Mandate System, reading the Mandate System and the 
transition away from a formal colonial legal order as the central contribution of the 
League, rather than a peripheral afterthought. In a further example of a changing 
international legal order, I also detailed how the League became the institutional 
setting in which prohibitionists would successfully fix drug prohibition- not only 
opium but now targeting a wider set of ‘transgressive substances’- as a norm in 
international law. However, the final chapter of Part B also took lengths to emphasise 
the stunted nature of the universalism achieved by both drug prohibition and 
international law more widely in the interwar period. Through a review and then 
critique of the drug prohibition treaties produced through the League, I illustrated how 
the failure of universality limited the practical effectiveness of the drug treaties agreed 
through the League, thereby emphasising the significant role the re-investment in 
universalism and communality after the Second World War would play in providing 
the context for the ultimate realisation of a War on Drugs.  
In Part C, I examined the establishment of the contemporary international 
drug laws, connecting the early prohibitionists with what we now commonly term the 
War on Drugs. Chapter Seven reviews the theoretical presuppositions that 
underpinned the establishment of the United Nations and the successful reinvestment 
in the institutional communality of international law following the Second World 
War. The importance of the U.S.A superseding the declining Europeans empires as 
the hegemonic actor in international law was stressed as both producing and being 
produced by the holistic, post-colonial conception of international legal order. The 
American influence shifted the theoretical grounding for international law towards a 
universalist humanitarianism, reflected in the U.N Charter and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. My reading of the Single Convention alongside these 
other major post-war international agreements was undertaken so as to illuminate the 
importance of the concept of universal humanity to drug prohibition. In dialogue with 
scholarship in the field of drug policy, I also offered this theoretical perspective as a 
corrective to the literature that has emphasised the tensions between human rights and 
drug prohibition; I argued instead that a shared conception of the order of the 
international allows the drug treaties to complement rather than strictly contradict the 
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humanitarianism of the post-colonial era. Moreover, a close-reading of the Preamble 
of the Single Convention was performed in order to highlight the continuing presence 
of theodicy within the legal order presumed to be fully secularised. Recalling the 
insights of Fanon, I read the reference to ‘evil’ within the preamble of the Single 
Convention not as a curious discontinuity, but as a recognition of the figure of 
negation against which the drug war was always already being waged. The ‘evil’ of 
‘universal mankind’ as cited in the preamble can be understood as the sub-human 
residing in the ‘zone of non-being’ as Fanon described the experience of the racial 
subaltern in modernity, an echo of the Augustine canonical account of the theological 
problem of evil. What is ‘evil’ about drugs, I argue, is not the inanimate objects 
themselves but the subjectivity that they are feared to engender; the subjectivity of 
these people which is being demonised.  
Chapter Eight dealt with the War on Drugs as it was fully realised in the final 
quarter of the twentieth century, showing how the ‘sacrificial’ structuring of drug 
prohibition allowed for the victims produced through the enforcement of the 
legislation reviewed in earlier chapters- victims largely derived from the racial and 
geographical subaltern populations- to be rendered legitimate within the order of 
international law. By reading the War on Drugs as a primary example of what 
scholars have termed ‘New War’, I explore how the drug war operated through a 
‘sacrificial’ universalism that superseded traditional sovereign state conflict. Placing 
the drug war in conversation with scholarship undertaken on other examples of ‘New 
War’, particularly the later War on Terror, Chapter Eight argued that the drug war 
should be understood as an early instantiation of war waged in the service of an 
acclaimed universal humanity. My reading of the Drug War allows the concept of 
‘New War’ to gain a longer history than merely the post-war, post-colonial 
investment in juridical universalism. While being largely devoid of theological 
proclamations and explicitly racist declarations of the early drug prohibitionist at the 
start of the century, the late twentieth century War on Drugs, I argue, is not best 
understood as merely a technocratic and ideologically neutral international legal 
project, but instead one that aimed to facilitate the cohering of disparate international 
into an operative whole through the opposition to a negation.  
In an attempt to further the theoretical depth applied to this problem in drug 
policy scholarship, my contribution in this thesis has been to attempt to reconcile the 
apparent paradox between the stated commitment to peace, humanitarianism and 
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universalism of the post-war, post-colonial international legal order and the 
asymmetrically violent drug war. This thesis has offered the notion of ‘sacrifice’ as a 
conceptual lens to unpack how the ‘ungrieveable’ victims of the drug war did not 
contradict, but were rather structured so as to help produce a communal international 
through their inclusive/exclusion. This theoretical perspective provides scholars of 
both international law and drug policy with a tool through which to understand a key 
question posed at the introduction to this thesis: how has international drug 
prohibition persisted despite the violence it has invoked and its empirical failure to 
reduce the consumption and trade of drugs? Moreover, in terms of the wider 
relevance of this argument, this thesis comes at a crucial time as reformists seek to 
dismantle the legislative architecture that produced the War on Drugs and begin to 
obtain early victories in this endeavour. In order to ensure that it is the violent, 
racially and geographically asymmetrical consequences of the drug war that are 
challenged and not just the laws themselves, it is important for activists to have a full 
theoretical understanding of the tacit assumptions and unarticulated presuppositions 
about international legal ordering, ideal human subjectivity and imperial continuities. 
As stated in the introduction, the ideas of the early twentieth century drug 
prohibitionists continue to inform the assumptions that underpin contemporary 
international laws on drugs and to a certain extent, even the terms in which drug law 
reform is being advocated for. Those presumptions must be unpacked along with the 
laws themselves. Without the work of this deep theoretical mining, much like 
Michelle Alexander has warned regarding policy-focused attempts to reform the 
drugs laws in the American domestic context, the violence of the drug war at the 
international level may not disappear with end of the drug war but instead be 
transferred into a new vehicle for legalised, racialised violence.  
 
Towards Ending the Drug War 
 
 
‘Let us then do away with this law which the history of conventions  
and of ethical norms has so deeply inscribed in the concept of ‘drugs’.’ 
Jacques Derrida 6 
 
 
As stated in the introduction, the philosophical notion of ‘sacrifice’ I have 
                                                
6 Jacques Derrida, ‘The Rhetoric of Drugs: An Interview’, 5 Differences: A Journal of Feminist 
Cultural Studies 5, 1 (1993), pp.1-25. 
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advanced in this thesis is reliant on the construction of sacrificial victims as not 
victims but legitimate targets, or at the least a necessary cost in the production of 
order. However, the early twenty-first century has been marked by a growing 
recognition of the innocence of many of those who have been killed, imprisoned or 
displaced by the War on Drugs. Voices from the Latin American region have, 
understandably, been amongst the loudest calling for reform of the international laws 
on drugs. The Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy report in 2009 
declared the War on Drugs a failure. Moreover, in 2012, the presidents of Colombia, 
Guatemala and Mexico issued a formal statement calling for a review of all drug 
policies, and in 2013 the Organisation of American States published the first ever 
inter-governmental report entertaining the possibility of future legal regulation of 
drugs. This trend reached its apotheosis in December 2013 when Uruguay became the 
first nation-sate since the implementation of the Single Convention to legislate for the 
legal production, distribution and possession of cannabis.  
A symbolic moment in the shift away from the drug war came in March 2009, 
at the 52nd session of the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND). 
Bolivian President Evo Morales travelled to Vienna to petition for the removal of the 
raw coca leaf from schedule 1 of the drugs that are prohibited by the Single 
Convention. In the midst of his speech calling for support for Bolivia’s initiative, 
Morales pulled out a coca leaf. Holding it up for the audience to verify, he then placed 
the prohibited substance into his mouth. He continued with this speech while chewing 
the coca leaf, critiquing “the socio-cultural projections” that resulted in the 
suppression of the chewing of coca in international law. Placing the blame firmly at 
the door of the law, Morales condemned the Single Convention as ‘an attack on the 
rights of indigenous peoples”. He also decried the drug treaty for contradicting the 
new Bolivian constitution, which enshrined that ‘the State protects the native and 
ancestral coca as cultural patrimony, as a renewable natural resource of the 
biodiversity of Bolivia, and as a factor of social unity.’7 Furthermore, Morales 
declared that United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime Executive Director Antonio 
Maria Costa, seated in the audience, should, by law, take him to jail for what he is 
doing in an attempt to render visible the violent absurdity of the drug laws. “I am a 
producer of the coca leaf,” he cried out “I am a consumer of the coca leaf. The coca 
                                                
7 Article 384, Constitution of Bolivia, 
<https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Bolivia_2009.pdf> [accessed 9 March 2017]  
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leaf represents the culture of the people of the Andean region.”8  
Following the failure to win support in 2009, Evo Morales’ Bolivia exerted 
further pressure on the international community by withdrawing from the Single 
Convention in 2011 and only re-adhering to it once a new reservation allowing for the 
traditional uses of the coca leaf was implemented in 2013. Bolivia’s ability to 
unilaterally withdraw from the convention and then re-enter as a party on its own 
terms. I would argue that Evo Morales, not only intervened at the CND as a head of 
state but he also embraced the subject position of the racial subaltern subject. As the 
first indigenous Amerindian President of his country Evo Morales has been read as a 
global/historical political figure that cannot be comprehended outside of a 
consideration of ‘raciality and indigeneity’ and the significance of his election has 
been taken to form a challenge to the persistent coloniality of world ordering.9 For 
Denise Ferreira de Silva, Morales functions as ‘an indigenous, racial, 
peasant…[who]…refigures past and present deployments of physical and symbolic 
violence that now configure the globe as a political space. That is, he exemplifies the 
radical political subject and the global subaltern (indigenous/racial) entity, which have 
been assembled by the threads of previous global/historical (colonial, national) 
moments.’10 Following the argument I have laid out over the course of this thesis, a 
reading of the War on Drugs as indebted to the sacrifice of the negated sub-human as 
embodied by the racial subaltern subject, Morales’ performance carries weight as a 
return of the Amerindian, the victim of Vitoria’s inclusive/exclusion at the very birth 
of international law, back into the realm of the universal on its own terms. The 
twenty-first century intervention of an Amerindian president at the CND challenged 
not only the Single Convention but also the geo-temporality presumed within 
international law. For Morales to interject his raciality and Amerindian indigeneity 
into the domain of universal, is to challenge the stunted universalism that has been 
acclaimed by a ‘sacrificial’ international law. As Oscar Guardiola-Rivera tells us: 
 
Following Evo’s election, indigenous and peasant memory and 
knowledge has become a political force to be reckoned with, regionally 
and worldwide. It is as if, five hundred years after the genocide that took 
                                                
8 See Evo Morales (2009), Speech at the CND, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FzuL5vHLMPA> 
and <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ilz6WzdaP14> [accessed 9 March 2017]. 
9See Denise Ferreira da Silva, ‘An Outline of a Global Political Subject: Reading Evo Morales's 
Election as a (Post-) Colonial Event’, Seattle Journal for Social Justice, 8, 1 (2009), pp.25-49. 
10 Denise Ferreira da Silva, p.38. 
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place in the Americas, we have all been given a second chance. Perhaps 
now, when the Indians of the Andes and the Amazon speak, we will 
listen.11 
 
Michelle Alexander has illustrated how the laws on drugs are linked to a 
lineage of racialised, legal violence in America and that to address the issue of this 
violence, changes would be required of not only the drug laws but also the given 
order of the U.S.A as a whole. The same is applicable to the international community. 
Despite an acclaimed equality amongst all peoples as its foundation, international law 
in the twentieth century anchored a universalising notion of humanity on assuming a 
conceptualised sub-human as its enemy. With sub-humanity still encapsulating ideas 
regarding race and geography, even in this post-colonial world, the bodies of 
particular peoples continue to signify this enemy. Therefore, the potential for drug 
prohibition, as a legal project directed against the ‘evil’ of sub-humanity, to impact 
asymmetrically upon the bodies of racial subaltern subjects was always already 
present within the laws themselves. However, as argued in Chapter Eight, this 
structure of international law is disintegrating, with international drug prohibition 
disintegrating along with it. If drug policy reform aims to ensure that the current 
violence of the drug war is not repeated in a new form, it will require not only a 
change in law but also a wider reconfiguration of the relation between international 
law’s use of violence and the people who are subjects of that violence. This would be 
the starting point towards developing any non-sacrificial international law.  
 
                                                
11 Oscar Guardiola-Rivera, What If Latin America Ruled the World? How The South Will Take The 
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